United States v. Jamal Rudolph

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4545
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMAL WALIEK RUDOLPH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00147-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 13, 2014 Decided: March 26, 2014
Before AGEE, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamal Waliek Rudolph pleaded guilty to possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). The district court sentenced Rudolph to 180 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Rudolph challenges the district court’s
finding that he qualified for enhanced penalties under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
Rudolph argues that the court erred in enhancing the statutory
maximum and mandatory minimum based on his prior convictions
because they were not pleaded in the indictment, violating his
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We conclude that
the district court did not err in determining that Rudolph was
an armed career criminal. In addition, Rudolph had actual
notice of the possibility of the application of increased
penalties under the ACCA prior to pleading guilty.
In Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.
2151 (2013), the Supreme Court determined that facts that
increase a statutory minimum, like those that increase a
statutory maximum, must be pleaded in the indictment and either
admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 2159-64. The Court was careful to note, however,
that the narrow exception to the general rule for the fact of a
prior conviction, as recognized in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.
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224 (1998), was “not revisit[ed]” in Alleyne. 133 S. Ct. at
2160 n.1. Therefore, Alleyne did not disturb that exception and
does not require that prior convictions must be pleaded in the
indictment. See United States v. McDowell, __ F.3d __, slip op.
at *16-19 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014) (No. 13-4370); United States
v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2013); see also United
States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 283-87 (4th Cir. 2005) (a
district court may, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, find
the fact of a prior conviction for purposes of the ACCA,
including whether conviction qualified as a violent felony and
when the conduct underlying the conviction took place).
Rudolph also argues that the district court improperly
placed on him the burden of demonstrating that one of his prior
convictions was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
However, Rudolph’s argument is foreclosed by binding Circuit
precedent. See United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 316 (4th
Cir. 2005). As one panel of this court may not overrule another
panel, see Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271
n.2 (4th Cir. 2002), Rudolph’s argument must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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