United States v. Moore

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4483
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SEAN MOORE, a/k/a Carles Tyson Moore,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (CR-03-262)
Submitted: October 29, 2004 Decided: November 17, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Monica L. Dillon,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Sean Moore, a federal prisoner, was indicted on one count
of possession of marijuana by a prison inmate, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2000). Moore moved to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds that his detention in administrative segregation for
five and a half months prior to his indictment violated his due
process and speedy trial rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. The district court denied the motion. Following a
bench trial, the district court found Moore guilty and sentenced
him to four months in prison to run consecutively to his
undischarged sentence. Moore appealed, asserting that the district
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Finding no merit to his claims, we affirm.
Regarding Moore’s Fifth Amendment claim, a defendant “may
invoke due process to challenge delay both before and after
official accusation.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655
n.2 (1992). To determine whether preindictment delay violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we examine: (1) whether
the defendant can show that he has suffered any actual substantial
prejudice; and (2) if so, whether the reasons for the delay justify
the prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1985); see Jones v.
Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendant’s
burden is a heavy one). Because Moore failed to demonstrate any
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actual prejudice in this case, we conclude that he failed to
establish a due process violation.
Turning to Moore’s Sixth Amendment claim, he argues that
his placement in administrative segregation deprived him of his
right to a speedy trial. However, “[t]he speedy trial right does
not apply to . . . preindictment delay because that right does not
attach until the defendant has been arrested or indicted.” Jones,
94 F.3d at 906 n.6. Confinement in administrative segregation is
not equivalent to an arrest or accusation for Sixth Amendment
purposes. See United States v. Daniels, 698 F.2d 221, 223 (4th
Cir. 1983). Therefore, Moore’s placement in administrative
segregation did not trigger his right to a speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm Moore’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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