Ronald Emrit v. Bank of America

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2253
RONALD SATISH EMRIT,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:13-cv-00547-RJC-DSC)
Submitted: February 24, 2014 Decided: April 17, 2014
Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se. Renner Jo St. John,
ROGERS, TOWNSEND & THOMAS, PC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court order
denying him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and
dismissing his complaint without prejudice to his ability to
refile upon payment of the fee. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012), a non-prisoner litigant may qualify
for IFP status after submitting an affidavit listing all assets
and anticipated expenses and substantiating his inability to
pay. When a non-prisoner litigant is granted IFP status, he is
excused from prepayment of filing fees. DeBlasio v. Gilmore,
315 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2003). A district court has
discretion to grant or deny IFP status and must base its
decision on “‘the poverty and good faith of the applicant and
the meritorious character of the cause.’” Dillard v. Liberty
Loan Corp., 626 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Kinney v.
Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915)). The PLRA
provides that, notwithstanding any portion of the filing fee
paid by the plaintiff, the district court “shall dismiss” a case
brought IFP if it determines “the allegation of poverty is
untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) (2012).
An order denying IFP status is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.
2
2007). We discern no such abuse of discretion by the district
court. The court conducted a detailed review of Emrit’s
finances and filing history, observing that Emrit had enjoyed a
substantially higher income for the previous twelve months; that
he had asserted in another case, just two months prior, that he
had $10,000 in a checking account; that another district court
had recently found Emrit able to pay the filing fee; and that
Emrit’s living expenses were exorbitant. Based on these
findings, the court was amply justified in concluding that
Emrit’s allegation of poverty was untrue. That conclusion, in
turn, required dismissal of Emrit’s action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(A); Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288
F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because the allegation of
poverty was false, the suit had to be dismissed; the judge had
no choice.”); see also Michau v. Charleston Cnty., S.C., 434
F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that when requirements of
§ 1915(e)(2) are not satisfied, district court “must dismiss”
action).
We have reviewed Emrit’s remaining assertions and
conclude that they entitle him to no relief. Nor do we find any
evidence of judicial bias. See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d
501, 530 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing required showing for
judicial bias claim, and recognizing that “judicial rulings
3
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed IFP on appeal
and affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4