United States v. John Battle

USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4768
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN DEVERE BATTLE, a/k/a Gotti,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:17-cr-00111-H-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2023 Decided: July 25, 2023
Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Noah Lerman, Criminal Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Michael F. Easley, Jr., United
States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Appellate Chief, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
John Devere Battle appeals his convictions imposed following a jury trial on charges
of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; two courts
of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951; four counts
of aiding and abetting brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c); aiding and abetting carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 2119; aiding and abetting bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113; and two
counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Following his convictions, the district court sentenced Battle to 1,276
months’ imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm Battle’s convictions but
vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
On appeal, Battle first argues that the district court abused its discretion and violated
his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause when it restricted him from
asking two cooperating codefendants about the specific sentences they avoided or hoped
to receive in exchange for their cooperation and about their anticipated Sentencing
Guidelines ranges. We disagree.
“[A] defendant’s right to cross-examine cooperating witnesses about sources of
potential bias is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution.” United
States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 358-59 (4th Cir. 1997). “We review for abuse of discretion
a trial court’s limitations on a defendant’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness.”
United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d. 487, 500 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A district court abuses its discretion by basing its decision on clearly erroneous
2
USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 3 of 6
findings of fact or by misapprehending the law. United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452,
458 (4th Cir. 2014). However, a district court has wide latitude in imposing limits on the
cross-examination of a witness, and may impose such limits to avoid harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, repetition, or marginal relevance. Id. at 459.
“[T]he exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). And “[a] witness’[] understanding of the potential penalties faced
prior to entering into a plea agreement may demonstrate bias and prejudice, as well as the
motive of the witness for testifying against the defendant and for the prosecution.” United
States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 1999). But while a defendant may ask a
cooperating witness whether he hopes to receive some benefit in exchange for his
testimony, a district court may generally prohibit the defendant from asking questions
about the “specific penalties” the witness avoided by pleading guilty, as well as questions
about the “mechanics of the Guidelines” or specific Guidelines ranges. Cropp, 127 F.3d
at 358-359; see United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the “district court did not err in refusing to allow Scheetz’s counsel to ask questions
concerning Sentencing Guidelines ranges”). Here, the district court did not prevent Battle
from asking the cooperating codefendants whether they expected to receive some benefit
in exchange for their testimony, instead ruling only that Battle could not ask about specific
sentences or delve into the mechanics of the Sentencing Guidelines. We therefore find that
the district court did not violate Battle’s right under the Confrontation Clause or otherwise
abuse its discretion.
3
USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 4 of 6
Battle next argues that the district court should have granted his motion for judgment
of acquittal on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge arising from his participation in the June 15,
2016, robbery of a Quality Mart convenience store. Battle argues that there was
insufficient evidence to show he aided and abetted the brandishing of a firearm during the
robbery because there was no evidence showing he had advance knowledge his
accomplices would be armed.
“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United
States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018). In assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction
when viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Id. “Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support
a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Soriano, 931 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In making this
determination, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate witness credibility.
Savage, 885 F.3d at 219. “A defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy
burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where
the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To prove aiding and abetting under § 924(c), the [g]overnment must show ‘that the
defendant actively participated in the underlying . . . violent crime with advance knowledge
that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.’” United
States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 237 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rosemond v. United States,
572 U.S. 65, 67 (2014)). Advance knowledge can be proven through circumstantial
4
USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 5 of 6
evidence. Benson, 957 F.3d at 238. The government sufficiently demonstrates advance
knowledge when “there is evidence that a defendant extensively participated in the
planning of a robbery of the type that would generally necessitate the use of firearms.” Id.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Government provided substantial
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Battle had advance knowledge that his
accomplices would use a gun during the Quality Mart robbery. We therefore find that the
district court did not err by denying Battle’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we
affirm Battle’s convictions. *
Finally, Battle argues—and the Government concedes—that the district court erred
by failing to orally pronounce two of the conditions of supervised release listed in the
written judgment. In United States v. Rogers, we held that a district court must pronounce,
either expressly or “through incorporation,” all discretionary conditions of supervised
release at the sentencing hearing. 961 F.3d 291, 296-99 (4th Cir. 2020). Discretionary
conditions of supervised release that appear for the first time in a written judgment are
nullities; a defendant has not been sentenced to these conditions, warranting vacatur and a
remand for resentencing. United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344, 346 n.4 (4th Cir.
*
Battle also challenges two of his other § 924(c) convictions on double jeopardy
grounds. He argues that these the two charges violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because
the evidence shows the charges arose from a single criminal episode. As Battle concedes,
however, his argument is foreclosed by our precedent, see United States v. Jordan, 952
F.3d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 493-94 (4th
Cir. 2006); and we will not overrule a decision issued by another panel of this court, see
Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2021).
5
USCA4 Appeal: 18-4768 Doc: 56 Filed: 07/25/2023 Pg: 6 of 6
2021) (citing Rogers, 961 F.3d at 295, 300-01). We review de novo the consistency of a
defendant’s oral sentence with the written judgment. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296.
In the written judgment, the district court ordered that: (1) Battle shall not incur new
credit charges or open additional lines of credit without approval of the probation officer;
and (2) Battle shall provide the probation office with access to any requested financial
information.” But the district court did not mention either of these at the sentencing
hearing. We therefore vacate Battle’s sentence and remand for resentencing. See
Singletary, 984 F.3d at 346 n.4. In light of our holding, we do not address Battle’s
remaining challenges to his sentence and the discretionary conditions of supervised release
at this time. See id. at 346-47.
Accordingly, we affirm Battle’s convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conditions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
6