United States v. Dana Stevenson

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4286
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANA JAHMAL STEVENSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:21-cr-00161-1)
Submitted: June 22, 2023 Decided: July 26, 2023
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Nowles H.
Heinrich, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Dana Jahmal Stevenson pled guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to being
a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2018), * and possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Stevenson to 105 months’ imprisonment, at the
high-end of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Stevenson contends that
the district court erred in counting his prior 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) conviction as a
“controlled substance offense,” see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
(2021), and in failing to address one of his arguments for a lesser sentence. Finding no
error, we affirm.
In considering Guidelines challenges, we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Dennings, 922
F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2019). The district court applied an enhanced base offense level
after finding that Stevenson’s prior § 841(a)(1) conviction qualified as a “controlled
substance offense.” See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) & cmt. n.1. A “controlled substance
offense” is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or
*
Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Stevenson
committed his offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.
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dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . .
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG § 4B1.2(b).
While this appeal was pending, we held that a 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) conviction qualifies
as a “controlled substance offense.” See United States v. Groves, 65 F.4th 166, 174 (4th
Cir. 2023). Thus, the district court correctly applied USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
Turning to Stevenson’s other argument, in evaluating a sentencing court’s
explanation of a selected sentence, we have consistently held that, although a court must
consider the statutory factors and explain the sentence, “it need not robotically tick through
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Regardless of whether the district court
imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an
individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.” United States
v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
sentencing judge must explain each sentence that [he] imposes by addressing all non-
frivolous mitigation arguments raised by the defendant.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d
480, 485 (4th Cir. 2018). “The sentencing court’s explanation need not be extensive, but
the record must make clear that the judge actually listened to, considered, and rendered a
decision on these arguments such that [we] can conduct a meaningful review of the
sentence imposed.” Id. Although it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s
rationale from the context surrounding its decision, we will not “guess at the district court’s
rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for
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any other clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 521
(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court adequately addressed Stevenson’s argument concerning his fear
motivating his offense conduct. The court explicitly noted the argument, but immediately
rejected it by underscoring that his offense conduct involved shooting at another individual.
It then implored the probation officer to work with the Bureau of Prisons to ensure
Stevenson would not suffer another attack while in custody. And, at the end of the hearing,
the court returned to this argument when it personally addressed Stevenson. Moreover, the
court did exactly what Stevenson asked regarding his other arguments—recommending
medical and substance abuse treatment while Stevenson was incarcerated.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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