United States v. Hakim Rashid

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4428
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HAKIM ABDULAH RASHID, a/k/a Rodney Buchanan,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00941-RBH-1)
Submitted: July 22, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua S. Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Hakim Abdulah Rashid appeals from his sentence of 262
month’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Rashid argues
that the district court erred in several respects when
determining his sentence. We disagree and affirm.
First, Rashid argues that the district court erred in
determining drug quantity and in imposing enhancements for
possession of a firearm and a leadership role in the offense.
Rashid contends that the evidence supporting the district
court’s findings of fact did not bear the requisite indicia of
reliability because the evidence was comprised primarily of
hearsay statements from cooperating witnesses, each of whom
Rashid claims had an incentive to exaggerate the extent of his
criminal conduct. We conclude, however, that Rashid’s blanket
assertion fails to show an abuse of discretion or clear error.
See United States v. Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2010)
(when assessing a challenge to the district court’s application
of the Guidelines, factual findings are reviewed for clear
error); United States v. Rhynes, 206 F.3d 349, 383 (4th Cir.
1999) (district court’s determination that evidence is reliable
enough to be relied on at sentencing is reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
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A district court must find facts relevant to
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and may accomplish
this task by referencing a wide variety of informational
sources. Perez, 609 F.3d at 614; see United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (during sentencing, “a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider,
or the source from which it may come”). The sentencing court’s
inquiry is not subject to the rules of evidence and, instead, is
constrained only by the Guidelines and due process, which both
require that evidence considered at sentencing exhibit a
“sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.”
United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006);
see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3, cmt. (2010).
In applying this standard, we have authorized district
courts to consider uncorroborated hearsay when making factual
findings at sentencing, so long as the hearsay evidence is
appropriately reliable. See, e.g., Perez, 609 F.3d at 618 n.4.
Although such evidence must go beyond wholly unsupported
allegations, the evidence must only bear “some minimal indicia
of reliability” to satisfy due process. Rhynes, 206 F.3d at
383. Accordingly, contrary to Rashid’s suggestion, the mere
fact that information originated from an individual who may have
had a motive to lie or embellish the truth does not
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automatically render that information uniquely suspect or
otherwise incompetent for sentencing purposes. United States v.
Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (defendants have an
“affirmative duty to make a showing that the information in the
presentence report is unreliable, and articulate the reasons why
the facts contained therein are untrue or inaccurate.”).
During Rashid’s sentencing hearing, the district court
appropriately ensured that the information on which the court
ultimately relied was sufficiently dependable and accurate.
Rashid has produced no authority suggesting that it was error
for the district court to accomplish this task through the
testimony of a law enforcement officer who was extensively
involved in investigating Rashid and his coconspirators. See
United States v. Pratt, 553 F.3d 1165, 1170-71 (8th Cir. 2009)
(at sentencing, district court did not err in relying on hearsay
statements of defendant’s coconspirators as related through law
enforcement officer where such statements were generally
consistent with each other and other evidence). Rashid offered
no evidence to contradict the information contained in his
presentence report or otherwise support his contention that the
information was unreliable. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court’s reliability determinations and findings of fact
when sentencing Rashid are not tainted by an abuse of discretion
or error, clear or otherwise.
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Nor do we find error in the district court’s refusal
to grant Rashid a reduction in offense level for acceptance of
responsibility. As the district court explained, Rashid’s
extensive objections to the presentence report amounted to a
denial of a majority of the conduct Rashid admitted in
connection with his guilty plea. Accordingly, Rashid’s claim
that the district court penalized him for making good-faith
objections to his presentence report rings hollow. See United
States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 463 (4th Cir. 2011).
Because we also find that Rashid’s below Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable, we affirm Rashid’s
sentence. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir.
2012). We deny Rashid’s pro se motions to supplement his
counsel’s reply brief and for the preparation of a transcript at
the Government’s expense. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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