Hillman v. Jenkins

Case: 18-51041 Document: 00515826179 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/19/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 19, 2021
No. 18-51041 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Danny A. Hillman,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Stuart Jenkins; Michelle Hillman; David G. Gutierrez;
Bryan Collier; Director Brad Livingston; Parnell
McNamara,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:18-CV-310
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Danny A. Hillman, Texas prisoner # 647683, appeals the district
court’s dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint challenging the defendants’ alleged unconstitutional and
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 18-51041 Document: 00515826179 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/19/2021
No. 18-51041
illegal conduct during his parole supervision and at his parole revocation
hearing. The district court determined, inter alia, that Hillman’s claims were
barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations.
A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo under the
same de novo standard as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998). In reviewing
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we “accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
First, to the extent that Hillman argues that the defendants’ actions
and his conduct in response ultimately led to the decision to revoke his
parole, the record does not support his contention that his parole revocation
has been invalidated, and he therefore fails to demonstrate any error in the
district court’s determination that those claims are barred under Heck. See
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Second, even if any of Hillman’s claims were not
barred by Heck, they were barred by the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. See Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989); Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a). We are unpersuaded by
his timeliness arguments based on letters from the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles, a continuing tort theory, the application of different limitations
periods, or equitable tolling based on his alleged drug use and mental
deficiencies or his alleged fear of retaliation. See Ramirez v. City of San
Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 2002); Hand v. Stevens Transp., Inc. Empl.
Benefit Plan, 83 S.W.3d 286, 293 (Tex. App. 2002). In light of the foregoing,
we need not consider any of the district court’s remaining bases for dismissal.
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Case: 18-51041 Document: 00515826179 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/19/2021
No. 18-51041
Next, Hillman fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in
denying motions to join his parents as additional plaintiffs, see Acevedo v.
Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 2010); Gonzales
v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998), or to amend or supplement his
complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (d); Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d
336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998); Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 1995);
Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320-21 (5th Cir.
1991). Although Hillman challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to appoint counsel, he has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances
showing that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691
F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1982). Finally, his argument that the district court
mischaracterized his claims as habeas claims is not supported by the record.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. All
outstanding motions are DENIED.
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