Reed v. Goertz

Case: 19-70022 Document: 00515833079 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 19-70022 April 22, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Rodney Reed,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Bryan Goertz, Bastrop County District Attorney; Steve McCraw,
Texas Department of Public Safety; Sara Loucks, Bastrop County District
Clerk; Maurice Cook, Bastrop County Sheriff,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:19-CV-794
Before Jones, Elrod, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
Rodney Reed was convicted of capital murder in 1998. Since then, he
has sought various forms of post-conviction relief. This case arises from his
motion for post-conviction DNA testing, which the Texas state courts
denied. Reed brought this lawsuit against certain Texas officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He challenges the constitutionality of the Texas post-
conviction DNA testing statute and seeks to compel the Texas officials to
release the items he wishes to test. The district court dismissed his claim,
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No. 19-70022
and he now appeals. Because Reed’s claim is barred by the statute of
limitations, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
I.
Stacey Stites was reported missing on April 23, 1996 when she failed
to show up for her morning shift at a local grocery store. Reed v. State, 541
S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A passerby found her body later
that day in the brush alongside a backroad in Bastrop County, Texas. Ex Parte
Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Nearby, her shirt and a
torn piece of her belt were also found. Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d at 762.
At the time of her death, Stites was engaged to Jimmy Fennell, who
was then a police officer in Giddings, Texas, and the two shared his red truck.
Id. Fennell claimed that Stites had likely left their apartment in the truck at
her usual hour of 3:00 a.m. to make it to her shift at work. The truck was later
found in the parking lot of Bastrop High School. Id. The other half of Stites’s
belt lay outside the truck with the buckle intact. Id.
The medical examiner determined that Stites had been strangled with
her own belt. Id. He also found intact sperm in Stites’s vagina and, based on
other medical evidence, concluded that Stites had likely been sexually
assaulted prior to her death. Id. The police could not initially match the
DNA of the sperm to anyone, however, and the investigation proceeded for
nearly a year before they matched it to Rodney Reed’s genetic profile. Reed
v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 761 (5th Cir. 2014).
Reed was charged with capital murder. He defended himself on the
theory that someone else, perhaps Stites’s fiancé Fennell, was the murderer.
Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d at 775. He argued that his sperm was present not
because he had sexually assaulted Stites but because the two had a
longstanding sexual relationship that had been carried on in secret. Id. The
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jury rejected these defenses and convicted Reed of Stites’s murder. Id. at
763.
Reed appealed his conviction and filed repeated habeas petitions in
state court. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Reed’s first
two habeas petitions, Reed filed a habeas petition in federal court. Reed v.
Thaler, No. A-02-CA-142, 2012 WL 2254216 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2012).
The district court permitted limited discovery and depositions and then
stayed Reed’s federal proceedings to allow him to return to state court and
exhaust several arguments he had been unable to make up until that point.
Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d at 763. Reed filed several more habeas petitions in
state court and returned to federal court several years later to file an amended
habeas petition asserting claims of actual innocence. See id. The district
court granted summary judgment to the government on these claims, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s action on appeal. See id.
After Reed’s federal habeas petition was denied, the state moved to
set an execution date. Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d at 764. Reed moved for post-
conviction DNA testing of several items discovered on or near Stites’s body
and in Fennell’s truck under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Id. Chapter 64 allows a convicted person to obtain post-
conviction DNA testing of biological material if the court finds that certain
conditions are met. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 64.03. The trial court
denied Reed’s Chapter 64 motion, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
ultimately affirmed that decision. Id. Reed sought certiorari from the
Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied in June 2018, see Reed
v. Texas, 138 S. Ct. 2675 (2018), and his execution was scheduled for
November 20, 2019, In re State ex rel. Goertz, No. 90,124-02, 2019 WL
5955986, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2019). On November 11, 2019,
Reed filed another state habeas petition, which is still pending review in state
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court. See Ex Parte Reed, No. 50,961-10, 2019 WL 6114891, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Nov. 15, 2019).
In August 2019, Reed filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Bryan Goertz, the Bastrop County district attorney, in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas, which he later amended. 1
Reed’s amended complaint challenges the constitutionality of Chapter 64,
both on its face and as applied to him. Reed requested declaratory relief from
the district court stating that Chapter 64 violates the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Goertz moved to
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court denied Goertz’s 12(b)(1) motion but granted
the 12(b)(6) motion. The court dismissed all of Reed’s claims with prejudice.
Reed now appeals the district court’s decision.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
Waste Mgmt. of La., L.L.C. v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 963 (5th Cir.),
cert denied 140 S. Ct. 628 (2019). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We must accept
all facts as pleaded and construe them in “the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dorsey
v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)). We review a
district court’s jurisdictional determinations, including determinations-
1
Reed initially brought his § 1983 lawsuit against other custodians of physical
evidence in Bastrop County, but dismissed his claims against them in his amended
complaint.
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regarding sovereign immunity, de novo. City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993,
997 (5th Cir. 2019).
III.
We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
Goertz argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 2 Goertz is incorrect.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to this case. The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts other than the Supreme Court
“from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006); see also Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263
U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)
. It is a narrow doctrine applicable only to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
2
Goertz also asserts that we lack jurisdiction because of the Eleventh Amendment.
He is incorrect. The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against public officials when the
state is the real party in interest. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 100–02 (1984). Because Goertz is being sued in his official capacity as a prosecutorial
agent of the state of Texas, the Eleventh Amendment would normally bar a lawsuit unless
immunity has been waived or abrogated, or if there is some exception. Id. at 99, 102. Here,
the Ex Parte Young exception permits Reed to bring his claim against Goertz. Under this
exception, a state official can be subject to a lawsuit if the lawsuit seeks only prospective
relief from a continuing violation of federal law. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Contrary to Goertz’s assertions, prospective relief can be
either injunctive or declaratory. See Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054
(5th Cir. 1998); see also Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 472–
73 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). As Reed has asserted a claim for prospective declaratory relief,
the Ex Parte Young exception permits him to bring his claim. Furthermore, taking the facts
alleged as true, Goertz has the necessary connection to the enforcement of the statute. See
Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014). According to Reed’s amended
complaint, Goertz has “directed or otherwise caused each of the non-party custodians of
the evidence [that Reed seeks] to refuse to allow Mr. Reed to conduct DNA testing” on
such evidence and “has the power to control access” to that evidence. This is sufficient
for Ex Parte Young at this stage.
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federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the doctrine is
inapplicable to Reed’s § 1983 claim because Reed challenged the
constitutionality of Texas’s post-conviction DNA statute. Reed did not attack
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision itself. Goertz contests that
conclusion, arguing that Reed’s amended complaint “challenged the [Court
of Criminal Appeals’] application of Chapter 64 to him.” Goertz argues that
Reed’s challenge “invited federal court review of a state court’s judgment and,
if successful, would ‘effectively nullify’ the [Court of Criminal Appeals’]
judgment and would succeed only to the extent that the [Court of Criminal
Appeals] wrongly decided the issues.”
Goertz’s argument, however, embraces an expansive version of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine that the Supreme Court has rejected. In Skinner v.
Switzer, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether “a convicted
state prisoner seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence” may “assert
that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 562 U.S. 521, 524
(2011). The Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to
Skinner’s claims because of the doctrine’s narrow scope. See id. at 531. Both
Rooker and Feldman involved cases where the plaintiffs, having lost in state
court, asked the federal district courts to overturn a state-court decision. Id.;
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479–80. Skinner’s situation
was different, however, because his § 1983 claims did “not challenge the
adverse [Court of Criminal Appeals’] decisions themselves; instead [they
targeted] as unconstitutional the Texas statute [that the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ decisions] authoritatively construed.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532.
Thus, although a state-court decision may be reviewed only by the Supreme
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Court, “a statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a
federal action.” Id.This case is no different than Skinner. In state court, Reed asserted
that he was entitled to post-conviction DNA testing of certain evidence. See
Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d at 764. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
Reed’s request for post-conviction DNA testing. In these proceedings, Reed
challenges “the constitutionality of [Chapter] 64 both on its face and as
interpreted, construed, and applied” by the state court. Like in Skinner,
Reed does not challenge the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision itself.
Instead, he targets “as unconstitutional the Texas statute [that the Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision] authoritatively construed.” Skinner, 562 U.S.
at 532. If Reed were to succeed in his § 1983 claims, the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ decision would remain intact. Reed has therefore asserted an
“independent claim” that would not necessarily affect the validity of the
state-court decision. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292–93 (quoting GASH Assocs. v.
Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Brown v. Taylor,
677 F. App’x 924, 927 (5th Cir. 2017). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply. 3
IV.
On appeal, Goertz also asserts that Reed’s claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Although the district court did not rule on
this issue, we can “affirm the district court’s judgment on any grounds
supported by the record.” United States ex rel Farmer v. City of Houston, 523
F.3d 333, 338 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sobranes Recovery Pool I, LLC v. Todd
3
Goertz also asserts that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Prosecutorial immunity applies only in lawsuits for damages, not for prospective relief. See
Robinson v. Richardson, 556 F.2d 332, 334 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). Because this is a lawsuit
brought for declaratory relief, Goertz is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
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& Hughes Constr. Corp., 509 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2007)). Section 1983
claims are subject to a state’s personal injury statute of limitations. See Walker
v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2008). In Texas, the statute of limitations
for personal injury claims is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 16.003(a). As such, Reed cannot assert any claims that accrued prior to
August 2017.
“We determine the accrual date of a § 1983 action by reference to
federal law.” Walker, 550 F.3d at 414. Our court has not previously decided
when the injury accrues in a denial of post-conviction DNA testing claim.
However, we have explained that that the limitations period for a § 1983 claim
“begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff becomes aware the he has suffered
an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.’”
Russell v. Bd. of Trustees, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Rodriguez
v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1992)). The question in this case is
when Reed had sufficient information to know of his alleged injury.
Reed alleges that he was denied access to the physical evidence that he
wished to test. An injury accrues when a plaintiff first becomes aware, or
should have become aware, that his right has been violated. See Russell, 968
F.2d at 493. Here, Reed first became aware that his right to access that
evidence was allegedly being violated when the trial court denied his Chapter
64 motion in November 2014. Reed had the necessary information to know
that his rights were allegedly being violated as soon as the trial court denied
his motion for post-conviction relief.
Moreover, Reed did not need to wait until he had appealed the trial
court’s decision to bring his § 1983 claim. The Supreme Court has
emphasized “that § 1983 contains no judicially imposed exhaustion
requirement; absent some other bar to the suit, a claim is either cognizable
under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and
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should be dismissed.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997) (citation
omitted); cf. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Edwards
and concluding that ongoing state proceedings do not toll the statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim for denial of post-conviction DNA testing). Reed
could have brought his claim the moment the trial court denied his Chapter
64 motion because there was a “complete and present cause of action” at
that time. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quoting Bay Area
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S.
192, 201 (1997)). Because Reed knew or should have known of his alleged
injury in November 2014, five years before he brought his § 1983 claim, his
claim is time-barred.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we therefore AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of Reed’s claims because they are not timely.
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