United States v. Villanueva

Case: 21-40356 Document: 00516347897 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/07/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 7, 2022
No. 21-40356 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Rafael Villanueva,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:17-CR-508-1
Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
A jury convicted Rafael Villanueva of six counts relating to drug
trafficking and money laundering, and the district court imposed concurrent
sentences that included terms of imprisonment for life. On appeal,
Villanueva challenges the district court’s finding him competent to stand trial
and its evidentiary ruling barring him from presenting evidence and argument
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-40356 Document: 00516347897 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/07/2022
No. 21-40356
related to his intervening stroke and purported memory loss. He also
challenges the constitutionality of the statutes of conviction and renews his
objection to a jury instruction as well as several sentencing objections. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
In Villanueva’s view, the district court erred in finding him competent
because loss of memory undermined his ability to testify or otherwise to assist
his counsel in contesting the Government’s case. In reviewing competency
determinations, we “re-analyze the facts and take a hard look at the trial
judge’s ultimate conclusion,” which we leave undisturbed “unless it is
clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” United States v. Doke, 171 F.3d 240, 247
(5th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The standard for
competency is “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960);
accord Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). Based on our review of the
record, including the nature of the evidence against Villanueva and expert
evaluations that undermine his claims of memory loss, the district court’s
determination of competence was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.
Villanueva also contends that the district court erred by granting a
motion in limine that largely barred him from presenting evidence about the
stroke and its effect on his memory—a ruling we review for abuse of
discretion and harmless error. See United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 287
(5th Cir. 2009). In this instance, even assuming error, relief is unwarranted
because there is not a reasonable probability that the exclusion of evidence
contributed to the verdicts, given the ample evidence of guilt predating the
stroke.
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Relatedly, Villanueva argues that the district court erred by not
permitting him to address his stroke and memory loss while cross-examining
witnesses or in closing argument. The first of these claims is unavailing
because Villanueva does not demonstrate that the restrictions on cross-
examination violated his confrontation right or were clearly prejudicial. See
United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438–40 (5th Cir. 2008). As for closing
argument, a presiding judge has broad discretion in limiting its scope to
ensure “that argument does not stray unduly from the mark.” Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). And because no evidence of memory loss was
adduced during trial, Villanueva had no basis for addressing the subject in his
closing. See United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The
sole purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating
and applying the evidence.”).
Next, Villanueva challenges the constitutionality of the statutes under
which he was convicted. He acknowledges that his challenge to the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is foreclosed by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005), but argues Gonzales was wrongly decided. To the extent Villanueva
is asking this court to disregard Supreme Court precedent, we must refuse
that request. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). His challenges to
statutes other than the CSA are not considered because he failed to brief
them. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010).
Villanueva contends that it was error for the district court to instruct
jurors that they must accept the law as explained to them by the court. We
have held that “a district court does not err by giving a charge that tracks this
Circuit’s pattern jury instructions and that is a correct statement of the law.”
United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 507 (5th Cir. 2012). As the
instruction at issue met those criteria, we conclude it was not erroneous.
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While Villanueva also asserts that the district court erred by
overruling various sentencing objections, insufficient briefing as to most of
these issues precludes our review. See Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 446-47. To the
extent he contends that sentencing determinations should have been made
by the jury, he is correct in conceding that his arguments are foreclosed.
AFFIRMED.
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