Alvarez v. Akwitti

Case: 20-50464 Document: 00515850641 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/05/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-50464 May 5, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Joaquin Alvarez,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Chimdi A. Akwitti,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:19-CV-623
Before Smith, Stewart, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
While “[t]he Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981)), it does prohibit “cruel and unusual punishments,”
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. And while we do not hold prison wardens
strictly liable for all harm that occurs to inmates during their incarceration,
the Supreme Court has made clear that “[h]aving incarcerated persons with
demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct”—and “having stripped them of virtually every means of self-
protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid”—“the government
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No. 20-50464
and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. at
833 (cleaned up). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’”
Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
Joaquin Alvarez, a Texas state prisoner, filed a handwritten, pro se
complaint alleging that he begged to be protected from “a sexually violent
predator inmate”—but that in response, prison guards required him to
identify that inmate publicly, and Chimdi Akwitti, an assistant prison
warden, called him a “snitch” and refused to grant a transfer for that reason.
That same inmate later attacked Alvarez for being a snitch.
The district court dismissed Alvarez’s suit sua sponte, before Akwitti
filed a response. In doing so, the court did not address Alvarez’s allegations
that Akwitti deliberately left a known “snitch” (one outed by his own guards)
in harm’s way. We vacate and remand so that the district court can consider
the merits of Alvarez’s allegations in the first instance, as well as any response
from the assistant prison warden.
I.
Alvarez filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Akwitti, an assistant
warden at the Hughes Unit in Gatesville, Texas. In his handwritten
complaint, Alvarez alleged that he had received threats from “a sexually
violent predator inmate” on his cell block. Because of those threats, Alvarez
requested a transfer to another cell block, or even to another prison (despite
the fact that, as he later explains, another prison would put him further away
from his family).
In response, a committee chaired by Akwitti held a hearing. After
considering the evidence presented by Alvarez, the committee denied his
transfer requests.
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About a month later, Alvarez was attacked by the same inmate who
had previously threatened him.
Alvarez filed this suit, alleging that Akwitti violated the Eighth
Amendment by deliberately failing to protect him. He sought a preliminary
injunction and damages.
The district court ordered Alvarez to file a more definite statement
and included a questionnaire. In response, Alvarez provided additional
details about his allegations.
To begin with, Alvarez alleged that, due to security lapses, the inmate
who was threatening him was able to access his cell in the middle of the night
without supervision. Alvarez further contends that he provided the
committee with the names of witnesses who could verify this allegation. He
also alleged that he provided the committee with threatening letters “in the
handwriting of the alleged . . . predator.”
Alvarez further alleged that, when he first reported the inmate to
prison guards, they required him to identify the inmate “in view of several
dozen inmates.” According to Alvarez, this “gained [him] . . . a reputation
as a ‘snitch’ . . . at the Hughes facility,” and “create[d] an obvious danger
from prison gangs.”
The complaint does not specifically allege that Alvarez ever actually
communicated this danger to Akwitti, either before or during the hearing.
But it does say that Akwitti called him a “snitch” during the hearing,
suggesting that Akwitti may have known about the previous developments
due to his role as assistant warden. Specifically, according to Alvarez,
Akwitti told Alvarez during his hearing that he was “nothing but a ‘snitch’”
who was “attempting to manipulate the committee,” and denied his request
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for transfer. Accordingly, Alvarez faults Akwitti for sending him back to the
same cell block where he was known as a “snitch.” 1
Finally, Alvarez alleged that, during the assault, the attacker told
Alvarez that he “never should have reported him.”
The district court dismissed Alvarez’s suit under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which allows district courts to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint sua sponte if the complaint fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. Alvarez timely appealed. We review such dismissals
de novo, using the same standard applicable to dismissals under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 430 F.3d
1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005). We construe in forma pauperis complaints
liberally. See Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th
Cir. 1994).
II.
Regarding Alvarez’s claim against Akwitti in his official capacity, the
district court correctly dismissed Alvarez’s claim for money damages as
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars recovering § 1983 money
damages from [Texas Department of Criminal Justice] officers in their
1
In addition, on appeal, Alvarez notes that, in his first prisoner grievance, he
alleged that Akwitti said: “We don’t protect snitches in Hughes Unit.” The district
court’s failure to consider the entirety of Alvarez’s allegations is a sufficient reason for us
to remand, so these additional allegations play no role in our decision today. But on
remand, the district court may wish to consider granting Alvarez leave to amend in light of
the additional facts he develops in his pro se brief on appeal. See, e.g., Peña v. United States,
157 F.3d 984, 987 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Because [Rule 12(b)(6)] dismissals [of pro se
complaints] are disfavored, a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable opportunity
to amend.”) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), and Bazrowx v. Scott,
136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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official capacity”) (citing Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052,
1054 (5th Cir. 1998)).
However, we remand Alvarez’s claim against Akwitti in his personal
capacity. As Alvarez points out on appeal, the district court did not consider
whether Alvarez had stated a valid Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that
Akwitti deliberately exposed him to an excessive risk of harm by refusing his
transfer request, despite the fact that Alvarez was known by other inmates as
a “snitch” due to the behavior of the prison guards and that Akwitti, just
three days later, presided over a hearing concerning these events.
“[A] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of
serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 828. An inmate establishes an Eighth Amendment violation by
showing that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm” and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to
his safety. Id. at 834. “To establish deliberate indifference, the prisoner must
show that the defendants (1) were aware of facts from which an inference of
an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety could be drawn and (2) that
they actually drew an inference that such potential for harm existed.” Rogers
v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2013).
“It is well established that prison officials have a constitutional duty
to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of their fellow inmates.”
Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 832–33). In Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2003), for example, an
inmate argued that a prison official violated the Eighth Amendment by
deliberately failing to protect him from his former gang after he provided
information about that gang to the prison. Id. at 514–15. The court
recognized that “an individual who divulges secret information about his
gang might be a target of violence by fellow gang members.” Id. at 514. It
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ultimately held that the inmate failed to state a valid Eighth Amendment
claim—but only because he could not show that the prison official actually
knew that the gang was aware of the inmate’s informant activities and was
therefore in danger. Id. at 514. See also Longoria, 473 F.3d at 594 (similar).
Here, although the complaint did not specifically allege what Akwitti
knew, it does allege that Akwitti called Alvarez a “snitch” and denied him a
transfer for that reason. But the district court never addressed these
allegations. Alvarez is entitled to have his allegations addressed by the
district court in the first instance.
***
We vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing Alvarez’s suit
and remand so that the court may fully consider Alvarez’s allegations in the
first instance, along with any response from Akwitti.
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