Watkins v. Three Admin Remedy

Case: 19-40869 Document: 00515873822 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/24/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 19-40869 May 24, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Eric Watkins,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Three Administrative Remedy Coordinators of the
Bureau of Prisons; Unknown Parties, Food Service
Administrator and Assistant Administrator and
Foremans,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:11-CV-553
Before Jolly, Stewart, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
Eric Watkins appeals an order of the district court dismissing his
complaint. Pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Watkins claimed that various prison
officials violated his constitutional rights by tampering with his meals and
denying his grievance. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
Case: 19-40869 Document: 00515873822 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/24/2021
No. 19-40869
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Watkins is a former inmate of FCI Beaumont. 1 He alleges that
between January and September 2009, two of the facility’s food
administrators and various “foremans” provided Watkins with meals that
were spoiled, contaminated with feces and urine, and that were “drastically
reduced from [the] required portions.” According to Watkins, the food
administrators and foremen tampered with his food on a daily basis in
retaliation for grievances that he had filed against prison officials.
BOP released Watkins from prison on June 7, 2010. He then filed the
instant action in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on October 24, 2011. He claimed
that the food administrators and foremen had violated his First Amendment,
Fifth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment rights by tampering with his
meals. He also claimed that the three BOP administrative remedy
coordinators were liable for the underlying constitutional violations because
they had incorrectly disposed of his grievance.
Because Watkins chose to proceed IFP, a magistrate judge reviewed
the sufficiency of Watkins’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
That provision requires a court to dismiss an IFP action if the court, among
other reasons, determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Concluding that Watkins’s claims
against the food administrators, foremen, and the first two administrative
remedy coordinators were time-barred, the magistrate judge recommended
dismissal of those claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). He also concluded that
the claim against the third administrative remedy coordinator, while timely,
should be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because an “inmate does not
1
FCI Beaumont is a correctional facility in Beaumont, Texas that is run by the
federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
2
Case: 19-40869 Document: 00515873822 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/24/2021
No. 19-40869
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in having a grievance
considered and resolved to his satisfaction.”
Watkins objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
contending that none of his claims were time-barred since the relevant
limitations period was tolled for the period during which he exhausted his
administrative remedies. He also argued that he was not claiming a right to
have his grievance resolved in his favor, but rather the right to hold the three
administrative remedy coordinators accountable for the underlying violations
of his constitutional rights because they wrongly rejected his grievance.
The district court overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendations, and dismissed Watkins’s claims under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) with prejudice. Watkins timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo.
Nyabwa v. Unknown Jailers at Corr. Corp. of Am., 700 F. App’x 379, 380 (5th
Cir. 2017) (citing Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998)).
We will consequently uphold dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) if the
complaint “does not contain ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
III. DISCUSSION
The district court dismissed Watkins’s case primarily on timeliness
grounds. However, “we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.”
El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 131 F. App’x 450, 452 (5th Cir.
2005) (citing, inter alia, LLEH, Inc. v. Wichita County, 289 F.3d 358, 364 (5th
Cir. 2002)). And the record indicates that Watkins does not have a viable
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Bivens claim. So even if Watkins’s claims were timely, 2 they must still be
dismissed. See Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(dismissing a plaintiff’s Bivens claim even though the defendant’s attorney
had not “rais[ed] the Bivens issue in the district court” and the district court
had not sua sponte addressed it); § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A. Food Administrators and Foremen
We first address Watkins’s claims against the food administrators and
foremen. The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that expanding the
Bivens cause of action has “become ‘a “disfavored” judicial activity.’”
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137
S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)). We must apply a two-part test when considering
whether to extend Bivens. First, we inquire whether the request to extend
Bivens “involves a claim that arises in a new context or involves a new
category of defendants.” Id. at 743 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Then we ask “whether there are any special factors that counsel
hesitation about granting the extension.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
A context is “new” if it is “different in a meaningful way from
previous Bivens cases decided by th[e] Court.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. As
this court previously observed:
Today, Bivens claims generally are limited to the circumstances
of the Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases in this area: (1)
manacling the plaintiff in front of his family in his home and
strip-searching him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90; (2) discrimination on the basis of
sex by a congressman against a staff person in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);
2
We express no opinion today on whether the claims were in fact timely filed.
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and (3) failure to provide medical attention to an asthmatic
prisoner in federal custody in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, [446 U.S. 14 (1980)].
Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020). “Virtually everything else
is a ‘new context.’” Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865).
Although Watkins asserts Bivens claims against the food
administrators and foremen under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment,
and Eighth Amendment, his claims are best construed under the First
Amendment since he claims that the defendants retaliated against him for
filing grievances. Because Watkins’s claims appear nothing like the Bivens
trilogy, we conclude that his claims arise in a new context.
Furthermore, this case presents special factors counseling hesitation.
The “most important” Bivens question is “who should decide whether to
provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?” Mesa, 140 S. Ct. at
750 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Like in Mesa, the answer
to that question here is Congress. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 3 which
governs lawsuits brought by prisoners, “does not provide for a standalone
damages remedy against federal jailers.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865. So out of
respect for Congress and the longstanding principle of separation-of-powers,
we cannot imply such a remedy in this case.
In sum, we decline to extend Bivens to include First Amendment
retaliation claims against prison officials, joining our sister courts that have
recently considered the matter. See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir.
2018); Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 781 (4th Cir. 2021). Our holding is
underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court has not only never
recognized a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment, Reichle v.
3
42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
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Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012), but also once rejected a First
Amendment retaliation Bivens claim for federal employees, Bush v. Lucas,
462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983).
B. Administrative Remedy Coordinators
Watkins argues that the administrative remedy coordinators are liable
for the food administrators and foremen’s violation of his constitutional
rights because they incorrectly rejected his grievance. We conclude that the
district court did not err in dismissing Watkins’s claims against these
defendants, but for a different reason. Even if Watkins had a viable Bivens
claim against the food administrators and foremen, “vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens . . . suits . . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Having failed to
assert standalone claims against the administrative remedy coordinators, his
claims against them must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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