Vallo v. Prator

Case: 20-30674 Document: 00516207407 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 17, 2022
No. 20-30674
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Princeton S. Vallo,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Steve Prator; Reginald Morris; Rufus Porter; Frizzell;
Sergeant Pinesett; Sergeant Pye; Lieutenant Darby;
Nurse Billy; Nurse Leone; Detective Escude; Detective
Evans; Sergeant Childress; Commander Wyche; Donnie
Laney; Sergeant Bedford; Englade; Crockett; Shultz;
Montoya; Farris; Fredieu,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:18-CV-1341
Before Davis, Jones, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30674 Document: 00516207407 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2022
No. 20-30674
Princeton S. Vallo, Louisiana prisoner # 490191, appeals the district
court’s partial dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive
force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as well as the
district court’s denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. 1 Vallo
also moves for the appointment of counsel on appeal. His remaining
excessive force claim is pending in the district court.
We must examine the basis of our own jurisdiction. Trent v. Wade,
776 F.3d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 2015). We may hear appeals only from: (1) “final
decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291”; (2) “interlocutory decisions under
28 U.S.C. § 1292”; (3) “nonfinal judgments certified as final”; or (4) “some
other nonfinal order or judgment to which an exception applies.” Briargrove
Shopping Ctr. Joint Venture v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 170 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Vallo’s appeal does
not fit into any of the first three categories: none of the orders terminate the
case for purposes of § 1291, qualify as interlocutory under § 1292(a), or were
certified by the district court as final. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538; see also
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996); § 1292(a).
The only possible ground under which we could hear Vallo’s appeal,
therefore, is if it involves “some other nonfinal order or judgment to which
an exception applies.” Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538. Under this ground, “we
sometimes exercise our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
the collateral order doctrine.” Marler v. Adonis Health Prods., 997 F.2d 1141,
1142 (5th Cir. 1993). The doctrine states “that a party can immediately
1
While Vallo’s notice of appeal also stated his intent to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motions for appointment of counsel and a temporary restraining order, his
brief provides no basis for challenging the district court’s resolution of those motions.
Accordingly, he has abandoned them. See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir.
1999).
2
Case: 20-30674 Document: 00516207407 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/17/2022
No. 20-30674
appeal an order from the district court if the district court’s order
1) conclusively determines the disputed issue, 2) resolves an important issue
that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and 3) is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 1143. Neither of the
challenged orders in this case is immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. See, e.g., Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 85-
86 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (denial of motion for recusal); Burge v. Par. of St.
Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The
motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is DENIED.
3