Garza v. Molina

Case: 21-40805 Document: 00516326903 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/20/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 20, 2022
No. 21-40805 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Irma Garza,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Mayor Richard Molina; Council Member David Torres;
Council Member Jorge Salinas; Gilbert Enriquez,
Defendants—Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:18-CV-267
Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Appellee Irma Garza brought this § 1983 action against the City of
Edinburg, its mayor (Richard Molina), two current city council members
(Jorge Salinas and David Torres), and one former city council member
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-40805 Document: 00516326903 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/20/2022
No. 21-40805
(Gilbert Enriquez). Garza alleges that she was fired from her position as the
City of Edinburg’s Director of Public Information at the direction of Molina
and the three council members. She argues that the firing occurred because
she was not a member of Appellants’ political faction, in violation of her First
Amendment rights to speech and association.
Appellants Molina, Torres, Salinas, and Enriquez moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the evidence does not support Garza’s claim and that
they are entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary
judgment as to the speech claim, but otherwise denied the motion. Molina,
Torres, Salinas, and Enriquez timely appealed.
The only issue properly before us in this interlocutory appeal is
whether Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985) (holding that denials of summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds may be appealed under the collateral order
doctrine). Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A good-faith
assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of
proof.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In such cases, we draw all reasonable inferences
in the nonmovant’s favor, but “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the defense [of qualified immunity] is not available.” Id. The qualified
immunity analysis consists of two parts: (1) “whether the [defendant’s]
alleged conduct has violated a federal right,” and (2) “whether the right in
question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such
that the [defendant] was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.”
Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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Much of Appellants’ briefing focuses on factual disputes, arguing that
they did not violate a constitutional right because Garza’s allegations are
factually wrong. However, we lack jurisdiction to resolve that portion of the
dispute. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995) (holding “that a
defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a
district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines
whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for
trial”); accord Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(“[W]hen a district court denies a qualified immunity defense based on its
determination that the summary judgment record raises a genuine issue of
fact concerning the applicability of the defense, such order is not immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.”). We therefore dismiss the
appeal as to the “genuine issue of fact” issues.
On the other hand, we have jurisdiction over the purely legal issue
where the “facts are as asserted by the plaintiff” but the question is whether
such facts demonstrate a constitutional violation that is clearly established.
See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527. If, as Garza’s version of the facts support, she
was fired because she did not belong to Appellants’ political faction and such
affiliation is not relevant to her position, then Appellants have committed a
paradigmatic First Amendment violation that is clearly established. Cf.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (“[I]t is manifest that the continued
employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned
upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county
government.”). It does not, despite Appellants’ argument to the contrary,
take a “constitutional scholar” to know that. See Jordan v. Ector County, 516
F.3d 290, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It is now a rote principle of constitutional
law that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights
by reason of their employment.” (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that, at this time, the district court
properly denied summary judgment on this issue.
As a result, we AFFIRM in Part, and DISMISS in Part.
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