Baustian v. State of Louisiana

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-30677
STEVEN E. BAUSTIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, Through the Department of
Safety and Corrections; RICHARD L. STALDER;
CHARLES J. KLOPH, JR.; J. ALTON DANIELS;
WILLIAM T. PRICE; MORRIS E. EASLEY, JR.;
JAMES M. LEBLANC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(95-CV-1072)
February 10, 1997
Before REYNALDO GARZA, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven Baustian appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
Americans with Disabilities Act case for failure to state a claim
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
upon which relief may be granted. We affirm.
I.
Baustian was a Probation and Parole Specialist at the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections in St. Bernard Parish.
On October 4, 1994, police pulled Baustian over for speeding in a
school zone while driving a state vehicle. Detecting a strong odor
of marijuana emanating from the state car, police arrested Baustian
for possession of illegal drugs. The undersecretary for the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections fired Baustian in a
November 28, 1994 letter, which noted that Baustian’s possession of
an illegal drug in a state car violated certain rules set out in
the Corrections Services Employee Manual.
Baustian filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which determined that it did not have jurisdiction over
his complaint because he was not a qualified individual with a
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 et seq. (“ADA” or “Act”). Baustian then brought this
action against the State and against various state officials. He
claims that he was discriminated against because of his addiction
to marijuana in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act. Defendants filed and the court
granted a motion to dismiss Baustian’s ADA claims under Rule
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12(b)(6), asserting that Baustian did not state a claim because he
was not a qualified individual with a disability under the Act.
The court later dismissed individual defendants Kloph, Daniels,
Price, Easley, and LeBlanc under principles of qualified immunity.
After a status conference, the court dismissed Baustian’s remaining
claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act. The court entered a judgment in favor of all
defendants.
On appeal, Baustian challenges the district court’s
determination that he did not state a claim for which relief could
be granted under the ADA. He also claims that the state had an
obligation to enroll him in a rehabilitation program, and he
challenges the court’s refusal to allow him to file an amended
complaint and refusal to compel discovery.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 958
F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1992). We should affirm dismissal if we
find that “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.” Chrissy F. Medley v. Mississippi Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991). In making this determination,
we must accept as true all well pleaded averments and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. American Waste &
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Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 949 F.2d
1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991).
First we address Baustian’s claim that he had alleged facts
sufficient to support a claim under the ADA. The district court
held that, as a matter of law, Baustian was not a qualified
individual under the ADA because he was a “current” drug user at
the time he was fired. The statute provides that “[f]or purposes
of this chapter, the term ‘individual with a disability’ does not
include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use
of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.”
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a). However, the statute explicitly creates an
exception for drug addicts who have stopped using drugs and who are
undergoing treatment. “Nothing in subsection (a) of this section
shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a
disability an individual who ... is participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use....”
Id. § 12114(b)(2). Baustian claims that the day he received the
speeding ticket, he stopped using drugs and began a treatment
program for his addiction))seven weeks before he was fired. The
district court held that Baustian did not come within the
rehabilitation exception because he was a “current” drug user at
the time of his firing. The court held that, even if Baustian had
not used drugs during the seven weeks between his arrest and his
firing, seven-week old drug use was sufficiently current to
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disqualify him as a matter of law.
We need not reach that determination here. Baustian fails to
state a claim under the ADA for independent reasons. He does not
challenge the state’s contention that he was fired for his drug use
on the job that led to his arrest and conviction. It is crystal
clear under the statute that the state may fire Baustian for drug
use, as opposed to drug addiction, consistent with the Act.
Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 93 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that employer may terminate employees consistent with ADA
for drug-related misconduct, as opposed to disabling addiction
itself); Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between disability and misconduct in context of
Rehabilitation Act). Although the Act protects some drug addicts
from termination based on their illness, the ADA specifically
provides that an employer:
may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use
of alcohol at the workplace by all employees; ...
may require that employees shall not be under the
influence of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal
use of drugs at the workplace; ... may hold an
employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic to the same qualification
standards for employment or job performance and
behavior that such entity holds other employees,
even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior
is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such
employee....
42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)(1-2,4).
Baustian does not contend that the state fired him for any
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reason other than the drug use incident to his arrest. Thus the
State may terminate his employment without running afoul of the
ADA, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c). Collings, 63
F.3d at 832-33. Therefore, we find that Baustian does not state
any facts that raise a cognizable claim under the ADA.1 Baustian’s
claim that the state should have placed him in a drug
rehabilitation program is irrelevant to the sufficiency of his ADA
claim and we need not consider them here.
Furthermore, we affirm the district court’s decision not to
allow Baustian to amend his complaint and its refusal to compel
discovery for the reasons articulated by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
1
We explicitly reserve the question of whether seven weeks is a long
enough rehabilitation period to bring Baustian within the protection of the Act,
since we find that Baustian’s claims are insufficient as a matter of law for
other reasons.
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