W v. NW Indep Sch Dist

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10621
Summary Calendar
SAMUEL TYLER W, on behalf of Debbie M,
on behalf of Harvey W,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NORTHWEST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas
(USDC No. 4:01-CV-285-A)
_______________________________________________________
December 16, 2002
Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The judgment is affirmed. We essentially agree with the district court’s reasoning
and add the following:
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1. Appellate review of the district court’s decision is a mixed question of law and
fact that we review de novo, but the underlying fact findings of the district court are
reviewed only for clear error. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347
(5th Cir. 2000).
2. Insofar as appellants Samuel Tyler W (Samuel) and his parents complain that
appellee Northwest Independent School District (the school district) failed to comply
with the procedural requirement that a regular education teacher be present at 1998-1999
ARD meetings under 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii), we have held that a failure to comply
with a procedural requirement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA
or Act), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487, may warrant a judicial finding that the district has
failed to provide the student with a free appropriate public education, but that “adequate
compliance” with the Act’s procedural requirements will ordinarily suffice. See Buser by
Buser v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch., 51 F.3d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1995). We have not
held that a procedural failure necessarily warrants judicial relief. Moreover, in the
pending case, the record indicates that (1) the parents elected to severely limit Samuel’s
attendance at school and instead chose to school him at home during the relevant period,
(2) the school program for three-year-olds like Samuel in 1998-1999 was in any event a
program for children with disabilities (PPCD) only available to disabled children and
therefore not in our view a “regular education” program, and (3) the PPCD which
Samuel sporadically attended during the 1998-1999 school year consisted of less than
three hours per week in a general education setting where Samuel’s class interacted with
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other students who were not disabled. The IDEA requires the participation of a “regular
education teacher of such child” only if the child “is, or may be, participating in the
regular education environment.” Only by the furthest stretching of the statutory language
did a “regular education teacher of such child” in a “regular education environment” even
exist.
3. Most assuredly Samuel had no regular or general education teacher who had
spent sufficient time with him to compel us to hold that the ARD meetings were not
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” See Bobby
R., 200 F.3d at 346 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Indeed, his parents
would be hard pressed to argue otherwise. Their main dispute with the school district as
to the substance of Samuel’s education was that they believed Samuel should receive
vastly more in-home training than the school district was willing to provide. In other
words, they did not want Samuel “mainstreamed” in the general student population,
despite the Act’s stated preference for mainstreaming disabled students whenever
possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (requiring participating states to establish
policies and procedures ensuring that “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children
with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled”). Yet they now
complain that the IEPs were fatally flawed because a mainstream teacher did not
participate in certain meetings.
4. As to the parents’ complaint that the district denied them access to assessment
reports prior to the ARD meetings, the Act does not specifically require that such reports
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be made available to the parents prior to meetings called to develop the IEP. The Act
only requires “an opportunity for the parents . . . to examine all records relating to such
child and to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and
educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public
education of such child . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). Appellants do not persuade us
that the district court clearly erred in finding that “plaintiff’s parents very vocally
participated in every ARD committee meeting and . . . were not hindered by any alleged
withholding of documents,” and we have no quarrel with the district court’s ultimate
conclusion that “the IEPs developed through the Act’s procedures were reasonably
calculated to enable plaintiff to receive educational benefits.”
5. Appellants argue that the district court clearly erred in ignoring a level of
hostility between the district and the parents that resulted in a denial of a free appropriate
public education for Tyler. Appellants fail to persuade us that hostility between the
parents and school district personnel resulted in IEPs that were not reasonably calculated
to enable Samuel to receive educational benefits, or that the school district was unable or
unwilling to provide him with a free appropriate public education. On the contrary, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that school district personnel “selflessly
devoted themselves to serving plaintiff’s best interest despite their discomfort with
plaintiff’s parents.”
AFFIRMED.
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