United States v. Solis

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-41089
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOEL SOLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
9:00-CR-59-1
February 21, 2003
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joel Solis appeals his conviction following his guilty plea to
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He specifically reserved his right to appeal
the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized
during a search of his vehicle. On appeal, he argues that there
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
was no probable cause for the initial traffic stop, that his
continued detention was not reasonably related to the initial stop,
and that his consent to search was not voluntary. In an appeal
from a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court reviews
conclusions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that
prevailed in district court.1
An officer’s “decision to stop [a vehicle] is reasonable where
the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred.”2 In this case, the arresting officer testified that
he observed Solis following another vehicle by less than two car
lengths, while driving his “18-wheeler” at speeds between 35 and 55
miles per hour. Solis does not dispute that following too closely
is a traffic violation in Texas. The district court’s finding that
the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred was not clearly erroneous.
The officer testified that he also suspected that Solis may
have been either intoxicated or drowsy; however, he also testified
that he quickly determined that Solis was neither intoxicated nor
drowsy. Solis ultimately received a written warning for the
traffic violations. After he received these written warnings, the
1
See United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
2
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
2
justification for the initial traffic stop ended, and Solis should
have been free to go; except as we will explain, any continued
detention threatened a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.3
A detention may be extended, however, if the officer has a
“reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts” that the
subject is involved in some other illegal activity.4 A reviewing
court “must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider
the collective knowledge and experience of the officers involved.”5
Based on the officer’s experience with commercial vehicles and the
information he obtained from Solis’ logbook and his answers to
questions, we conclude that the officer had a reasonable suspicion
that Solis was involved in illegal activity. Therefore, Solis’
detention was properly extended.
We assess the voluntariness of consent under the tests set
forth in Jones.6 Solis has failed to show that the district
court’s finding of voluntary consent “was clearly erroneous or
influenced by an incorrect view of law.”7
3
See United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432 (5th
Cir. 2001) (stating, “Once the purpose justifying the stop has been
served, the detained person must be free to leave”).
4
See United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir.
2000).
5
Id.6
See 234 F.3d at 242.
7
United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 1993).
3
In light of the foregoing, the order of the district court
denying Solis’ motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.
4