United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez

Revised May 15, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 01-50510
_________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
JOSE GERARDO MENDOZA-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
______________________________________________
January 10, 2003
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
I. Background
On May 8, 1998, Jose Gerardo Mendoza-Gonzalez (“Mendoza”),
the appellant, drove up to a permanent immigration checkpoint
along Interstate 10, approximately four miles west of Sierra
Blanca, Texas. United States Border Patrol Agent Reynaldo Ramos
(“Ramos”) was on duty checking the citizenship of the occupants
of the vehicles passing through. Three days prior, over twenty
illegal aliens had been found inside a truck bearing the logo
-1-
“Mesilla Valley Transportation” at another checkpoint in the same
sector. Ramos had been instructed to be on the look-out for
similar trucks. As Mendoza approached the checkpoint, Ramos
noticed the Mesilla Valley name on the exterior of the truck.
Ramos stopped Mendoza, and asked him a series of brief
questions regarding his citizenship and cargo. Mendoza replied
that he was a resident of the United States, a citizen of Mexico,
and was hauling cheese. Although he spoke coherently in English,
his voice was shaky and he did not look at Ramos throughout the
questioning. Mendoza’s nervous demeanor and suspicious vehicle
prompted Ramos to ask if he could “take a look in the back” of
the trailer. Mendoza replied, “Okay,” and pulled into the
secondary inspection area.
At the secondary inspection area, Agent Leonardo Lopez
(“Lopez”), a ten-year veteran of the Border Patrol, emerged from
inside the checkpoint as Mendoza stepped down from his truck.
Lopez examined Mendoza’s bill of lading1 and inquired as to his
citizenship and cargo.2 Mendoza responded that he was a resident
alien and that he was transporting cheese. Lopez than asked if
he could “take a look” inside the trailer. Mendoza assented and
1
A bill of lading is “a receipt given by a carrier for goods accepted for
transportation.” Random House College Dictionary 134 (1980).
2
At oral argument, defense counsel questioned the consistency of Lopez’s
testimony regarding his encounter with Mendoza. On direct examination, Lopez
only described the portion of the conversation where he asked Mendoza for
consent. He provided a more detailed version of their encounter on cross
examination, at defense counsel’s request. We find the two versions entirely
consistent, and the district court implicitly found Lopez credible. We
therefore rely upon his entire testimony.
-2-
opened the rear doors. As Mendoza latched the doors to the side
of the truck, Lopez asked if him if he had any passengers.
Mendoza said, “No.” Lopez then requested permission to look
inside of the cab of the truck. Mendoza said, “Sure. Go ahead.”
After checking the cab, Lopez returned to the rear of the trailer
and climbed inside.
An array of mostly white boxes were inside the trailer.3
The white boxes were “mummified” with cellophane wrapping and lay
on top of pallets. On top of the white boxes were a few 24" X
18" X 18" brown cardboard boxes, each with a piece of clear tape
over the top and labeled “Ryder Rental Trucks.”4 Due to their
different appearance, Lopez became suspicious of the brown boxes.
Using a pocketknife, he sliced the tape on one of the boxes and
opened it to reveal rectangular bundles wrapped in clear, grease-
stained cellophane. Lopez immediately recognized the packages to
be bricks of marijuana. He cut just enough from one of the
bricks to reveal a green, leafy substance. Ramos arrested
Mendoza as Lopez took one of the bricks inside the checkpoint for
3
The district court stated in its findings that the boxes were located in the
cab of the truck. It is evident from the record that after searching the cab,
Agent Lopez returned to the trailer, found the boxes and then executed the
search that is the subject of this appeal.
4
There was some confusion at oral argument regarding the quantity of tape over
the top of the brown cardboard boxes. In its findings, the district court
stated that the boxes “had tape on them.” At the suppression hearing, Agent
Lopez testified that the box he opened had “just a piece of Scotch tape or
just clear tape on it.” This was the only evidence the court received
regarding the manner in which the box had been closed, and Mendoza has not
disputed the agent’s testimony. The district court’s findings clearly gave
credence to Agent Lopez’s testimony, and we therefore conclude that over the
top of each box was a single piece of clear or Scotch tape.
-3-
a field test. The field test confirmed the agents’ suspicions.
In all, Mendoza had been transporting over 150 kilograms of
marijuana.
Mendoza filed a motion before the district court to suppress
the marijuana discovered in the boxes as fruit of an illegal
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court conducted
a pre-trial hearing, and denied the motion. Subsequently, the
court held a bench trial and convicted Mendoza of knowingly
possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1999). He was originally sentenced to a
prison term of 96 months, followed by four years of supervised
release. After the parties filed their briefs with this court,
at the behest of the Government the district court reduced
Mendoza’s sentence to 30 months in prison. The court did not
alter the term of supervised release. We granted Mendoza’s
motion to supplement the record with the district court’s amended
sentence.
II. Motion to Suppress
Mendoza appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. It is well established that Border Patrol agents
stationed at a permanent checkpoint site may stop a vehicle,
question its occupants about citizenship, and conduct a visual
inspection of the vehicle without any individualized suspicion
that the car or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-62, 96 S.Ct.
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3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).
The Fourth Amendment, however, prohibits a search of the
vehicle in the absence of a warrant, with only two exceptions.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 572 (1982); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219,
93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). The agents must have
either the consent of the owner to conduct the search or probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other
evidence of a crime. Id. The appellant argues that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
there was neither probable cause nor consent to open the boxes
found in the trailer of his truck. Because we find that the
search fell within the scope of Mendoza’s consent, we affirm the
district court’s ruling and do not address whether the agents
conducted the search with probable cause.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision to deny the motion
to suppress in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
the government. United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 306
(5th Cir. 2002). The district court’s conclusions of law are
subject to de novo review, but factual findings are reviewed only
for clear error. United States v. Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th
Cir. 2001). The scope of consent is a question of law. United
States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the
factual circumstances surrounding the consent may be instructive.
-5-
"[W]here the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral
testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous
standard is particularly strong since the judge had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses." United
States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993)).
B. The Scope of Consent
Mendoza does not dispute the district court’s finding that
he consented to the agents’ requests to “look in” the truck.
Instead, he argues that the search of the cardboard box inside of
the trailer exceeded the scope of his consent.
1.
When the government relies upon consent as the basis for a
warrantless search, “they have no more authority than they have
apparently been given by the consent.” Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 8.1(c) (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2003). Under the
Fourth Amendment, “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect’s consent...is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness–-what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L. Ed.
2d 297 (1991). “The question is not to be determined on the
basis of the subjective intentions of the consenting party or the
subjective interpretation of the searching officer.” LaFave,
Search & Seizure § 8.1. Although objective reasonableness is a
-6-
question of law, the factual circumstances are highly relevant
when determining what the reasonable person would have believed
to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given. See United
States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354, 1357 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(7-7 decision).5
The terms of the search’s authorization were simple. At the
initial inspection area, Ramos asked Mendoza if he could “take a
look in the back.” Mendoza replied simply, “Okay.” At the
secondary inspection area, when Lopez asked Mendoza if he could
“take a look” inside the trailer, Mendoza said, “Yes.” Law
enforcement officials are not required to separately request
permission to search each container within a vehicle for which
they have received consent to search. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
Mendoza chose not to place any explicit limitations in his
response to their general request, which, in this Circuit, is
evidence of general consent. See United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d
480, 484 (5th Cir. 1994). As we have stated in the past, “the
defendant, as the individual ‘knowing the contents of the
vehicle,’ has the ‘responsibility to limit the scope of the
consent.’” United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir.
1995)(quoting Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1993)). At the
time Mendoza consented to a search of the trailer, he knew that
the brown cardboard boxes contained marijuana. “‘[I]f he deemed
5
Decisions by an equally divided en banc court have no value as binding
precedent. United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1997). We
nonetheless find the reasoning of Ibarra persuasive.
-7-
it necessary to do so,’” he should have limited his consent “to
clarify any ambiguity from which he now seeks to benefit.” Id.The fact that Mendoza did not object when Lopez actually began to
open the box provides additional evidence that the agent’s
actions were within the scope of initial consent.6 McSween, 53
F.3d at 688; United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir.
1994).
Mendoza further argues that a reasonable person would have
assumed he had consented to only a quick look inside of the
trailer, rather than a search of the containers within, because
this is what Ramos had (1) literally requested; and (2) actually
done after receiving permission to “take a look” inside the cab
area. We first note that it is established law in this Circuit,
and others, that a request to “look in” a vehicle is the
equivalent of a request for general consent to search. McSween,
53 F.3d at 688; Crain, 33 F.3d at 484; Rich, 992 F.2d at 506.7
6
Defense counsel contends that Mendoza may not have been able to see Ramos
open the box, and was therefore not in a position to object. This is a purely
hypothetical argument. We have been unable to find any evidence in the record
to support the contention that the box was opened outside of Mendoza’s line of
sight. Moreover, this argument has been made, and rejected, in the past. “We
are unwilling to read Jimeno to hold ... that enforcement officials must
conduct all searches in plain view of the suspect, and in a manner slowly
enough that he may withdraw or delimit his consent at any time during the
search.” McSween, 53 F.3d at 688 (quoting Rich, 992 F.2d at 507).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 112 F.3d 239, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Rich, 992 F.2d at 506, for the proposition that “‘any words...that
objectively communicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is
requesting permission to [conduct a search] constitute a valid search request’
for Fourth Amendment purposes.”); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117
(11th Cir. 1991) (search of container found in trunk of vehicle after
permission given to “look” in vehicle held to be within the scope of consent);
United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1990) (consent to
“look in” defendant’s vehicle included permission to thoroughly search the
vehicle and did not limit the officer to a “cursory look through the
windows”); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1989)
-8-
Second, Lopez requested and received permission to search the
trailer before he searched the cab of the truck. It is therefore
impossible that Mendoza relied upon the way that Lopez searched
the cab as an illustration of what he was agreeing to when he
consented to a search of the trailer.
2.
The scope of a consent search may also be limited, if not by
the suspect, by the stated object of the search. Jimeno, 500
U.S. at 251. In Jimeno, the defendant was pulled over in his
vehicle for a traffic violation. The officer told Jimeno that he
suspected that he was carrying narcotics, and then asked for
permission to search the car. Jimeno consented, and the officer
discovered cocaine inside of a folded, brown paper bag that had
been placed on the floorboard of the vehicle. The Supreme Court
held that a reasonable objective person would have concluded that
Jimeno’s general consent included permission to search containers
within the car that could conceivably contain drugs, such as the
paper bag. Id. at 249-51.
Mendoza contends that when he agreed to allow the trailer to
be searched, he did so because the questions asked by the agents
led him to believe that they were solely interested in looking
for illegal aliens, who could not have been hidden inside a 24" X
18" X 18" cardboard box. See United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894
(concluding that defendant’s consent to officer’s request to “look through”
defendant’s automobile authorized officer to conduct thorough search of
vehicle).
-9-
F.2d 1430, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that searches at
checkpoints for illegal aliens are limited to compartments large
enough to hold a person). However, the exchanges between the
appellant and the agents support a consensual search of broader
dimensions.
The agents do not deny that they initially suspected that
Mendoza was transporting illegal aliens. Over twenty illegal
aliens had been found inside a similar truck at another
checkpoint in the same geographic area just three days earlier.
However, the primary inquiry in determining the scope of consent
is what a reasonable, objective, third party observer would have
understood the suspect had consented to –- not the subjective
intent of the enforcement officer. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
8.1(c). The agents did not tell Mendoza what they expected to
find during the course of a search, nor would their questions
have lead a reasonable observer to believe that they were solely
interested in eliminating the possibility that he was
transporting people.
At the primary inspection area, Agent Ramos asked Mendoza
his citizenship, and then asked him what he was hauling. Mendoza
replied that he was a Mexican citizen and was carrying cheese.
At the secondary inspection area, as Agent Lopez walked with
Mendoza to the back of the trailer, Lopez asked Mendoza his
citizenship and what he was transporting. Again, Mendoza
responded that he was a resident alien and that he was carrying
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cheese. Then Lopez said, “Well, can we take a look?” and Mendoza
replied, “Yes.” At the time that Mendoza gave his consent to
search the trailer, an objective observer would not be able to
specify a particular object of the search. Rather, the onlooker
would understand that the agents wanted to confirm that Mendoza
was indeed carrying nothing but cheese. The fact that after
Lopez received consent to search the trailer he asked Mendoza if
he had any passengers or a co-driver does not change this
conclusion. The agents never voiced their suspicion that Mendoza
was smuggling aliens, but rather asked a series of questions that
would lead a reasonable observer to believe that they were
interested in the contents of the truck generally. Considering
the conversations in toto, an objective, specifically that of
confirming the absence of people, was not sufficiently delineated
by the agents when they sought consent to constrain them in their
search. Mendoza gave general consent to a general request to
search the trailer.
3.
When a search is premised upon a general, limitless
statement of consent, enforcement officers do not have carte
blanche over the domain where consent was given. The
reasonableness superstructure of the Fourth Amendment still
applies, and demarcates the outer bounds of a consensual search.
Ibarra, 965 F.2d at 1358. The question then becomes whether it
was reasonable to interpret Mendoza’s general oral consent to
-11-
search the trailer as authority to open a cardboard box, closed
shut with a piece of tape, located inside. See McSween, 53 F.3d
at 688. Mendoza contends that it was not. We disagree.
This Circuit has already addressed the situation where
enforcement officers interpret a grant of general consent to
search a vehicle as encompassing the containers located within.
See Crain, 33 F.3d 480. In Crain, this court was faced with
circumstances virtually identical to those the Supreme Court
encountered in Jimeno, with the exception that Crain had not been
told that the officers were interested in searching for
narcotics. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50; Crain, 33 F.3d at
483. Crain and his vehicle had been stopped by law enforcement
officers for speeding. 33 F.3d at 482. Without stating
expressly or by implication what they expected a search of his
vehicle to uncover, the officers asked Crain for consent to look
inside his car. Crain agreed. Id. at 483. During the search,
one of the officers found a twisted and rolled up brown paper bag
lodged underneath the driver’s seat. Id. He opened the bag to
reveal a whitish rock substance that later proved to be crack
cocaine base. Id. Relying on Jimeno, we affirmed the district
court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress and held that
Crain’s general consent to an open-ended request to search the
vehicle reasonably extended to a paper bag jammed underneath the
seat. Id. at 484. The fact that the officers did not
particularize an objective when the sought consent did not limit
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the search’s scope beyond that which the Supreme Court had
previously deemed reasonable in Jimeno.
The Second Circuit has also concluded that the fact that the
defendant was not informed of the purpose of the search does not
affect the reasoning of Jimeno. See United States v. Snow, 44
F.3d 133, 135 (2d. Cir. 1995). In Snow, it was held that:
[T]he defendant did not–and probably could not–know
what the officer was looking for does not change our
view of his consent. It is self-evident that a police
officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle
is looking for evidence of illegal activity. It is
just as obvious that such evidence might be hidden in
closed containers. If the consent to search is
entirely open-ended, a reasonable person would have no
cause to believe that the search will be limited in
some way.
Id. at 135. The First Circuit has reached a similar conclusion.
See United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 977-78 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that general consent to search a vehicle, granted
without the defendant’s knowledge of the search’s object,
extended to a zipped duffel bag found in the trunk of the
vehicle). Although the scope of a search is generally defined by
its expressed object, an object need not have been specified if
the circumstances could otherwise lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the search might include the container at issue.
McSween, 53 F.3d at 688. As discussed earlier, we believe a
reasonable person privy to the conversations that took place
between Mendoza and each of the Border Patrol Agents would
believe that Mendoza’s consent to search the trailer included
-13-
permission to open a brown cardboard box located inside of it.
As previously noted, Mendoza did not object as Agent Lopez opened
one of the brown cardboard boxes. “A failure to object to the
breadth of the search is properly considered an indication that
the search was within the scope of the initial consent.” Id.
4.
The parties have invested significant energy into debating
whether the brown boxes were “closed” or “sealed,” and whether
they were more akin to “locked” or “unlocked” containers. In
Jimeno, the Court held that “consent to search a vehicle may
extend to closed containers found inside the vehicle.” 500 U.S.
at 250 (emphasis added). It specifically noted an exception,
however, stating in dicta that “[i]t is very likely unreasonable
to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase
within the trunk.” Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added).
Mendoza contends that because the boxes were taped shut,
they were similar to a locked or sealed container, and their
search was therefore presumptively unreasonable. The government
responds that a box, kept shut by a single piece of tape, is
necessarily more like a closed, but unlocked container whose
search the Supreme Court condoned in Jimeno. We decline to
engage in an unnecessary semantic debate over the closed vs.
sealed distinction. The dictionary definition of “seal” is “to
close or make secure against access, leakage, or passage by a
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fastening or coating.” The definition of “close” is “to bring or
bind together the parts or edges....” Merriam-Webster Collegiate
Dictionary (2002). Neither of these definitions creates much of
a distinction between the two words, and therefore do not justify
their use as categories in which to pigeonhole the brown
cardboard box in this case. They are an even less appropriate
pivot upon which the question of a consensual search’s legality
should turn.8 The distinction has not yet achieved legal
significance, and we decline to recognize it at this time.9 In
this case, where the district court made no findings on the
issue, we find that the fundamental values that drove the Supreme
Court to distinguish a locked briefcase from a twisted paper bag
to be a sufficient guide in determining whether the search at
issue was reasonable.
8
The distinction is so indeterminate that a single container has been
described by one circuit as “sealed” and by another as “closed.” In United
States v. Springs, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to
suppress the drugs located inside a baby powder container found during the
course of a consensual search of the defendant’s tote bag. 936 F.2d 1330(D.C. Cir. 1991). In the course of its opinion upholding the search of a can
of vegetable protein found during a consensual search of the defendant’s
luggage, the Third Circuit referred to the baby powder container at issue in
Springs as a “sealed” container. See United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 957
(3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). In an opinion approving the search of
taped juicer boxes found within the defendant’s luggage, the Seventh Circuit
referred to the same baby powder container at issue in Springs as a “closed”
container. See United States v. Maldonado, 38 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1994).
9
In recounting the procedural history of the case, the Supreme Court, in
Jimeno, quoted the earlier opinion of the Florida Court of Appeals which
equated the twisted paper bag at issue to a “sealed container.” 500 U.S. at
250. This is the only instance where the Court has used the term “sealed” in
this context.
This court used the word “sealed” liberally throughout both opinions in
United States v. Ibarra as descriptive of a characteristic that, if applicable
to a compartment or object opened during the course of a consent search, would
render that portion of the search illegal. 965 F.2d 1354, 1355-56, 1358, 1362
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-7).
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The Supreme Court likely differentiated between a reasonable
and unreasonable search of a container premised upon general
consent to search the vehicle in which it was found by the
varying impact that such a search has upon two interests: (1)
the owner’s expectation of privacy as demonstrated by his attempt
to lock or otherwise secure the container; and (2) the owner’s
interest in preserving the physical integrity of the container
and the functionality of its contents. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 826 (1982)(Powell, J., concurring); Jimeno,
500 U.S. at 251-52; United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d
1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1990); Ibarra, 965 F.2d at 1360.
Mendoza’s expectation of privacy with regard to the brown
cardboard boxes did not rise to the level of that evidenced by a
locked container. Locked containers require specific knowledge
of a combination, possession of a key, or a demonstration of
significant force to open. See United States v. Springs, 936
F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d
947, 957 (3d Cir. 1994). The boxes at issue in this case were
located inside the trailer of a commercial vehicle and could be
easily opened by removing or cutting through a single piece of
tape.10 A single piece of tape is commonly used on a cardboard
box not to send any particular message of privacy, but rather to
keep the stiff side flaps closed to prevent the contents from
10
Although Agent Lopez had a pocketknife with him which he used to cut the
piece of tape over the top of the box, there was no evidence presented to
indicate that the use of a knife was actually necessary to open the box.
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spilling out and being damaged during transit. The box was not
marked with the word “private,” placed underneath two pieces of
heavy luggage, or otherwise sent out a message to curious eyes
that its owner placed particular importance upon the privacy of
its contents. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n. 30
(1982). An objective appraisal of all of the circumstances
surrounding the search of the cardboard box indicates that
Mendoza’s apparent expectation of privacy regarding its contents
did not rise to the level of making its search unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
Nor did Agent Lopez damage the box, render it useless, or
endanger its contents during the course of the search. See
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (describing as “likely unreasonable”
the “breaking open of a locked briefcase” (emphasis added));
Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354 (deeming unreasonable search where agents
used sledgehammer to smash open securely boarded-up attic);
United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that slashing open a spare tire found inside the trunk
of the defendant’s vehicle exceeded the reasonable scope of
consent).
Mendoza relies particularly upon our decision in United
States v. Ibarra, where a split en banc court affirmed the
panel’s decision to suppress evidence found within the boarded-up
attic space of a house which law enforcement officers had
obtained simple consent to search. 965 F.2d 1354. In Ibarra, we
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accepted the district court’s finding that in using a
sledgehammer to remove the well-secured boards that covered the
attic entrance, the “agents engaged in flagrant structural
demolition of the premises.” Id. at 1355, 1357. Ibarra,
however, is distinguishable from the case at hand in two key
respects. First, the cardboard box is an entity independent of
the compartment (in this case, a vehicle) in question. In
Ibarra, the attic space was adjacent to, or arguably a part of,
the area of consent. See id. at 1362. Second, the search of the
box did not result in anything remotely similar to structural
damage –- to either the truck, its trailer, or the boxes. As
hordes of college students and others who seek out discarded
boxes at grocery stores are well aware, cardboard boxes that were
once taped, glued, or closed in some other manner are just as
capable of performing their function on subsequent occasions with
the help of a brand new piece of tape. In this respect,
notwithstanding the first distinction, the search of the boxes is
more similar to the search that we upheld in United States v.
Flores, where troopers unscrewed two screws and removed two vent
covers from the interior panels of a vehicle. 63 F.3d 1342, 1362
(5th Cir. 1995). In each case, with minimal effort, the
structure of the vehicle, and the boxes opened by Agent Lopez,
can be restored to their original condition.
The cardboard boxes in this case are not similar to locked
briefcases. We therefore reject the appellant’s argument that
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the search of the box was per se unreasonable based upon the
dicta of Jimeno, which addresses concerns that are inapplicable
to facts at hand.11
III. Sentencing
Mendoza contends that his amended sentence, which, in
addition to thirty months of jail time, calls for four years of
supervised release, exceeds the statutory maximum of the drug
crime for which he was convicted. His argument is premised upon
this court’s evolving jurisprudence in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466, 20 S.
Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed.2d 435 (2000). There, the Court determined
that “other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”12
Id. at 490.
Mendoza was convicted of knowingly possessing marijuana,
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The statute proscribes a minimum and maximum permissible sentence
for a violation, based upon the amount and the type of drug. §
841(b)(1)(D) mandates that prison time imposed for violations
11
We base our decision on the specific facts found here, so we do not decide
whether a package can ever be so well bound with tape that it is tantamount to
a “locked” container for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
12
The Government, at oral argument, appeared to concede this argument.
However, given the state of flux in this area of the law, and the time that
has since passed, we feel obliged to apply the law as it stands on the day of
this decision and determine the issue on the merits.
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involving less than 50 kilograms of marijuana does not exceed
five years. As a Class D felony, such a violation is also
subject to a maximum supervised release term of three years. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2); United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593,
600 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court originally sentenced
Mendoza to 96 months in jail, followed by four years of
supervised release, pursuant to the sentencing range prescribed
in § 841(b)(1)(B) for violations involving over 100 kilograms of
marijuana. At the request of the Government, the district court
subsequently amended the sentence to require 30 months of jail
time, but did not adjust the four year period of supervised
release. Mendoza maintains that the four year period of
supervised release violates Apprendi.
In United States v. Doggett, we held that Apprendi required
that the quantity of drugs to be alleged in the indictment and
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt if, as here, the
government seeks a sentence above the “core” five-year maximum in
§ 841(b)(1)(D). 230 F.3d 160, 163-65 (5th Cir. 2000). The
indictment against Mendoza charged him with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute under § 841(a)(1), but did
not allege the quantity of marijuana involved. Nor did the
district court make a finding regarding drug quantity.
Mendoza argues, for the first time on appeal, that Doggett
requires us to vacate and remand for resentencing his four-year
term of supervised release. 230 F.3d 160. In the time since the
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parties submitted their briefs, both the Supreme Court and this
court have handed down decisions that directly confront the
question before us. See United States v. Cotton, — U.S. —, 122
S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed.2d 860 (2002); United States v. Longoria,
298 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
573 (2002); United States v. Baptiste, 309 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (on petition for rehearing), petition for
cert. filed (Dec. 13, 2002) (No. 02-8060), and petition for cert.
filed (Dec. 20, 2002) (No. 02-8117).
In Cotton, the Supreme Court held that indictment omissions
should be reviewed for plain error if the defendant failed to
object to the enhanced sentence in the trial court. 122 S. Ct.
at 1783. “Under that test, before an appellate court can correct
an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) an ‘error,’ (2)
that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’”
Id. at 1785 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-
467, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed.2d 718 (1997). “If all three
conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id.The Government concedes that its failure to include drug
quantity in the indictment, a fact that increased the statutory
maximum sentence, was erroneous under the reasoning of Apprendi.
At the time of sentencing, the decision in Apprendi had been on
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the books for almost a year, and Doggett had been decided six
months earlier. The error was therefore also plain. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (equating “plain” with
“clear” or “obvious”). We decline to determine whether the error
affected Mendoza’s substantial rights, however, because we find
that the error did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Cotton, 122 S.
Ct. at 1785.
In determining the impact of the error upon the judicial
proceeding, Cotton requires us to consider the likelihood that
the grand jury would have indicted the defendant of possessing
with the intent to distribute that particular quantum of
marijuana, had the Government requested, by assessing the
available evidence relating to drug quantity. See Cotton, 122 S.
Ct. at 1786; Longoria, 298 F.3d at 373-74; Baptiste, 2002 WL
31178217, *2. If the evidence supporting the drug quantity that
the district court used as a basis for Mendoza’s enhanced term of
supervised release is “overwhelming” and “essentially
uncontroverted,” than the error cannot be said to have seriously
affected the integrity of the proceedings. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. at
1786.
Mendoza never disputed at trial or at sentencing that his
truck contained over 150 kilograms of marijuana when he came
through the Sierra Blanca checkpoint. He admitted in a statement
produced by his attorney on his behalf that he believed he was
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transporting approximately 300 pounds (approximately 145
kilograms) of marijuana. Additional statements throughout the
record consistently note that over 150 kilograms of marijuana
were ultimately discovered inside the truck. Given these
circumstances, and the precedent by which we are bound, we feel
constrained to find that the failure to mention drug quantity in
the indictment does not rise to the level of remediable plain
error.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the search of the
defendant’s truck was consensual and conducted in a reasonable
manner consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The terms of the defendant’s supervised release, while erroneous,
do not rise to the level of remediable error. The conviction and
sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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