United States v. Sullivan

Case: 20-50817 Document: 00516016636 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-50817 September 16, 2021
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Melvin Lee Sullivan,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:15-CR-738-3
Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Melvin Lee Sullivan, federal prisoner # 66136-380, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, which sought
compassionate release on the ground that he is medically vulnerable to
COVID-19 in the prison setting. Despite the Government’s assertion to the
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-50817
contrary, Sullivan’s notice of appeal was timely filed within 14 days after the
entry of the order denying his motion for reconsideration. See FED. R. APP.
P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii); United States v. Brewer, 60
F.3d 1142, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1995).
A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence, after considering
the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, if “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). We review a district court’s
decision denying compassionate release for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
In its denial order, the district court determined, after considering the
§ 3553(a) factors and the applicable policy statements and “complete[ly]
review[ing]” the motion on the merits, that Sullivan failed to show any
extraordinary and compelling reasons, that he “still pose[d] a significant
danger to the safety of the community,” and that the § 3553(a) factors
“strongly disfavor[ed]” a sentence reduction. We recently concluded that,
in addressing a prisoner’s motion for compassionate release, the district
court is “bound only by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and . . . the sentencing factors in
§ 3553(a)” and not by either the policy statement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 or its
commentary. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021). To
the extent that the district court here relied on § 1B1.13, the record does not
suggest that the district court considered it to be binding.
In any event, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See
United States v. Chacon, 742 F.3d 219, 220 (5th Cir. 2014). The district
court’s denial of relief in this case was also based on two proper grounds,
namely the lack of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a
reduction, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and a balancing of the § 3553(a) factors. See
Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392-93; see also United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283,
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No. 20-50817
20-20485, 2021 WL 1661493, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2021) (referencing a
distinction between an order erroneously based on the limits of § 1B1.13 with
an order that alternatively denied relief based on a discretionary balancing of
the § 3553(a) factors).
Sullivan’s child sex trafficking offense was especially serious, as he
was directly involved in and profited from the forced prostitution and sexual
exploitation of very young teenaged girls. See § 3553(a)(1). Additionally,
Sullivan has served only a small fraction of his 300-month sentence, and his
asserted medical conditions of a prior heart attack, hypertension, and high
cholesterol do not appear to be extraordinary, even in the context of COVID-
19 in a prison setting. See § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Thompson,
984 F.3d 431, 434-35 & nn.8, 10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 2021 WL 2044647(U.S. May 24, 2021) (No. 20-7832). And since Sullivan will not be eligible
for release until May 2037, it appears that his early release would not provide
just punishment or adequate deterrence. See § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B); Chambliss,
948 F.3d at 694. Moreover, Sullivan has not yet served the 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence for his offense, indicating that early release
would undermine the seriousness of this offense as determined by statute.
See § 3553(a)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2).
Finally, Sullivan’s renewed assertion that his postsentencing
rehabilitation efforts should have weighed in favor of release is, in essence,
a disagreement with the manner in which the district court weighed the
§ 3553(a) factors, which is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion on the
district court’s part. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 694. In light of the foregoing,
the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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