Sigmon v. Southwest Airlines Co.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-10720.
Ernesto D. SIGMON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; William Gregory Hassler, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
April 28, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before DUHÉ, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to determine whether airline
passengers can bring suit against an airline to obtain refunds of
amounts erroneously collected by the airline as federal excise
taxes. We conclude that they cannot.
In late 1995, Ernesto Sigmon and William Hassler each
purchased an airline ticket from Southwest Airlines Company
("Southwest") for travel in 1996. In addition to the ticket price,
Southwest included a 10% charge on each ticket. Southwest added
the 10% charge to all tickets sold on or before December 31, 1995,
including tickets for travel in 1996. Southwest charged this
amount in expectation that Congress would renew a longstanding
excise tax on domestic airline tickets.1 See 26 U.S.C. § 4261.
1
The parties entered into the following stipulation:
Throughout the period from July 1995 through January
1996, Southwest Airlines knew that the ten percent (10%)
1
Congress had repeatedly renewed the airline ticket excise tax
provision at the eleventh hour. See Pub.L. No. 88-52, § 3(a)(3),
77 Stat. 72 (1963); Pub.L. No. 88-348, § 2(a)(3), 78 Stat. 237
(1964); Pub.L. No. 89-44, § 303(a), 79 Stat. 136, 148 (1965);
Pub.L. No. 100-223, § 402(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1486, 1532 (1987);
Pub.L. No. 101-508, § 11213(d)(1), 104 Stat. 1388-435 (1990).
Southwest's expectation that the tax once again would be renewed
was disappointed when President Clinton vetoed the bill containing
the airline ticket excise tax. The tax expired on December 31,
1995. Although Congress reenacted the tax nearly nine months
later, the tax was not given retroactive application. Pub.L. No.
104-188, § 1609(b), 110 Stat. 1755, 1841 (1996).2
When the excise tax provision expired at the end of 1995,
excise tax Southwest Airlines was required by 26 U.S.C.
§ 4261 to collect on tickets sold by Southwest Airlines
for travel on or before December 31, 1995, had not been
extended by Congress to apply to tickets sold for travel
on or after January 1, 1996, and that no statute in force
at any time in 1995 required an excise tax to be
collected on tickets sold by Southwest Airlines for
travel on or after January 1, 1996. Nevertheless, based
on Southwest Airlines' expectation throughout the second
half of 1995 that Congress and the President would extend
the application of 26 U.S.C. § 4261 or otherwise enact a
statute requiring the collection of a ten percent (10%)
excise tax on tickets sold by Southwest Airlines for
travel on or after January 1, 1996, Southwest Airlines
collected from customers who purchased tickets in 1995
for travel on or after January 1, 1996, an amount equal
to the ten percent (10%) excise tax that Southwest
Airlines was required by 26 U.S.C. § 4261 to collect on
tickets sold by Southwest Airlines for travel on or
before December 31, 1995.
2
The tax expired again on December 31, 1996, and was reenacted
on February 28, 1997. Pub.L. No. 105-2, § 2(b)(1), 111 Stat. 4
(1997).
2
Southwest had already collected the tax on tickets sold during 1995
for travel during 1996. Ultimately, the taxes collected on these
tickets, including those purchased by putative class
representatives Sigmon and Hassler,3 were not owed; the excise tax
provision in effect in 1995 imposed the tax based on the date of
travel rather than the date of purchase.4 The total amount of
erroneously collected excise taxes at issue is unclear; Southwest
remitted approximately $18 million to the IRS in January of 1996
for all excise taxes collected during December of 1995.
Sigmon and Hassler allege that they requested refunds from
Southwest and that Southwest denied their requests. They brought
a class action suit in state court, alleging common-law causes of
action for fraud, "for money had and received," and for conversion.
Southwest removed the suit to federal district court. Sigmon and
Hassler did not move to remand the case to state court. In
addition to actual damages, they seek attorneys' fees and costs,
exemplary damages, and pre- and post-judgment interest.
Shortly after removal, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint. In response, plaintiffs moved for leave to
amend their complaint; the district court granted the motion. The
plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted an implied cause of action
3
The case was dismissed before any class was certified.
4
When Congress reenacted the tax in February of 1997, it
solved the dilemma faced by Southwest and other airlines in 1995 as
a result of the previous lapse. Congress added Section
4261(g)(1)(B), which applies the excise tax to tickets purchased
before the expiration of the tax for transportation beginning after
the expiration date. Pub.L. No. 105-2, § 2(b)(1), 111 Stat. 4
(1997).
3
under 26 U.S.C. § 6415(c) and alleged that Southwest had failed to
remit to the IRS the amounts collected as excise taxes.5 After
plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, Southwest moved to have
its motion to dismiss be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted Southwest's motion and allowed the
parties to submit summary judgment evidence.
On May 23, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Southwest on three grounds: (1) the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7422, preempts the plaintiffs' claims; (2) the
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, preempts the
plaintiffs' claims; and (3) 26 U.S.C. § 6415 does not create an
implied cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs.
I.
On appeal, Sigmon and Hassler assert that the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because they asserted only state
common-law causes of action against Southwest Airlines in their
state-court petition. Southwest Airlines removed to federal court
5
Although the parties fought long and hard in the district
court about whether Southwest actually remitted the collected
amounts to the IRS, the appellants do not pursue this line of
argument on appeal. Rather, they argue that regardless of whether
the collected funds were remitted to the IRS, Southwest is not
entitled to protection from suit under the Internal Revenue Code.
Even if appellants had raised the issue, however, it appears that
Southwest did remit the taxes it collected, although it took
credits and deductions against those amounts and remitted its net
tax liability. In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Southwest submitted the affidavit of Rhonda Heatley, Southwest's
Senior Tax Accountant, who swore that "all excise tax proceeds
collected by Southwest Airlines Company on or prior to December 31,
1995 have been remitted to the United States government" and that
"Southwest Airlines Company no longer has possession or control of
any such monies."
4
on the ground that plaintiffs stated federal claims under 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4261 and 6415. The plaintiffs' state-court petition cites 26
U.S.C. § 6415(c), which they now claim provides them with an
implied federal cause of action. We need not decide whether the
reference to Section 6415(c) in the state-court petition is
sufficient to create a federal question, because plaintiffs'
amended federal complaint clearly states an implied cause of action
under 26 U.S.C. § 6415(c). This claim constitutes a federal
question and thus gives the district court original jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Although subject-matter jurisdiction is generally assessed as
of the time of removal, there is an exception if the plaintiff
voluntarily amends his or her complaint after removal to add a
federal cause of action, and the case is "tried on the merits
without objection." See Kidd v. Southwest Airlines Co., 891 F.2d
540, 547 (5th Cir.1990).6 In this case, the district court
acquired jurisdiction, if it did not already exist, when the
plaintiffs amended their federal complaint to include an implied
cause of action under federal law. See id. at 546 ("[A]lthough
[plaintiff's] initial complaint was not removable, [plaintiff's]
decision to "throw in the towel' and amend his complaint to state
an "unmistakeable federal cause of action' conferred original
jurisdiction on the federal court.") (quoting Bernstein v. Lind-
Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir.1984)).
6
Summary judgment is equivalent to a trial on the merits for
the purpose of this rule. Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
5
The district court had discretion to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' pendent state-law claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), (c)(3); see also Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1344
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S. Ct. 189, 130 L. Ed. 2d
122 (1994). The district court's decision to retain jurisdiction
in this case was far from an abuse of discretion, especially given
that the court disposed of the plaintiffs' pendent state-law claims
based on federal preemption. Cf. Statland v. American Airlines,
Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 541 (7th Cir.) (after affirming the district
court's conclusion that the Federal Aviation Act did not create an
implied cause of action in favor of plaintiffs, the court of
appeals exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of
plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims based on federal
preemption), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012, 114 S. Ct. 603, 126
L. Ed. 2d 568 (1993).
II.
The Internal Revenue Code governs tax refund suits. Under
Section 7422(a) of the Code, a taxpayer7 who seeks a refund of
federal taxes must first make an administrative refund claim with
the Secretary of the Treasury. "No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected ... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Secretary...." 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Failing an
7
Airline ticket purchasers, not airlines, are the taxpayers of
the airline ticket excise tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 4261(d).
6
administrative resolution, the taxpayer's remedy is to file suit
against the government. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f)(1)("A suit [for
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected taxes] may be
maintained only against the United States ....")(emphasis added);
Kaucky v. Southwest Airlines Co., 109 F.3d 365, 370 (7th
Cir.1997)("Money collected in error by a lawful agent, public or
private, of the [IRS] can be recovered only from the government,
because a claim or suit to collect such money is a claim or suit
for a tax refund.").
Southwest acts as the government's agent in collecting
airline ticket excise taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 4291; see also Kaucky,
109 F.3d at 368. Section 7422 protects from lawsuits private
entities, like Southwest, that are required by statute to collect
taxes for the government under threat of criminal penalty for
failure to do so. DuPont Glore Forgan Inc. v. AT & T, 428 F. Supp.
1297, 1306 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S. Ct. 465, 58 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1978).8
Although appellants seek the return of amounts collected by
Southwest to pay anticipated excise taxes, they argue that the
Internal Revenue Code's refund scheme does not apply. The amounts
collected, they argue, were not "taxes" because the excise tax
8
Other courts in other contexts have likewise held that if
taxpayers seek to compel a refund, they must proceed against the
United States rather than against a private tax collector. See,
e.g., Burda v. M. Ecker Co., 954 F.2d 434, 439 (7th Cir.1992)
(employment tax); Econ, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 351
F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (N.D.Ill.1972) (communications excise tax); see
also Columbia Marine Servs., Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 22
(2d Cir.1988).
7
statute was not reenacted. It is literally true that the amounts
collected ultimately were not taxes. For the reasons that follow,
however, "we do not think the literal sense is the right sense."
Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 368.
Appellants advance two hypotheticals in support of their
position. Suppose, they posit, a law firm added a 10% surcharge to
its fees and called it a "federal excise tax," when no such tax
existed. Or what if an airline dreamed up a 5% "carry on luggage
tax"? The government would have no interest in the collected funds
because they are not really "taxes." The culpable tax collectors
would not deserve the protection of Section 7422 because they were
not really acting as agents for the government. Southwest, they
argue, is no different from their hypothetical tax collectors.
Unlike the defendants in these hypotheticals, however,
Southwest was not imposing a make-believe tax, nor did it dream up
a surcharge and pocket the money for itself. Southwest was
collecting an excise tax that has been part of the airline
passenger ticket sales landscape for nearly four decades. Here, it
was stipulated that Southwest "expect[ed] throughout the second
half of 1995 that Congress and the President would extend the
application of 26 U.S.C. § 4261 or otherwise enact a statute
requiring the collection of a ten percent (10%) excise tax on
tickets sold by Southwest Airlines for travel on or after January
1, 1996." Thus, Southwest was acting as an agent of the government
in collecting a tax that it had every expectation would be
reenacted, as it had been on several previous occasions. See
8
Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 368.
Citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
appellants contend that, Section 7422 notwithstanding, they may sue
Southwest because Southwest lacked a "colorable basis" for
collecting the anticipated excise tax. 370 U.S. 1, 82 S. Ct. 1125,
8 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1962). The Supreme Court in Enochs acknowledged a
limited exception to 26 U.S.C. § 7421, which prohibits the courts
from issuing injunctions against the collection of taxes. See
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509, 52 S. Ct.
260, 263, 76 L. Ed. 422 (1932). Under the Enochs exception, a
taxpayer can obtain an injunction against the collection of taxes
if it is "clear that under no circumstances could the Government
ultimately prevail ..." and equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.
Enochs, 370 U.S. at 6-7, 82 S.Ct. at 1128-29. The Enochs
exception, however, has never been applied to allow a taxpayer to
sue a private tax collector for the refund of erroneously collected
taxes.9 We need not decide whether the Enochs exception loosens
the strictures of Section 7422; Enochs is not satisifed in this
case because Southwest was acting with colorable authority when it
collected the tax. See Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 369. Appellants argue
that "[n]either the IRS nor Southwest Airlines could conceivably
9
To allow an exception to Section 7422 based on a lack of a
colorable basis, especially if evaluated at the time suit is filed,
would open Pandora's box. Plaintiffs, in search of common-law
damages in addition to a tax refund, would have strong incentives
to attempt to bypass the normal administrative tax refund process.
Such an exception would allow taxpayers to seek a judicial
resolution of whether a collected tax was colorable before
challenging the tax through the administrative process provided by
the IRS.
9
prove that Southwest Airlines properly collected the "excise taxes'
in issue." Although it is now apparent that passengers who paid
the excise tax in 1995 for travel in 1996 are entitled to a refund
from the IRS, that ex post knowledge does not establish that
Southwest lacked a colorable basis for collecting the tax. The
issue is whether Southwest had a colorable basis to collect the tax
at the time.
Although the collection may ultimately have been erroneous,
the Internal Revenue Code provides the exclusive remedy for the
erroneous or illegal collection of taxes: The taxpayer may file an
administrative claim for a refund with the IRS. If the IRS does not
return the erroneously or illegally collected tax, the taxpayer may
then resort to the courts. But under Section 7422, the proper
defendant in such a suit is the United States, not Southwest. The
exclusive remedy provided by the Internal Revenue Code thus
preempts the appellants' state-law claims against a private
entity.10
III.
Appellants also ask this court to hold that 26 U.S.C. §
6415(c) creates a private cause of action for the return of the
erroneously collected amounts. That section provides that if a
private collector of excise taxes "make[s] an overcollection of
such tax, such person shall, upon proper application, refund such
10
Because we conclude that appellants' claims are precluded by
26 U.S.C. § 7422, we need not determine the propriety of the
district court's conclusion that these claims are preempted by the
Airline Deregulation Act.
10
overcollection to the person entitled thereto." 26 U.S.C. §
6415(c). Appellants claim that the plain language of this statute
creates a federal right for their benefit, which they are entitled
to enforce in a private cause of action in state or federal court
against Southwest. We disagree.
As an initial matter, Section 6415(c) may not even apply to
the sort of refund sought by the appellants in this case. See
Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 370 (citing AT & T, 428 F. Supp. at 1304-05 and
Lehman v. USAIR Group, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 912, 915 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).
Section 6415(c) on its face is limited to "overcollection" of
excise taxes, which has historically been distinguished from
"illegal" or "erroneous" collection under Section 7422. Early
Treasury regulations explained that "overcollection" referred only
to cases in which "an excess amount [was] collected or paid" "as a
result of some clerical or mechanical error." See Treas. Reg. 43,
art. 65 (1921). The traditional distinction between taxes
collected as the result of a mechanical or clerical error and taxes
collected because of an error of law makes sense. The IRS has no
interest in taxes collected purely as a result of mechanical or
clerical error and hence need not be involved in the refund
decision. If excise taxes are collected as the result of a legal
error, however, the IRS's interest in being involved in the refund
decision is apparent. In the case of a legal error, the private
tax collector would also risk being unable to recover the amounts
refunded if the IRS determined the amount in fact was owed. See AT
& T, 428 F. Supp. at 1306.
11
Of course, in this case, there is no dispute that the taxes
were not ultimately owed. But if Section 6415(c) creates a right
of action and applies to collections due to an error of law, as the
appellants suggest, there is no principle by which the right would
be limited to cases in which the tax was clearly not owed. Under
appellants' interpretation, Section 6415(c) would allow any
taxpayer to challenge any excise tax in court without first
complaining to the IRS. If, for example, the appellants alleged
that Southwest had misinterpreted the statute and as a result
collected taxes erroneously, nothing would prevent them from
seeking a refund in court before seeking an administrative
resolution through the IRS. No rational basis exists for giving
excise taxpayers special access to the courts that is denied all
other taxpayers under Section 7422. See AT & T, 428 F. Supp. at
1304.
Even if Section 6415(c) does apply in this case, it does not
create a private right of action enforceable in federal district
court. No court appears to have recognized an implied private
cause of action under Section 6415(c), and with good reason. See
Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 370; AT & T, 428 F. Supp. at 1305; Lehman, 930
F. Supp. at 915. In evaluating whether a federal statute creates an
implied cause of action, this circuit has applied the four factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash: (1) whether the
statute creates a federal right or "especial benefit" for a class
of which plaintiffs are members; (2) whether there is any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create
12
a private cause of action; (3) whether implying a private cause of
action would be consistent with the purpose of the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action urged by the plaintiff
is one traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. 66, 78-79,
95 S. Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975). In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, the Supreme Court explained that congressional intent is
the touchstone for determining whether a federal statute creates a
private right of action. 442 U.S. 560, 578, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2490,
61 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1979); see also Louisiana Landmarks Soc'y, Inc. v.
City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir.1996) (citations
omitted). This circuit has recognized a "presumption that Congress
did not intend to create a private right of action." Louisiana
Landmarks, 85 F.3d at 1123 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Appellants "bear[ ] the relatively heavy burden of
demonstrating that Congress affirmatively contemplated private
enforcement when it passed the relevant statute." Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). They have not met that
burden.
Nothing indicates that Congress intended Section 6415(c) to
create an exception to Section 7422 that would allow excise
taxpayers to seek relief from the courts in the first instance.
Congress's failure even to hint that it intended to allow excise
taxpayers to sue private tax collectors directly for refunds,
combined with Section 7422's express bar on tax refund suits
against a defendant other than the United States, compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to provide a private
13
remedy. See Kaucky, 109 F.3d at 370 ("[T]here is ... no indication
that Congress would have wanted the courts to entertain such suits
despite the absence of express authorization.").
The third Cort v. Ash factor is particularly salient on the
issue of congressional intent. The structure of the Internal
Revenue Code shows that Congress intended the courts to play a role
only after the IRS has been given an opportunity to resolve the
taxpayer's claims. We have held that the "existence of [an]
administrative scheme of enforcement is strong evidence that
Congress intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive." Till
v. Unifirst Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 160 (5th
Cir.1981). "Indeed, it is clear under the maxim—expressio unius
est exclusio alterius—that a pervasive remedial scheme provided by
Congress is an indication there was no intent to provide an
additional private remedy." Id.
Section 6415(c) is part of a scheme set up by Congress by
which taxpayers can obtain refunds from the IRS. See AT & T, 428
F. Supp. at 1305 ("[T]he overall structure of the refund provisions
of the Code negates plaintiffs' efforts to seek a tax refund from
defendants."). To recognize a private cause of action against a
nongovernmental tax collector under Section 6415(c) would be
inconsistent with that scheme.
Appellants rely heavily on the word "shall" in 26 U.S.C. §
6415(c), which provides that a private tax collector "shall, upon
proper application, refund such overcollection to the person
entitled thereto." They argue that "shall" is a mandatory rather
14
than a permissive term and that this fact alone indicates that
Congress intended to make refunds by private tax collecting agents
mandatory. But courts do not always construe "shall" as mandatory.
See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys. v. DLG
Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993, 1001 (5th Cir.1994), cert. dismissed, ---
U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1085, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1995). Moreover, we
are especially reluctant to infer a private cause of action from
Congress's use of "shall" in Section 6415(c) when another component
of the legislative scheme, Section 7422, indicates that an
aggrieved taxpayer's remedy lies solely in a proceeding against the
United States. See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 57.06, at 20 (5th ed. 1992) ("[I]f the particular provision in
question is a part of a general legislative scheme, a consideration
of the entire scheme together may make the particular provision
clear. If the construction, mandatory or directory, would produce
conflict with other statutes, the opposite ruling would ordinarily
be adopted.").
Other than their heavy reliance on the statute's use of the
phrase "shall ... refund," appellants merely point to the absence
of evidence that Congress did not intend to create a private right
of action. This is insufficient to overcome this circuit's
presumption against implying causes of action.
IV.
Holding that appellants' state-law claims are precluded by
Section 7422 does not leave consumers at the mercy of the airlines.
Consumers can seek a refund of any erroneously collected excise
15
taxes from the IRS. We recognize that this may inconvenience
taxpayers. As a practical matter, however, many taxpayers would
have been far more inconvenienced if Southwest had failed to
collect the tax and it had been renewed as expected, especially
those taxpayers who learned about their tax deficiencies at the
departure gate.
Federal law provides an additional protection to consumers.
The Airline Deregulation Act gives the Secretary of Transportation
authority to investigate an airline's unfair or deceptive acts or
practices or unfair methods of competition. See 49 U.S.C. § 41713.
Upon discovering such an act or practice, the Secretary may issue
cease-and-desist orders or levy civil sanctions against an
offending airline. Id.; see also American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 n. 4, 115 S. Ct. 817, 823 n. 4, 130
L. Ed. 2d 715 (1995) (citations omitted). We do not suggest that
such an action would be appropriate against Southwest in this case,
only that the law provides another protection against the airlines
engaging in the mischief prophesied by the appellants.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
16