Pollard v. Campbell

Case: 21-60829 Document: 00516613925 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/18/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 18, 2023
No. 21-60829
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Isaac Pollard; Lisa Pollard; Ronnie Pollard,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Thomas Campbell; Brandon Perkins; Jonathan Hendrix,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:19-CV-182
Before Stewart, Dennis and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants—Isaac, Lisa, and Ronnie Pollard—brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against three DeSoto County Sheriff’s Department
officers to recover damages for several alleged Fourth Amendment
violations. The issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly
determined, on summary judgment, that the deputies were entitled to
qualified immunity from the Pollards’ claims of unlawful detention,
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-60829 Document: 00516613925 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/18/2023
No. 21-60829
excessive force, and warrantless entry into their home. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the
claims of unlawful detention and excessive force and therefore AFFIRM the
district court’s summary judgment with regard to those claims. However, we
find the district court erred by treating the movant-officers’ factual
contentions as true with regard to the warrantless-entry claim. Because the
district court’s analysis of that claim turned on its erroneous acceptance of
the movants’ factual contentions, we VACATE that part of its opinion and
REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
Reciting the facts as asserted by the Plaintiffs, Isaac Pollard, who has
autism, lives with his parents, Ronnie and Lisa Pollard, in Olive Branch, Mis-
sissippi. On the night in question, Isaac went for a late-night run in his neigh-
borhood and then retraced the route in his white pickup truck to confirm the
mileage of his run. While driving his route, Isaac was pulled over by Deputy
Brandon Perkins. Deputy Perkins questioned Isaac about why he was out late
but then let him go.
That same night, another resident of the Pollards’ neighborhood con-
tacted the Desoto County Sheriff’s Department about a possible car break-
in. The resident’s car had been rummaged through, but nothing was missing.
Before contacting the police, the resident had observed a male in a light-col-
ored shirt and basketball shorts walking at a fast pace in the street. The resi-
dent also saw a white pickup truck pass by. Separately, another neighbor
called in a report of a “suspicious male” wearing light-colored clothing get-
ting into a white pickup truck at the Pollard residence.
After receiving this information, Deputy Perkins went to the Pollard
residence with another officer, Deputy Hendrix. Isaac answered the door and
spoke with the deputies. What happened next is a point of contention. The
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officers claim that Isaac requested to go back into the house to retrieve his
cell phone, and that he consented to Officer Perkins accompanying him in-
side. The Pollards claim that Officer Perkins wanted to sit in the bed of
Isaac’s truck. When Isaac explained that the bed was locked and the keys
were in the house, Officer Perkins told him to go get the keys. Isaac did so, at
which point Officer Perkins followed him inside without his consent. It is un-
disputed that Officer Hendrix stood at the threshold when Perkins entered
and that Perkins was inside for less than a minute before returning outside
with Isaac.
By that time, another officer, Deputy Campbell, had arrived. The dep-
uties began questioning Isaac about his activities that evening. Isaac became
distraught and agitated, and the officers placed him in handcuffs. Isaac man-
aged to make a phone call to his parents. Ronnie and Lisa joined the officers
and Isaac outside, saw Isaac in handcuffs, and informed the officers that Isaac
was autistic, so the handcuffs were distressing for him. Isaac remained in
handcuffs for approximately an hour while he was questioned. He com-
plained that his wrists hurt, and he received several mosquito bites. Isaac
alleges that the deputies’ actions, including the use of handcuffs, caused him
severe emotional distress, and he has since been diagnosed with post-trau-
matic stress disorder.
Following these events, Isaac, Ronnie, and Lisa brought a § 1983 claim
against, inter alia, Deputy Perkins, Deputy Hendrix, and Deputy Campbell,
alleging that the officers unlawfully (1) detained Isaac; (2) used excessive
force; and (3) entered Lisa and Ronnie’s home without a warrant or consent,
all in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The deputies moved for summary
judgment, arguing that, as officials employed by the county, they were enti-
tled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and granted their mo-
tion for summary judgment. The Pollards timely appealed.
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II. Standard of Review
We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards as the trial court.” Griffin v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
However, “[a] good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the
usual summary judgment burden of proof.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376
(5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In such
cases, we draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, but “the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense [of qualified immunity]
is not available.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing
a genuine and material dispute as to whether the official is entitled to qualified
immunity.” Id.III. Discussion
The Pollards’ claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a
private right of action to a person who has been “depriv[ed] of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the
United States by a person acting under the color of state law. However, qual-
ified immunity “shields public officials sued in their individual capacities from
liability for civil damages” so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph
v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tation omitted).
The qualified-immunity analysis consists of two steps. The first in-
quiry is “whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federal right.”
Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). The second
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inquiry is “whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness
of his or her conduct.” Id. On the second prong, “[a]n officer is entitled to
qualified immunity unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circum-
stances would have then known that the defendant’s conduct violated the
United States Constitution.” Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 538–39 (5th Cir.
2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court
has made clear that this does not “require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The court need not decide the
first question before the second, and it may decide the case solely on the basis
that the right was not clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236–37, 243 (2009). Within this framework, we address whether the district
court erred in concluding that the deputies were entitled to qualified immun-
ity on the Pollards’ Fourth Amendment claims.
We start with Isaac’s claim that the deputies unlawfully detained him.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the rights of individuals “against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth
Amendment is concerned with ensuring that the scope of a given detention
“is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” United States v.
Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To be reasonable, a
warrantless arrest must ordinarily be supported by probable cause. Kaupp v.
Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (per curiam). However, officers “can stop
and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a rea-
sonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be
afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). To fall within
this exception to the usual probable-cause requirement, an investigative de-
tention “must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v.
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Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 500 (1983). Whether a particular stop is reasonable
depends on the facts of the case. Id. We consider the “information available
to the officer[s] at the time of the decision to stop a person.” See Turner v.
Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 691 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted).
The district court determined that the deputies were entitled to qual-
ified immunity on this claim, and we agree. Even if we assume arguendo that
the deputies violated Isaac’s Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him
without reasonable suspicion, we cannot say that the detention was objec-
tively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. To satisfy this test,
Isaac was required to demonstrate that “every reasonable official would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates” the law. See id. (quotation omitted).
Isaac fails to make such a showing. Rather, an objectively reasonable individ-
ual in the deputies’ position could have suspected that Isaac was responsible
for the car break-ins. As we have noted, “qualified immunity turn[s] on [the
deputies’] reasonable beliefs and knowledge, including information received
from eye witnesses.” Bone v. Dunnaway, 657 F. App’x 258, 261 (5th Cir.
2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). In detaining Isaac, the deputies relied on
information relayed to them by the neighborhood residents. Isaac matched the
physical description of the allegedly suspicious individual in front of the neigh-
bor’s house, he admitted to being out when the break-in occurred, and his
white pickup truck—the same car reported by the neighbor—was seen
nearby. We cannot say that, when viewed in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, the deputies’ detention was objectively unreasonable, and Isaac fails
to cite to controlling authority suggesting otherwise. Thus, we conclude the
deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Next, we address Isaac’s claim that the officers used excessive force.
“To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury
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that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to
the need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Windham
v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 242 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The right to be free from excessive force is clearly es-
tablished, but the degree of force that is reasonable varies based on the totality
of the circumstances. See Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 735 (5th Cir.
2013). “To gauge the objective reasonableness of the force used by a law en-
forcement officer, we must balance the amount of force used against the need
for force, paying careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case.” Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 2008) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity on the excessive-force claim, and again, we agree. The only force
the deputies used here was handcuffing, and Isaac has not demonstrated that
the deputies violated clearly established law by handcuffing him. Rather, our
court has been hesitant to conclude that handcuffing alone amounts to exces-
sive force. On the contrary, we have held that “minor, incidental injuries that
occur in connection with the use of handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not
give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive force.” Freeman v. Gore, 483
F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745,
751–52 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that “‘acute contusions of the wrist’ and psy-
chological injury from being handcuffed” were de minimis and insufficient to
establish excessive force). In the absence of precedent establishing that hand-
cuffing Isaac, under these circumstances, violates clearly established law, the
deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.
Finally, we turn to the claim of warrantless entry. The district court
found that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified by exigent circum-
stances—specifically, “[i]mmediate safety risks to the officers.” Moreover,
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it was “[o]nly because Isaac Pollard requested to obtain an item from his bed-
room” that the officers entered the home at all. These claims, however, seem
to overlook the Pollards’ contrary factual assertions, supported by deposition
testimony, that Officer Perkins told Isaac to reenter the home, and for what
appears to be a frivolous reason: Perkins desired to sit on the bed of Isaac’s
truck and therefore needed Isaac to retrieve his keys to open it.
In sum, the district court erred by treating the factual contentions of
the movant officers—rather than the nonmovant plaintiffs—as true on sum-
mary judgment. We therefore VACATE the part of the district court’s opin-
ion discussing the warrantless-entry claim and REMAND for reconsidera-
tion of that claim.
We note that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “the exigent-
circumstances exception . . . requires a court to examine whether an emergency
justified a warrantless search in a given case.” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct.
2011, 2018 (2021) (emphasis added). This requires a “case-specific” analysis
that considers the “totality of the circumstances,” for only a fact-intensive
analysis reflects “the nature of emergencies.” Id. (“Whether a ‘now or never
situation’ actually exists . . . depends upon facts on the ground.”). On remand,
if the district court once again finds that exigent circumstances justified the
officers’ warrantless entry, it should specify the “immediate safety risks”
Isaac posed that created an emergency.
The district court’s opinion is AFFIRMED IN PART and VA-
CATED and REMANDED IN PART.
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