United States v. Edwards

Case: 22-10206 Document: 00516613085 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10206
Summary Calendar FILED
January 17, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Bryan David Edwards,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:20-CR-68-1
Before Barksdale, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Bryan David Edwards was charged with distribution and receipt of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), and
possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Evidence leading to his indictment
was seized during execution of a search warrant authorizing officers to enter
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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a specified residence and “seize and forensically analyze property including
but not limited to: electronic devices, computers, tablets, cellular
[tele]phones, laptop computers, desktop computers, and digital memory
storage devices used in storage, dissemination or viewing of explicit images
in violation [of] Texas Penal Code [§] 43.262”.
Edwards moved to suppress evidence discovered during execution of
the search warrant. The court denied his suppression motion; and he entered
a conditional guilty plea to the possession count, reserving the right to appeal
the adverse suppression ruling.
Edwards asserts: the search warrant was impermissibly general
because it did not specify the parts of his cellular telephone that could be
searched or limit the types of property that could be seized; and, because the
warrant lacked precision, a reasonable officer would have known it was
invalid, meaning the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not
have applied. Further, he contends the court erred by denying his request for
a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); and maintains
that, in addition to the requested Franks hearing, the court should have
ordered sua sponte an evidentiary hearing for his suppression motion.
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, our court reviews
“factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law
enforcement action de novo”. United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594
(5th Cir. 2014). Generally, when the sufficiency of a search warrant is
challenged, we first determine whether the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies. E.g., United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857
(5th Cir. 2018).
“For the good-faith exception to apply, the executing-officer’s
reliance on the issuing-judge’s probable-cause determination and the
technical sufficiency of the warrant must have been objectively reasonable.”
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United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2005). An officer’s reliance
on a warrant is not objectively reasonable where, inter alia, the warrant
authorizing the officer’s actions is so “facially deficient” in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the
executing officers “cannot reasonably presume it to be valid”. United States
v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 343 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Despite the “including but not limited to” language in the warrant, it
provided a list of items usually expected to be used to view, store, or
disseminate child pornography, therefore linking the items to be seized and
searched with the suspected criminal offense. E.g., United States v. Layne, 43
F.3d 127, 132–33 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding warrants directing seizure of
“assorted pornographic videotapes; assorted pornographic magazines;
assorted devices” and “[c]hild pornography; records of victims; drawings;
pictures; computer disks, sexual devices; videotapes; child abuse books;
magazines; audiotapes; and any other obscene or child pornographic
material” were sufficiently particular).
Moreover, the warrant explained these items were evidence of the
commission of the offense of possession of child pornography as described in
the accompanying affidavit. E.g., United States v. Triplett, 684 F.3d 500, 505
(5th Cir. 2012) (concluding terms such as “electronic devices” or
“electronic memory devices” were sufficiently particular where warrant also
provided limiting guidance that items were relevant). That the warrant could
have been more grammatically correct and specific did not render it so
“facially deficient” that the officers could not reasonably presume it was
valid. E.g., Mays, 466 F.3d at 343 (citation omitted). And because the court
correctly determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
applied, it is unnecessary to consider Edwards’ assertion the warrant was
impermissibly general. E.g., Contreras, 905 F.3d at 857.
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To obtain a Franks hearing on a suppression motion, defendant
challenging the validity of a warrant affidavit must make a “substantial
preliminary showing” that: (1) affiant “knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth”, made a false statement in the affidavit or
omitted material information; and (2) the remaining portion of the affidavit,
or the affidavit with the omitted information included, is insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56, 171–72;
United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1376–77 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
Franks to situations involving alleged omissions in a supporting affidavit).
The court denied a Franks hearing on the grounds the alleged
omissions were immaterial, meaning they did not affect the probable-cause
determination. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1377. Edwards contends the
affidavit should have listed general information about Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses, including that IP addresses do not specify a user or device, can be
secured or open, and can be spoofed or copied. He also maintains the
affidavit should have: mentioned whether he lived alone or with others; and
included additional steps that law enforcement could have taken, such as
subpoenaing the electronic-service provider for more information.
The affidavit contained sufficient information giving rise to a fair
probability that someone in Edwards’ household uploaded child
pornography to Tumblr, the online blogging platform. E.g., Contreras, 905
F.3d at 858 (“[P]robable cause does not demand more than a fair probability
on which a reasonable person would act”. (citation omitted)). Although the
omitted information may have introduced the possibility that someone other
than Edwards could have committed the offense, it did not affect the
connection between the Tumblr account that uploaded the child
pornography, Edwards’ IP address, and his physical address. Cf. United
States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 740–42 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding probable cause
existed based on connection between transmission of child pornography,
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No. 22-10206
defendant’s IP address, and defendant’s physical address). Accordingly, the
court did not err by denying a Franks hearing on the basis that Edwards failed
to make a preliminary showing the omitted information was material to the
probable-cause determination. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1376–77.
Finally, regarding the claim that the court, in addition to the requested
Franks hearing, should have ordered an evidentiary hearing on other points
sua sponte, an evidentiary hearing is required “only when necessary to receive
evidence on an issue of fact”. United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 737
(5th Cir. 1983). Edwards contends an evidentiary hearing was necessary to
determine whether: the detective who prepared the search-warrant affidavit
knowingly and intentionally or recklessly omitted information; and the
officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Because the omitted information
was immaterial, the legal issues could be resolved without answering these
factual questions; therefore, the detective’s state of mind when allegedly
omitting the information was irrelevant. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1377.
Further, Edwards failed to assert in his suppression motion that the officers
exceeded the scope of the warrant, so it was unnecessary to order an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether they did so.
AFFIRMED.
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