Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Center Board of Trustees

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-1573
Summary Calendar.
ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS OF DALLAS, et al., Plaintiffs,
Advocacy, Incorporated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL RETARDATION CENTER BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, et al., Defendants,
Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Center Board of
Trustees, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
April 25, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Advocacy, Incorporated ("Advocacy, Inc."), the Association for
Retarded Citizens of Dallas ("ARC"), and Matt W., through his
guardian Judi Chamblee, sought declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, and monetary damages under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as
amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §
3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against the
Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center Board of
Trustees, the Dallas County Commissioners Court, Commissioners Jim
Jackson and John Wiley Price, the McShann Road Neighborhood
Association, Inc., and the Dallas County Mental Health and
1
Retardation Center.1 In November 1992, the district court
dismissed Advocacy, Inc.'s claims for lack of standing; in May
1993, the district court dismissed ARC's claims for lack of
standing. Shortly thereafter, the court granted Matt W.'s motion
to dismiss himself as a plaintiff in this action. Advocacy, Inc.
now appeals the dismissal of its claims by the district court.2
Finding Advocacy, Inc. to be without standing, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
DISCUSSION
A. Background
Matt W., a minor with mental retardation and cerebral palsy,
resided at Crossroads, a large residential facility serving
children with developmental disabilities. In April 1991, the Texas
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation decided to close
the facility and relocate the children to small group homes located
throughout the community. The Board of Trustees of the Dallas
County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center ("the Board")
took responsibility for developing three homes in the Dallas area.
The Board purchased a site located at 5640 McShann Road in Dallas
upon which to construct one of the small group homes ("the McShann
home"), the home in which Matt W. was scheduled to live. However,
the McShann Road Neighborhood Association (the "Association")
1
Joyce Brown, Sheryl Howard, Dr. Agnes Whitley, and Dr.
Paula Dobbs-Wiggins were named defendants in the original
complaint, but were later dismissed upon motion of the
plaintiffs.
2
Neither ARC nor the McShann Neighborhood Association chose
to participate in this appeal.
2
objected to the construction of the home, and the Board eventually
voted to abandon the construction of the group home on this site,
choosing instead to sell the property to the Association.
The McShann home was originally scheduled to be completed by
February 1992, and Matt W. was scheduled to move in shortly
thereafter, simultaneous to the closing of Crossroads. However,
following the cancellation of the construction of the McShann home,
it was necessary for Matt W. to move into a temporary home until
another small group home in which Matt W. was to reside permanently
was completed. Matt W. finally moved into that permanent home.
Advocacy, Inc., ARC, and Matt W. filed suit against the
defendants asserting that the move to the temporary home caused
irreparable injury to Matt W. and five other children.3 They
claimed that Matt W. had suffered severe regression in self-help
skills and ambulation with his walker. Moreover, they complained
that the Association's obstruction of the McShann home would
inhibit the development of other group homes for disabled
individuals in Dallas in the future. The lawsuit was premised on
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1986.
B. Lack of Standing
On appeal, Advocacy, Inc. contends that the district court
3
The five other children were not parties to this action.
3
erred in dismissing its claim for lack of standing.4 Advocacy,
Inc. asserts that it has both (1) standing on behalf of itself as
an organization as well as (2) representational standing on behalf
of individuals with developmental disabilities.
1. Standing On Behalf of Itself as an Organization
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct.
2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court stated the minimum
requirements that a plaintiff must establish in order to
demonstrate constitutional standing on behalf of itself as an
organization:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court. Third, it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (internal quotes, parentheses, and
citations omitted).
Because Advocacy, Inc. failed to establish that it has
suffered an injury in fact—the first requirement under Lujan—it
fails to establish organizational standing in this case.
Advocacy, Inc. claims that it has suffered the requisite
4
As a preliminary matter, appellees complain that Advocacy,
Inc. has raised before this court factual and legal arguments in
behalf of standing that were not raised in the district court.
Advocacy, Inc. relies not only upon new legal arguments, but it
has also submitted documents to this court which were never
presented to the district court. We decline to consider the
newly raised matters. See Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d
745, 751 (5th Cir.1993).
4
injury because, as a federally funded organization, it has more
than a general and abstract interest in this case. Advocacy,
Inc.'s statutory mandate is to protect and advocate the rights of
disabled individuals5 and, as a result of the appellees' actions,
it has had to direct some of its resources to challenging the
allegedly wrongful actions of the appellees. We disagree with this
characterization of "injury in fact."
The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its
resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions
or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing
upon the organization. Advocacy, Inc.'s argument implies that any
sincere plaintiff could bootstrap standing by expending its
resources in response to actions of another. Furthermore, that
Advocacy, Inc. is a federally funded program established in part to
provide disabled individuals with legal representation does not
enhance its assertion of organizational standing. If this were not
so, then, for example, indigent defender organizations established
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act or any other self-styled
advocacy group could assert standing to sue whenever it believed
the rights of its targeted beneficiaries had been violated. This
result is at odds with Lujan's definition of injury in fact as the
"invasion of a legally-protected interest." Lujan, --- U.S. at ---
-, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Advocacy, Inc. and similar groups have no
legally-protected interest in not expending their resources on
behalf of individuals for whom they are advocates, at least where
5
See 42 U.S.C. § 6042 (West Supp.1993).
5
the only resources "lost" are the legal costs of the particular
advocacy lawsuit. See id.; Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of
Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 202-03 (5th Cir.1984) (relying on
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71
L.Ed.2d 214 (1982)) aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3244, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); cf.
Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27-29 (D.C.Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980, 111 S.Ct. 508, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990)
(fair housing agency has standing if its time and money were
deflected from counseling to legal efforts against discrimination);
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1525 (7th Cir.1990)
(same).
2. Standing On Behalf of Disabled Individuals
Advocacy, Inc. also advances its alleged associational
standing to sue on behalf of individuals with developmental
disabilities. In order to have associational standing, Advocacy,
Inc. must establish (1) that its members would have standing to sue
in their own right, (2) that the interests Advocacy, Inc. seeks to
protect are germane to its organizational purpose, and (3) that
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See Self-
Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479, 484 (5th
Cir.1993) (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)).
Advocacy, Inc. fails to establish the first prong of this inquiry
because Matt W. is not a "member" of Advocacy, Inc. The
6
organization bears no relationship to traditional membership groups
because most of its "clients"—handicapped and disabled people—are
unable to participate in and guide the organization's efforts.
CONCLUSION
Matt W. and other disabled individuals affected by the
appellees' actions have standing in a case such as this, and
Advocacy, Inc. has the duty to provide them with legal assistance.
Advocacy, Inc. may be permitted to participate in such a case as
amicus curiae. However, Advocacy, Inc. does not possess standing
in its own right to litigate these claims against these appellees.
For these reasons, this court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
district court.
7