Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Department

REVISED - October 2, 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-30185
SHEILA STOCKSTILL JACOBS, Deceased; ANTHONY
JULIUS LAFORTE, Son of Sheila Stockstill Jacobs; and
CHRISTOPHER LOFORTE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
WEST FELICIANA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants,
BILL DANIEL; EARL REECH; and WAYNE RABALAIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
September 13, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
In this section 1983 claim brought by the sons of a woman who
committed suicide as a pretrial detainee in a Louisiana jail,
Defendants-Appellants, West Feliciana Sheriff Bill Daniel, Deputy
Earl Reech, and Deputy Wayne Rabalais have filed this interlocutory
appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss
this appeal as it relates to claims against Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity for
Sheriff Daniel and Deputy Reech, and we reverse the denial of
qualified immunity for Deputy Rabalais.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 21, 1996, Sheila Jacobs was arrested for the
attempted, second-degree murder, by shooting, of her uncle. Jacobs
had become enraged at her uncle when she learned that he had
allegedly sexually molested one of her sons years before. The
arresting state troopers informed an investigator for the West
Feliciana Sheriff’s Department that Jacobs told them shortly after
her arrest that, after shooting her uncle, she had tried to kill
herself by placing a loaded gun in her mouth and pulling the
trigger, but the gun had jammed. The investigator conveyed this
information to Sheriff Daniel.
Sheriff Daniel and Deputy Rabalais both testified that they
were, indeed, told that Jacobs had attempted suicide shortly before
her arrest. After processing Jacobs, the officers at the West
Feliciana Parish Prison placed Jacobs in a “detox” cell, which is
used to house inmates who are intoxicated, who need to be isolated
2
for safety reasons, or who are designated for placement on a
suicide watch. According to Deputy Rabalais’s deposition
testimony, when Jacobs was placed in the detox cell, the officers
had her on suicide watch and had placed a note to that effect in
the control center. The various defendants testified that the
detox cell could be constantly observed from the jail’s control
room through a window, but that a substantial portion of the cell,
including the bunk area, fell into a “blind spot,” and was not
visible from the control room. This cell could be completely
observed only if an officer viewed it from the hallway. The cell
also had several “tie-off” points (bars and light fixtures from
which a makeshift rope could be suspended), despite Sheriff
Daniel’s acknowledgment that a suicide prevention cell should not
have such tie off points and despite the fact that another inmate,
James Halley, had previously committed suicide in the very same
cell by hanging himself with a sheet from one of these tie-off
points. To the best of Deputy Rabalais’s knowledge, and pursuant
to Sheriff Daniel’s directive, Jacobs was not given sheets on the
first night of her detention, August 21.
On the morning of August 22, Jacobs appeared before a
Louisiana state district judge, who appointed attorney Clayton
Perkins to represent her. The next morning, Friday, August 23,
Perkins visited Jacobs at the jail. Perkins requested that Sheriff
Daniel leave Jacobs in the detox cell, and perhaps provide her with
a blanket and towel. Sheriff Daniel instructed one of his deputies
3
to give these items to Jacobs, but the record reflects only that
Jacobs received a sheet (which she eventually used to kill
herself), and there is no evidence that she received either a towel
or a blanket. In his report, Sheriff Daniel stated that he had
been thinking about moving Jacobs to another cell with other female
detainees, but decided to leave her in the detox cell after she
asked him not to move her because she was afraid the other women
would hurt her. He also noted that Jacobs had asked for her
hepatitis medication and had given no other indications that she
was planning to attempt suicide or to harm herself.
Deputies Reech and Rabalais were on duty at the West Feliciana
jail facility from 11:30 p.m. the night of August 23, until 7:30
a.m. the next morning, August 24. The record reveals that the
defendants still regarded Jacobs as a suicide risk during that
time. Indeed, Sheriff Daniel testified that Jacobs was on a
“precautionary,” though not a “straight” suicide watch. Our review
of the record reveals few discernable differences between these two
types of suicide watches. When an inmate was on “strict” suicide
watch, the informal policy at the jail was to have the inmate
checked on every fifteen minutes. Deputy Reech testified that he
and Deputy Rabalais made periodic checks on Jacobs; however, it is
unclear exactly how often the deputies checked on Jacobs while she
was under the “precautionary” suicide watch. What is clear is that
as many as 45 minutes elapsed from the time a deputy last checked
on Jacobs to the time she was discovered hanging from the light
4
fixture in the detox cell.
Specifically, the record reveals that, after having observed
Jacobs in the detox cell at 12:22 a.m. and 1:00 a.m., Deputy Reech
checked on Jacobs at 1:22 a.m., and he observed her lying awake in
her bunk. At 2:00 a.m., Deputy Rabalais went to investigate some
loud music down the hall, and on his way back to the control
station, he observed Jacobs lying awake in her bunk. Deputy
Rabalais testified that both he and Deputy Reech checked on Jacobs
sometime between 2:00 and 2:44 a.m., and that Jacobs was still
awake in her bunk. After this last check, Deputy Reech returned to
the jail lobby to read his newspaper. At approximately 2:44 a.m.,
Deputy Rabalais looked into the detox cell from the control room
and saw what appeared to be part of an arm hanging from the
ceiling. Concerned, he went to find Deputy Reech, who was still
reading the newspaper, to help him get into the detox cell. When
the deputies arrived at the cell, they found Jacobs hanging from a
sheet that had been tied around the caging surrounding a ceiling
light fixture. Deputy Rabalais found a knife and enlisted the
assistance of another inmate in cutting the sheet and lowering
Jacobs onto the floor. By all indications, Jacobs had torn a small
string from the bunk mattress and wrapped that string around the
sheet to form a make-shift rope. The paramedics who arrived only
moments later were unable to resuscitate Jacobs. Jacobs’s suicide
was the third suicide at the jail during Sheriff Daniel’s tenure
there. As noted above, James Halley’s suicide had occurred in the
5
same cell where Jacobs killed herself. The third suicide had
occurred in a cell down the hallway from the detox cell.
On July 8, 1997, Anthony LaForte commenced this action in the
Eastern District of Louisiana. The case was transferred to the
Middle District, which includes the Parish of West Feliciana. On
April 6, 1998, Jacobs’ other son, Christopher LoForte,1 was added
as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged a
violation of section 1983 by the Parish of West Feliciana, the West
Feliciana Parish Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Daniel, in his
individual and official capacities, and Deputies Reech and
Rabalais, in their individual capacities. The plaintiffs asserted
that the individual defendants violated Jacobs’s rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to her
obvious suicidal tendencies and failing to protect her from self-
inflicted harm. They also contended that Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity, violated Jacobs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by
failing to implement a suitable policy for accommodating the
medical and psychiatric needs of pretrial detainees like Jacobs.
On January 26, 1998, the case was transferred to a magistrate judge
and the parties consented to disposition by a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On August 31, 1998, Sheriff
Daniel, Deputy Reech, and Deputy Rabalais, moved for summary
judgment, claiming qualified immunity with respect to the claims
1
We have retained the seemingly inconsistent spellings of the
sons’ last names which appear in the record before us.
6
asserted against them in their individual capacity. Additionally
the defendants claimed that the medical/psychiatric accommodation
policy for pretrial detainees was constitutionally sufficient to
defeat the claim asserted against Sheriff Daniel in his official
capacity. The Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing on October 16,
1998, and on January 19, 1999, denied the motion. The individual
defendants have now timely filed this interlocutory appeal from the
denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, we must consider whether we have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. “Normally, we do not have
appellate jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a
motion for summary judgment because such [an order] is not a final
one within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Lemoine v. New
Horizons Ranch and Center, Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1999).
There is an exception to this rule, however, when a summary
judgment motion is based on an official’s claim of absolute or
qualified immunity and the district court's disposition is premised
upon a legal conclusion, and not simply a dispute with regard to
the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. (citing Mitchell v.
Forsythe, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985)). The district court's order in
this case states that the defendants' conduct was not objectively
7
reasonable in light of the applicable legal standard of deliberate
indifference. Accordingly, we have interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction to review the denial of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, but only insofar as the denial considered the
viability of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, which
defense is applicable only to the claims against Sheriff Daniel,
Deputy Reech, and Deputy Rabalais in their individual capacities.
We are without jurisdiction to review the denial of the
defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity. Municipal governments may not raise immunity
defenses on interlocutory appeal. See Nicoletti v. City of Waco,
947 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing McKee v. City of
Rockwell, 877 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1989)). And since a suit
against Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity is a suit against
the Parish, we may not review the Magistrate Judge’s denial of
summary judgment regarding Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity.
For these reasons, we must dismiss this appeal as it relates to the
claim against Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity. The
district court's decision that the individual defendants are not
entitled to immunity will be reviewed on the merits.
B. The Individual Capacity Claims
We review a denial of summary judgment based on a claim of
qualified immunity de novo, and consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. See Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d
8
298, 301 (5th Cir. 1994). To determine whether an official is
entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine: (1) whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the defendant’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law at the time of the incident. See Hare v. City of
Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Colston v.
Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997)).2
Regarding the first inquiry, the plaintiffs have stated a
claim under currently applicable law for the denial of Jacobs’s
substantive due process rights. Unlike convicted prisoners, whose
rights to constitutional essentials like medical care and safety
are guaranteed by the Eight Amendment, pretrial detainees look to
the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these same basic needs.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). A pretrial detainee’s
due process rights are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Hare II, 74 F.3d
at 639 (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S.
2
We pause here to identify the three Hare decisions which are
referenced in this opinion. The original panel opinion in Hare v.
City of Corinth, 22 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994) is referred to as Hare
I; our en banc review of that panel opinion in Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc) is referred to as
Hare II; and the second panel opinion, Hare v. City of Corinth, 135
F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998), which followed the remand ordered by our
en banc opinion, is referred to as Hare III.
9
Ct. 2979, 2983 (1983)). In Hare II, which was a somewhat factually
analogous prison suicide case, we observed that “the State owes the
same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to
provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
human needs, including medical care and protection from harm,
during their confinement.” Id. at 650.
The plaintiffs have alleged that the individual defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Jacobs’s obvious need for
protection from self-inflicted harm. It is well-settled in the law
that “a state official’s episodic act or omission violates a
pretrial detainee’s due process rights to medical care [and
protection from harm] if the official acts with subjective
deliberate indifference to the detainee’s rights.” Nerren v.
Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Hare II, 74 F.3d at 647-48).3 By alleging deliberate indifference
to Jacobs’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights, the
plaintiffs have cleared the first hurdle in defeating the
defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
The second part of our qualified immunity analysis is to
3
The claim against the individual defendants is properly
analyzed as an “episodic act or omission” case, as opposed to a
“condition of confinement” case. See Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51,
53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“In an ‘episodic act or omission’
case, an actor usually is interposed between the detainee and the
municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a
particular act or, or omission by, the actor and then derivatively
to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality
that permitted or caused the act or omission.”).
10
determine whether the defendants’ conduct was objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of
Jacobs’s suicide. As noted above, we have observed that at least
since 1989, it has been clearly established that officials will
only be liable for episodic acts or omissions resulting in the
violation of a detainee’s clearly established constitutional rights
if they “had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate
indifference to that risk.” Hare II, 74 F.3d at 650; see also
Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A
detainee’s right to adequate protection from known suicidal
tendencies was clearly established when Flores committed suicide in
January 1990.”). Thus, we must hold the defendants to the standard
of subjective deliberate indifference in determining whether their
conduct was objectively reasonable. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 327.
The determination of the objective reasonableness of particular
conduct in light of the subjective deliberate indifference standard
is a question of law for the court. See id. at 328. In Hare III,
we explained the somewhat confusing relationship between the
deliberate indifference and objective reasonableness standards as
follows:
. . . for [an] appeal on qualified immunity,
the subjective deliberate indifference
standard serves only to demonstrate the
clearly established law in effect at the time
of the incident . . . . And under that
standard–the minimum standard not to be
11
deliberately indifferent–the actions of the
individual defendants are examined to
determine whether, as a matter of law, they
were objectively unreasonable.
Hare III, 135 F.3d at 328. In other words, we are to determine
whether, in light of the facts as viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the conduct of the individual
defendants was objectively unreasonable when applied against the
deliberate indifference standard. See id. at 329.
In denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
regarding the individual capacity claims, the Magistrate Judge
first found that for purposes of summary judgment, Sheriff Daniel
and the two deputies all had subjective knowledge that Jacobs posed
a serious risk of suicide throughout her confinement.
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the defendants had
placed Jacobs on some kind of suicide watch, that she remained
classified as being a suicide risk at all relevant times, and that
a reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that they regarded
her as a suicide risk until the moment she killed herself. The
Magistrate Judge found that despite this subjective knowledge, the
defendants:
“(1) placed Jacobs in a detox cell that purportedly
permitted constant observation from the control
room but which in fact had a substantial III, 135 F.3d at 328-29 (quoting
Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, 924 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir.
1991)). It is well-settled, however, “that negligent inaction by
a jail officer does not violate the due process rights of a person
lawfully held in custody of the State.” Hare II, 74 F.3d at 645
(citing Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 671 (1986)) (emphasis
supplied). Accordingly, to be considered deliberately indifferent
to a known suicide risk, an officer’s acts must constitute at least
13
more than a mere “oversight.” See Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 635 (noting
that “oversight” in administration at juvenile behavior
modification camp where deceased plaintiff died of heatstroke was
not sufficient to demonstrate anything more than negligence and
therefore qualified immunity was appropriate). Indeed, to defeat
qualified immunity, the plaintiffs must establish that the officers
in this case were aware of a substantial and significant risk that
Jacobs might kill herself, but effectively disregarded it. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
While the Magistrate Judge evaluated the conduct of the three
defendants collectively, we note that Sheriff Daniel and his
deputies did not act in unison at every moment Jacobs was in the
jail. Accordingly, prudence and our own precedent dictates that we
examine each individual defendant’s entitlement to qualified
immunity separately. See Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th
Cir. 1999) (in a section 1983 action, the conduct of each defendant
who has been sued in his individual capacity should be examined
separately).
i. Sheriff Daniel
The record before us reveals that Sheriff Daniel was aware
that Jacobs had tried to kill herself once before and that she
posed a serious risk of trying to do so again. Throughout the time
Jacobs was in the jail, Sheriff Daniel considered her to be a
suicide risk. Under Sheriff Daniel’s supervision, Jacobs was
14
placed in the detox cell, which had a significant blind spot and
tie-off points, despite the fact that during Sheriff Daniel’s
tenure another detainee, James Halley, had committed suicide in the
same cell by hanging himself from one of the tie-off points.
Specifically, Halley tied a blanket around one of the bars in the
window of the detox cell and hung himself by fashioning the secured
blanket around his neck and sitting down. Deputy Reech, and not
Sheriff Daniel, initially ordered Jacobs to be placed in the detox
cell. Nevertheless, Sheriff Daniel effectively ratified that
decision by keeping Jacobs in the cell while he considered her to
be a significant suicide risk. Moreover, Sheriff Daniel ordered
his deputies to give Jacobs a blanket and towel, despite the fact
that he still knew that she was a suicide risk. He did not offer
any reason for doing so other than Jacobs’s appointed counsel’s
suggestion that she be given these items, and in fact, he
acknowledged that a suicidal person should not have loose bedding
of any kind in a cell with them. Sheriff Daniel also acknowledged
that it was not advisable to place a suicidal detainee in a cell
with tie-off points, even though the detox cell had tie-off points.
We note also that with full awareness that a prior suicide occurred
in the detox cell by way of an inmate securing a blanket to a tie-
off point therein, Sheriff Daniel did nothing to eliminate or
conceal the tie off points in the detox cell, which cell Sheriff
Daniel’s own unwritten policy mandated as the appropriate cell for
housing suicidal detainees.
15
Of course, Sheriff Daniel did not completely ignore Jacobs’s
suicidal condition, and in fact instituted some preventative
measures, including not allowing Jacobs to have loose bedding
during the first day and a half of her detention and instituting
more frequent checks on her. However, those measures are not be
enough to mitigate his errors and, overall, his conduct was
objectively unreasonable in light of his duty not to be
deliberately indifferent. Indeed, based on our review of other
pretrial detainee suicide cases, we conclude that there is
sufficient evidence in this record for a jury to conclude that
Sheriff Daniel acted with deliberate indifference to Jacobs’s known
suicidal tendencies. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 329 (examining
other pretrial detainee suicide cases as “backdrop of the
deliberate indifference” standard when considering whether
individual defendants might be entitled to qualified immunity).
In Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992), an
official capacity case addressing the merits of a deliberate
indifference claim, we found that a county and its sheriff were not
liable under section 1983 for the suicide of a pretrial detainee
even though the jail officials gave the detainee, who had already
attempted suicide twice, a blanket, and failed to keep him under
constant supervision. See id. at 393. Yet Rhyne actually supports
our conclusion that Sheriff Daniel’s conduct was not objectively
reasonable. In Rhyne, we concluded that the county policies did
16
not exhibit deliberate indifference because there was no evidence
that those policies were “obviously inadequate.” See id. at 392-93
(“A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent when
it is obvious that the likely consequences of not adopting a policy
will be a deprivation of constitutional rights.”). Additionally,
in Rhyne, there was no evidence such as past suicides at the jail,
“that would have alerted the Sheriff to the need for more frequent
suicide checks.” Id. at 393. Here, by contrast, Sheriff Daniel
knew that placing a clearly suicidal detainee in a cell with tie-
off points and a blind spot was “obviously inadequate.” These
accommodations became even more inadequate when one of the
deputies, at Sheriff Daniel’s direction, supplied Jacobs with loose
bedding. Our holding in Rhyne suggests that the evidence of
Sheriff Daniel’s conduct could support a jury finding of deliberate
indifference.
The two cases relied on by the defendants are distinguishable
and do not support a finding of qualified immunity for Sheriff
Daniel. In Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736 (5th Cir.
1997), a sheriff initially placed Flores, a pretrial detainee, on
suicide watch because he was acting strangely, but after twelve
hours discontinued the watch because Flores seemed to be doing
better. Flores was then given a blanket and checked every hour;
later, he hung himself with the blanket. We found that the sheriff
had not acted with subjective deliberate indifference because
17
Flores did not give any indication of suicidal tendencies at the
time he killed himself. See id. at 738-39. Unlike that kind of
situation, where “nothing the [detainee] did so clearly indicated
an intent to harm himself that the [officers] caring for him could
have only concluded that he posed a serious risk of harm to
himself,” Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999), in
this case, Sheriff Daniel was fully aware that Jacobs had actually
attempted suicide once before, regarded her as a suicide risk at
all times during her detention, and yet still placed her in the
detox cell and ordered loose bedding to be given to her.
In Hare, Tina Hare, a pretrial detainee, threatened suicide
and was moved to an isolation cell nearest to a camera. See Hare
II, 74 F.3d at 637. One of the officers took away her shoes and
belt, but left her a blanket, believing erroneously that she was
not strong enough to tear it into a size suitable for harming
herself. Hare was in fact strong enough, and hung herself with
strips of the blanket. See id. at 637-38. A panel of our Court in
Hare III found that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because their conduct was “within the parameters of
objective reasonableness,” as measured by the subjective deliberate
indifference standard. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 329. However,
Hare III is distinguishable on the basis that the officer in that
case gave Hare the blanket in the reasonable, though mistaken,
belief that she was not strong enough to hurt herself with it. In
18
this case, the only reason Sheriff Daniel had for ordering that
Jacobs be given a blanket and towel was that her attorney requested
it, and that is insufficient to excuse Sheriff Daniel’s decision.
Sheriff Daniel still regarded Jacobs as a suicide risk and would
have been well within his rights to decline the attorney’s request
on those grounds. Additionally, in Hare III, there was no
evidence, as there is in this case, that the jailers were aware of
a prior suicide by means similar to those made available to the
suicidal detainee, in the very same defective and unaltered cell,
in which the prior suicide victim was housed.
Sheriff Daniel knew that Jacobs exhibited a serious risk of
suicide and placed her in conditions he knew to be obviously
inadequate. He then ordered, without reasonable justification,
that she have a blanket and towel, even though he knew that those
items should not be in the hands of a seriously suicidal detainee.
We would find it difficult to say that this behavior could not
support a jury finding that Sheriff Daniels acted with deliberate
indifference, and likewise we find it even more difficult to say
that this conduct was objectively reasonable. For these reasons,
as well as for substantially the same as those reasons given in the
Magistrate Judge’s order denying summary judgment, we affirm the
denial of qualified immunity for Sheriff Daniel as to claims
asserted against him in his individual capacity.
ii. Deputy Reech
19
Deputy Reech was the senior deputy on duty when Jacobs killed
herself. Like Sheriff Daniel and Deputy Rabalais, he had actual
knowledge that Jacobs was a suicide risk at all times during her
detention.4 He also knew about the earlier hanging suicide of
James Halley in the detox room, and with respect to the Halley and
Jacobs suicides, Reech deposed that there was nothing they (at the
jail) could do to stop the detainees from killing themselves if
they wanted to and that it wasn’t their responsibility. Despite
this knowledge, and the fact that nothing had been done to correct
either the blind spot or the tie-off points in the detox cell,
Deputy Reech ordered Jacobs to be placed in it for a suicide watch.
Like Sheriff Daniel, Deputy Reech was on notice that these
facilities were “obviously inadequate.”
We note that it was Sheriff Daniel, not Deputy Reech, who made
the decision that Jacobs be given a blanket. The fact that Reech
did not make the decision that Jacobs should have a blanket would
seem to militate in favor of finding qualified immunity, since
after all, if no blanket had ever been provided, it would not have
made any difference which cell he had placed her in. On the other
hand, Deputy Reech did observe Jacobs lying on the bunk in the
detox cell several times during the period when she had the sheet,
and despite his awareness that a prior suicide occurred in the
4
Though he claims not to have been notified that Jacobs was on
a suicide watch, he conceded that she was placed, by him, in the
detox cell “probably” as a precautionary measure given her risk of
suicide.
20
detox cell using a blanket and that suicidal inmates should not be
given lose bedding, he did not take the sheet away from Jacobs.
Additionally, Deputy Reech did not check on Jacobs as frequently as
he was supposed to.
Given Deputy Reech’s level of knowledge about the significant
risk that Jacobs would attempt to harm herself and his disregard
for precautions he knew should be taken, we conclude that there is
enough evidence in this record from which a reasonable jury could
find subjective deliberate indifference. And in light of Deputy
Reech’s failure to insure that adequate precautions were taken to
protect Jacobs from her known suicidal tendencies, we find that
Deputy Reech’s conduct falls outside the realm of that which could
be characterized as being objectively reasonable in light of the
duty to not act with subjective deliberate indifference to a known
substantial risk of suicide.
iii. Deputy Rabalais
Based on the summary judgment evidence, we conclude that no
reasonable jury could find that Deputy Rabalais, who had only been
on the job for about six months at the time of Jacob’s death, acted
with deliberate indifference, and we further find that his conduct,
in light of the record evidence, was objectively reasonable, thus
entitling him to qualified immunity from suit in his individual
capacity. While Deputy Rabalais, like his co-defendants, had
actual knowledge that Jacobs was a suicide risk at all times during
21
her confinement, he did not make the decision to place her in the
detox cell. As noted above, Deputy Reech, the senior deputy on
duty with over twenty years of experience, made that decision.
Deputy Rabalais likewise had nothing to do with the order that
Jacobs be given a blanket and towel, which order was evidently
interpreted by some unknown jail official as entitling Jacobs to a
loose sheet instead.
In all the events leading up to the evening of Jacobs’s death,
Deputy Rabalais was essentially following orders. Additionally,
there is no evidence that Deputy Rabalais knew about the Halley
suicide in the detox cell, and he cannot be said to have been on
the same notice as Sheriff Daniel or Deputy Reech that the facility
was “obviously inadequate.” In light of his more limited
knowledge, and the fact that the orders he received from his two
superiors were not facially outrageous, Rabalais acted reasonably
in following them.
The only element of Jacobs’s detention over which Deputy
Rabalais had direct control was the frequency with which he checked
on her. Like Deputy Reech, Deputy Rabalais did not comply with
Sheriff Daniel’s unwritten policy of checking on Jacobs every
fifteen minutes. However, this failure to abide by Sheriff
Daniel’s policy alone evinces at best, negligence on the part of
Deputy Rabalais, which is insufficient to support a finding of
deliberate indifference. See Hare II, 74 F.3d at 645-46. In light
22
of the foregoing, we conclude that Deputy Rabalais conducted
himself in an objectively reasonable manner with respect to his
duty to not act with subjective deliberate indifference to the
known risk that Jacobs might have attempted suicide, and that as a
result, the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his motion for
summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing analysis, we dismiss this appeal
as it relates to the official capacity claims asserted against
Sheriff Daniel for a lack of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction,
we affirm in part the Magistrate Judge’s order to the extent that
it denies summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity on the
individual capacity claims asserted against Sheriff Daniel and
Deputy Reech, and we reverse in part the Magistrate Judge's order
to the extent it denies summary judgment on grounds of qualified
immunity on the individual capacity claims asserted against Deputy
Rabalais and we remand to the district court for entry of judgment
in his favor.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
and REMANDED.
g:\opin\99-30185.opn 23