United States v. Murta

Case: 21-20658 Document: 00516638619 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 8, 2023
No. 21-20658 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Daisy Teresa Rafoi Bleuler,
Defendant—Appellee.
consolidated with
No. 22-20377
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Paulo Jorge Da Costa Casquiero Murta,
Defendant—Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 4:17-CR-514-7, 4:17-CR-514-8
Before Graves, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns an alleged international bribery scheme between
U.S.-based businesses and Venezuelan officials. On defendants-appellees’
motions, the district court dismissed all counts charged against them and
suppressed statements made during an interview. The government timely
appealed. We REVERSE and REMAND.
I. Background:
According to the indictment, Daisy Teresa Rafoi Bleuler (“Rafoi”), a
citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and
Paulo Jorge Da Costa Casqueiro Murta (“Murta”), a citizen of Portugal and
Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm,
(together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme
wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority
payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-
owned energy company. The indictment alleges that between 2011 and 2013,
Defendants, working as agents for their co-conspirators, laundered the
proceeds of the bribery scheme through numerous financial transactions,
including through international wire transfers to and from bank accounts that
they opened overseas in the names of various companies. Specifically, the
indictment provides that in the Southern District of Texas and elsewhere,
Defendants communicated with their co-conspirators through e-mail, phone,
and various messaging applications to set up bank accounts into which their
co-conspirators’ bribe payments could be deposited and created false
justifications for those payments to conceal and disguise their nature, source,
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and ownership. There is no allegation that Rafoi was ever physically present
in the United States during the scheme. 1 Murta, however, purportedly
traveled to Miami, Florida, to meet with co-conspirators in furtherance of the
scheme.
A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging
Defendants and others with: (1) conspiring to commit money laundering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); (2) conspiring to violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a); and (3) money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 2 (Rafoi) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A), 2
(Murta). Both Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment. In addition,
Murta moved to suppress statements made during a March 2018 interview.
The district court granted the three motions. This appeal followed.
II. Subject-matter jurisdiction:
We begin by examining subject-matter jurisdiction. We review the
district court’s legal determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction de
novo. United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Urrabazo, 234 F.3d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 2000)). The district court
concluded that the FCPA and money-laundering statute did not apply
extraterritorially to Defendants, and thus the court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that “[j]urisdiction over
[Defendants] under the FCPA rests in whether the government can establish
that [he or she] was an ‘officer, director, employee or agent’ of a domestic
1
The government concedes this point.
3
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concern.” 2 Because there was no “direct or undisputed evidence” of an
agency relationship in the United States, the court found that it lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. The money-laundering counts failed as
well, said the court, because: (1) Rafoi did not commit some portion of the
offenses “while in the United States”; and (2) there were no allegations that
(a) Murta was in the United States “at the time the alleged transactions
occurred, or that he initiated, or attempted to initiate them, from within the
United States,” or (b) “any of the communications or acts … occurred in the
United States.” The court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was in error.
“In the criminal context, subject matter jurisdiction is
straightforward.” Id. at 654 (citing United States v. Scruggs, 714 F.3d 258,
262 (5th Cir. 2013)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides that “[t]he district
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction … of all offenses
against the laws of the United States.” “To invoke that grant of subject
matter jurisdiction, an indictment need only charge a defendant with an
offense against the United States in language similar to that used by the
relevant statute.” Scruggs, 714 F.3d at 262 (quoting United States v. Scruggs,
691 F.3d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “That
is the extent of the jurisdictional analysis: ‘a federal criminal case is within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court if the indictment charges
that the defendant committed a crime described in Title 18 or in one of the
other statutes defining federal crimes.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
2
Relying on its decision in the Rafoi case, the court, in dismissing Murta’s charges,
reasoned that the indictment did “not establish that the defendant was an ‘agent’ to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements of the statute.”
4
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Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 2002)) (alterations omitted). So, the
district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 3
Moreover, whether a statute reaches extraterritorial acts is not a
challenge to the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v.
Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Vasquez, 899
F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 2018) (“An argument that a statute does not apply
extraterritorially is not an argument that the court lacks jurisdiction.”).
Rather, “[e]xtraterritoriality ‘is a question on the merits rather than a
question of a tribunal’s power to hear the case.’” Vasquez, 899 F.3d at 371(quoting Rojas, 812 F.3d at 390); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010) (concluding that the extraterritorial reach of a
statute raises a “merits question,” not a question of subject-matter
jurisdiction). Therefore, because extraterritoriality concerns the merits of
the case, not the court’s power to hear it, the district court erred in
concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these counts.
III. The FCPA:
Next, we consider the court’s dismissal of the FCPA-conspiracy
charges on the grounds that the indictment did “not establish that the
defendant was an ‘agent’ to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
statute.” This Court reviews the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. United
States v. Lawrence, 727 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2013). The government
contends that the FCPA-conspiracy charges are valid under two theories.
First, that Rafoi and Murta are directly liable as enumerated actors. And
second, that Rafoi and Murta are secondarily liable as conspirators with
enumerated actors. We address each in turn.
3
Because this is an appeal by the United States, we have jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3731. Kaluza, 780 F.3d at 654.
5
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A. Liability as enumerated actors:
In pertinent part, enumerated actors under the FCPA are:
(1) any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is subject
to section 78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any
stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern,
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (emphasis added); or
(2) any person other than an issuer that is subject to section
78dd-1 of this title or a domestic concern (as defined in section
78dd-2 of this title), or for any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on
behalf of such person, while in the territory of the United
States, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (emphasis added).
The government contends that the indictment sufficiently alleges that Rafoi
and Murta are agents of a domestic concern under § 78dd-2 and that Murta
is liable as a person who acted while in the United States under § 78dd-3. We
agree.
i. Rafoi and Murta’s potential liability under § 78dd-2:
We first address the indictment’s allegations that Defendants are
liable as agents of a domestic concern. “The validity of an indictment is
governed by practical, not technical considerations, and the basic purpose
behind an indictment is to inform a defendant of the charge against him.”
United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
States v. Cooper, 714 F.3d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). “An indictment is legally sufficient if (1) each count
contains the essential elements of the offense charged, (2) the elements are
described with particularity, and (3) the charge is specific enough to protect
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the defendant against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” Id.(quoting Cooper, 714 F.3d at 877) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4
While Defendants argue that the factual allegations in the indictment
do not support the government’s conclusion that they are agents of a
domestic concern, “[a] defendant may not properly challenge an indictment,
sufficient on its face, on the ground that the allegations are not supported by
adequate evidence, for an indictment returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge
on the merits.” United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1975)
(citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)). That is because
“a defendant’s constitutional right to know the offense with which he is
charged must be distinguished from a defendant’s need to know the
evidentiary details establishing the facts of such offense, which can be
provided through a motion for bill of particulars.” United States v. Gordon,
780 F.2d 1165, 1172 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d
1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis in original). “To comply with Rule 7(c)
[of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure], an indictment need not provide
the evidentiary details of the government’s case.” United States v. Ellender,
947 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Lavergne, 805 F.2d
517, 521 (5th Cir. 1986)). Thus, “[i]n determining whether an indictment is
sufficient, [this Court] do[es] not ask whether the indictment could have
been better drafted, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional
standards.” United States v. Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 2007).
4
The Defendants are charged with two conspiracy charges and one substantive-
offense charge. “It is well established that in ‘an indictment for conspiring to commit an
offense-in which the conspiracy is the gist of the crime – it is not necessary to allege with
technical precision all the elements essential to the commission of the offense which is the
object of the conspiracy.’” Lawrence, 727 F.3d at 397 (quoting United States v. Graves, 669
F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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Against this backdrop, Defendants’ contention that the indictment
does not sufficiently allege that they are agents of a domestic concern does
not lend itself to the conclusion that the indictment is inherently insufficient.
The indictment specifically alleges that both Rafoi and Murta acted as
“agent[s] of a ‘domestic concern’ as that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15,
United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1).” This paragraph is incorporated
into every count with which Defendants are charged. Viewed practically, this
express characterization of their agent-of-a-domestic-concern status is
enough to be put on notice of the charge and agency theory asserted against
them such that they may prepare a defense. Apart from meeting this
minimum constitutional standard, the government need not describe all
evidentiary details establishing the facts of the alleged agency relationship.
See Gordon, 780 F.2d at 1172. Therefore, the district court’s grant of
Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment
adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards.
ii. Murta’s potential liability under § 78dd-3:
Next, we address the indictment’s allegations that Murta is liable as a
person acting while in the United States under § 78dd-3 based on his meeting
with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida. The indictment specifically alleges
that Murta acted as “a ‘person’ as that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15,
United States Code, Section 78dd-3(f)(1).” This paragraph is incorporated
into every count with which Defendants are charged. Viewed practically, this
express characterization of his status as a person acting while in the United
States is enough to be put on notice of the charge asserted against him such
that he may prepare a defense.
Murta counters that the charge, which relies on a sole visit to Miami,
violates his due-process rights. “In the context of non-U.S. citizens,” like
Murta, “‘due process requires the Government to demonstrate that there
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exists “a sufficient nexus between the conduct condemned and the United
States’ such that application of the statute would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair to the defendant.”’” Lawrence, 727 F.3d at 396(quoting United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006)). To
examine this nexus, we have looked to the aim of the charged activity and
fair-warning principles. Rojas, 812 F.3d at 393.
First, “[a] jurisdictional nexus exists when the aim of that activity is
to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.” Id.(quoting United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)). And
here, this nexus is demonstrated because Murta was charged with the intent
or knowledge that monies, which were the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity, would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in the
United States to a place outside the United States. This, at the very least,
constitutes harm to United States’ interests. See id.Second, Murta had fair warning that his conduct could be criminally
prosecuted. “Fair warning does not require that the defendants understand
that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in the United States so long
as they would reasonably understand that their conduct was criminal and
would subject them to prosecution somewhere.” Id. (quoting Al Kassar, 660
F.3d at 119) (emphasis in original). International-bribery schemes and money
laundering are condemned universally by law-abiding nations. That
international condemnation constitutes fair warning. See Rojas, 812 F.3d at
393 (concluding that no due-process violation existed where the crime was
internationally condemned); United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 371 (5th
Cir. 2002) (same). In sum, the indictment does not violate Murta’s due-
process rights.
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B. Liability as conspirators with enumerated actors:
In addition to potential liability as enumerated actors, the government
contends that, “[u]nder well-established principles of secondary liability,”
Defendants may be liable for conspiracy even though they were incapable of
committing the substantive offense. So, says the government, Defendants
may be charged as conspirators even if they are not the types of actors subject
to principal liability under the FCPA. The parties then ask this Court to rule
on conspiracy-related issues that the district court did not consider, 5
including the application of the limited exception created by Gebardi v.
United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932), the implication of the FCPA’s text,
history, and purpose, and the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Since they were not ruled upon by the district court, this Court is not
required to address these alternative arguments for or against dismissal.
Tercero v. Texas Southmost Coll. Dist., 989 F.3d 291, 298-99 (5th Cir. 2021).
And we decline to rule on these arguments now. See, e.g., Gil Ramirez Grp.,
L.L.C. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d 400, 411 (5th Cir. 2015) (remanding
so district court could consider issues in first instance)); Lone Star Nat. Bank,
N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 2013)
(“[W]e decline to decide these complex issues as they are better addressed
by the district court in the first instance.”); La. Env’t Action Network v. City
of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 749-50 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the
district court should determine in the first instance a complex question of
law); United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371,
381 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The district court did not reach this ground. Because
the district court should have the opportunity to address the facts
underpinning the claim of public disclosure and original source and make any
5
These arguments were, however, presented to the district court.
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necessary findings in the first instance, we do not reach this ground.”);
Breaux v. Dilsaver, 254 F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to consider
issues not ruled upon by the district court). It is proper, then, for the district
court to decide these conspiracy-related issues in the first instance. 6
C. Vagueness:
Next, we consider whether the term “agent” as used in the FCPA is
unconstitutionally vague. A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute presents a pure question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
United States v. Clark, 582 F.3d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 662 (5th Cir. 2006)). The
district court determined that the term “agent” as used in the FCPA and the
money-laundering statute 7 is unconstitutionally vague when used “as a
jurisdictional basis to prosecute a foreign national.” The government argues
that the district court’s analysis is incorrect. We agree.
“‘The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes is an essential of
Fifth Amendment due process.’” United States v. Ross, 948 F.3d 243, 246
(5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018))
(alterations omitted). “Along that line, the vagueness doctrine requires
statutes ‘define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” Id. at 246-47
6
To be clear, at this juncture, this Court neither accepts nor rejects the theory that
an individual who falls outside of the actors enumerated in the FCPA can be held liable as
a conspirator under a secondary-liability theory.
7
Although the district court applied its vagueness analysis to both the FCPA and
the money-laundering statute, the term “agent” does not appear in the money-laundering
offenses charged against Defendants. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Rafoi) and 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A) (Murta).
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(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (alteration omitted).
“[T]o be unconstitutionally vague, a statute must be impermissibly vague in
all its applications, including its application to the party bringing the
vagueness challenge.” Clark, 582 F.3d at 612-13 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Further, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997);
United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). “Objections
to vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice and
hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would
know that their conduct is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361
(1988).
The term “agent” is not vague. The district court’s vagueness
conclusion, which was rooted in the “novel application” of agency as a
means to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, is inherently flawed. The
court concluded that because “no court has interpreted the statute or
rendered a judicial decision that fairly discloses the manner in which the term
[agent] may be applied to establish jurisdiction,” the term agent as “a basis
for jurisdiction” is vague. But, considering that Defendants’ statuses as
agents implicate the merits of the case, not the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, 8 the court’s conclusion that the term “agent” is
unconstitutionally vague “when used as a basis for jurisdiction” is unsound.
Perhaps tellingly, Defendants do not defend the district court’s
vagueness analysis. Instead, the two argue that the term “agent” is vague on
8
See supra Section II.
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a lack-of-fair-warning theory. 9 Rafoi argues that “agent” is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because she “was not on notice
that simply by acting as a service provider, money manager and by
communicating about the alleged opening of Swiss bank accounts by a Swiss
bank, she would be subject to criminal penalties in the United States.” And
so, says Rafoi, “a person of ordinary intelligence would not have understood
Rafoi – a foreign national residing and working for a Swiss company in
Switzerland performing standard wealth management services – to be an
agent of a domestic concern and thus someone who would come within the
scope of persons subject to the FCPA.” Similarly, Murta conclusively
contends that he did not have fair notice that his alleged conduct could
subject him to U.S. prosecution under the FCPA as an “agent” of a domestic
concern.
That the term “agent” in the context of the FCPA is not defined and,
therefore, is governed by its common-law meaning, 10 “does not draw a line
so vague that [Defendants] w[ere] not reasonably aware of [their] potential
for engaging in illegal activity under the FCPA.” Kay, 513 F.3d at 441. The
indictment alleges that, among other things, Defendants, at the direction of
their co-conspirators, set up “a complex web of bank accounts through which
to conduct the financial transactions in connection with the scheme and
conceal the nature and ownership of the proceeds.” A person of common
intelligence would have understood that Defendants, allegedly setting up
9
Defendants argued this lack-of-fair-warning theory in their respective district-
court briefings. The court, however, centered its analysis on jurisdictional grounds and did
not address the lack-of-fair-warning theory.
10
Christiana Tr. v. Riddle, 911 F.3d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2018) (“To determine
whether an agency relationship exists, the Supreme Court looks to the Restatement of
Agency, which requires both the principal’s control over the agent and both parties’
consent to the agent’s acting on the principal’s behalf.”).
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accounts on behalf of others to obfuscate the source of monies knowingly
derived from an illegal bribery scheme, “w[ere] treading close to a
reasonably-defined line of illegality” under an agency theory of liability. See
Kay, 513 F.3d at 442. 11 Accordingly, the term “agent” is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendants.
IV. The money-laundering statute:
Next, we consider the money-laundering charges and whether they
contemplate Defendants’ conduct, which allegedly occurred “in part” in the
United States in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f). This court reviews
questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Lawrence, 727 F.3d at 391 (citing
Kay, 359 F.3d at 742). Section 1956(f) provides:
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct
prohibited by this section if –
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a
non-United States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the
United States; and
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves
funds or monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.
11
In addition, Rafoi contends that “[i]f § 78dd-2(a) is not understood as subjecting
to liability only those who act on behalf of a domestic concern, similar to an officer, director,
or employee, in carrying out a substantive violation of the statute, then the term [agent] has
no discernible meaning.”11 She correctly observes that § 78dd-2(a) subjects those to
liability when acting as an agent of a domestic concern. And the indictment alleges exactly
what Rafoi understands liability under § 78dd-2(a) to mean: that Rafoi carried out a
substantive violation of the statute by acting on behalf of a domestic concern. Because the
term “agent” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Rafoi, her argument fails.
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The government argues that the district court was wrong to conclude that
conduct can only occur “in part” in the United States if the actor “commit[s]
some portion of the offense while in the United States.” We agree.
The text of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 demonstrates Congress’s clear and
specific intent for the statute to apply extraterritorially in a case like this,
where a foreign citizen engages in money-laundering activity in part in the
United States. There is no physical-presence requirement. See, e.g., United
States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1106 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
2780 (2022) (finding unpersuasive the argument that § 1956(f) did not apply
to a defendant who was not a U.S. citizen, whose actions occurred entirely
overseas, and who did not enter the U.S. during the conspiracy); see also
United States v. Stein, 1994 WL 285020, at *4 (E.D. La. June 23, 1994)
(unpublished) (Clement, J.) (“It is plain from both the purpose of section
1956 [18 U.S.C. § 1956(f)] and its legislative history that Congress did not
intend to limit section 1956 so that it would only apply to defendants who are
actually present in the United States.”). In fact, in United States v. Iossifov,
the Sixth Circuit recently endorsed the principle that a defendant need not
be physically present in the United States to fall within the reach of § 1956(f).
45 F.4th 899, 912-14 (6th Cir. 2022). There, the court observed that
§ 1956(f) “explicitly states that it applies to foreign citizens where the
conduct in question occurs, at least ‘in part,’ in the United States.” Id. at
912. It concluded that the statute’s reach encompassed the foreign defendant
because his conspiratorial conduct – which included communicating with
persons located in the United States and creating false identifications to
facilitate transactions within the United States – occurred “in part” in the
United States. Id. at 912-14. The Sixth Circuit did not require that the
defendant be physically present in the United States. Id. at 913 (“[A]s long
as … conspiratorial conduct occurred in the United States, jurisdiction was
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proper here.”). Likewise, Rafoi’s conduct need not have occurred while she
was physically present in the United States.
The indictment alleges that “in the Southern District of Texas and
elsewhere,” Rafoi “did knowingly conduct, and aid, abet, and cause others
to conduct, and attempt to conduct” the Rincon-Company-2 wire, a financial
transaction. The indictment, then, expressly alleges that the transaction and
Rafoi’s activity took place, at least in part, in the United States in accordance
with § 1956(f). 12 Similarly, the indictment alleges that “in the Southern
District of Texas and elsewhere,” Murta “did knowingly set up the
structures and accounts used in the money laundering scheme.” The
indictment, then, expressly alleges that the transaction and Murta’s activity
took place, at least in part, in the United States in accordance with § 1956(f).
Whether there is proof that Defendants did, in fact, engage in conduct that
took place in part in the United States is surely a fair subject for a trial
defense. But for now, the allegations that Defendants engaged in conduct
that occurred in part in the Southern District of Texas satisfy the money-
laundering statute’s extraterritorial provision. The district court erred in
concluding otherwise.
V. Tolling the statute of limitations:
Next, we consider the government’s challenge to the district court’s
dismissal of Murta’s indictment on statute-of-limitations grounds. “The
district court’s ultimate decision that the statute of limitations was properly
tolled is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo.” United States v. Wilson, 322
F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). Factual findings underpinning that ultimate
12
Moreover, Rafoi’s argument that Rincon Company 2’s action could have
originated outside of the U.S. via its Venezuelan affiliate, as opposed to in the U.S., is of no
import. It matters not where the transaction originated, but that the defendant’s conduct
occurred in part in the United States. See § 1956(f).
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finding, however, are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Pursley, 22
F.4th 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2022).
The statute of limitations for Murta’s alleged offenses is five years, see
18 U.S.C. § 3282, and is subject to suspension. The length of the suspension
of the statute of limitations is determined by 18 U.S.C. § 3292. United States
v. Pursley, 22 F.4th 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2022). Section 3292 provides:
(a)(1) Upon application of the United States, filed before re-
turn of an indictment, indicating that evidence of an offense
is in a foreign country, the district court before which a grand
jury is impaneled to investigate the offense shall suspend the
running of the statute of limitations for the offense if the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an official re-
quest has been made for such evidence and that it reasonably
appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was
made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a pe-
riod of suspension under this section shall begin on the date on
which the official request is made and end on the date on which
the foreign court or authority takes final action on the request.
(c) The total of all periods of suspension under this section
with respect to an offense--
(1) shall not exceed three years; and
(2) shall not extend a period within which a criminal
case must be initiated for more than six months if all for-
eign authorities take final action before such period
would expire without regard to this section. ….
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18 U.S.C. § 3292 (emphasis added).
The district court found that the 2019 indictment - the first of the
indictments to charge Murta – was untimely because the mutual legal
assistance treaty (“MLAT”) 13 requests and related tolling orders failed to
toll the statutes. The government contends that under § 3292, the second
MLAT request and related tolling order suspended the five-year statute of
limitations of the offenses charged. We agree.
i. Pertinent facts:
Over the course of its five-year investigation, the government
submitted multiple MLAT requests to other countries. It filed related
applications to toll the statute of limitations in the district court. And the
grand jury returned multiple indictments.
In 2014, the government submitted its first MLAT request to
Switzerland and filed a related application to toll the statute of limitations in
the district court. Neither the MLAT request nor the tolling application
identified Murta. A district judge granted the government’s application on
September 21, 2015. Approximately two months later, a grand jury returned
its first indictment. Murta was not charged. 14
The government submitted its second MLAT request to Switzerland
on November 7, 2016, and filed a related application to toll the statute of
limitations in the district court. A district judge granted the government’s
13
The district court noted that “the government may move to suspend the tolling
of the statute of limitations during a request of foreign authorities for documents or records
that might aid a grand jury in its determination whether there is evidence to indict a
person.” One such request is an MLAT.
14
On June 8, 2016, Swiss authorities provided documents in response to the
December 2014 MLAT request. The government, however, purportedly never received a
formal letter of final execution regarding this MLAT request.
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application on January 12, 2017. 15 Neither the MLAT request nor the tolling
order identified Murta. Months later, on August 23, 2017, a grand jury
returned a superseding indictment. Murta was not charged.
The government submitted its third MLAT request on March 5, 2018,
this time to Portugal, requesting that Portuguese authorities interview Murta
and others as witnesses. Fifteen days later, two U.S. agents interviewed
Murta for multiple hours at a local criminal investigation office in Portugal.
In 2019, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Murta for offenses
allegedly committed between 2011 and 2013.
ii. Analysis:
Section 3292 has four prerequisites that, if present, mandate 16 a court
order of tolling: (1) the United States must apply for tolling, (2) the
application must be “filed before return of an indictment,” and the court
must find by a preponderance of the evidence both that (3) “an official
request has been made” for foreign evidence and (4) “it reasonably appears”
that such evidence is or was in that foreign nation. 18 U.S.C. § 3292. There
is no dispute that, upon (1) an application of the United States, a court found
that (3) an official request was made and that (4) it reasonably appeared that
evidence was in that foreign nation. Nor is there any dispute that, if the
second MLAT’s 2017 Tolling Order was not improvidently granted and did,
in fact, apply to Murta, the statute of limitations was tolled sufficiently such
15
It was not until August 15, 2018, that Swiss authorities provided documents in
response to the November 2016 MLAT request. The accompanying transmittal letter
stated that the enclosed documents resulted from the “partial execution” of the 2016
MLAT request. On October 4, 2018, the Swiss government provided additional evidence
and a transmittal letter stating that it had fully executed the November 2016 MLAT.
16
See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Use of the word
‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary
is made”).
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that Murta was properly and timely indicted as to these alleged crimes. Thus,
the suspension was both warranted and effective unless the application was
not (2) “filed before return of an indictment.”
The parties disagree as to whether this statute gives the government
only one shot to get it right – that is, whether for any one course of illegal
activity, the government may use § 3292 to toll the statute of limitations only
once and for all possible participants. This particular dispute is a matter of
first impression for any federal court. In order to interpret the statute, it
makes sense to consider it in the context of a criminal investigation. As an
ordinary matter of course, investigation of an offense is always likely to reveal
its participants, perhaps multiple, and the indictment of one participant does
not prohibit the subsequent indictment of another – this much is above
dispute. It is unclear whether the language of this statute changes the nature
of this ordinary course.
In the federal criminal system, tolling of the statute of limitations must
be established “by law;” there are no common-law or equitable-tolling
provisions for the filing of an indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
Moreover, “criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in
favor of repose.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (cleaned
up). “The purpose of a statute of limitations is to … protect individuals from
having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have
become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.” Id. at 114-15. “Such a
time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement
officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 115.
In the case of investigations involving foreign evidence, though,
Congress determined that investigators ought to have the opportunity to toll
the statute of limitations in certain circumstances “to compensate for ‘delays
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attendant in obtaining records from other countries.’” United States v.
Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-907, at
2-3 (1984)). This accords naturally with the “salutary effect” of a statute of
limitations – while domestic investigators faced with a statute of limitations
are encouraged to investigate promptly, officials in other nations have no
such interest in crimes being investigated and prosecuted by other nations.
Congress determined that this fact of life ought not to deter or hinder
criminal investigations.
And as the case law indicates, statutes of limitations are designed to
“protect individuals,” Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114, and rightly so, for it is
individuals who face the consequences of actions – not offenses. This simple
fact also illustrates why the language of “an indictment” in the statute most
neatly corresponds to the government’s view of the case here. As the
government points out, had Congress intended the statute to refer to “any”
indictment relating to the offense in question, it could have done so by use of
“any,” “initial,” “first,” or another such word, and Congress has done so
in other statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 3282(b) (“In any indictment for an offense
under chapter 109A for which the identity of the accused is unknown…”).
Instead, “before return of an indictment” is more naturally read to refer to
the indictment charging the specific defendant in question. Thus, it operates
as a limitation on the government’s ability to seek additional tolling even after
it has received the records from foreign countries and sought an indictment
against that particular defendant. In keeping with the general purpose of
statutes of limitations, § 3292 is designed to ensure prompt and diligent pre-
indictment investigation.
So, the language of the statute lends itself to the government’s
interpretation, especially in light of the manner in which investigations
typically proceed. The government is correct that “[p]recluding [it] from
tolling the statute of limitations as to newly implicated defendants … even
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though the process of requesting and receiving evidence from a foreign
government often takes substantial time (and longer than the use of
subpoenas for U.S.-based evidence), would be inconsistent with the purpose
of § 3292.” The district court’s conclusion that § 3292 failed to toll the
statute of limitations is erroneous.
VI. Motion to suppress:
Next, we examine the district court’s grant of Murta’s motion to sup-
press. In March of 2015, Portuguese authorities, at the request of the U.S.
government, interviewed Murta as a witness. The interview lasted multiple
hours and was conducted at a local criminal investigation office in Portugal.
Murta was accompanied by his lawyer. 17 Two translators and a Portuguese
judicial police inspector were also present during the interview. Murta was
never read his Miranda rights and, accordingly, later moved to suppress the
statements made. The district court granted the motion after concluding that
Murta was questioned while in a custodial environment. The government
argues that Murta was not “in custody” under Miranda during the interview.
We agree.
“Custody determinations under Miranda present a mixed question of
law and fact.” United States v. Coulter, 41 F.4th 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting United States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir.
2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When considering the denial of
a motion to suppress, this Court reviews factual findings for clear error and
legal conclusions, including whether Miranda’s guarantees have been
impermissibly denied, de novo.” Id. (quoting United States v. Nelson, 990
F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation marks and alteration
17
There is no argument made, nor any record evidence suggesting, that this
attorney was incompetent or inadequate in any way.
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omitted). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible
in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423,
427 (5th Cir. 2001). “[T]his court evaluates evidence in the light most
favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court, and it will uphold
the district court’s ruling on the motion if there is any reasonable view of the
evidence to support it.” Coulter, 41 F.4th at 456 (quoting United States v.
Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
“Custodial interrogations that necessitate Miranda warnings consist
of ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.’” Coulter, 41 F.4th at 457 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444). “Custody for purposes of Miranda ‘is a term of art that specifies
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of
coercion.’” Arellano-Banuelos, 927 F.3d at 359 (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565
U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012)).
This Court employs a two-step inquiry to determine whether a
custodial interrogation occurred. First, looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the Court analyzes the defendant’s freedom of movement.
Next, it analyzes whether the questioning took place in an environment
resembling the stationhouse questioning at issue in Miranda. Coulter, 41
F.4th at 457-58.
i. The freedom-of-movement test:
To the first step. “A suspect is ... ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes
when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s
position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal
arrest.” Coulter, 41 F.4th at 457 (quoting United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d
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769, 774 (5th Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original). “The reasonable person
through whom [this Court] view[s] the situation must be neutral to the
environment and to the purposes of the investigation – that is, neither guilty
of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the
seriousness of the circumstances.” United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593,
596 (5th Cir. 1988). “Neither the officer’s nor the suspect’s subjective intent
‘is relevant to the custody determination.’” Coulter, 41 F.4th at 458 (quoting
United States v. Chavira, 614 F.3d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 2010)).
“A custodial determination in the Miranda context involves ‘an
objective determination, depending on the totality of the circumstances, that
looks to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and whether, given
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he was at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Id. (quoting Nelson, 990 F.3d at
955). “[T]o determine how a suspect would have ‘gauge[d]’ his ‘freedom of
movement,’ courts must examine ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation,’” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511
U.S. 318, 322, 325 (1994), including:
• The length of the questioning;
• The location of the questioning;
• The accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning;
• The amount of restraint on the individual’s physical movement;
and
• The statements made by officers regarding the individual’s
freedom to move or leave.
Coulter, 41 F.4th at 458 (citing Wright, 777 F.3d at 775). “No one fact is
determinative.” Wright, 777 F.3d at 775.
Notwithstanding the want of record evidence, the district court
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presumably found the third and fourth factors decisive as those were the only
two factors considered in its analysis section. For example, it concluded that:
(1) the agent’s questions were “asked in an intimidating manner and were
designed to elicit incriminating responses”; and (2) Murta was restrained
and not free to leave where Portuguese law allegedly “required the
defendant’s attendance, even as a ‘witness’, to appear and remain in the
interview until the questioning was concluded.” But because the freedom-
of-movement test is based on the totality of the circumstances, we consider
each of the five factors in turn.
First, the length of the questioning. The district court observed that
“[t]he interview started at 10:00 a.m. and continued until 6:50 p.m.” and
“[b]etween those hours, the defendant took a lunch break and two fifteen-
minute breaks.” At 4:50 p.m., Murta began reviewing and revising a typed
transcription of the agents’ interview notes. The length of the detention
certainly raises considerable suspicion. See United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d
120, 124 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that a detention of approximately an
hour raises considerable suspicion). This Court, however, “has warned
against ‘overreliance upon the length of questioning’ because doing so
‘injects a measure of hindsight into the analysis which it wishes to avoid.’”
Coulter, 41 F.4th at 458-59 (quoting Harrell, 894 F.2d at 124 n.1).
Second, the location of the questioning. The district court stated that
Murta, accompanied by his attorney, was interviewed in a conference room
at a local criminal investigation office. When a defendant is “interviewed in
a well-lit, averaged-sized conference room, where he was ‘not
uncomfortable,’” the environment negates a finding that the defendant is in
custody. Howes, 565 U.S. at 515. There is no description of the conference
room set forth in the record on appeal. In addition to Murta and his attorney,
there were two U.S.-government agents, one Portuguese judicial police
inspector, and two translators in the room. To be sure, the presence of
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multiple agents may indicate that an individual is in custody. That Murta’s
attorney was present, however, is key. See Chavira, 614 F.3d at 135(observing that the presence of only government agents weighs in favor of
finding that defendant was “in custody”). Likely, the “criminal
investigations office” is not the isolated police-station setting that brings with
it the compulsion to speak where Murta was accompanied by his attorney to
guard him against intimidation, coercion, or trickery. See United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579 (1976); Howes, 565 U.S. at 512 (observing that
isolation may contribute to a coercive atmosphere by preventing individuals
who serve as safeguards from attending the meeting). Indeed, the presence
of counsel is an adequate protective device employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458,
466.
Third, the accusatory or non-accusatory nature of the questioning.
Without citation to the record, the district court stated that “[t]he DHS
agents conducted the entire interview, asking all the questions” and
“[a]ccording to the defendant, in instances where his answers appeared to
[the agents] to be untruthful or inaccurate, the agents became argumentative,
attempting to persuade him to change his statement(s).” Moreover, without
explanation, the court concluded that the questions were asked “in an
intimidating manner and were designed to elicit incriminating responses.”
The only two sources of record evidence describing the interview, the Record
of Examination and Murta’s attorney’s affidavit, contradict such
conclusions.
The Record of Examination presents a 16-page summary of the
interview, which Murta and his attorney had the liberty to review and revise
for two hours following the close of questioning. This summary highlights
the bland, non-accusatory and cooperative tone throughout. For example,
the summary notes:
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• “He was asked what was his connection with the Espirito Santo
Group?”
• “When asked who ordered those payments to be made, he stated that
it is in the newspapers, as far as he knows, it was a decision from the
BES board of directors.”
• “When asked if he knew Roberto Rincon, he answered that he does
not remember.”
• “When asked to comment on the fact that Abraham Shiera claimed
that the respondent herein knew who the ‘friends’ were, he stated that
if he said that, it is probably true, but that he does not recall who they
are.”
• “He was asked who recommended César? He did not have the slight-
est recollection, if he opened Labarca’s account, he certainly knew
him, but he surely did not know César.”
This representative sample of non-accusatory and non-threatening
questions does not support the district court’s conclusion. See Coulter, 41
F.4th at 460 (observing that non-accusatory and non-threatening inquiries
negated the fact that defendant was in custody); Wright, 777 F.3d at 777
(observing that cooperative tone throughout interview transcript negated
proposition that defendant was in custody).
Moreover, absent from the one short paragraph in Murta’s attorney’s
affidavit describing the interview is any indication of its tone. Murta’s
attorney’s observation that “[s]everal times throughout the meeting, the
American agents said that they wanted Mr. Murta’s help” weighs against a
finding that the interview was accusatory or threatening. See Coulter, 41
F.4th at 460 (observing that a police officer’s statements that he wanted the
defendant to “be honest” and “real upfront with him” evidenced non-
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accusatory and non-threatening interview) (alterations omitted). Further,
Murta’s attorney’s observation that the agents repeatedly informed Murta
that he was only a witness, not a subject or target, evidences the non-
accusatory nature of the questioning. At no point was he accused of any
crime so as to heighten apprehension. See Chavira, 614 F.3d at 135. So, when
identified as a mere witness tapped to help the government, it cannot be said
that Murta had some sort of “awareness … that he ha[d] become the ‘focal
point’ of the investigation, or that the police already ha[d] ample cause to
arrest him, [which] may well [have] [led] him to conclude, as a reasonable
person, that he [wa]s not free to leave, [and] that he ha[d] been significantly
deprived of his freedom.” See Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 597 n.16. While “the
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure from an
interrogator’s insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a
confession is obtained,” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984), a
reasonable person reminded that he is a witness and there to help the
government would not have the impression that the interview would
continue until a confession was given.
Fourth, the amount of restraint on the individual’s physical
movement. “Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody
for purposes of Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. “Indeed, ‘some
significant restraint of freedom of movement must have occurred,’” Coulter,
41 F.4th at 460 (quoting United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.
1993)) (emphasis in original and alteration omitted), such that a reasonable
person in Murta’s position would have equated the restraint on his
movement with formal arrest. Id. There is no evidence that Murta was
physically restrained. Nor is there evidence that he was “followed and
monitored,” which would indicate restraint, during the multiple breaks
permitted over the course of the interview. See United States v. Cavazos, 668
F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (observing that the following and monitoring of
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defendant on breaks weighed in favor of a finding that defendant was in
custody).
The district court concluded that Murta was restrained because
Portuguese law required him to appear and remain in the interview until the
questioning concluded. It sourced this conclusion from Murta’s attorney’s
affidavit, which explains that a witness is required to attend the noticed
interview and can be arrested for non-appearance. Even assuming that the
requirement to attend the meeting is a requirement to be present for its entire
duration, “the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully
d[oes] not in itself convert [a defendant’s] otherwise voluntary statements
into compelled ones.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427. And no such conversion
took place. The record does not support that any compulsion Murta might
have felt as a result of Portuguese law was “comparable to the pressure on a
suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent
custodial interrogator.” Id. at 433. Therefore, it does not stand to reason
that Murta, who was legally required to appear and did so, was necessarily
placed “in custody” under Miranda.
Lastly, the statements made by officers regarding Murta’s freedom to
move or leave. Without record support, the district court stated that “[a]t
no time did the DHS agents inform the defendant that [Murta] had the
protection of the federal Constitution and could refuse or stop the
questioning or not … sign a statement.” To be sure, there is no evidence that
the agents advised Murta that he was free to move or leave or that Murta
asked or attempted to end the interview and was denied. Instead, the agents
said “multiple times” that Murta was only a witness, not a suspect or target,
which would suggest to a reasonable person that he had the freedom to move
or leave and that he was not under arrest. Cf. Coulter, 41 F.4th at 461.
“Informing a suspect he is ‘not under arrest, even without explicitly telling
him he is free to leave, .... would also suggest to a reasonable person that he
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is free to leave.’” Coulter, 41 F.4th at 461 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 781
F.3d 221, 231 (5th Cir. 2015)) (alterations omitted). Against this backdrop, a
reasonable person, summoned to an interview with his attorney present and
having been repeatedly reminded that he was merely a witness, would not
have equated his interview with formal arrest.
The totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in
Murta’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of
movement with formal arrest. But in the unlikely event that a reasonable
person in Murta’s situation thought he was “in custody,” no evidence
suggests that the environment in which Murta was interviewed was
tantamount to a station-house interrogation as contemplated by Miranda,
which is the second step of the inquiry.
ii. Station-house environment
To the second step. This Court must determine “whether the
relevant environment [in which Murta was questioned] presents the same
inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue
in Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. The station-house-environment
concerns at issue in Miranda are not implicated here.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court observed that the “practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most
cherished principles – that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58. One such “adequate protective device” is
“[t]he presence of counsel,” as he or she “would insure that statements
made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of
compulsion.” Id. at 466. Why, then, would Murta’s interview present the
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same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station-house questioning
at issue in Miranda when the Court acknowledged that such pressures are
mooted by the presence of his attorney? It does not.
First, in the presence of Murta’s attorney, it is unlikely that the
interrogators would abuse their powers or that Murta would submit to the
U.S. agents’ will and confess. Thus, the Supreme Court’s concern that
incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere would
result in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, is not implicated while Murta’s attorney is
present. In other words, Murta’s attorney’s presence and involvement for
the entirety of the interview, including the fact that he reviewed and signed
off on the interview notes, dispels the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings.
Second, the Supreme Court has “recognized that many official
investigations … take place in a setting wholly different from custodial police
interrogation.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 579-80. Here, the purpose of
Murta’s interview was to gather information from a witness about individuals
related to a bribery and money-laundering scheme. Murta, a witness who had
been repeatedly told that he was not a target or suspect and not accused of
any crime, was therefore “unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for
prompt release” or to be “pressured to speak by the hope that, after doing
so, he will be allowed to leave and go home.” Howes, 565 at 511. So, the
environment in which the agents questioned Murta, wherein his attorney
could safeguard against police coercion, does not present the same inherently
coercive pressures as the station-house questioning at issue in Miranda. The
district court’s order suppressing the statements, then, was erroneous.
31
Case: 21-20658 Document: 00516638619 Page: 32 Date Filed: 02/08/2023
No. 21-20658
c/w No.22-20377
VII. Conclusion:
The district court’s grant of Rafoi and Murta’s motions to dismiss and
Murta’s motion to suppress was error. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
REMAND.
32