Sousa-Santos v. Garland

Case: 22-60194 Document: 00516640975 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/09/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-60194 February 9, 2023
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Andreia Sousa-Santos,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
______________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A098 592 886
______________________________
Before Smith, Southwick, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Andreia Sousa-Santos, appearing pro se, is a native and citizen of
Brazil. She petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) denial of her motion for reconsideration of her first motion to
reopen and the denial of her second motion to reopen. She was ordered
removed in absentia in 2004. In 2019, she filed her first motion to reopen on
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-60194
the grounds that she was seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on
changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
We review de novo “the legal question of our own jurisdiction.”
Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2021). Because Sousa-
Santos did not file a separate petition for review of the dismissal of her appeal
from the immigration judge’s denial of her first motion to reopen, we lack
jurisdiction to review it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Guevara v. Gonzales, 450
F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the BIA’s denial of an appeal and
its denial of a motion to reconsider are two separate final orders, each of
which require their own petitions for review”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). To the extent that Sousa-Santos is challenging the BIA’s
discretionary denial of sua sponte relief with respect to her second motion to
reopen, we similarly lack jurisdiction to review it. See Gonzalez-Cantu v.
Sessions, 866 F.3d 302, 306 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2017) (“we cannot consider the
BIA’s or the [immigration judge’s] refusal to reopen sua sponte”). Relatedly,
to the extent that Sousa-Santos is challenging the denial of her motion for
statutory reopening pursuant to Section 1229a(c)(7), she cannot prevail
because she is number-barred, as this is her second motion to reopen. See §
1229a(c)(7)(A) (“[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under
this section”); see also Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2022).
“We review the BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration under a
highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938
F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2019). Here, Sousa-Santos has failed to identify a
change in the law, a misapplication of the law, or an aspect of the case that
the BIA overlooked in finding that she did not establish a change in country
conditions because she failed to present evidence of Brazil’s country
conditions at the time of her 2004 removal order. See id.; Nunez v. Sessions,
882 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2018). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
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in denying her motion for reconsideration of her first motion to reopen. To
the extent that Sousa-Santos raises the procedural argument that the BIA
erroneously used a single-member panel, rather than one with three
members, to hear her motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to
reach that issue because it concerns the BIA’s unreviewable discretionary
decision. See Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2009).
Finally, Sousa-Santos has abandoned her issues related to credibility,
exceptional circumstances, and summary dismissal due to her failure to brief
them. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Rui
Yang v. Holder, 664 F.3d 580, 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that while we will
liberally construe the briefs of pro se litigants and apply a less stringent
standard to them, pro se litigants “must still brief the issues”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, Sousa-Santos’s petition for review is DISMISSED in
part and DENIED in part.
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