Brown v. Pool

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 21, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60521
Conference Calendar
ERIC LAQUINNE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LARRY POOL, Chief of Police, Pontotoc City, in his
individual capacity; ROBERT G. SUDDUTH, Head Investigator,
Pontotoc City, in his individual capacity; FRANKY DANIELS,
Ex-Sheriff of Pontotoc County, in his individual capacity;
MIKE MCGOWAN, Jail Administrator, in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:03-CV-55-D-A
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Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Eric LaQuinne Brown, Mississippi prisoner #K0577, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Brown
argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint
as time-barred.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-60521
-2-
A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as
frivolous on statute-of-limitations grounds if it is clear from
the face of a complaint that the claims asserted are time-barred.
Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). Contrary to
Brown’s contentions, the district court was not required to give
him an opportunity to respond to the time-bar issue prior to
dismissing his complaint, as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) does
not afford a plaintiff all procedural protections. See Jackson
v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 958 F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir.
1992).
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a statute of
limitations, it “borrows” a statute of limitations from the forum
state’s general personal-injury limitations period. Moore, 30
F.3d at 620. Mississippi law provides for a general three-year
period of limitations in personal-injury cases. James v. Sadler,
909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990).
Brown asserts that his complaint was “filed late” because he
“had no knowledge of any [constitutional] violation and [his]
mental condition kept [him] from understanding his legal
obligations.” However, “[u]nder federal law, the [limitations]
period begins to run the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that
he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know
that he has been injured.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51
F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995)(alteration in original)(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “A plaintiff need not
No. 03-60521
-3-
know that a legal cause of action exists; he need only know facts
that would support a claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, that
Brown did not understand the legal significance of the
defendants’ alleged actions and omissions until he was later
informed of his rights is not relevant when determining the date
on which the limitations period begins to run in a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action. See id. Because Brown knew he had suffered an
injury, at the latest, by September 1999, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Brown’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983complaint as frivolous because it was filed beyond the applicable
statute of limitations. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016,
1019 (5th Cir. 1998).
The district court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous
counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). Brown
is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g), he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any
civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained
in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury. Id.Brown’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel is
DENIED.
AFFIRMED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED; MOTION DENIED.