Aguirre v. Nueces County Texas

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 9, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-40317
Summary Calendar
_______________________
JOHN AGUIRRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
No. 2:04-CV-275
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Inmate John Aguirre appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Nueces County on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
stemming from an alleged beating by unknown prison guards. The
district court found that Aguirre failed to present any evidence of
an inadequate training or hiring policy by Nueces County that could
form the basis of municipal liability. As we agree with the
conclusions of the district court, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court.
MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 2003).
A court should grant summary judgment when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “If the
nonmovant fails to make a showing on an element for which he bears
the burden of proof, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Whelan v. Winchester Prod. Co., 319 F.3d 225, 228 (5th
Cir. 2003). “[M]ere conclusory allegations are not competent
summary judgment evidence, and such allegations are insufficient,
therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Eason v.
Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
For Nueces County to be liable for the acts of the
unknown prison guards, Aguirre must show: “(1) the training or
hiring procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were
inadequate, (2) the municipality’s policymaker was deliberately
indifferent in adopting the hiring or training policy, and (3) the
inadequate hiring or training policy directly caused the
plaintiff's injury.” Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir.
1996). Although the county’s motion for summary judgment relied
primarily on assertions that no beating occurred by any state
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actor, it remained Aguirre’s burden to present some evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nueces
County had an inadequate training or hiring policy that led to his
alleged injuries. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322,
106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (summary judgment must be granted
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial”).
Citing Snoddy v. City of Nocagdoches, 98 F.App’x 338, 343
(5th Cir. 2004), Aguirre contends that he was not provided with
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to the grounds on
which the district court granted summary judgment. Unlike the
cases cited in Snoddy and relied on by Aguirre, however, Nueces
County moved for summary judgment on the grounds on which it was
ultimately granted: a lack of evidence to support the allegations
in the complaint. Aguirre had the opportunity to file a responsive
brief and present evidence to carry his burden before the court
ruled against him. While it would have been advisable for the
county to have asserted all of the defective grounds of Aguirre’s
pleadings in its motion for summary judgment, this does not change
Aguirre’s burden to produce some credible evidence to support his
claims. As he failed to do this, the district court properly
granted summary judgment to the county.
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Aguirre also argues that the district court improperly
denied him additional discovery before granting summary judgment.
This court reviews discovery orders for abuse of discretion.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d
1388, 1395 (5th Cir. 1994). To obtain a continuance of a motion
for summary judgment in order to conduct further discovery, a party
must indicate why he needs additional discovery and how that
discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The
party “may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional
discovery will produce needed, but unspecified facts.” Id.
(quoting Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th
Cir.1993)).
In this case, Aguirre had sufficient opportunity for
discovery; he had the opportunity to view videotapes and interview
inmates and was provided with numerous witness statements generated
by Nueces County. He has not articulated how further discovery
would help him establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any
inadequate training or hiring practices; therefore the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Aguirre further
discovery.
Aguirre cannot point to any evidence of an inadequate
training or hiring policy by Nueces County sufficient to establish
a genuine issue of material fact on his § 1983 claims. The
district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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