United States v. Hughey

Revised August 4, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-50925
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
FRASIEL HUGHEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
July 21, 1998
Before WISDOM, SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMoss, Circuit Judge:
Frasiel Hughey was convicted on eleven criminal counts
relating to his fraudulent possession and use of counterfeit
business checks and credit accounts.1 Hughey appeals his
convictions and certain aspects of his sentence, arguing (1) that
1
Counts 1 and 2 alleged access-device fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). Counts 3 through 10 alleged possession
of counterfeited securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513. Count
11 alleged a continuing scheme of bank fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1334.
he was denied his Sixth Amendment qualified right to counsel, (2)
that count 2 of the indictment was invalid, and (3) that the
district court’s order of restitution lacked ample support. We
affirm Hughey’s convictions on count 1 and counts 3 through 11,
reverse Hughey’s conviction on count 2, and remand with
instructions to enter a modified judgment reducing the amount of
restitution ordered.
HUGHEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE
I.
Hughey first maintains that he is entitled to a new trial with
respect to all eleven counts of conviction. He does not challenge
the truth of the facts underlying his conviction. Rather, Hughey
maintains that the district court’s refusal to accommodate defense
counsel’s conflicting obligation in a later-acquired criminal
matter deprived him of his constitutional right to defense counsel
of his own choosing. A fairly detailed recitation of the
development of this case in the district court is essential to an
understanding of this claim.
Hughey was indicted in a two-count indictment in July 1995.
Trial was set for October 30, 1995. Hughey’s first counsel of
record, Douglas McNabb, secured his release on bond and filed
twenty-eight pretrial motions seeking to discover the factual and
legal basis of the government’s case against Hughey. The profusion
of motions filed by the industrious McNabb effectively stalled the
2
case and forced the government to reconsider its strategy. By
early October, it was apparent that neither side would be prepared
to try the case on October 30.
On October 2, the parties filed a joint motion for continuance
of trial, noting that Hughey’s many pretrial motions were still
pending, that plea negotiations were ongoing, and that the
government might file a superseding indictment. The district court
granted the parties’ joint request for continuance and reset the
trial for January 8, 1996.
On December 6, the government filed a superseding indictment
charging eleven counts. Hughey terminated his relationship with
McNabb and filed a motion to substitute attorney David Botsford,
which was granted December 14. With trial less than one month
away, Botsford’s first action was to request a continuance of the
deadline for pretrial motions until January 8, and a continuance of
trial from January 8 until after January 31, 1996. The government
did not oppose the motion. The district court granted the motion,
setting a pretrial motion deadline of January 8 and a trial date of
February 5. The parties later filed an agreed motion to extend the
deadline for filing pretrial motions from January 8 until January
15. The record does not reflect that the district court ever ruled
upon that motion.
On January 16, 1996, one day after the requested deadline,
Botsford filed seven pretrial motions. On January 17, Botsford
filed a new motion for continuance. Botsford maintained that
3
continuance was required to resolve pending discovery issues, to
hire a handwriting expert, and to accommodate scheduling conflicts.
The scheduling conflicts identified by Botsford were a February 6
appellate briefing deadline before our Court and a firm trial date
of February 20 in United States v. Moore, a criminal matter pending
before the federal district court in Austin, Texas.
With regard to the Moore case, Botsford reported that he
initially agreed to represent Moore on January 10, subject to
making adequate financial arrangements. Botsford further reported
that adequate financial arrangements were finalized January 16, and
that he planned to make his first appearance in Moore on January
17, the same day the motion for continuance of Hughey was being
filed. Botsford suggested, however, that his representation of
Moore might also be conditioned upon a continuance in Hughey, by
stating that he had informed Moore of the potential for a
scheduling conflict and the need to seek a continuance in Hughey.
Botsford nonetheless asked the district court to “continue the
case” until the Moore trial was complete. That trial was scheduled
to begin February 20 and continue at least through April.
The government responded that it did not oppose a continuance
until a date certain in April 1996. The government acknowledged
that it was considering a second superseding indictment. The
government also recognized that ongoing discovery disputes and
Botsford’s appellate deadline both provided ample support for
4
continuing the case until April. The government objected, however,
to Botsford’s request that the case be indefinitely continued
pending completion of Botsford’s engagement in Moore. Given the
need to resolve numerous pending discovery issues and the
possibility of a second superseding indictment before trial in
April, the government was understandably concerned, not only about
Botsford’s participation at trial, but about his availability to
participate in the resolution of pretrial matters.
The government noted that Botsford himself created the alleged
scheduling conflict by accepting responsibility for Moore’s case
after Hughey was set for trial and with full knowledge that his
work for Moore created a potential conflict with his earlier
commitment to Hughey. The government argued that Botsford’s desire
to represent Moore at trial should not excuse his presence either
at pretrial hearings or the trial of Hughey’s case in April. The
government also requested that the district court order Botsford to
provide written assurance that he could resolve Hughey’s case in
April, irrespective of the Moore trial, or to withdraw from the
case.
On January 25, the district court granted a third continuance
of Hughey’s trial until April. On January 29, the district court
entered an order formally setting a pretrial motions hearing for
April 13 and trial for April 25. The district court accepted the
government’s position that Botsford’s involvement in Moore was not
5
a legitimate reason for delaying pretrial proceedings or for
continuing the trial of Hughey’s case. Accordingly, the district
court ordered Botsford to either confirm his availability to
resolve Hughey’s case in April or withdraw from Hughey’s case.
On February 5, Botsford filed a conditional motion to
withdraw. Botsford advised the district court that he was unable
to confirm his availability for April 1996 and reurged his earlier
position that Hughey’s case should be continued until the Moore
trial was complete. Absent an order embracing that position,
Botsford stated that he felt compelled to withdraw. Botsford
attached Hughey’s signed (but unverified) statement objecting to
Botsford’s withdrawal as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice. On February 12, the government responded to
Botsford’s conditional motion to withdraw, stating its preference
that Botsford withdraw if, as Botsford stated, the only alternative
would be an indefinite trial date contingent upon Botsford’s
completion of his later-arising commitments in Moore.
On February 15, the district court granted Botsford’s
conditional motion to withdraw and ordered Hughey to select
alternative counsel. Hughey then hired his third attorney, Jack
Pytel, who first appeared on February 22.
Hughey’s trial was eventually reset on two more occasions. On
April 10, the district court sua sponte reset the trial from April
25 to May 13. That delay was occasioned by Hughey’s arrest for
6
further criminal activity while released on bond and the need to
consider issues raised by the government’s second superseding
indictment. Hughey’s trial was postponed a fifth and final time
when the district court granted Hughey’s unopposed motion to
continue the trial date until July. Although Hughey’s formal
motion for continuance was based in large part on Pytel’s
scheduling conflicts, the record reflects that the parties were
also actively engaged in resolving pretrial and bond revocation
issues.
One week prior to the final motion for continuance, the
parties appeared in the district court to argue pretrial motions.
One week after the motion for continuance was filed, the parties
appeared again to litigate whether Hughey’s bond should be revoked.
Hughey’s trial eventually began on July 15, 1996.
II.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in
all criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That guarantee
has long been construed to include a criminal defendant’s qualified
right to retain counsel of the defendant’s own choosing. E.g.,
United States v. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); Morris v.
Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1615-18 (1983); Powell v. State, 53 S. Ct.
55, 58 (1932); United States v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th
Cir. 1992).
7
Hughey argues that trial lawyers are not fungible, and
therefore, the Sixth Amendment must be construed to afford him the
right to insist upon Botsford’s services in particular. Hughey
also claims that the district court erred by (1) ordering Botsford
to either make a firm commitment to Hughey’s case or withdraw, and
(2) refusing to grant a continuance until an indefinite date tied
only to Botsford’s completion of his obligations in Moore’s trial.
Hughey miscomprehends both the scope of the relevant right and
the competing concerns of adversarial fairness to which it may be
subjected. While we concur that trial lawyers are not for the most
part fungible, the Sixth Amendment simply does not provide an
inexorable right to representation by a criminal defendant’s
preferred lawyer. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697; Paternostro, 966 F.2d
at 912; United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 256-58 (5th Cir.
1986). Indeed, “there is no constitutional right to representation
by a particular attorney.” Neal v. Texas, 870 F.2d 312, 315 (5th
Cir. 1989); see also Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697; Paternostro, 966
F.2d at 912; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 258. The Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice is limited, and protects only a paying
defendant’s fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel of the
defendant’s choice. Paternostro, 966 F.2d at 912; Neal, 870 F.2d
at 315; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256; Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318,
8
1323 (5th Cir. 1978).2
Hughey was afforded that opportunity. The district court’s
order granting Botsford’s motion to withdraw afforded Hughey five
days to find alternative counsel. While Hughey objected to
Botsford’s withdrawal, Hughey made no objection that he was unable
to secure competent alternative counsel in the time period
provided. Cf. Ungar v. Sarafite, 84 S. Ct. 841, 850 (1964)
(finding five days to be a constitutionally sufficient time period
to retain counsel for scheduled contempt hearing).
Further, Hughey exercised his Sixth Amendment right by
independently selecting Pytel. Pytel assumed responsibility for
Hughey’s defense many months in advance of trial, and he diligently
represented Hughey through trial and sentencing. Thus, this is not
a case in which the district court’s action resulted in the
defendant being forced to trial with an inadequately prepared
attorney or no attorney at all. See, e.g., Paternostro, 966 F.2d
at 912-13; Neal, 870 F.2d at 315-16; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 756-58;
2
This limitation finds support in the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee, which is to provide a fair trial. Wheat, 108
S. Ct. at 1697; Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1617-18. When examining any
alleged deprivation of the right to counsel, we must therefore
focus upon the integrity of the adversarial process, not on the
defendant’s relationship with any particular lawyer. Wheat, 108 S.
Ct. at 1697 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046
n.21 (1984)); see also Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1617 (there is no
constitutional right to a “meaningful relationship” with defense
counsel).
9
Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1327.3
Hughey’s subsequent actions demonstrated that he was
proceeding with his counsel of choice. Notwithstanding the fact
that he was not tried until July 1996, Hughey made no attempt to
reinject Botsford into the case. In April 1996, Hughey stated in
open court that he was satisfied with Pytel’s representation and
wanted to continue with Pytel as his lawyer without regard to any
conflict of interest that may have existed as a result of Pytel’s
representation in another matter.
Hughey claims that he renewed his objection to Botsford’s
removal at sentencing. Near the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing, Hughey was asked whether he had any comments prior to the
imposition of sentence. Hughey opined that the circumstances
surrounding Botsford’s removal might provide a fertile ground for
reversal on appeal. Hughey did not, however, express any dissatis-
faction with Pytel’s services or reiterate a preference for
Botsford’s services, at that or any other time. See Slappy, 103
S. Ct. at 1617 (observing that the record did not support an
inference that the defendant continued to prefer prior counsel, who
3
Even in these more sympathetic cases for constitutional
relief, we have been reluctant to afford relief where the defendant
failed to capitalize on a fair or reasonable opportunity to secure
counsel. See, e.g., Paternostro, 966 F.2d at 912-13; Neal, 870
F.2d at 315-16; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256-58 (all finding no
constitutional error where the trial court’s refusal to grant a
continuance forced the defendant to trial without retained
counsel); see also Ungar, 84 S. Ct. at 849.
10
was unable to appear at trial, and that the defendant had
“specifically disavowed any dissatisfaction with [replacement]
counsel,” who did appear at trial).
Hughey had a fair and reasonable opportunity to replace
Botsford. Hughey exercised his Sixth Amendment right by
independently selecting and retaining Pytel, and by voicing his
desire to continue Pytel’s services notwithstanding any conflicts.
There is no allegation that Hughey’s counsel was denied an adequate
opportunity to prepare a defense. There is no allegation that
Pytel’s representation was in any way deficient. Despite the fact
that Hughey was tried well after the Moore case was scheduled to
end, Hughey never sought to reintroduce Botsford to the case. We
thus conclude that Hughey was afforded a fair or reasonable
opportunity to select counsel, which is all the Sixth Amendment
guarantees.
III.
Hughey argues that the district court’s February 15 order
requiring Botsford to either commit to a firm trial date or
withdraw deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel of
choice. An arbitrary or unreasonable action that impairs the
effective use of counsel of choice may violate a defendant’s
constitutional right to due process of law. Ungar, 84 S. Ct. at
849-50; Neal, 870 F.2d at 315; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256; Gandy,
11
569 F.2d at 1323-26.4 The counsel of choice theme of the Due
Process Clause is qualified, and may be made subject to competing
concerns about the effectiveness of the adversarial process. See
Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256; Gandy, 569
F.2d at 1323 & n.9. There are many circumstances in which purely
private concerns or the orderly administration of justice may
require that a defendant’s first, or even second, choice of counsel
must give way. See, e.g., Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697 (“a defendant
may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or
who for other reasons declines to represent the defendant”);
Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 257 (a defendant had no constitutional right
“to continue to insist on a particular lawyer and postpone the
trial indefinitely, at the expense of the court, its schedule, the
government, the other parties, and the orderly administration of
justice”); Barrentine, 591 F.2d at 1075 (the defendants had no
constitutional right to unavailable counsel); Gandy, 569 F.2d at
1323 (“the right to choose counsel may not be subverted to obstruct
4
The “counsel of choice theme” of due process protection
appears to have developed in cases involving a state law
conviction, in which it would have been necessary to hold that the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is a right incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Neal, 870 F.2d at 315; Gandy, 569 F.2d
at 1320-25. Since then, however, that doctrine has developed into
a distinct due process analysis for claims involving federal
convictions. E.g., Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256-58; United States v.
Barrentine, 591 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1979).
12
the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair
administration of justice”).
Hughey contends that the district court’s February 15 order
left Botsford with no other choice but to withdraw because, due to
circumstances beyond his control, Botsford was unable to commit to
an April trial date. We disagree. Botsford himself created the
conflict that forced a choice between Hughey’s case and Moore’s.
Hughey maintains on appeal that Botsford had no idea there
could be a conflict when he accepted Moore’s case. Hughey further
claims that Botsford firmly believed that Hughey’s case would be
tried on February 5, and that it would be concluded before the
February 20 date on which Moore’s case was scheduled to be tried.
But Botsford filed an unopposed motion to continue Hughey’s case
the day after he reached an agreement with Moore. In that motion,
Botsford expressly recognized the possibility that Moore
potentially compromised his commitment to Hughey, by stating:
The undersigned has never before got himself into
such a position and the undersigned apologizes to
the Court for the situation. However, when a
citizen who professes his innocence virtually begs
for your assistance, it is extremely difficult to
say “no.”
We can only conclude that Botsford was aware that his agreement to
represent Moore potentially compromised his obligations to Hughey
when he agreed to take the case.
We likewise disagree that the order left Botsford without any
choice but to withdraw. Botsford could have temporarily withdrawn
13
and then rejoined Hughey’s defense once the Moore trial was
complete. Botsford could have associated counsel and divided the
work load to permit his appearance at key events in both cases.
Botsford could have unequivocally committed to a firm date in the
future without regard to the Moore trial. Notwithstanding those
options, Botsford refused to offer any accommodation that would
have permitted him to retain Hughey’s case.
Hughey seeks to impugn the district court’s exercise of its
discretion by suggesting that Botsford required only a short
extension of the April trial date to which the government had
already agreed. Thus, Hughey claims that Botsford essentially
agreed to a May 1996 trial date. Again, we must disagree.
Botsford’s own pleadings acknowledge that pending motions in Moore
were threatening to derail the scheduled trial date in that case,
and Botsford was unwilling to make any commitment to Hughey’s case
that was not contingent upon completion of Moore.
Hughey likewise suggests that Botsford’s request was limited
to a continuance of the trial setting, and that there was never any
question about his availability to participate in pretrial
hearings. But Botsford’s motion for a continuance is not so
limited. Botsford asked that the district court “continue the
case” until completion of the Moore trial. That request can be
fairly read as a request to continue all proceedings in Hughey’s
case until the Moore trial was complete.
14
When Botsford moved for continuance, there were a number of
pretrial motions pending. The government was discussing the
possibility of a second superseding indictment. In addition, the
day after Botsford filed his conditional motion to withdraw (and
before the government responded to that motion) Hughey was arrested
for further criminal conduct. That development further complicated
the case by creating the need for a contested bond revocation
hearing before trial. Given the posture of the case at the time
and the phrasing of Botsford’s motion for continuance, we cannot
say that the district court acted unreasonably in requiring that
Botsford clarify how he would handle the Moore trial, scheduled to
begin shortly, and Hughey’s case at the same time. Hornbuckle v.
Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1984) (“trial
lawyers are obligated to undertake no more responsibility than they
can responsibly handle”).
Trial courts “have both the power and the duty to take
measures to control their dockets and to ensure that counsel
properly prepare cases scheduled for trial so that they can be
tried and decided rather than continued and rescheduled.”
Hornbuckle, 732 F.2d at 1237; In re Air Crash Disaster, 549 F.2d
1006, 1019 n.18 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Though an attorney has a
conflicting engagement the court may decline to postpone his case,
necessitating his associating other counsel to handle one of the
two commitments.”). While we are somewhat troubled by the facially
15
compulsory nature of the district court’s order, we are loathe to
find error where the district court acted to ensure that Hughey
would be adequately represented by prepared and available counsel
-- in other words, to secure for Hughey’s benefit the very
protections which he now claims he was denied. The district
court’s efforts in this regard place this case in stark contrast to
Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978), the principal case
upon which Hughey relies.
In Gandy, a state prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that the state trial court’s refusal to grant a trial
continuance violated his constitutional right to counsel of choice.
Id. at 1319. Gandy’s defense lawyer abandoned his case in favor of
another engagement on the first day of Gandy’s trial. Id. at 1320.
When the state court insisted that the matter would proceed to
trial, Gandy was represented by a lawyer completely unfamiliar with
the case. Id. Our Court noted that the state trial judge “failed
to take any steps to assure the continued attendance” of Gandy’s
retained lawyer. Id. at 1326. Thus, in Gandy, the state trial
judge allowed defense counsel’s schedule to prejudice the
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. In this case, the district
court’s proactive, if somewhat intrusive, efforts prevented
Hughey’s rights from being similarly prejudiced.
Faced with the prospect of making an independent commitment to
Hughey’s pre-existing case, Botsford chose to withdraw. Based upon
16
the record, we can reach no other conclusion but that Botsford
preferred his later-acquired representation in Moore. Hughey was
not constitutionally entitled to unavailable counsel. Barrentine,
591 F.2d at 1075. While the record was carefully prepared for this
appeal, Hughey’s subsequent actions demonstrate that he was neither
deprived of able counsel nor intent upon Botsford’s representation
in particular. We find no abuse of the district court’s discretion
and no deprivation of Hughey’s constitutional right to due process
in the district court’s February 15 order requiring Botsford to
make a firm commitment to Hughey’s case or to withdraw.
IV.
Hughey also claims that the district court’s refusal to grant
an indefinite continuance tied to completion of the Moore trial was
an abuse of discretion. A trial court’s arbitrary or unreasonable
refusal to grant a continuance to accommodate a defense lawyer’s
scheduling conflicts may render the trial fundamentally unfair.
See, e.g., Ungar, 84 S. Ct. at 849 (“a myopic insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can
render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality”); see
also Slappy, 103 S. Ct at 1616; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 256-58;
Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1320-24.
But not every denial of a continuance in this context is a
deprivation of due process. Id. at 1322. “Trial judges
17
necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.”
Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1616; see also Ungar, 84 S. Ct. at 849;
Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 255. A trial court’s exercise of its
discretion to either grant or deny a continuance will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Neal, 870
F.2d at 315; Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 255.
Our Court has resolved the apparent tension between the
defendant’s right to counsel of choice and the district court’s
need to manage its docket by holding that only an arbitrary or
unreasonable denial of a requested continuance will constitute a
violation of the defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. See
Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1322-23. If the challenged decision is neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable, we must uphold the trial court’s
decision to deny the continuance, even when we consider the
decision to be a harsh one. Neal, 870 F.2d at 315.
The decision whether to grant a continuance in such a
situation requires a “delicate balance between the defendant’s due
process right to adequate representation by counsel of his choice
and the general interest in the prompt and efficient administration
of justice.” Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1323. There are no mechanical
tests for making this determination, which is uniquely dependent
upon the circumstances presented in every case. Ungar, 84 S. Ct.
at 850. Our precedent establishes, however, that several factors
are routinely relevant to this inquiry. Those factors include: (1)
18
when the request for continuance was filed; (2) the nature of the
reasons offered to support the continuance, particularly where
there is reason to believe that those reasons are either less than
candid or offered in bad faith; (3) the length of the requested
delay; (4) the number of continuances previously granted; and, the
great catch-all, (5) the general balance of convenience to the
parties and the court. See Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1324; see also
Slappy, 103 S. Ct. at 1617; Ungar, 84 S. Ct. at 850; Mitchell, 777
F.2d at 257-58.
Botsford filed the subject motion to “continue the case” on
Hughey’s behalf about three weeks before trial, and on the same day
that Botsford reached an agreement to represent Moore. When the
motion was filed, there were numerous pretrial motions pending,
many of which required a decision prior to trial. Hughey’s request
for a continuance was supported by several factors. With the
exception of Botsford’s agreement to represent Moore at trial, none
of those factors would have required a continuance beyond the April
1996 trial date already accepted by the government, and eventually
set by the district court. Thus, the relevant decision to be
examined is the district court’s refusal to continue Hughey’s case
until an uncertain date when Botsford was finished with the Moore
trial.
When Botsford filed Hughey’s motion for continuance in January
1995, the case had already been continued twice. Although those
19
continuances were granted on the basis of agreed or unopposed
motions, the fact remains that Hughey had been awaiting trial since
July 1995. The district court effectively granted a third
continuance by moving the trial date back to April 1996. Hughey’s
argument is that the district court’s refusal to grant what was in
effect a fourth continuance to accommodate his second defense
counsel’s newly-acquired scheduling conflict deprived him of due
process.
The district court’s refusal to grant such a continuance, like
the granting of the motion to withdraw, was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. Botsford refused to offer any accommodation that
would have enabled him to handle both cases, and he maintained that
he could not proceed in Hughey absent an order tying Hughey’s trial
date to the completion of his representation of Moore. Hughey’s
third lawyer, Pytel, assumed responsibility for the case well in
advance of trial. Thus, Hughey was not forced to trial without
adequately prepared counsel or without any counsel at all. Hughey
has not offered any other facts that would support the conclusion
that he was denied a fair trial.
We cannot say on the basis of this record that Hughey’s
interest in Botsford’s particular services was so strong as to
override those interests protected by the district court’s action.
Those interests, were they neglected, would have soon impacted the
substantial constitutional rights of Hughey and other criminal
20
defendants. We conclude that the district court’s refusal to grant
an additional continuance that would have been justified only by
Botsford’s newly-acquired scheduling conflict and would have
continued Hughey’s trial to an uncertain date tied only to the end
of Botsford’s competing obligation was not an abuse of discretion.
To the contrary, that refusal protected both the adversarial
process and Hughey’s substantial rights. On the facts of this
case, there was no deprivation of Hughey’s Fifth Amendment right to
due process of law.
V.
Based upon the circumstances presented, we find no deprivation
of Hughey’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice or his Fifth
Amendment right to due process of law. Our holding is necessarily
limited to the particular facts of this case. See Ungar, 84 S. Ct.
at 850 (“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial
of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The
answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the
time the request is denied.”). In particular, we disclaim any
general rule that would routinely place a district court’s
generalized need to proceed promptly in a superior position to
defense counsel’s legitimate scheduling conflicts. Scheduling
conflicts must be hammered out, as they are every day, by mutual
21
accommodation and with an ever-vigilant eye on the defendant’s
right to proceed with counsel that is adequately prepared and
competent to provide constitutionally sufficient representation.
In this case, the defendant was afforded a fair or reasonable
opportunity to proceed with his second choice of counsel, who was
adequately prepared and competently represented Hughey through
trial. We likewise find it significant that the district court did
not unconditionally require Botsford’s withdrawal. Rather, the
district court conditioned Botsford’s continuing appearance on some
assurance that he would be prepared to try the case at some
definite time. Defense counsel created the scheduling conflict
himself and then refused to engage in that mutual accommodation
that must accompany requests for a continuance on the basis of
scheduling conflicts.
Likewise, we agree with Hughey that defense lawyers are not
fungible and that a defendant’s choice, even his first choice, of
counsel may be entitled to significant weight in the decision
whether to grant a continuance. That does not mean, however, that
a defendant may effectively hold a federal district court and the
prosecutorial arm of the government hostage for an indefinite
period of time pending completion of whatever criminal matter may
be acquired or require priority treatment. We therefore hold that
neither the district court’s order requiring Botsford to commit to
Hughey’s case or withdraw nor the district court’s refusal to grant
22
a continuance tied to Botsford’s completion of the Moore trial
deprived Hughey of his constitutional rights. Hughey makes no
other argument capable of requiring relief with respect to his
convictions on count 1 and counts 3 through 11. Accordingly,
Hughey‘s convictions with respect to those counts are affirmed.
HUGHEY’S CHALLENGE TO COUNT 2 OF THE INDICTMENT
I.
Hughey argues that count 2 of the indictment was impermissibly
duplicitous. We agree that count 2 is defective. Rather than
charging two separate offenses, however, count 2 charges no federal
offense at all. We therefore reverse Hughey’s conviction with
respect to that count.5
Count 2 charged use of an unauthorized access device in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) and (b)(1). The statute
provides:
whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud
traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access
devices during any one-year period, and by such
conduct obtains anything of value aggregating
$1,000 or more during that period . . . shall, if
the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce,
be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this
section.
5
Given the concurrent nature of Hughey’s sentences, the
relief afforded with respect to this issue should not affect the
total term of Hughey’s sentence. The relief will, however, require
a reversal and refund of the $50 special assessment imposed with
respect to count 2 and the entry of a modified judgment excluding
the conviction on count 2.
23
18 U.S.C. § 1029 (a)(1). Section 1029(b)(1) provides that an
attempt to violate § 1029(a) will be punished under the same
provision governing a substantive violation of § 1029(a). 18
U.S.C. § 1029(b)(1). The applicable version of § 10296 defines an
unauthorized access device as follows:
(e) As used in this section --
(1) the term “access device” means any card,
plate, code, account number, or other means of
account access that can be used, alone or in
conjunction with another access device to obtain
money, goods, services, or any other thing of
value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer
of funds (other than a transfer originated solely
by paper instrument).
* * *
(3) the term “unauthorized access device”
means any access device that is lost, stolen,
expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent
to defraud.
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) & (3) (emphasis added).
Section 1029 was passed to stem the tide of large-scale fraud
arising from the unauthorized use and counterfeiting of credit
cards, debit cards, and the account numbers assigned thereto.
S. Rep. No. 98-368, at 2, 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3648, 3656; H. R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 4-5, 6-8 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689-91, 3692-94. Congress drafted the statute
broadly to include any fraud arising from unauthorized use or
6
Section 1029 has been amended twice since the time of
Hughey’s criminal conduct. Neither of these amendments is material
to or applicable to Hughey’s appeal.
24
counterfeiting of credit cards, debit cards, account numbers, or
other devices capable of affording account access, such as by
electronic transfer. See S. Rep. No. 98-368, at 10. Congress
intended that the definition of an access device be broad enough to
include devices that were not then contemplated, but which by way
of technological development might become available as a means of
affording unlawful account access. See S. Rep. No. 98-368, at 10;
H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19. Congress did not, however, intend to
enact a comprehensive scheme that would completely supplant state
law regulation of similar conduct. To the contrary, § 1029 was
intended to supplement the efforts of state and local governments
by encompassing only the more serious and extensive fraudulent
schemes. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 13; see also S. Rep. No. 98-
368, at 5 (“While the federal interest is clear . . . federal
involvement was neither necessary nor desirable in the routine
case. Rather, the committee was urged to report legislation which
would zero in on major counterfeiting and trafficking
activities.”). Thus, Congress restricted the scope of § 1029 to
those areas where federal intervention was perceived to be either
useful or necessary. H. R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 13. For example,
the statute does not apply when the offense involves less than
$1000. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 13.
Similarly, the plain text of the statute makes § 1029 inapplicable
to conduct involving “(transfer[s] originated solely by paper
25
instrument).” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). That parenthetical
exclusion unambiguously places the passing of bad checks and
similar conduct outside the scope of the federal statue. See
S. Rep. No. 98-368, at 10 (“By specifically excluding transfers of
funds originated solely by paper instrument, it covers offenses
such as those included in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, but
does not cover activities such as passing bad checks.” (footnote
omitted)); H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19 (“This would cover credit
cards, debit cards, account numbers, and combinations of these and
other methods of obtaining money, goods and services. The
definition of this term is broad enough to encompass future
technological changes and the only limitation i.e., ‘(other than a
transfer originated solely by paper instrument)’ excludes
activities such as passing forged checks.”); see also United States
v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing legislative
history for the same proposition).
Count 2 charged that Hughey unlawfully used two checking
accounts to obtain funds aggregating more than $1000. With respect
to the first account, the evidence showed that Hughey, using an
alias, opened a checking account at First Interstate Bank in
Houston, Texas. Between August 9 and August 11, 1993, Hughey
deposited four counterfeit checks purportedly issued by Houston
Light & Power (HL&P) into the First Interstate account. The checks
bore the correct account and bank routing number for HL&P’s account
26
with Texas Commerce Bank (TCB). Hughey received $2000 cash back
when he deposited each of the four checks. The losses on these
checks, and others passed during the same time period by Hughey
against HL&P’s account with TCB, were shared by TCB and HL&P.
With respect to the second account, the evidence showed that
Hughey and his college friend Wilbur Tippins agreed to pass
counterfeit checks at an H.E.B. grocery store (HEB) in San Antonio,
Texas. Tippins secured the help of his girlfriend, Vanessa Wilson,
who worked in the check-cashing booth of the store, and his cousin,
Mary Thomas. Hughey and Tippins, with the help of Wilson and
Thomas, successfully caused a number of counterfeit checks to be
presented and cashed at HEB. The parties shared the proceeds of
the checks as they were cashed.
In September 1993, Wilson and Thomas agreed to cooperate with
a sting operation designed to catch Hughey and Tippins. Wilson
called Tippins and told him to bring more checks to HEB.
Tippins and Hughey completed six counterfeit checks
purportedly issued by a company named Central Linen. The pair then
met Thomas at HEB. Tippins and Thomas cashed two of the Central
Linen checks, while Hughey waited outside in his truck. Agents
moved in to arrest Hughey, but he evaded arrest and remained at
large for many months.
In addition to Hughey’s conduct in relation to the HL&P
checks, the government also charged Hughey’s conduct in relation to
the Central Linen checks in count 2. The Central Linen checks were
27
drawn on a closed account at Randolph-Brooks Federal Credit Union,
which had previously been assigned to an individual account holder.
HEB took the loss on all checks passed at the San Antonio grocery
store.
The conduct charged in count 2 concerned only transfers
“originated solely by paper instrument”; specifically, the creation
and presentation of bad checks at First Interstate Bank and an HEB
grocery store. Such conduct is not within the ambit of the conduct
that Congress sought to prohibit in § 1029. Therefore, count 2
fails to allege any offense that may be prosecuted under that
section, and Hughey’s conviction must be reversed.
The government argues that Hughey’s conviction on count 2 may
nonetheless be affirmed because Hughey was in possession of account
numbers which could have been used, in conjunction with other
codes, to obtain access to those accounts. For example, the
government argues that Hughey could have used the account numbers,
in conjunction with additional codes, to make an electronic
transfer by telephone. The government’s “potential use” theory
relies upon that portion of § 1029(e)(1) which defines an access
device to include anything that “can be used, alone or in
conjunction with another access device,” to obtain anything of
value. § 1029(e)(1). That phrase was included to clarify that the
statutory definition includes those devices which “may be used in
connection with accounts but which themselves may not be ‘access
28
devices.’” H.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19. Thus, the government’s
position appears to be that the account numbers were access devices
because of their inherent potential for use with other devices.
The government’s argument ignores the fact that there is
absolutely no suggestion in the record that Hughey either possessed
or had access to the additional codes that would have been required
to complete a wire transfer with the account numbers. More
importantly, the government’s interpretation also ignores the plain
text of the parenthetical exclusion, which is directly applicable
to Hughey’s conduct. The statute excludes “transfer[s] originated
solely by paper instrument,” without regard to whether the transfer
involved some component of an access device or some device which,
but for the parenthetical exclusion, might otherwise have the
potential be an access device.
Hughey used the account numbers to originate a transfer solely
by paper instrument. Hughey did not use the subject account
numbers independently to gain account access. Indeed, Hughey
merely presented bad checks with those numbers to unsuspecting
third parties in order to defraud those organizations into giving
him money back in exchange for the instruments.7 We are not
persuaded that Hughey’s mere possession of the numbers, at least
7
Hughey was also prosecuted and convicted in separate
counts for passing the counterfeit Central Linen checks to HEB in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513. With respect to those checks, there
appears to be no way to distinguish the conduct thus punished under
§ 513 from that punished under § 1029.
29
without additional evidence demonstrating the possibility of an
additional use, is sufficient to overcome the express statutory
provision excluding his conduct from the ambit of § 1029.8
The government also argues that Hughey’s conduct went beyond
merely the creation and presentation of bad checks. Specifically,
the government points to evidence that Hughey ordered form checks
bearing Central Linen’s name from a printing company, and that at
least some of the completed Central Linen checks were given to
Tippins to cash while Hughey waited outside. The government argues
that such conduct goes beyond merely passing bad checks and invades
the province of “trafficking’ in access devices.
Even assuming that Hughey’s conduct can be characterized as
“trafficking,” Hughey was merely trafficking in counterfeit or
forged checks. The government’s approach, although clever, ignores
the fact that the checks, and Hughey’s conduct in relation to the
checks, both fall outside the statutory definition of an
8
The government offers United States v. Sepulveda, 115
F.3d 882, 889 (11th Cir. 1997) as a case adopting its “potential
use” theory. That case has no application to the issue presented
here. First, the defendants in Sepulveda were charged under §
1029(a)(3), which criminalizes mere possession of more than fifteen
access devices and does not require actual use, knowing or
otherwise. Id. at 884-85. Hughey was charged under § 1029(a)(2),
which requires that the government prove an actual use. Second,
even Sepulveda relies in part upon the defendant’s actual, as
opposed to potential, use. See id. at 889 (fact that defendants
used some of the devices supported an inference that they had
access to the technology required to use the remaining devices and
that the devices were therefore capable of affording account
access).
30
unauthorized access device. The nature of Hughey’s conduct with
respect to the checks in this case does not change their essential
nature.
Count 2 fails to allege a cognizable federal offense. “If an
indictment does not charge a cognizable federal offense, then a
federal court lacks jurisdiction to try a defendant for violation
of the offense.” United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 850 (6th
Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 628
(5th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1688 (1998); see also
United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071 (11th Cir. 1998) (indictment
must allege use of an “access device” within the meaning of § 1029
in order to confer federal jurisdiction); Thor v. United States,
554 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If the indictment upon which
Thor was tried and convicted failed to allege a federal offense,
the district court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction necessary
to try Thor for the actions alleged in the indictment.”). Hughey’s
conviction on count 2 is reversed and the cause remanded for entry
of a judgment excluding that count.9
9
We note in passing that count 1, which also charged a
violation of § 1029 does not suffer from the same defect as count
2. Count 1 charged conduct relating to (1) counterfeit checks
presented to a retailer, and (2) a retail credit card account.
Although the first factual allegation falls outside the scope of §
1029, the second allegation and Hughey’s conduct in relation
thereto fall well within the prohibition prescribed by § 1029.
There is, therefore, no defect in count 1 of the indictment.
31
HUGHEY’S CLAIM FOR RELIEF FROM RESTITUTION
I.
The district court ordered Hughey to make restitution to a
number of banks and businesses. Hughey’s final argument is that
the district court’s order of restitution to two of those entities,
TCB and HL&P, was in error.
We review the legality of the district court’s order of
restitution de novo. United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 451
(5th Cir. 1992). Once we have determined that an award of
restitution is permitted by the appropriate law, we review the
propriety of a particular award for an abuse of discretion. Id.Hughey maintains that the restitution order goes beyond what
was proven at trial and considers amounts that are not tied to the
offense made the basis of the restitution order. The judgment
entered by the district court awarded $40,675.10 in restitution to
TCB and $22,260 in restitution to HL&P. Those amounts were drawn
from the lengthy Presentence Report and supporting documentation.
Both the PSR and the judgment of conviction report that the order
of restitution in favor of TCB and HL&P was justified by Hughey’s
conviction on count 2, which has been reversed herein, and Hughey’s
conviction on count 11, which alleged a comprehensive scheme to
defraud TCB.
32
Obviously, the restitution order cannot be supported by
Hughey’s conviction on count 2. Aside from the fact that we have
reversed the conviction, the substantial losses made the basis of
the restitution order exceed by a considerable margin, and thus
fall outside the scope of the conduct made the basis of that
conviction at trial. See Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1979,
1982-84, 109 L.Ed.2d. 408 (1990).10 The restitution order may
potentially be supported, however, on the basis of Hughey’s count
11 conviction for bank fraud.
II.
The Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663,
authorizes a district court to order restitution to any victim of
the particular offense made the basis of the restitution order.
18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a)(1)(A). A “victim” is defined as someone who
was both “directly and proximately harmed as a result of an offense
for which restitution may be ordered.” Id. at § 3663(a)(2). In
1990, the Supreme Court held that an award of restitution may not
include losses that do not directly result from the offense made
the basis of the conviction supporting the restitution order.
Hughey, 110 S. Ct. at 1982-84 (reversing restitution order that
included losses incurred with respect to counts dismissed as part
10
Hughey involved this defendant’s prior federal conviction
for use of an unauthorized credit card.
33
of a plea agreement and holding that restitution order may not
exceed the scope of the offense of conviction). After Hughey, some
courts held that an order of restitution must be limited to the
loss attributable to the specific conduct supporting the offense of
conviction, even when the offense of conviction involved a
conspiracy or scheme. E.g., United States v. Sharp, 941 F.2d 811,
815 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress responded by amending that portion
of the Victim and Witness Protection Act that defines who may
receive restitution. The statute now provides that when the
subject offense involves a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity, restitution may be awarded to any person who is
directly harmed by the defendant’s course of criminal conduct. Id.That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to
the limits of the offense, however, still stands. See, e.g.,
United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 686 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1818 (1997); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d
469, 473 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916,
928-29 (5th Cir. 1993) (restitution may be ordered for victims who
are not named in the indictment provided that the scheme is
precisely defined in the indictment).
Count 11 alleged a comprehensive scheme of bank fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1334. TCB is named as the victim in count
11 of the indictment, and HL&P was directly harmed by the specific
fraudulent activities made the basis of Hughey’s conviction on that
34
count. Therefore, TCB and HL&P are the types of organizations that
may receive restitution for Hughey’s count 11 bank fraud offense.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).
The restitution award must still be limited, however, to those
losses within the scope of the offense alleged in count 11. To
determine whether the order is appropriately limited, we will
examine both the amount of the claimed losses and the scope of the
offense conduct. The record contains detailed documentary evidence
supporting TCB’s and HL&P’s claimed loss of $62,933.10.11 The
record also contains evidence that HL&P paid $22,260 of the claimed
loss, while TCB paid $40,675.10 of the claimed loss. Although
Hughey lodged general objections that the PSR overestimated the
loss, Hughey did not file evidence capable of rebutting the
detailed evidence presented in support of the PSR calculations.
See United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 1997);
see also United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir.
1992) (affirming the district court’s reliance on PSR for statement
of loss calculation). We conclude that the government met its
burden of establishing that TCB and HL&P suffered the claimed
11
TCB and HL&P claimed a joint loss of $78,543.89. Of that
amount, $15,610.79 was recovered from other accounts. The net loss
claimed was therefore $62,933.10.
35
losses by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e);
United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1992).
We turn now to the scope of the offense conduct. The
fraudulent scheme made the basis of Hughey’s conviction on count 11
began on or about April 26, 1993 and continued until on or about
September 24, 1993. Notwithstanding that temporal limitation in
the indictment, the documentary evidence supporting the restitution
order includes a significant number of losses that occurred before
April 26, 1993. Of the claimed loss of $62,933.79, only $56,520
occurred within the timeframe defined for the subject offense in
the indictment. Under Hughey, the district court lacked authority
to award restitution in excess of those amounts attributable to the
conduct made the basis of Hughey’s conviction. See Pepper, 51 F.3d
at 473; Stouffer, 986 F.2d at 929 (both holding that restitution
for all losses caused by a criminal scheme satisfied Hughey’s
requirement that restitution be limited to the offense of
conviction because the indictment specifically defined both the
duration of the scheme and the fraudulent conduct). Those losses
in excess of $56,520 fall outside the offense as defined in the
indictment, and the trial record does not otherwise tie those
losses to Hughey’s fraudulent scheme. We therefore conclude that
the record does not support an award of restitution in favor of TCB
and HL&P in excess of $56,520 with respect to count 11. Of that
36
amount, the record reflects that HL&P paid $22,260.
The restitution order is affirmed to the extent that $56,520
was awarded to TCB and HL&P for losses directly resulting from the
conduct made the basis of Hughey’s conviction on count 11. The
restitution order is reversed to the extent that it awarded losses
in excess of that amount to these parties. The case will be
remanded for entry of a modified judgment in accordance with this
opinion.
CONCLUSION
Hughey’s convictions on count 1 and counts 3 through 11 are
AFFIRMED. Hughey’s conviction on count 2 is REVERSED. The
district court’s order of restitution is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED
in part. The cause is REMANDED for entry of a modified judgment
reflecting the reversal of count 2 and limiting the amount awarded
to TCB and HL&P to those amounts that are within the scope of
Hughey’s conviction on count 11.
37