United States v. Pipkin

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-20402
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ROGER W, PIPKIN, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
June 2, 1997
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DeMOSS, Circuit Judge and JUSTICE,1
District Judge.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Roger W. Pipkin, III, was convicted of multiple
counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring currency
transactions so as to avoid reporting requirements. Applying the
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 655 (1994), we hold that the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that Pipkin knew structuring was illegal.
Accordingly, we reverse the structuring convictions. Finding no
other reversible error, we affirm all other convictions.
1
District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
BACKGROUND
Pipkin took part in a scam that defrauded Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corporation (“Pioneer”) of at least $14 million. Pioneer
was a lender which financed residential real estate transactions.
Pioneer loaned money to borrowers based on loan packages presented
by mortgage brokers. Pioneer did not perform credit checks on the
borrowers or appraise the properties itself, but instead relied on
the mortgage bankers.
One of the mortgage brokers Pioneer dealt with was Mortgage
Credit Corporation (“MCC”), a company Pipkin was associated with.
Pipkin and Robert Cartwright, president of MCC, entered into a
scheme to defraud Pioneer by submitting phony loan applications.
As part of the scheme, MCC prepared loan applications for the
purchase of empty lots and non-existent properties. MCC told
Pioneer that the properties had great value, and Pioneer loaned
money based on the inflated numbers. For example, MCC told Pioneer
that a property was appraised at $227,867, when it was really a
vacant lot worth $6,000. Based on this deception, Pioneer loaned
$153,370 on the property. MCC also used fake buyers on the loan
applications. It filled out the applications using the names of
Pipkin’s friends and acquaintances, paying them nominal amounts
(usually $50) to sign the forms.
MCC told Pioneer that it was closing the loans itself and had
Pioneer wire the money directly to it. Because the loans were
fraudulent, MCC was not actually closing them, but just pocketing
the money. Between 1988 and 1989, Pioneer funded approximately
2
1,400 loans for MCC totaling about $93 million. Of this amount,
$14 to $17 million was fraudulent. Because of the fraudulent
loans, Pioneer was forced into bankruptcy. These fraudulent loan
applications form the basis for the conspiracy and wire fraud
charges in Counts 1 through 8 of the indictment.
In June 1989, Pipkin purchased a cashier’s check for
$320,797.97, using a check drawn on an account owned by C & P
Realty, a company Pipkin controlled. Pipkin used the cashier’s
check to buy a house at 5138 Doliver Street in Houston. This
purchase forms the basis for the money laundering charges in Counts
9 and 10 of the indictment.
Three times between August and October 1989, Pipkin had an
employee cash checks for him. Each time, Pipkin gave the employee
three checks, each for slightly less than $10,000. The employee
then cashed the checks at the same bank on successive days. By
using checks of less than $10,000, Pipkin hoped to avoid triggering
the bank’s currency transaction reporting requirements. These
transactions form the basis for the structuring transaction charges
in Counts 11 through 13 of the indictment.
Pipkin was charged in a 13 count indictment with one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
(Count 1); seven counts of aiding and abetting the commission of
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343 (Counts 2
through 8); two counts of laundering money in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count 9) and 1957 (Count 10); and three
counts of structuring currency transactions in violation of 31
3
U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322 and 5324(3) (Counts 11 through 13). Pipkin
was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 60 months as to each
of Counts 1 through 8, to run concurrent with each other and 78
months as to each of Counts 9 through 13, to run concurrent with
each other and concurrent with Counts 1 through 8. In lieu of a
fine, Pipkin was ordered to pay $842,000 in restitution. Pipkin
filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Pipkin appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to support his structuring and money laundering
convictions, that the indictment should have been dismissed because
of Speedy Trial Act violations, that the district court failed to
instruct the jury on the issue of materiality in Counts 1 through
10, and that the district court erred in failing to instruct the
jury about the impeachment of a prosecution witness. We will
address each of these issues in turn.
Structuring
Federal law requires banks to file a currency transaction
report (“CTR”) with the Secretary of the Treasury for any cash
4
transaction over $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a);2 31 C.F.R. §
103.22(a)(1).3 The law also forbids structuring a transaction for
the purpose of evading a bank’s requirement to file a CTR. 31
U.S.C. § 5324(3).4 At the time Pipkin structured the transactions,
the law provided criminal penalties for anyone “willfully
violating” the anti-structuring requirements. 31 U.S.C. §
5322(a).5
2
Section 5313(a) provides that:
When a domestic financial institution is involved
in a transaction ... of United States coins or
currency ... in an amount ... the Secretary [of the
Treasury] prescribes by regulation, the institution
... shall file a report on the transaction at the time and in the
way the Secretary prescribes.
3
Section 103.22(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:
Each financial institution ... shall file a report
of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency
or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to
such financial institution which involves a
transaction of currency of more than $10,000.
4
After Pipkin’s alleged structuring, § 5324(1)-(3) was
reorganized without substantive change as § 5324(a)(1)-(3). We
will refer to the codification as it existed at the time of the
alleged offense.
Section 5324(3) provides that:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the
reporting requirements of section 5313(a) ... (3)
structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction
with one or more domestic financial institution.
5
At the time of Pipkin’s structuring, § 5322(a) provided
that:
A person willfully violating this subchapter [31
U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.] or a regulation prescribed
under this subchapter (except section 5315 of this
5
The Supreme Court interpreted § 5322(a)’s “willfully
violating” provision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146
(1994), holding that the defendant must know “not only of the
bank’s duty to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, but
also of his duty not to avoid triggering such a report.” In
Ratzlaf, the defendant, Ratzlaf, ran up a large debt at a casino.
He returned to the casino several days later with $100,000 of cash
in hand, ready to pay the debt. The casino informed him that all
transactions of over $10,000 in cash had to be reported to federal
authorities. The casino said that it could accept a cashier’s
check for the full amount without triggering any reporting
requirement. The casino then packed Ratzlaf into a limousine and
sent him to area banks. Informed that banks, too, are required to
report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, Ratzlaf purchased
multiple cashier’s checks, each for less than $10,000, and each
from a different bank. He then delivered the checks to the casino.
See id. at 137.
Ratzlaf was convicted of structuring transactions to evade the
banks’ obligations to file CTRs, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§
5322(a) and 5324(3). The district court instructed the jury that
while the government had to prove Ratzlaf knew of the banks’
title or a regulation prescribed under section
5315) shall be fined not more than $250,000, or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
The law no longer requires a willful violation of the anti-
structuring statute. See Pub. L. No. 103-325 § 411, 108 Stat.
2160, 2253 (1994), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(c)(1).
Pipkin’s alleged violations occurred between August and October
1989, so the new law does not apply.
6
reporting requirements, it did not have to prove that he knew that
structuring was unlawful. See Id. at 137-38.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that “to
give effect to the statutory ``willfulness’ specification, the
Government had to prove Ratzlaf knew the structuring he undertook
was unlawful.” Id. at 138. The Court stated that, for § 5322(a)
purposes, a “willful” actor is “one who violates a known legal
duty.” Id. at 142 (internal quotation omitted). Because “currency
structuring is not inevitably nefarious,” id. at 144, structuring
is not “so obviously ‘evil’ or inherently ‘bad’ that the
willfulness requirement is satisfied irrespective of the
defendant’s knowledge of structuring.” Id. at 146. The Court
reaffirmed “the venerable principle that ignorance of the law
generally is no defense to a criminal charge. In particular
contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That ... is what
Congress has done with respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) and the
provisions it controls.” Id. at 149. Thus, to convict a defendant
of structuring, “the jury ha[s] to find he knew the structuring in
which he engage[d] was unlawful.” Id.
Much of the public’s ignorance regarding the illegality of
structuring must be laid at the feet of the government. The
Secretary of the Treasury thought that ignorance of the illegality
of structuring was not an element of the crime, so he deliberately
avoided publicizing the change in the law. In March 1988, the
Secretary considered requiring banks to take steps to inform the
public of the new anti-structuring laws. See 53 Fed. Reg. 7948
7
(1988). For example, banks would have been required to place a
notice of the requirements at every teller’s window, every deposit
ticket would have been imprinted with a notice regarding the
illegality of structuring, and all bank customers would have
received notice of the new law in their bank statement every
quarter. Id. The Secretary withdrew the proposal in May 1989,
stating that the notices were unnecessary because it was clear that
“the government need only prove that a criminal defendant had
actual knowledge of the currency reporting requirements and the
specific intent to evade them; the government need not prove that
the defendant had knowledge of the structuring prohibitions.” 54
Fed. Reg. 20398 (1989); see Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 n.6 (noting
Secretary’s actions).
If the Secretary had adopted the proposed rules, our task
would be much simpler. See United States v. Simon, 85 F.3d 906,
911 (2d Cir.) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
517 (1996). We would simply hold that given the ample notice
provided by his bank, Pipkin knew structuring was a crime. The
Secretary chose not to go that route. Mistakenly thinking the
government would never have to prove knowledge of the illegality of
structuring, the Secretary deliberately avoided taking steps to put
the public on notice. That certainly was his prerogative. It was,
however, also a gamble, as Ratzlaf proves. Having chosen to keep
the public in the dark, the government cannot now argue that
everyone knew structuring was illegal. Instead, it must provide
some specific proof that will allow the inference that the
8
defendant knew structuring was a crime.
To support the inference that the defendant knew structuring
was a crime, the government must prove “something more” than the
fact that a defendant structured his transaction to avoid the
filing of a CTR. See United States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50, 58 (4th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 927-28 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 578 (1995); United States v. Vazquez, 53
F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 1995). For example, the government may
show that the “defendant had some special status or expertise from
which a jury could reasonably infer that he knew structuring was
illegal.” Ismail, 97 F.3d at 58; see also Simon, 85 F.3d at 909-10
(defendant, a stockbroker, was familiar with reporting requirements
and required to file CTRs as part of his business); Tipton, 56 F.3d
at 1013 (defendants who were bank officials were familiar with CTR
reporting requirements).
Pipkin does not deny that he structured transactions so as to
avoid triggering a CTR. Nor does Pipkin deny that he knew of the
bank’s duty to file a CTR for any cash transaction over $10,000.
He contends, however, that the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding that he knew that structuring itself was illegal. We
agree. At trial, the government provided ample proof that Pipkin
knew about CTRs and banks’ duties to file them. Indeed, Pipkin
admitted as much on direct examination. The government, however,
offered no evidence that would support the inference that Pipkin
knew of his duty not to structure.
The government presented evidence that Pipkin was involved in
9
the banking industry in the past, even serving as president of a
bank in the 1970s. The evidence shows that as bank president
Pipkin was responsible for making sure that CTRs were filed.
Pipkin’s experience in the banking industry does not support an
inference that he knew structuring was illegal, however, given the
dates of his employment. Banks have been required to file CTRs for
over 25 years. See Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Tit. II, 84 Stat. 1118. Structuring trans-
actions to avoid triggering a CTR, however, did not become a crime
until 1986, a mere three years before Pipkin structured the
transactions. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
99-570, Tit. I, Subtit. H, § 1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207-22. Pipkin
worked for banks in the 1970s, when CTRs were required, but before
structuring was illegal. Therefore, the fact that Pipkin knew
about CTRs from his banking days is absolutely no evidence that he
knew structuring was illegal. Because structuring was legal when
he was a banker, if anything, his experience is evidence that he
thought structuring was legal.
The record shows that in the late 1980s Pipkin was president
of First State Investors, an investment company. There is no
evidence that this company was ever required to file a CTR, or that
Pipkin became aware of the new anti-structuring laws through his
involvement with the company. Likewise, the evidence that Pipkin
attended two years of law school is no evidence of his knowledge of
the illegality of structuring. He attended before structuring was
made a crime, and there is no evidence in the record that he kept
10
up with developments in the law after dropping out of law school.
At least two circuits have held that the fact that a defendant
went to lengths to conceal his structuring can provide evidence of
his knowledge of its illegality. See United States v. Marder, 48
F.3d 564, 574 (1st Cir.) (jury can infer knowledge of illegality
from concealment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1441 (1995); United
States v. Walker, 25 F.3d 540, 543, 548 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
This view has been rejected by at least three circuits, which hold
that the evidence of the structuring itself cannot allow the
inference that the defendant knew structuring was unlawful. See
Ismail, 97 F.3d at 58 (“we cannot agree that evidence of
structuring alone can provide the basis for an inference, proving
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant knew that structuring
violated the law); Wynn, 61 F.3d at 927-28 (“abundant evidence” of
structuring itself insufficient to demonstrate knowledge that
structuring violated the law); Vazquez, 53 F.3d at 1226 (“ample”
evidence of structuring failed to prove defendant knew structuring
was illegal, only defendant’s testimony as to knowledge of
illegality allowed finding of willfulness).
While we are sympathetic to the Fourth, Eleventh and D.C.
Circuits’ view that the structuring itself cannot allow an
inference of knowledge of illegality, we need not enter this debate
because there is no evidence that Pipkin went to great lengths to
hide his structuring. During the three structuring episodes, he
simply had an employee cash checks of slightly less than $10,000
each. No effort was made to use multiple checks of smaller amounts
11
to avoid attracting notice of his structuring activity. Cf.
Marder, 48 F.3d at 564 (fact that defendant used three checks to
structure $11,460 transaction, rather than just two, is evidence of
concealment). Nor were different accounts used, or the checks
made out to different individuals. Pipkin’s scheme was so obvious
that a teller at the bank noted his behavior and, unbeknownst to
him, prepared a CTR. On the form, she noted that this was the “5th
time in 2 weeks” that such a transaction had been made. Thus, even
if we were to hold that the structuring itself could provide proof
of knowledge, given Pipkin’s lack of concealment, there is no
evidence to support such an inference in this case.
The record is devoid of evidence which would support an
inference that Pipkin knew structuring was illegal. Therefore, the
evidence is insufficient to prove that he structured transactions
in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3). Accordingly, his
convictions on Counts 11, 12 and 13 must be reversed.6
Money Laundering
Pipkin was convicted of laundering money in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count 9) and 1957 (Count 10).7 Pipkin
6
Pipkin also argues that the jury was not properly instructed
that the government must prove that he knew structuring was
illegal. Because the evidence is insufficient to support the
structuring convictions, we do not address the jury instruction
issue. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the correctness of
the charge.
7
Pipkin does not appeal his conviction on Count 10. The
conduct charged in Counts 9 and 10 was similar: buying the
cashier’s check. The only real distinction is the concealment
element under Count 9.
12
argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on Count 9,
which involved purchasing the $320,797.97 cashier’s check using a
check drawn on the account of one of his companies, C & P Realty.
The cashier’s check was then used to purchase the house at 5138
Doliver Street. To obtain a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),8
the government must prove that Pipkin: (1) conducted or attempted
to conduct a financial transaction, (2) which he knew involved the
proceeds of unlawful activity, (3) with the intent either to
conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the proceeds of unlawful activity. See United States v.
West, 22 F.3d 586, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994).
Pipkin does not deny that the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding that he conducted a financial transaction which
he knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity. He does,
8
Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents the proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity --
***
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part --
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity
***
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than
$500,000 or twice the value of the property
involved in the transaction, whichever is greater,
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.
13
however, argue that the evidence is insufficient to support an
inference that he did so with intent to conceal. Pipkin contends
that he merely purchased a cashier’s check using a check signed by
him. The check was drawn on an account of a corporation he owned,
and the evidence shows he made no secret of his ownership. The
check was used to purchase a house, which he then occupied. Pipkin
contends that he used a cashier’s check to pay for the house
because title companies will not take personal checks at closings.
Because his purchase of the check was “open and notorious,” United
States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1995), Pipkin asserts,
the evidence is insufficient to show he concealed the transaction.
We disagree.
Under our Circuit’s law, concealment can be established by
showing that “the transaction is part of a larger scheme designed
to conceal illegal proceeds.” United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d
380, 390 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 1997)
(No. 96-8492). As we said in United States v. Willey, “it in not
necessary to prove ... that the particular transaction charged is
itself highly unusual....” United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374,
1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 675 (1995). “Indeed,
viewed in isolation, many transactions charged as money laundering
could not be classified as ‘unusual’ financial transactions. Those
who would launder illegal proceeds frequently use cash, personal
checks, or cashier’s checks to pay for the assets or to make the
transfers that are charged as money laundering.” Id. at 1386 n.23.
In determining whether there is a larger scheme to conceal
14
proceeds, the defendant’s use of “a third party, for example, a
business entity or a relative, to purchase goods on [her] behalf
... usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.”
Id. at 1385.
The facts of this case prove that Pipkin’s purchase of the
cashier’s check was more than an innocent isolated transaction.
Rather, the purchase was part of a larger scheme designed to
conceal illegal proceeds. In buying the Doliver Street house,
Pipkin led the owner to believe that he was purchasing the house in
trust for his children, using a third party as trustee. The
trustee then purchased the house with the understanding between
himself and Pipkin that he would eventually transfer the house into
Pipkin’s name. At the closing, the owner was given the $320,797.97
cashier’s check Pipkin bought. The check was payable to the Aspen
Mortgage Company, in order to pay off the prior mortgage on the
house. After the trustee bought the house, a lease agreement was
prepared showing that Pipkin was leasing the house from the
trustee. The house was then transferred to Sam Houston Oil and
Gas, a corporation which Pipkin controlled. The record reflects
that Sam Houston Oil and Gas never conducted any business, but was
a shell corporation.
Given these numerous, complicated transactions, many involving
third parties (including a shell corporation), there is abundant
evidence of Pipkin’s concealment. Therefore, the evidence is
sufficient to support Pipkin’s conviction of money laundering in
Count 9.
15
Speedy Trial Act
Pipkin asserts that his trial did not begin until 917 days
after his initial appearance. Pipkin argues that because of this
delay, the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Pipkin
failed to move for dismissal of the indictment prior to trial. He
therefore waived his right to dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“Failure of the defendant to move for
dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right
to dismissal under this section.”); United States v. Bradfield, 103
F.3d 1207, 1220 (5th Cir. 1997).
Materiality Instruction
In United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), the Court
held that where materiality is an element of the offense, a
defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury instructed on
the question of materiality. Pipkin contends that the district
court erred in not instructing the jury that any misrepresentations
he made in the wire fraud scheme were material misrepresentation.
Assuming, without deciding, that the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, requires that the misrepresentations be material,9 there is
still no error. The jury was properly instructed that it was to
determine whether the misrepresentations were material. See United
States v. McGuire, 99 F.3d 671, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
9
See United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding no materiality requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the
mail fraud statute).
16
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 29, 1997) (No. 96-
1206).
Impeachment of Witness Instruction
Pipkin argues that the district court erred in refusing to
include in the charge an instruction regarding impeachment by
evidence of untruthful character. During the trial, a witness
testified that Cartwright, president of MCC and a key government
witness against Pipkin, was not an honest person and is a “very
good con man.” Pipkin’s defense was that Cartwright, not Pipkin
had committed the crimes, and that Cartwright was lying.
As part of that strategy, Pipkin asked that the jury be given
the following instruction:
You have heard the testimony of Robert Cartwright.
You also heard testimony from others concerning
their opinion about whether that witness is a
truthful person or the witness’s reputation, in the
community where the witness lives, for telling the
truth. It is up to you to decide from what you
heard here whether Robert Cartwright was telling
the truth in this trial. In deciding this, you
should bear in mind the testimony concerning the
witness’s reputation for truthfulness as well as
all the other factors already mentioned.
The district court refused to give this instruction, and instead
gave a general instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses.
As part of that instruction, the district court told the jury that:
You are the sole judges of the credibility or
“believability” of each witness and the weight to
be given the witness’s testimony. An important
part of your job will be making judgments about the
testimony of the witnesses including the defendant
who testified in this case. You should decide
whether you believe what each person had to say,
and how important that testimony was.
17
District courts have “substantial latitude in formulating the
jury charge,” United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116. S. Ct. 162 (1995), and we review refusals of
requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion. We reverse
“only if the requested instruction (1) is substantively correct;
(2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered
to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so
that failure to give it seriously impairs the defendant’s ability
to effectively present a given defense.” United States v. Gray,
105 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir.) (internal quotations and citations
omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1326 (1997). In essence, our
inquiry is whether “the defendant was improperly denied an
opportunity to convey his case to the jury.” Laury, 49 F.3d at
152.
Instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses was
substantially covered in the charge the district court gave and
Pipkin was not improperly denied an opportunity to convey his case
to the jury. See Laury, 49 F.3d at 152 (failure to give
instruction on substance abuse by a witness not grounds for
reversal when jury was given the general credibility instruction);
United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1316 (5th Cir. 1986) (no
error in denying instruction regarding witness’s psychiatric
condition when judge gave jury general credibility instruction).
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to give the requested instruction.
18
CONCLUSION
The government did not prove that Pipkin knew that structuring
was a crime. Therefore, under Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
655 (1994), the evidence is insufficient to support his structuring
convictions. Accordingly, we REVERSE the structuring convictions
on Counts 11 through 13 and VACATE the sentences on these counts.
The district court committed no other reversible error, so we
AFFIRM all other convictions and sentences.
19