Robertson v. Neuromedical Center

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-31169
Summary Calendar
JAMES M. ROBERTSON, M.D. and VICTORIA ROBERTSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,
VERSUS
THE NEUROMEDICAL CENTER, THOMAS B. FLYNN, JOHN R. CLIFFORD,
ANTHONY S. IOPPOLO, ALLEN S. JOSEPH, THOMAS P. PERONE, L. ALLEN
PROCTOR, OSCAR L. ROGERS, III, CAROLYN C. BAKER, SUSAN L.
SCARBERRY, and BARBARA J. GOLDEN,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
December 3, 1998
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants (“the Robertsons”) sued the Defendants-
Appellees, (collectively, “the NMC”) under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“the ADA”), as well as other state-law
claims, alleging that the NMC had discriminated against Dr.
Robertson in firing him. Robertson claims that the NMC failed to
make reasonable accommodations for his Attention Deficit
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Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the claims under the
ADA, but remanded the Robertsons’ state-law claims, including a
claim under the Louisianians with Disabilities Act (“the LDA”),
back to state court for further proceedings. The Robertsons now
appeal from the grant of summary judgment, and the NMC appeals from
the remand of the state-law claims. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Dr. James Robertson, had been a neurologist at the
NMC in Baton Rouge since 1981. He was a shareholder in the NMC
Corporation and was working under an employment contract until the
time of his termination. In May 1994, at the suggestion of one of
his colleagues, Robertson was tested and diagnosed with ADHD.
Approximately four months later, he was terminated from his
employment with the NMC. Robertson contends that he was wrongfully
discharged because of his diagnoses of ADHD and that reasonable
accommodations were recommended, but never implemented. The NMC
contends that certain of Robertson’s work-related problems predated
his diagnosis of ADHD, and that those problems resulted in his
termination “for cause” as provided in his employment contract.
Originally filed in Louisiana state court, the Robertsons
filed suit against the NMC and various individual doctors alleging
violations of the ADA as well as a similar claim under the LDA and
other state-law causes of action. Later, the NMC removed the case
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to federal court on the basis of the ADA claim. Upon a motion
filed by the NMC, the court granted summary judgment on the ADA
claim, finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed on
whether Dr. Robertson was a “qualified individual” able to recover
under the ADA. Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims, the district court remanded
them back to state court for further proceedings.
II. Discussion
After reviewing the record before us and the applicable law,
we conclude that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
behalf of the NMC should be affirmed.
In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
questions of fact are viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-movant and questions of law are reviewed de novo. See Deas v.
River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1998). As this court
has stated in Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., “[i]f plaintiff lacks
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact in support of
a necessary element of a claim or claims, then summary judgment is
appropriate against plaintiff on that claim.” 134 F.3d 721, 725
(5th Cir. 1998)(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
Title I of the ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . .
discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and
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privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(1994). To
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory firing, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) he has a “disability;” (2) he is a “qualified
individual” for the job in question; and (3) an adverse employment
decision was made because of his disability. See id.; Hamilton v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir.
1998).
A. Was Dr. Robertson a “Qualified Individual” Under the ADA?
The basis on which the district court granted summary judgment
in this case was because the plaintiffs, as a matter of law, could
not prove that Dr. Robertson was a “qualified individual” with a
disability--that is, one who can perform the essential functions of
his job with or without reasonable accommodations. See 42 U.S.C.
§12111(8). Dr. Robertson contends that either the administrative
portions of his job were not “essential functions” as defined under
the Act, or even if they were, he would have been able to perform
them with the aid of reasonable accommodations.
After a review of the record, we conclude that the
“administrative portion” of Dr. Robertson’s job is unquestionably
one of its essential functions. Contrary to the Robertson’s
blatant attempt to minimize its importance, we believe: (1) that
the administrative portion of Dr. Robertson’s job is one of the
major reasons why his position existed in the first place; (2) that
Dr. Robertson, as a neurologist was one of the few employees at the
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NMC to whom those administrative duties could have been
distributed; and (3) that the highly specialized administrative
portion of the job could not be transferred to someone without
expertise in that area without destroying the utility of the job
altogether.1 Indeed, Dr. Robertson’s own definition of a
neurologist stated that studying and analyzing tests and blood work
were part of what defined the job. Accordingly, we agree with the
district court’s determination that no factual dispute exists as to
the essential functions of Dr. Robertson’s job.
Next, we must address whether Dr. Robertson could perform this
essential part of his job with the aid of “reasonable
accommodations.” In support of his argument, Dr. Robertson has
proposed, among other things, either a part time position, no call
duty, that he be allowed to treat his ADHD with medication, or that
a clerical assistant could be hired to oversee his administrative
duties.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that
“[c]onsidering the limitations on plaintiff’s abilities caused by
1
The Code of Federal Regulations provides that,
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of
several reasons, including but not limited to the following:
(i) . . . because the reason the position exists is to
perform that function;
(ii) . . . because of the limited number of employees
available among whom the performance of that job function
can be distributed; and/or
(iii) the function may be highly specialized so that the
incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise
or ability to perform that particular function.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).
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ADHD, the type of work he is engaged in, the interests of NMC in
running its business, and most importantly, the safety of the
patients at NMC . . . plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
that he could continue in his position as a neurologist because
accommodation is not possible in these circumstances.” Order and
Reasons, October 9, 1997, at 32.
First, the ADA does not require an employer to relieve the
employee of any essential functions of the job, modify the actual
duties, or reassign existing employees or hire new employees to
perform those duties. As this court has stated in describing what
is required of an employer for accommodation purposes, “the law
does not require an employer to transfer from the disabled employee
any of the essential functions of his job.” Barber v. Nabors
Drilling U.S.A., Inc., 130 F.3d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1997); accord
Riddle v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 654 So.2d 698, 701 (La. App.
Cir. 1995). Also, when the Barber Court was confronted with a
similar request to what has been suggested by Dr. Robertson as a
reasonable accommodation--here the hiring of an administrative
assistant, the court responded: “[w]e cannot say that [the
disabled] can perform the essential functions of the job with
reasonable accommodation, if the only successful accommodation is
for [the disabled] not to perform those essential functions.” Id.Likewise, we conclude that the ADA does not require NMC in this
case to transfer any of the essential functions of Dr. Robertson’s
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job to an assistant or to anyone else. If he can’t perform the
essential functions of his job absent assigning those duties to
someone else, (e.g., having someone else perform his job) then Dr.
Robertson can not be reasonably accommodated as a matter of law.
See generally Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health, 859 F.Supp.
963(E.D. N.C. 1994)(holding that physician’s request for re-
assignment to part-time position, position with no call duty or
position of supervision, all of which would have depleted the
group’s physicians by one and increased the administrative staff by
one, was not a reasonable accommodation).
Second, the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an
individual if the employee would pose a direct threat to the health
and safety of others. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); Turco v. Hoescht
Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996). Based on his own
testimony that he was concerned for his patients’ safety, Robertson
posed a “direct threat” to the health and safety of others in the
workplace. Robertson’s short-term memory problems had already
caused various mistakes to be made in patients’ charts and in
dispensing medicine. Most significantly, Robertson voiced his own
concerns about his ability to take care of patients, stating that
it was only a matter of time before he seriously hurt someone. In
light of this evidence, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that any accommodations in this case would be
unjustified from the standpoint of the basic medical safety of Dr.
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Robertson’s patients.
Third, Dr. Robertson mischaracterizes the decision to take or
not to take medication for his condition as an accommodation option
available to NMC. Because this personal decision rests solely with
Dr. Robertson, NMC was not in a position to “accommodate” him in
this way. Thus, we find this argument wholly without merit.
Therefore, after a review the record before us in a light most
favorable to the Robertsons, we conclude that no issue of material
fact remains on whether Dr. Robertson was a “qualified individual”
under the ADA. The district court was correct in granting summary
judgment in favor of NMC.
B. Remand of Pendent State-law Claims
Next, we turn to NMC’s cross-appeal challenging the district
court’s remand of the Robertson’s claims under the LDA. Under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court has the
constitutional power to hear a state law claim if it is closely
related to another federal claim. See United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). However, it is clear that
a district court has wide discretion to refuse to hear a pendent
state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United States v.
Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1980). We
will therefore reverse a district court’s decision to remand
pendent state law claims after dismissing all remaining federal
claims only upon a finding of abuse of this “wide” discretion. See
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Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. V. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585
(5th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court identified certain
circumstances that should persuade a court to dismiss a state
claim: “Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the
state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers,
383 U.S. at 726. As such is the situation in this case, we hold
that the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in
refusing to hear the Robertson’s claims under the LDA.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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