Mangum v. Stan Trans Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 99-40111
Summary Calendar
____________________
KEVIN MANGUM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STAN TRANS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Civil Docket No. 98-CV-36
_________________________________________________________________
December 9, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Mangum appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee
Stan Trans, Inc. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 1996, Defendant-Appellee Stan Trans, Inc. (“Stan
Trans”) hired Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Mangum (“Mangum”), an
African-American, to work as a probationary operator at its
chemical storage facility in Texas City, Texas. In January 1997,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Stan Trans terminated Mangum. Stan Trans claims that it
terminated Mangum for poor job performance; Mangum contends that
racial discrimination motivated Stan Trans’s decision to
terminate him. In January 1998, Mangum filed this lawsuit
against Stan Trans in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. Mangum’s complaint alleged that Stan
Trans’s decision to terminate him violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Stan Trans moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Mangum failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. In the alternative, Stan Trans argued that even
if Mangum had established a prima facie case, Mangum did not
present sufficient evidence to show that Stan Trans’s articulated
reasons for termination were pretext for racial discrimination.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment,
finding that Mangum failed to establish his prima facie case.
Mangum timely appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Horton
v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). All fact
questions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
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non-moving party, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. See
Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir.
1995). However, only disputes concerning facts that might affect
the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the
entry of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In addition, this Court may affirm on
grounds other than those relied upon by the district court when
the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that
result. See Britt v. The Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d
1441, 1449 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941
F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991)).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal Mangum argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because (1) the district court applied
the wrong legal standard in its analysis of his prima facie case,
and (2) he presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. After
analyzing the evidence presented by Mangum, we conclude that
Mangum fails to raise a fact issue that precludes summary
judgment. Because we affirm the district court’s summary
judgment on this basis, we need not determine whether Mangum
established a prima facie case of discrimination or whether the
district court applied the proper standard in its evaluation of
Mangum’s prima facie case.1
1
Citing Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396
(5th Cir. 1995), the district court noted that to make out a
prima facie case Mangum must show that: (1) he is a member of a
3
Mangum’s complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, namely that Stan Trans discriminated
against him because of his race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17
(1994). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973), the Supreme Court articulated “the applicable rules as to
burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima
facie case [of discrimination].” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
801.2 This shifting burden helps “sharpen the inquiry into the
elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Texas
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981). Initially, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case
of racial discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802. Establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.
protected class, (2) he was qualified for an available employment
position, (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action
despite his qualifications, and (4) he was replaced by a non-
member of the protected class or a non-member of the class
received more favorable treatment by virtue of being outside the
class. The district court held that Mangum failed to establish
the fourth element of his prima facie case. As observed by this
court in Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., our cases reflect some
uncertainty regarding this requirement. See Nieto v. L&H Packing
Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (comparing Hornsby v.
Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
“that the single fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone
within the protected class does not negate the possibility that
the discharge was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons”) with
Singh v. Shoney’s Inc., 64 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that replacement by a member of the same protected
class precludes the establishment of a prima facie case)).
Because we affirm the district court on alternative grounds, we
need not decide this issue to resolve the instant case.
2
McDonnell Douglas was later clarified and refined by Texas
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
4
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The defendant may rebut this
presumption by providing admissible evidence, which, “if believed
by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful
discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.” St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). If the
defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption
raised by the prima facie case dissolves. See Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 255. However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. at
253 (emphasis added). Therefore, the plaintiff must “produce
evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons are mere pretexts,
the real reason for the action having been based on an
impermissible animus.” Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F.
Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256).
We assume, without deciding, that Mangum established his
prima facie case of racial discrimination. Stan Trans presents
sufficient evidence--including written evaluations of Mangum’s
job performance, completed performance ratings worksheets, and
affidavits from Mangum’s supervisors--to support its contention
that it terminated Mangum for his failure to improve his job
performance. To survive summary judgment at this stage, Mangum
must provide sufficient evidence to allow a jury to make a
reasonable inference that Stan Trans’s proffered reasons for
termination were merely pretexts for discriminatory intent. See
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Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); Britt, 978 F.2d at 1450 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256). Mangum’s evidence of discriminatory intent must be of
"such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded persons
in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions.” Sherrod v. American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1122
(5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Mere speculation and belief
are insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext, as are the
plaintiff’s conclusory statements about feelings of
discrimination. See Britt, 978 F.2d at 1451; EEOC v. Exxon
Shipping Co., 745 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1984).
Mangum primarily relies on his affidavit and the allegations
in his pleadings to show that Stan Trans’s articulated reasons
for termination--poor job performance and lack of improvement--
are pretexts for racial discrimination. Mangum contends that he
has presented evidence showing that Stan Trans’s articulated
reasons were pretexts for discrimination, including evidence
that: (1) his performance was adequate, (2) Stan Trans terminated
him before it terminated an Anglo co-worker who had admitted
making mistakes at work, (3) a co-worker allegedly involved in
the termination decision told him a racial joke, and (4) Stan
Trans’s employee evaluation system was subjective and pretext for
discriminatory discharges. We evaluate each of these contentions
and conclude that Mangum’s evidence falls short of raising a fact
issue with regard to Stan Trans’s motivation for terminating
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Mangum.
Arguably, Mangum’s evidence creates a factual dispute as to
whether his performance was inadequate. Mangum’s affidavit
includes self-serving statements about the high quality of his
work at Stan Trans. The affidavit also recounts Mangum’s version
of a counseling session with a supervisor in which the supervisor
expressed concerns about Magnum’s ability to “get along” with co-
workers but did not criticize Mangum’s job performance. A
dispute about Mangum’s job performance is insufficient to support
an inference of racial discrimination because Mangum’s remaining
evidence is too speculative and relies too heavily on isolated
incidents.
Mangum attempts to show that a “similarly situated” co-
worker received more favorable treatment than Mangum due to his
race. Mangum’s affidavit describes an Anglo co-worker’s
admission that he “messed up” on the job. Magnum suggests that
because Stan Trans terminated this employee after it terminated
Mangum, the Anglo employee received more favorable treatment than
Mangum. Mangum does not provide sufficient evidence to show that
the co-worker was “similarly situated” to Mangum. Mangum
provides no evidence concerning the nature of the employee’s
alleged error, whether the employee’s job performance improved or
worsened during the course of the probationary period, or whether
the employee was counseled about his job performance or attitude
at work. Without more, Mangum’s speculation does not create a
fact issue concerning Stan Trans’s motivation for terminating
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Mangum.
In his affidavit, Mangum recounts a single racial comment
made during his time at Stan Trans. He states that a co-worker
made “an ill-received joke” about Ebonics. A single
inappropriate joke told by a co-worker, even a supervisor, does
not support a claim of discrimination by itself, nor does it
reveal Stans Trans’s reasons for terminating Mangum. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1998)
(noting that absent a causal link between the remark and the
employment decision, a supervisor’s single racial comment is only
“a stray remark from which no reasonable fact-finder could infer
race discrimination. The mere utterance of a racial epithet is
not indicia of discrimination under Title VII.”).
Finally, Mangum attacks Stan Trans’s employee evaluation
system as subjective and pretext for discriminatory discharges.
As evidence, Mangum provides his supervisors’ final evaluations
and termination recommendations. All four evaluations recommend
terminating Mangum for inadequate job performance. Two of the
four recommendations are dated one day after Mangum’s
termination, one is dated four days after his termination, and
one is dated three days prior to his termination. Mangum claims
this evidence reveals Stan Trans’s discriminatory motive. We
fail to see how, without more, Stan Trans’s memorialization of an
employment decision evidences a discriminatory motive. The
parties agree that four men supervised Mangum’s work at Stan
Trans--two Anglos, a Hispanic, and an African-American. Even if
8
the court accepts Mangum’s suggestion that the African-American
supervisor did not participate in evaluating Mangum, a
presumption of discrimination does not follow. Mangum does not
provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that the
evaluation system was subjective and racially discriminatory.
We conclude that Mangum’s evidence, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to him, is insufficient to create a jury
question regarding racial discrimination. Mangum does not raise
a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his favor,
would support a conclusion that Stan Trans’s proffered reasons
for termination were pretexts for racial discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment.
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