Jones v. Apfel

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-60158
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EARNEST JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
May 18, 1999
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant, Earnest Jones, appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s determination that Jones is not entitled to social security disability
insurance benefits or supplemental security income. We affirm.
I
Earnest Jones (“Jones”) injured his back while working as a lumber puller, and subsequently
applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income (“SSI”). The Commissioner
of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) determined that Jones was not entitled to disability benefits
or SSI. Jones requested a hearing befo re an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Based upon a
review of the administrative record, the ALJ found that Jones was not disabled and agreed that Jones
was not entitled to benefits or eligible for SSI. The Appeals Council for the Social Security
Administration denied Jones’s request for review o f the ALJ’s determination, and, as a result, the
ALJ’s determination became the final decision of the Commissioner. Jones appealed this final
decision to federal district court. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, see 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), who found that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, and dismissed Jones’s
claims. Jones timely appealed.
II
Our review is limited to determining (1) whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, and (2) whether the Commissioner’s decision comports with relevant legal
standards. See Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 1996). We may not “reweigh the evidence
or substitute [our] judgment for the [Commissioner’s].” Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1009
(5th Cir. 1987). We must, however, “scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine whether
substantial evidence does indeed support the [Commissioner’s] findings.” Ransom v. Heckler, 715
F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.1983).
Jones argues that, in finding him not disabled, the Commissioner erred in considering the
opinion of the vocational expert who testified before the ALJ. The expert opined that specific jobs
existed that Jones could perform and that would accommodate Jones’s need to alternate between
sitting and standing. According to Jones, the expert improperly based his opinion on the Americans
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with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Jones asks us to reverse, or in the alternative, to remand for a new
hearing.
We agree with the Eighth Circuit that “the ADA and the disability provisions of the Social
Security Act have different purposes and have no direct relationship to each other.” Eback v. Chater,
94 F.3d 410,. 412 (8th Cir. 1996). Hence, a vocational expert should not base his determination of
the availability of jobs on the assumption that the ADA requires an employer to accommodate an
individual’s disability. See id.
Nonetheless, in this case, a review of the record shows that the Commissioner did not commit
reversible error. The vocational expert explained, prior to mentioning the ADA, that a significant
number of jobs existed that would permit Jones to work. The expert only mentioned the ADA in
response to a question specifically regarding assembler jobs.1 Moreover, the expert’s reference to
the ADA suggests not that he assumed that assembler jobs required accommodation, but that
allowing for an employee to alter between sitting and standing is a prevalent accommodation in the
workplace. See id. (quoting from a statement issued by the Associate Commissioner of Social
Securit y noting that an “assessment [of jobs available to a claimant] must be based on broad
vocational patterns . . . rather than on any individual employer’s practices”); see also Pena v. Apfel,
No. C-97-4445-VRW, 1999 WL 155699, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1999) (noting that “[t]he ALJ
did not assume that employers will accommodate plaintiff’s physical limitations in making her
1
Q Would an individuals’ inability to stand or sit for longer than 20 or 30
minutes, would that eliminate any of jobs as an assembler.
A. The jobs—I think that we’re talking about assembler here, the worker has that
option, you know, just sitting and standing at will. And some of them—most
employers today, will accommodate workers along that line. The eighty-eight
[sic], for instance, made short work of that option.
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decision. Rather, the ALJ’s decision is based on the [vocational expert’s] testimony that allowing for
altering between sitting and standing is ‘a commonplace accommodation in the workplace.’”).
Accordingly, we hold that the Commissioner did not improperly rely on the vocational expert’s
testimony.
Having held that the Commissioner did not improperly rely on the vocational expert’s
testimony, we are left with Jones’s specific arguments that the Commissioner erred in (1) diminishing
Jones’s allegations of pain, (2) failing to consider properly the medical opinions of record, and (3)
not finding Jones an illiterate. We are also left with Jones’s more general argument that the record
lacks substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision finding Jones not disabled. After
reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we find that, for each of these issues, the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based upon a proper application
of the law.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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