Strangi v. CIR

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED AUGUST 8, 2005
July 15, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
_____________________
No. 03-60992
_____________________
ALBERT STRANGI, Deceased,
Rosalie Gulig, Independent Executrix,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court
_________________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
This case, which comes before us now for a second time,
involves an assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of
an estate tax deficiency against the Estate of Albert Strangi.
Initially, the Tax Court held for the Estate. However, we remanded
to the Tax Court, which reversed its prior holding and decided the
case under I.R.C. § 2036(a). Section 2036(a) provides that
transferred assets of which the decedent retained de facto
possession or control prior to death are included in the taxable
estate. The Tax Court held that Strangi retained enjoyment of the
assets in question, and thus, that the transferred assets were
properly included in the estate. The Estate now appeals that
decision. We find no reversible error, and accordingly AFFIRM.
I
As failing health began to telegraph that the inevitable would
occur, Albert Strangi transferred approximately ten million dollars
worth of personal assets into a family limited partnership. Upon
his death, Strangi’s Estate filed an estate tax return based on the
value of his interest in that partnership, as opposed to the actual
value of the transferred assets. The Internal Revenue Service
issued a notice of a deficiency of $2,545,826 in estate taxes.
Strangi’s Estate petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of
the deficiency.
After protracted litigation, the Tax Court found that Strangi
had retained an interest in the transferred assets such that they
were properly included in the taxable estate under I.R.C. §
2036(a), and entered an order sustaining the deficiency. Our
review of the Tax Court’s decision requires an inquiry into the
structure of the limited partnership established by Strangi and the
extent to which he retained enjoyment of partnership assets.
First, however, some account of antecedents is in order.
A
Albert Strangi died on October 14, 1994 in Waco, Texas. He
was survived by four children from his first marriage: Jeanne,
Rosalie, Albert Jr., and John (collectively, the “Strangi
2
children”). Rosalie was married to Michael J. Gulig, a local
attorney.
In 1965, after divorcing his first wife, Strangi married
Delores Seymour. Seymour had two daughters, Angela and Lynda, from
a prior marriage (collectively, the “Seymour children”). In 1987,
Strangi and Seymour both executed wills, naming one another as
primary beneficiaries and the Strangi and Seymour children as
residual beneficiaries. That same year, Seymour began to suffer
from a series of medical problems. As a result, Strangi and
Seymour decided to move their residence from Florida to Waco,
Texas. To facilitate the relocation, Strangi executed a general
power of attorney naming Gulig as his attorney-in-fact.
In July 1990, Strangi executed a new will, naming the Strangi
children as sole beneficiaries if Seymour predeceased him –- i.e.,
cutting out the Seymour children. The new will designated
Strangi’s daughter Rosalie and a bank, Ameritrust, as co-executors
of the Estate. Seymour died in December 1990.
In 1993, Strangi began to experience health problems. He had
surgery to remove a cancerous mass from his back, was diagnosed
with a neurological disorder called supranuclear palsy, and had
prostate surgery. At this point, Gulig took over management of
Strangi’s daily affairs.
Gulig testified that, on several occasions between 1990 and
1993, he discussed his concerns regarding Strangi’s Estate with
retired Texas probate Judge David Jackson, who was a personal
3
friend. Gulig said that he felt “confident” that the Seymour
children would either sue Strangi’s Estate or contest the will. He
also claimed to have been concerned about “horrendous executor
fees” that he believed Ameritrust would charge. Further, Gulig
said he worried about the possibility of a tort claim by Strangi’s
housekeeper for injuries she sustained in an accident while caring
for Strangi. He testified that Judge Jackson advised him that his
fears were “very valid” and that he “had to do something” to
protect the Strangi Estate.
B
On August 11, 1994, Gulig attended a seminar provided by
Fortress Financial Group, Inc., explaining the so-called “Fortress
Plan”. The Fortress Plan was billed as a means of using limited
partnerships as a tool for (1) asset preservation, (2) estate
planning, (3) income tax planning, and (4) charitable giving.
Fortress marketed the plan as a means of, among other things,
“lower[ing] the taxable value of your estate” by means of “well
established court doctrines which recognize that the value of a
limited partnership interest is worth less than the value of the
assets owned by the limited partnership”. In brief, the plan
instructed parties to “sell” their assets in exchange for an
interest in a newly-created limited partnership. Because a
partnership interest is worth less for tax purposes than a
proportional share of the partnership’s assets –- due to lack of
4
direct control and non-liquidity -- this “exchange” would reduce
the taxable value of the estate.
The next day, Gulig, acting under power of attorney on behalf
of Strangi: (1) prepared the Agreement of Limited Partnership of
the Strangi Family Limited Partnership (“SFLP”); (2) prepared and
filed the Articles of Incorporation of Stranco, Inc. (“Stranco”);
(3) transferred 98% of Strangi’s assets1 –- valued at $9,932,967 –-
to SFLP in exchange for a 99% limited partner interest; (4)
transferred $49,350 of Strangi’s assets to Stranco in exchange for
47% of Stranco’s common stock; (5) facilitated the purchase of the
remaining 53% of Stranco’s common stock by the four Strangi
children for $55,650; (6) issued a check from Stranco for a 1%
general partner interest in SFLP.
The result of Gulig’s efforts was a three-tiered entity, with
SFLP –- and the roughly $10 million in assets Strangi had
transferred into it –- at the top. The SFLP partnership agreement
provided that Stranco, which owned a 1% general partnership
interest in SFLP, had sole authority to conduct SFLP’s business
affairs. Strangi owned a 99% interest in SFLP, but was a limited
partner, and thus had no formal control.
1
The assets that Strangi transferred to SFLP included, inter
alia, (1) brokerage accounts at Smith Barney and Merrill-Lynch
valued at $7.4 million; (2) an annuity valued at $276,000; (3) two
life insurance policies valued at a total of $70,000; (4) two
houses in Waco; (5) a condominium in Dallas; (6) a commercial
warehouse in Dallas; and (7) several limited partnership interests,
valued at approximately $400,000.
5
Stranco itself was a Texas corporation. Strangi owned 47% of
Stranco’s common stock; each of his four children owned a 13%
share. Stranco’s articles of incorporation named Strangi and the
four Strangi children as the initial board of directors. On August
17, the five met to execute the corporate bylaws, a shareholder
agreement, and an authorization to employ Gulig as manager of
Stranco.
On August 18, Stranco made a corporate gift of 100 shares –-
a 1/4 of one percent stake –- to the McLennan Community College
Foundation. Gulig later testified that he understood that the gift
would improve the asset protection features of the Stranco/SFLP
structure. The implementation of the “Fortress Plan” was thus
completed.
Following Strangi’s death in October 1994, Gulig asked Texas
Commerce Bank (“TCB”, a successor in interest to Ameritrust) to
decline to serve as executor of the Estate. To that end, Gulig
claims to have issued a “threat that no distributions would be made
from SFLP to pay executor fees”. After receiving indemnification
from the Strangi children, TCB agreed. Strangi’s will was admitted
to probate in April 1995 with Rosalie Gulig as the sole executor.
C
Both prior to and after Strangi’s death, SFLP made various
outlays, both monetary and in-kind, to meet his needs and expenses.
In September and October of 1994, SFLP distributed $8,000 and
$6,000, respectively, to Strangi. On both occasions, SFLP made
6
proportional distributions –- $80.81 and $60.61, to be precise –-
to its general partner, Stranco. The Commissioner suggests that
these payments to Strangi were necessary because, after the
transfer to SFLP, Strangi retained possession of only minimal
liquid assets –- i.e., two bank accounts with funds totaling $762.
The Estate responds by noting that Strangi received a monthly
pension of $1,438 and Social Security payments of $1,559, and that
he retained over $187,000 in “liquefiable” assets, which consisted
largely of various brokerage accounts.
SFLP also distributed approximately $40,000 in 1994 to pay for
funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, and various
personal debts that Strangi had incurred. In 1995 and 1996, SFLP
distributed approximately $65,000 to pay for Estate expenses and a
specific bequest made by Strangi. Moreover, in 1995, SFLP
distributed $3,187,800 to the Estate to pay federal and state
inheritance taxes. The Estate notes that all of these
disbursements were recorded on SFLP’s books and accompanied by pro
rata distributions to Stranco. The Estate further notes that it
repaid SFLP for the $65,000 “advance” in January 1997.
In addition, prior to his death, Strangi continued to dwell in
one of the two houses he had transferred to SFLP. The Estate notes
that SFLP charged rent for the two months that Strangi remained in
the house. Although the accrued rent was recorded in SFLP’s books,
it was not actually paid until January 1997, more than two years
after Strangi’s death.
7
D
In December 1998, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice
of deficiency to the Estate, asserting that it owed $2,545,826 in
federal estate tax or, in the alternative, $1,629,947 in federal
gift tax. The deficiency was attributable to the IRS’s
determination that Strangi’s interest in SFLP was $10,947,343 –-
i.e., the actual value of the assets transferred –- rather than the
$6,560,730 that the Estate reported.2
The Estate petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of
the deficiencies. In the Tax Court, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue contended, inter alia, that (1) SFLP should be disregarded
because it lacked economic substance and business purpose; (2) the
partnership agreement was a restriction on the sale or use of the
underlying property that should be disregarded for valuation
purposes; (3) the fair market value of Strangi’s partnership
interest was understated; and (4) if a discount was appropriate,
Strangi had made a taxable gift on formation of SFLP to the extent
the value of the property transferred exceeded the value of his
partnership interest.
2
The basis for the discrepancy in this case –- and the
primary rationale for the use of family limited partnerships
generally –- is the IRS’s practice of permitting discounts in the
taxable value of an estate based on a lack of marketability or
control of estate property. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-1(b) (“The
value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross
estate ... is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's
death ...”).
8
Prior to trial, the Commissioner filed a motion for leave to
amend his answer to include the alternative theory that, under
I.R.C. § 2036(a), Strangi’s taxable estate should include the full
value of the assets he transferred to SFLP and Stranco. The Tax
Court denied the motion. After a two-day trial, the court held for
the Estate, rejecting all of the Commissioner’s proffered reasons
for inclusion of the assets. See Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000) (“Strangi I”).
The Commissioner appealed, inter alia, the denial of the
motion to amend his answer. This court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and remanded the case to the Tax Court with
instructions that it either “set forth its reasons for ... denial
of the Commissioner’s motion for leave to amend” or “reverse its
denial of the Commissioner’s motion, permit the amendment, and
consider the Commissioner’s claim under § 2036". Estate of Strangi
v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
On remand, the Tax Court opted to permit the amendment. The
parties submitted additional briefs on the § 2036(a) issue and the
Tax Court entered its opinion in May 2003, finding in favor of the
Commissioner, and upholding the initially-assessed estate tax
deficiency. See Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-
145 (2003) (“Strangi II”). The Estate now appeals the decision of
the Tax Court.
II
9
The Strangi Estate advances two primary arguments. Both hinge
on the application of I.R.C. § 2036(a) to the facts at hand.
Section 2036(a) provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of any
interest therein which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in the case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money’s worth), by
trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death
or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of,
or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in
conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom.
First, the Estate contends that the Tax Court erred in holding
that Strangi retained “possession or enjoyment” of the property he
transferred to SFLP or the right to designate who would possess or
enjoy it. If Strangi did not retain such an interest, § 2036(a)
does not apply. Second, the Estate contends that, even if Strangi
retained possession or enjoyment of the assets, the Tax Court erred
in holding that the transfer did not fall within the “bona fide
sale” exception to § 2036(a).
A
10
The core of the Estate’s argument on appeal is that the Tax
Court erred in concluding that Strangi retained possession or
enjoyment of the assets he transferred to SFLP. It follows, the
Estate contends, that the Tax Court erred in holding that the
assets were includible in the taxable estate under § 2036(a).
Section 2036(a) is one of several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code intended to prevent parties from avoiding the estate
tax by means of testamentary substitutes that permit a transferor
to retain lifetime enjoyment of purportedly transferred property.
See Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th
Cir. 1973). Specifically, § 2036(a) provides that property
transferred by a decedent will be included in the taxable estate
if, after the transfer, the decedent retains either (1) “possession
or enjoyment” of the transferred property; or (2) “the right ... to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom”.
A transferor retains “possession or enjoyment” of property,
within the meaning of § 2036(a)(1), if he retains a “substantial
present economic benefit” from the property, as opposed to “a
speculative contingent benefit which may or may not be realized”.
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 145, 150 (1972). IRS
regulations further require that there be an “express or implied”
agreement “at the time of the transfer” that the transferor will
11
retain possession or enjoyment of the property. 26 C.F.R. §
20.2036-1(a).
In the case at bar, the benefits retained by Strangi –-
including, for example, periodic payments made prior to Strangi’s
death, the continued use of the transferred house, and the post-
death payment of various debts and expenses –- were clearly
“substantial” and “present”, as opposed to “speculative” or
“contingent”.3 As such, our inquiry under § 2036(a)(1) turns
solely on whether there was an express or implied agreement that
Strangi would retain de facto control and/or enjoyment of the
transferred assets.
The Commissioner does not suggest that any express agreement
existed. Thus, the precise question before us is whether the
record supports the Tax Court’s conclusion that Strangi and the
other shareholders of Stranco –- that is, the Strangi children –-
had an implicit agreement by which Strangi would retain the
enjoyment of his property after the transfer to SFLP.4
3
See Byrum, 408 U.S. at 146-47 (A substantial present
interest exists in “situations in which the owner of property
divested himself of title but retained an income interest or, in
the case of real property, the lifetime use of the property”.).
4
As the Tax Court explained, § 2036(a) includes within the
taxable estate any asset that is not transferred “absolutely,
unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations”.
Strangi II, T.C. Memo 2003-145 (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632, 645 (1945)). The controlling question for
present purposes, then, is not whether Strangi actually kept any
particular asset in his possession, but whether he received a
general assurance that his assets would be available to meet his
personal needs.
12
The Tax Court’s determination that an implied agreement
existed is a finding of fact and is reviewed only for clear error.
See Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1993). A
factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in
light of the record read as a whole. See, e.g., United States v.
Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2005). As such, we will
disturb the Tax Court’s findings of fact only if we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made”.
Otto Candies, L.L.C. v. Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Corp., 346 F.3d 530,
533 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Allison v. Roberts (In re Allison),
960 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The Tax Court, in its memorandum opinion, presented a litany
of circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion. The Estate
responds that each of the factors cited by the court is either
factually erroneous or irrelevant. We consider each of the
evidentiary factors in turn.
First, the Commissioner cites SFLP’s various disbursements of
funds to Strangi or his Estate. The Estate responds that only two
of the payments –- those made in September and October 1994,
totaling $14,000 –- should be considered, because the remaining
payments were made after Strangi’s death, and thus “were not as a
consequence of anything Mr. Strangi did”.
The Estate’s response misses the point. Certainly, part of
the “possession or enjoyment” of one’s assets is the assurance that
they will be available to pay various debts and expenses upon one’s
13
death.5 And that assurance is precisely what Strangi retained in
this case. SFLP distributed over $100,000 from 1994 to 1996 to pay
for funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, specific
bequests and various personal debts that Strangi had incurred.
These repeated distributions provide strong circumstantial evidence
of an understanding between Strangi and his children that
“partnership” assets would be used to meet Strangi’s expenses.6
Second, the Tax Court found “highly probative” Strangi’s
“continued physical possession of his residence after its transfer
to SFLP”. The Estate responds by noting that SFLP charged Strangi
rent on the home. As the Tax Court observed, although the rent
charge was recorded in SFLP’s books in 1994, the Estate made no
actual payment until 1997. Even assuming that the belated rent
payment was not a post hoc attempt to recast Strangi’s use of the
5
See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1 (“The ‘use, possession ... or
other enjoyment of the transferred property’ is considered as
having been retained by ... the decedent to the extent that the
use, possession ... or other enjoyment is to be applied toward the
discharge of a legal obligation of the decedent ... .”); see also
Ray v. United States, 762 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir.
1985)(considering use of transferred assets to pay transferor’s
funeral expenses as supportive of finding that transferor retained
possession or enjoyment under § 2036).
6
The Estate further contends that all of the above payments
were “pro rata partnership distributions”, meaning that Stranco
received cash disbursements in proportion to its 1% general partner
interest in SFLP. The Tax Court characterized these payments as
“de minimis”, insofar as they did not “in any substantial way
operate to curb decedent’s ability to benefit from SFLP property”.
Strangi II, T.C. Memo 2003-145. In short, although the importance
of the pro rata distributions to the “implied agreement” inquiry is
perhaps debatable, there is nothing clearly erroneous about the
decision to assign them minimal weight.
14
house, such a deferral, in itself, provides a substantial economic
benefit. As such, the Tax Court did not err in considering
Strangi’s continued occupancy of his home as evidence of an implied
agreement.
Third, both the Commissioner and the Tax Court point to
Strangi’s lack of liquid assets after the transfer to SFLP as
evidence that some arrangement to meet his expenses must have been
made. As noted supra, Strangi transferred over 98% of his wealth
to SFLP and afterward retained only $762 in truly liquid assets.
The Estate counters that Strangi had over $187,000 in “liquefiable”
securities, which could have been sold to meet expenses for the
remainder of Strangi’s life –- that is, for the twelve to twenty-
four months he was expected to live after August 1994. Even this
limited assertion seems dubious, however, when, as the Tax Court
noted, Strangi averaged nearly $17,000 in monthly expenses over the
two months between the creation of SFLP and his death. See Strangi
II, T.C. Memo 2003-145.
In sum, upon creation of SFLP, Strangi retained assets barely
sufficient to meet his own living expenses for the low end of his
life expectancy –- that is, for about one year –- assuming he was
never required to pay rent, estate administration costs,
outstanding personal debts, funeral expenses, or taxes. At the
same time, Strangi began receiving substantial monthly payments out
of SFLP’s coffers. Given these circumstances, we cannot say that
the Tax Court clearly erred in holding that Strangi and his
15
children had some implicit understanding by which Strangi would
continue to use his assets as needed, and therefore retain
“possession or enjoyment” within the meaning of § 2036(a)(1).7
B
The Estate next contends that, even if the assets transferred
to SFLP do fall within the ambit of § 2036(a)(1), they should
nonetheless be excluded from the taxable estate, based on the “bona
fide sale” exception contained in § 2036(a). For the reasons set
forth below, we disagree.
Section 2036(a) provides an exception for any transfer of
property that is a “bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money’s worth”. The exception contains
two discrete requirements: (1) a “bona fide sale”, and (2)
“adequate and full consideration”. See Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-121. Both must be satisfied for the
exception to apply.
1
We turn briefly to the “adequate and full consideration”
requirement. This requirement is met only where any reduction in
the estate’s value is “joined with a transfer that augments the
estate by a commensurate ... amount”. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 262.
7
Because we hold that the transferred assets were properly
included in the taxable estate under § 2036(a)(1), we do not reach
the Commissioner’s alternative contention that Strangi retained the
“right ... to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property”, thus triggering inclusion under § 2036(a)(2).
16
Where assets are transferred into a partnership in exchange for a
proportional interest therein, the “adequate and full
consideration” requirement will generally be satisfied, so long as
the formalities of the partnership entity are respected.8 The
Commissioner concedes that such has been the case here. As such,
the adequate and full consideration prong of the exception is
satisfied and the sole question before us is whether the transfer
was a “bona fide sale”.
2
Thus, we turn our attention to the bona fide sale requirement.
The term “bona fide”, taken literally, means “in good faith” or
“without fraud or deceit”. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 186 (8th ed.
2004). As we have previously observed, use of a “bona fide”
standard often requires the courts to assess both the subjective
intent of a party and the objective results of his actions. See,
8
As we observed in Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 266:
The proper focus therefore on whether a
transfer to a partnership is for adequate and
full consideration is: (1) whether the
interest credited to each of the partners was
proportionate to the fair market value of the
assets each partner contributed to the
partnership, (2) whether the assets
contributed by each partner to the partnership
were properly credited to the respective
capital accounts of the partners, and (3)
whether on termination or dissolution of the
partnership the partners were entitled to
distributions from the partnership in amounts
equal to their respective capital accounts.
17
e.g., United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571, 576-77 (5th Cir.
1999).
As we noted in Wheeler v. United States, however, Congress in
1976 removed a provision from the Internal Revenue Code that
included within the taxable estate transfers “intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment” after the decedent’s death. 116
F.3d 749, 765 (5th Cir. 1997). We observed that Congress’s
apparent purpose was to “eliminate factbound determinations hinging
on subjective motive”. Id. (quoting Estate of Elkins v.
Commissioner, 797 F.2d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1986)). As such, since
Wheeler, we have held that whether a transfer of assets is a bona
fide sale under § 2036(a) is a purely objective inquiry. See
Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 263-64.
We have yet to definitively state, however, precisely what
this “objective” inquiry entails. Relying on language from
Wheeler, the Estate contends that the “objective” bona fide sale
inquiry requires only that the transfer be for adequate and full
consideration.9 The exception to § 2036(a), however, already
9
In support of its contention, the Estate cites Wheeler for
the proposition that “[t]he only possible grounds for challenging
the legitimacy of a transaction [under § 2036(a)] are whether the
transferor actually parted with the [transferred property] and the
transferee actually parted with the requisite adequate and full
consideration”. 116 F.3d at 764. Our holding in Wheeler, however,
was expressly limited to the narrow factual circumstances of an
intra-family sale of a remainder interest in real property. See
id. at 756. Although adequate consideration may suffice to show
the absence of fraud or deceit where a real property interest is,
in fact, transferred from one party to another, such is not the
case where, as here, the purported transfer arguably deprives the
18
expressly requires that transfers be for “adequate and full
consideration”. As such, the Estate’s interpretation of the
exception would render the term “bona fide” superfluous, and must
therefore be rejected.10
We think that the proper approach was set forth in Kimbell, in
which we held that a sale is bona fide if, as an objective matter,
it serves a “substantial business [or] other non-tax” purpose. Id.
at 267. As noted supra, Congress has foreclosed the possibility of
determining the purpose of a given transaction based on findings as
to the subjective motive of the transferor. Instead, the proper
inquiry is whether the transfer in question was objectively likely
to serve a substantial non-tax purpose.11 Thus, the finder of fact
is charged with making an objective determination as to what, if
any, non-tax business purposes the transfer was reasonably likely
to serve at its inception. We review such a determination only for
clear error. See Walker Intern. Holdings Ltd. v. Republic of
Congo, 395 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2004).
transferor of literally nothing.
10
We recognize that the Estate’s proposed interpretation of
§ 2036(a) would yield a more uniform and predictable rule than the
one set forth in Kimbell and here. Although we acknowledge the
importance of predictability in the law governing estates and
estate planning, it cannot be had at the expense of the plain
language of the statute.
11
Accord Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 881 (5th
Cir. 1989) (“To determine whether economic substance is present,
courts view the objective realities of the transaction or, in other
words, whether what was actually done is what the parties to the
transaction purported to do.”).
19
The Estate proffered five discrete non-tax rationales for
Strangi’s transfer of assets to SFLP. They are: (1) deterring
potential tort litigation by Strangi’s former housekeeper; (2)
deterring a potential will contest by the Seymour children; (3)
persuading a corporate executor to decline to serve; (4) creating
a joint investment vehicle for the partners; and (5) permitting
centralized, active management of working interests owned by
Strangi. The Tax Court rejected each of the rationales as
factually implausible. In reviewing for clear error, we ask only
whether the Tax Court’s findings are supported by evidence in the
record as a whole, not whether we would necessarily reach the same
conclusions.
First, the Estate contends that Strangi transferred his assets
to SFLP partly out of concern that his former housekeeper, Stone,
might bring a tort claim against the Estate for injuries sustained
on the job. The Tax Court, however, heard admissions by Gulig
that Strangi had paid all of the medical expenses stemming from
Stone’s injury and had continued to pay her salary during her
absence from work.
Still, the Estate contends, had Stone sued, she might have
recovered a substantial amount for her pain and suffering.
Although this possibility cannot be ruled out entirely, the
evidence before the Tax Court suggests otherwise. Gulig testified,
for example, that Stone and Strangi were “very close” and admitted
that he had never inquired as to whether there was any evidence
20
that Strangi actually caused Stone’s injury. Further, there is no
evidence that Stone ever threatened to take any action. As such,
the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding that the transfer of
assets into SFLP did not operate to deter Stone from bringing a
tort claim against the Estate.
Second, the Estate contends that SFLP served to deter a will
contest by the Seymour children. The Tax Court concluded that
“[t]he Seymour claims were stale when the partnership was formed,
and they never materialized”. Strangi I, 115 T.C. at 485.
Further, although the Seymour children did retain counsel, Gulig
admitted that prior to the creation of SFLP neither they nor their
attorney ever contacted him in regard to Strangi’s will, and that
no claim was ever made against the Estate. Although reasonable
minds might differ on this point, the Tax Court’s factual
conclusion –- i.e., that the Seymour children either would not or
could not have mounted a successful challenge to the will –- is not
clearly erroneous.
Third, the Estate argues that SFLP deterred TCB, the corporate
co-executor of Strangi’s will, from serving, thus saving the Estate
a substantial amount in executor’s fees. The Estate presented
Gulig’s testimony regarding a meeting with TCB and TCB’s subsequent
declining to serve. Nonetheless, the Tax Court was unpersuaded,
noting that it was “skeptical of the estate's claims of business
purposes related to executor and attorney's fees”. See id.
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The Estate concedes that “the reason for which the corporate
co-executor declined to serve[] is not reflected in the record”.
Thus, although a finder of fact might infer a causal relationship
between the existence of SFLP and TCB’s withdrawal, there is
nothing clearly erroneous in the Tax Court’s refusal to do so.
Fourth, the Estate contends that SFLP functioned as a joint
investment vehicle for its partners. The Tax Court rejected this
contention, noting that the contribution of the Strangi children,
which totaled $55,650, was de minimis and thus properly ignored for
purposes of the bona fide sale requirement. The Tax Court further
concluded that, even if the contributions of the children were
properly considered, SFLP never made any investments or conducted
any active business following its formation. See Strangi I, 115
T.C. 486.
The Estate responds that ignoring a shareholder’s contribution
as de minimis runs contrary to Kimbell, in which we noted that
there exists “no principle of partnership law that would require
the minority partner to own a minimum percentage interest in the
partnership for ... transfers to be bona fide”. 371 F.3d at 268.
It is certainly true that the de minimis contribution of a minority
partner is not, in itself, sufficient grounds for finding that a
transfer of assets to a partnership is not bona fide. However,
where a partnership has made no actual investments, the existence
of minimal minority contributions may well be insufficient to
overcome an inference by the finder of fact that joint investment
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was objectively unlikely. Such appears to have been the case here.
Thus, it was not clear error for the Tax Court to reject the
Estate’s “joint investment” rationale.
Finally, the Estate contends that SFLP permitted active
management of Strangi’s “working assets”. As a preliminary matter,
it is undisputed that the overwhelming majority of the assets
transferred to SFLP did not require active management. Some
seventy percent of the transfer, for example, consisted of various
brokerage accounts. As the Estate points out, however, this is not
unlike the situation in Kimbell, where we reversed summary judgment
for the Commissioner based in part on the transferor’s contribution
of $438,000 in working oil and gas properties, which comprised
approximately 11% of the overall transfer. See id. at 267.
The Estate asserts that working assets –- including real
property and interests in real estate partnerships –- comprise an
approximately equal proportion of the transfer in this case, as in
Kimbell. Assuming this to be an accurate characterization of
Strangi’s contribution, this analogy misses the point. In Kimbell,
we reviewed cross motions for summary judgment on the “bona fide
sale” issue. In reversing the district court, we noted that the
Commissioner “raised no issues of material fact in its motion for
summary judgment and challenged none of the taxpayer's facts”. Id.
at 268-69. Among the unchallenged facts was the taxpayer’s
assertion that there had been significant active management of the
transferred oil and gas properties. Id. at 267-68.
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By contrast, this case comes to us after a full trial on the
merits. The Tax Court heard uncontested evidence that “[n]o active
business was conducted by SFLP following its formation”. Strangi
I, 115 T.C. at 486. In short, although Strangi may have
transferred a substantial percentage of assets that might have been
actively managed under SFLP, the Tax Court concluded, based on
substantial evidence, that no such management ever took place.
From this, the Tax Court fairly inferred that active management was
objectively unlikely as of the date of SFLP’s creation. As such,
we cannot say that the Tax Court clearly erred in rejecting the
Estate’s “active management” rationale.
In sum, we hold that the Tax Court did not clearly err in
finding that Strangi’s transfer of assets to SFLP lacked a
substantial non-tax purpose. Accordingly, the “bona fide sale”
exception to § 2036(a) is not triggered, and the transferred assets
are properly included within the taxable estate. We therefore
affirm the estate tax deficiency assessed against the Estate.
C
The Estate raises one final matter for our consideration. It
contends that, even if the Tax Court did not err in holding the
transferred assets includible under § 2036(a), it nonetheless
abused its discretion in denying the Estate leave to amend its
petition to include a computational offset, based on a time-barred
income tax refund, under the doctrine of equitable recoupment. As
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such, the Estate requests that we remand the case to the Tax Court
with instructions that it offset the assessed estate tax deficiency
by $304,402 already paid in income taxes.
The doctrine of equitable recoupment applies where the
Commissioner brings a timely suit for payment of taxes owed and the
taxpayer seeks to offset that amount by seeking a refund of an
erroneously imposed tax, but the taxpayer’s claim is time-barred.
Equitable recoupment allows the taxpayer to raise the time barred
refund claim “in order to reduce or eliminate the money owed on the
[Commissioner’s] timely claim”. Estate of Branson v. Commissioner,
264 F.3d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 2001).
The problem in this case, as the Tax Court points out, is that
the Estate has adopted two inconsistent positions with respect to
its equitable recoupment argument. To sustain a claim for
equitable recoupment, the taxpayer must show, inter alia, that the
refund sought is, in fact, time-barred. See Estate of Branson, 264
F.3d at 910 (citing Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 538 (1937)). The
Estate, however, currently has a separate action pending in the
Western District of Texas, in which it contends that the disputed
refund is not time-barred.
Given this inconsistency, the Tax Court held that the Estate
failed to show that the refund was time-barred, and denied its
motion to amend. On appeal, the Estate argues only that this
result is inequitable. Unfortunately, in so doing, it neglects to
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address the controlling legal issue here –- i.e., whether the Tax
Court erred in concluding that the refund was not time-barred, and
thus not subject to equitable recoupment. In sum, because the
Estate has failed to brief us on the underlying merits of the Tax
Court’s ruling, it has likewise failed to show that the Tax Court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Tax Court is
AFFIRMED.
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