Sims v. Monumental General Ins. Co.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 91–9529
Summary Calendar.
Julia Brumfield SIMS, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
MONUMENTAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
May 11, 1992.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
This case requires us to decide whether a man's hanging
himself by the neck in order to restrict the flow of oxygen to his
brain is an intentionally self-inflicted injury within the meaning
of an exclusion to his insurance policy. We hold that he
intentionally injured himself, even though he did not mean to kill
himself, and that his death is not covered by the policy. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
I.
The relevant facts are not disputed. William P. Brumfield was
discovered strangled to death in his home. He hanged himself by
the neck so the flow of oxygen to his brain would be restricted;
he enjoyed this practice and its concomitant activities,1 and he
apparently had engaged in it several times before. This time,
1
This practice is known as "autoerotic asphyxiation."
however, he died. The parties agree that his death was not the
result of suicide, foul play, or natural causes.
Mr. Brumfield was covered by an insurance policy originally
issued by Monumental Life Insurance Company and later assumed by
Monumental General Insurance Company. The policy covers accidental
death that does not result from intentionally self-inflicted
injury. Julia Brumfield Sims, Mr. Brumfield's sister and the
beneficiary under the policy, claims that $150,000 is due under the
policy, but Monumental denied her claim on the grounds that Mr.
Brumfield's death was not accidental and resulted from an
intentionally self-inflicted injury.
Mrs. Sims sued Monumental. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court rendered judgment for Monumental.
Sims v. Monumental Gen. Life Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.La.1991).2 Mrs. Sims now appeals.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing the summary judgment, we apply
the same standard of review as did the district court. Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir.1989); Moore
2
The district court was mistaken when it referred to the
Defendant as Monumental General Life Insurance Company. See 1 Rawle
112–13.
v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548 (5th
Cir.1989). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and answers to
interrogatories, together with affidavits, must demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact remains. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). To that end
we must "review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to
the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986). If the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106
S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Because we only need
apply the unambiguous policy language to undisputed facts, this
case is well suited to summary judgment.
III.
Mr. Brumfield's policy excludes "any loss resulting directly
or indirectly, wholly or partly from: 1. Suicide or attempt
thereat or intentionally self-inflicted injury occurring while sane
or insane." 1 Rawle 121. The issue is whether Mr. Brumfield's death
"result[ed] directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from ... [an]
intentionally self-inflicted injury." The parties agree that
Louisiana law applies in this diversity case.
In Louisiana, someone is said to have acted intentionally
"where the actor entertained a desire to bring about the
consequences that followed or where the actor believed that the
result was substantially certain to follow." Bazley v. Tortorich,
397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La.1981). Mr. Brumfield desired to partially
strangle himself. The partial strangulation that he apparently
achieved on previous occasions was intentional and self-inflicted.
The only question is whether partial strangulation is an injury.
According to the undisputed opinion of Monumental's expert,
the type of strangulation desired by Mr. Brumfield damages tissues
in the neck and deprives the brain of valuable oxygen. 2 Rawle 242.
If Mr. Brumfield came before this Court and proved that a robber
had partially strangled him, we would have no trouble holding that
Mr. Brumfield had been injured and that the robber should be held
criminally liable. Two state supreme courts have so held. See
State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 250 (Utah 1970) (affirming second
degree murder conviction because the victim's life was greatly
endangered even though only partial strangulation was intended);
State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 418, 788 P.2d 1162, 1169 (1989)
(affirming death sentence partly based on same), aff'd sub nom.
Schad v. Arizona, ––– U.S. ––––, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555
(1991). In the words of a court facing an issue identical to ours,
"it continues to be an injury even when it is self-inflicted."
Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542, 545
(S.D.Iowa), aff'd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir.1981).
That Mr. Brumfield only intended partial strangulation and did
not intentionally kill himself does not avail Mrs. Sims. The
policy in this case not only excludes suicide, but also any loss
(including death) "resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or
partly from ... [an] intentionally self-inflicted injury." Partial
strangulation is an injury in and of itself. His death "result[ed]
directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from" that intentionally
self-inflicted injury.
An analogy is helpful. If Mr. Brumfield had been a member of
a fraternal organization that required him to brand his forearm,
and he did so, any loss arising from the branding would be
excluded. For instance, although he only intended to burn the
insignia of the organization onto his skin, he might
unintentionally burn into his muscle and do serious damage to his
arm. He intended some injury, but another, unintended injury
resulted. The loss would not be covered the policy at issue here.
Our decision is in accord with the Eighth Circuit's
application of Iowa law to an identical case. Sigler, 663 F.2d 49
(affirming summary judgment for defendant). The Fourth Circuit has
reached the same result in two cases decided under Virginia law,
although that court held that the deaths were not accidental (an
issue we do not reach3). International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir.1981); Runge v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.1976). The opinion of the
intermediate appellate court in Wisconsin, which reached an
3
Because we have decided that coverage was excluded under
the "intentionally self-inflicted injury" provision, we need not
decide whether his death was "accidental" within the meaning of
the policy.
opposite result in a similar case, does not inform our analysis
because it, like the Fourth Circuit, only addressed the issue
whether the death was "accidental." See Kennedy v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 136 Wis. 2d 425, 401 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Ct.App.1987).
The policy in that case apparently had no exclusion for
intentionally self-inflicted injury. See id. See generally Alan
Stephens, Annotation, Accident or Life Insurance: Death by
Autoerotic Asphyxiation as Accidental, 62 A.L.R. 4th 823 (1988).
The only case cited by Mrs. Sims that holds that partial
strangulation is not an injury is Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). That case, however, was in an entirely
different procedural posture than the instant case. In Tommie, the
Texas intermediate appellate court was reviewing a jury finding
that partial strangulation did not constitute an injury under Texas
law. The Texarkana court, constrained by its standard of review,
held that "some probative evidence" introduced in the trial court
tended to support the jury's finding, which the appellate court was
therefore required to affirm. Id. at 203. The record in the case
at bar, however, does not raise any genuine issue of material fact,
even when viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Sims. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d
265 (1986); Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577,
578 (5th Cir.1986).
IV.
No genuine issues of material fact remain, and Monumental is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mr. Brumfield's death
resulted from an intentionally self-inflicted injury, and his death
is not covered by the Monumental policy. The judgment of the
district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.