Linton v. City of Marlin

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 00-50227
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CAROLYN LINTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF MARLIN,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas, Waco Division
(W - 99 - CV - 272)
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April 16, 2001
Before DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LINDSAY 1, District Judge.
PER CURIAM 2:
Carolyn Linton (“Linton”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
City of Marlin (“the City”) dismissing her claims of sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Because we conclude that the district court’s order
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District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
is inconsistent with our precedents on the relevant issue, we reverse and remand for consideration of
the merits.
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Wilting v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 F.3d 474, 475 (5th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment was requested, and granted, on a single issue,
the question of whether plaintiff had timely filed her claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). We therefore limit our discussion to those facts directly relevant to that
issue.
Linton was discharged by the City on October 31, 1996. She submitted a sworn charge of
discrimination to the EEOC on January 23, 1998. Because a plaintiff in Texas must file a charge with
the EEOC within 300 days of the date of the discriminatory act, Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,
209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), the sworn charge filed on January 23,
1998 was not timely. The requirement of filing a timely charge with the EEOC, however, “is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations,
is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982). We have previously recognized two reasons for allowing Title VII claims despite
a plaintiff’s failure to file a sworn charge within the prescribed period: 1) equitable tolling, see Hood
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1999); McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical
Services Co., 700 F.2d 260, 263-65 (5th Cir. 1983); or 2) an unsworn charge, within the prescribed
period, which is subsequently amended by a sworn charge, see Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
687 F.2d 74, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1982); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 464-66 (5th Cir.
1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Equitable tolling is not argued by Linton here. In any event, the only relevant circumstances
that she mentions are the EEOC’s delays in sending her the official form for a sworn charge and in
notifying the City of the charge. These circumstances do not fall within the bases previously
recognized for equitable tolling, see Hood, 168 F.3d at 232, and were not such a serious impediment
to the City’s assertions of her rights as would justify tolling. Cf. Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co.,
601 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1979). We therefore address the second reason.
Linton alleges that she sent an unsworn letter to the EEOC on July 14, 1997 that constituted
a “charge.” Although Title VII requires that a charge be sworn, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),
applicable regulations define “charge” more broadly:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is sufficient
when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement
sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or
practices complained of. A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or
omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations
made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which
constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject
matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received.
A charge that has been so amended shall not be required to be redeferred.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Linton asserts that her unsworn letter constituted the “charge” and her
sworn charge on January 23, 1998 constituted an amendment.
The City challenges the admissibility of the unsworn letter as inadequately authenticated. The
district court indicated similar concerns about the authentication of the letter, but decided to consider
it nonetheless. We think these concerns are misplaced. To accept the City’s argument would exalt
form over substance, and such is not warranted by the facts of this case. Circumstantial evidence
alone may be sufficient to authenticate a letter, see United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 785 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990). The letter is consistent with Linton’s description of
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the letter she mailed. Her attorney’s affidavit, along with date stamp by (apparently) the EEOC,
supports an inference that the letter was in the EEOC’s possession. Absolute certainty is not
required. The authentication requirement “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). That standard has been
met. The issue thus becomes whether this unsworn claim satisfies the requirements of a “charge.”
The district court concluded that it does not, but this was a misapplication of relevant precedent.
Our previous cases holding such unsworn claims to be “charges” have been limited to
situations where the EEOC treated the unsworn statement, supplemented by a sworn statement
outside the limitation period, as a charge by initiating an investigation and notifying the defendant.
See Price, 687 F.2d at 78-79; Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 464-66; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 230-31. The
district court apparently read these holdings as limited to situations where the EEOC has initiated an
investigation on the basis of the unsworn claim alone, before receiving the subsequent sworn charge.
That is an incorrect reading and application of these cases.
In Price, we noted that the EEOC took action on the basis of the initial complaint itself, see
Price, 687 F.2d at 76, and stated that “[t]he fact that the Commission, at least at the initial stage of
the proceedings, considered the circumstances surrounding the receipt of Price’s complaint sufficient
to initiate the administrative process, is relevant.” Id. at 78-79. This is completely consistent with
the interpretation by the district court. Although Price held that immediate action, before receipt of
the sworn charge, was sufficient to infer that the unsworn statement was a “charge,” however, it did
not hold that such immediate action was necessary.
Our earlier cases demonst rate that the EEOC’s failure to take action right away does not
preclude a finding that the unsworn statement was a “charge.” In Weeks and Georgia Power, the
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plaintiffs filed unsworn complaints, but the EEOC took action only after the sworn charges were
received. See Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 464 (EEOC notified the employer seven days after the
sworn charge was filed; the original unsworn complaint was dated three months earlier); Weeks, 408
F.2d at 231 (“In its amicus brief the Commission makes clear that under its procedures unsworn
charges are not served upon respondents and that the investigation does not commence until a sworn
charge is served.”); see also Gonzalez v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 1997 WL 855968, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 1, 1997) (“Courts have made such exceptions where: (1) the EEOC itself treats the
claimant’s unsworn statement as a charge by initiating an investigation and notifying the defendant
(either before or after the charge is finally sworn to) . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citing Price, Weeks,
and Georgia Power).
The district court reached its decision based on an absence of evidence to show that the
EEOC took any action regarding her letter; however, it is clear from the record that the EEOC did
take action after the sworn charge was filed. The EEOC compiled an investigative file, notified the
City of the investigation, and eventually issued a “right-to-sue” letter. Compare Gonzalez, 1997 WL
855968, at *6 (unsworn statement not treated as a “charge” where “the EEOC regarded her letter
as a mere ‘inquiry,’ [and] returned it with explicit instructions to respond with more information prior
to the 300-day deadline”). This at the very least creates a fact issue as to whether the EEOC
considered the letter to be a “charge” within the meaning of Title VII.**
**
After Linton sent her unsworn letter to the EEOC on July 14, 1997, she told EEOC personnel on
several occasions that she “had not made up her mind” whether to pursue her claim against the City. The City
relies heavily on this piece of evidence and makes repeated references to it in its brief. We have considered this
evidence and find it irrelevant and the City’s argument unpersuasive because the letter plainly satisfies the
definition of a charge under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
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The doctrine of Weeks and Georgia Power is not completely elastic. At some point in time,
delay in filing a sworn charge necessarily becomes unduly prejudicial to a defendant. Our prior cases
involved only minimal delays beyond the deadlines. See Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 464, 467 (filed
seven days after the then-existing deadline of ninety days); Weeks, 408 F.2d at 230 (filed thirteen days
after the deadline). We decline to establish a firm rule on how long a delay can still remain within this
doctrine; however, we are convinced that, under the facts of this case, the delay of approximately five
months was not so unreasonable as to cause undue prejudice to the City.
The grant of summary judgment of the basis of an untimely charge was therefore
inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of Linton’s claim.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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