Submersible Sys Inc v. Perforadora Ctrl S A

Revised May 16, 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________________
No. 99-60591
________________________________
SUBMERSIBLE SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
PERFORADORA CENTRAL, S.A. de C.V.,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
_____________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_____________________________________________
May 4, 2001
Before FARRIS*, JOLLY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Submersible Systems, Inc. (“SSI”) sued Perforadora Central,
S.A. de C.V. (“Central”) in the southern district of Mississippi
for the conversion of some of its equipment aboard a vessel owned
by Central while that vessel was docked in a Mexican port.
Following a bench trial, the district court awarded SSI more than
$4.25 million in damages. Because the district court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Central, we vacate the judgment of the
*
Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
district court and remand with instructions to dismiss this case.
I.
SSI is a Louisiana corporation that operates small, remotely-
operated, submersible vehicles used in underwater inspection,
construction, and surveying. In the latter part of 1996, SSI
contracted with Quantum Ingenieros, S.A. de C.V. (“Quantum”) to
provide the submersible vehicles for Quantum’s inspection of
certain oil and gas pipelines located in Mexican waters. As part
of this project, Quantum also contracted with Central to transport
the equipment, including SSI’s submersible vehicles, and the
personnel to be used to inspect the pipelines. To carry out this
contract, Central dispatched the M/V DON FRANCISCO to Morgan City,
Louisiana in November of 1996 to pick up SSI’s equipment and
transport it to its destination in Mexico.
Quantum was late paying both SSI and Central for their
services, and Central twice brought its vessel back to port during
the early months of 1997 to force Quantum to pay what it owed. By
early June of 1997 Quantum owed both SSI and Central substantial
sums for their services on the pipeline inspection project. As a
result of Quantum’s indebtedness, Quantum and Central agreed to end
the charter of the DON FRANCISCO on June 23, 1997 and on that day
the DON FRANCISCO returned to the port of Dos Bocas, Mexico. At
that time, SSI had two employees, one of its submersible vehicles,
and some other related equipment on board the DON FRANCISCO. All
of SSI’s equipment was clearly marked as belonging to SSI.
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At about 9 am on the morning of the 23rd, the captain of the
DON FRANCISCO woke the two SSI employees and told them that SSI’s
equipment had been seized to force Quantum to pay Central what it
was owed for the charter of its vessel. Shortly thereafter, one of
Central’s agents boarded the vessel and inspected the immigration
papers of the two SSI employees. Seeing that they were out of
order, the agent reported the two men to the Mexican immigration
authorities. The two SSI employees then left the vessel and spent
the day getting their immigration papers in order. While they were
gone, Central offloaded SSI’s equipment from the DON FRANCISCO and
put it into a locked yard at the port.
Wolfgang Burnside, the owner of SSI, arrived in Mexico on June
26, 1997 to demand the release of SSI’s equipment. Central refused
to release the equipment and instead deposited it with the Mexican
Ministerio Publico. In later proceedings before the Ministerio
Publico, Central asserted that the seized equipment belonged to
Quantum and should be held pending an investigation of Quantum for
its failure to pay its debts. Central was eventually appointed
custodian of SSI’s equipment for the Ministerio Publico and moved
the equipment to Central’s yard in Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico, where
it was exposed to the elements.
After SSI filed this lawsuit, Central released the equipment
in March of 1999 and SSI transported it back to the United States.
However, because of prolonged exposure to the elements, the
equipment had been rendered worthless.
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II.
While it was attempting to get Central to return its property,
SSI discovered that Central was building a marine drilling rig at
the TDI Halter shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. SSI then filed
suit in the southern district of Mississippi, in May of 1998, for
the conversion of its equipment by Central. SSI’s suit invoked
both the admiralty jurisdiction and the diversity jurisdiction of
the district court. SSI prayed for attachment of the rig, pursuant
to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims or pursuant to Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Mississippi law.
Central responded to the suit by moving to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Central argued that given the nature of the
suit, it had insufficient contacts with Mississippi to subject it
to suit in Mississippi. Central argued against attachment of its
rig pursuant to Rule B by arguing that the district court had no
admiralty jurisdiction, or in the alternative that it could be
found within the southern district of Mississippi and so attachment
under Rule B would be improper. Central argued against attachment
pursuant to Rule 64 and Mississippi law on the grounds that it was
not subject to suit in Mississippi. Central also moved to dismiss
on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
The district court denied both motions. It ruled that the
nature of Central’s contacts with Mississippi made it subject to
suit in Mississippi. The district court ruled that admiralty
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jurisdiction existed in this case, but denied attachment under Rule
B on two separate grounds. The district court first held that as
Central was subject to jurisdiction in the southern district of
Mississippi, it could also be found within the southern district of
Mississippi. The district court next held, in the alternative,
that SSI had not filed the affidavit required by Rule B regarding
SSI’s efforts to locate Central within the southern district of
Mississippi. Having found Central subject to suit in Mississippi,
the district court allowed attachment of Central’s rig pursuant to
Rule 64 so long as SSI posted a $1 million bond.1 Concerning the
forum non conveniens issue, the district court found that Mexico
did not provide a civil remedy for conversion, and thus was not an
adequate alternative forum. In ruling on both motions, the
district court also ruled that United States general maritime law,
and not Mexican law, should apply to the case.
Following a three day bench trial, the district court found
that Central had converted SSI’s equipment. The district court
awarded SSI actual damages of $289,734.62, pre-judgment interest of
$48,211.84, consequential damages of $106,520.50, lost profits of
$2,311,140.00, and punitive damages of $1,500,000.00. Central
moved for a new trial on the grounds that it had newly discovered
evidence from the captain of the DON FRANCISCO concerning the
events of June 23, 1997. The district court denied the motion,
1
SSI never posted the bond and so never perfected its
attachment.
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holding that the captain’s testimony was not credible, and that it
was suspicious that he was located just a few days following the
trial after being missing since the incident on June 23, 1997.
Central then took this appeal.
Central argues on appeal that, 1) it is not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Mississippi, 2) the district court has no
admiralty jurisdiction in this case, 3) the district court should
have dismissed this case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, 4)
the district court should have applied Mexican law to this case, 5)
the district court erred in its damages calculations in several
respects, and 6) the district court should have granted it a new
trial. SSI cross-appeals for an award of its costs and for
attachment of Central’s rig should we find that the district court
did not have jurisdiction over Central.
III.
We begin with the issue we find dispositive, namely whether
the district court had jurisdiction over Central. Because the
facts concerning Central’s contacts with Mississippi and the United
States are undisputed, the issue of personal jurisdiction in this
case presents a question of law that we review de novo. World
Tanker Carriers Corp. v. M/V YA MAWLAYA, 99 F.3d 717, 720 (5th Cir.
1996).
A.
Absent a federal statute that provides for more expansive
personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of a federal
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district court is coterminous with that of a court of general
jurisdiction of the state in which the district court sits. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). For a federal district court in a particular
state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that
exercise of jurisdiction must first be proper under that state’s
long-arm statute. If the state long-arm statute allows the
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction must also be proper under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Mississippi long-arm statute provides, in relevant part,
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited
partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not
qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state
as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract
with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or
in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit
a tort in whole or in part against a resident or
nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business
or perform any character of work or service in this
state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing
business in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
Miss. Code § 13-3-57. A plaintiff who is not a resident of
Mississippi, such as SSI, may not take advantage of the contract
portion of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Lifeline Ambulance
Services, Inc. v. Laidlaw, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 686, 688 (S.D. Miss.
1998). Any tort committed by Central in this case was committed
solely in Mexico. Thus, SSI may not take advantage of the tort
portion of the Mississippi long-arm statute. By arranging to have
a drilling rig built in a shipyard in Pascagoula, it could be
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argued that Central did business in Mississippi. However, a non-
resident plaintiff like SSI may not take advantage of the doing
business portion of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Herrley v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 957 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1992);
Smith v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1984);
Lifeline, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 688. Thus, Central is not subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts under the
Mississippi long-arm statute.
Nor would a district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Central in Mississippi comport with the requirements of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process
requires that a foreign corporate defendant, “establish sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable
and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which [the defendant] has incurred there.” International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d
683 (1977). An exercise of personal jurisdiction, even when a
foreign corporate defendant has established sufficient contacts
with a forum, must also be reasonable in light of the forum’s
interest in the litigation in question. Asahi Metal Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102,
113-14, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987).
The extent of the contacts that a foreign corporate defendant
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must establish with a forum to satisfy due process concerns differs
depending on the nature of the litigation. In this case, Central’s
contacts with the state of Mississippi are wholly unrelated to
SSI’s claim that Central converted SSI’s equipment in Mexico. When
a plaintiff’s claim does not arise out of a defendant’s contacts
with a forum, then the defendant’s contacts with the forum must be,
“continuous and systematic” to satisfy the requirements of due
process. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 416, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96
L. Ed. 485 (1952); Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.
1994).
As commentators have recognized, the continuous and systematic
contacts test is a difficult one to meet, requiring extensive
contacts between a defendant and a forum. 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.41[3] (3d ed. 1999). The
Supreme Court has upheld an exercise of personal jurisdiction when
the suit was unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with a forum
only once. Id. Purchasing equipment in a forum and traveling to
that forum on related business are, without more, insufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s cause of action
does not arise out of those purchasing activities. Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 417.
Central’s only contacts with the state of Mississippi grow out
of its construction of a marine drilling rig at the TDI Halter
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shipyard in Pascagoula. Central contracted with TDI Halter for the
construction of the rig, and also maintained an office at the
shipyard with three employees to monitor the construction.2 These
are not the sort of continuous and systematic contacts that would
allow the district court to take jurisdiction over Central in this
case.
In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court considered a tort claim
against a Colombian helicopter operator arising out of a helicopter
crash in Colombia. The Colombian company had negotiated a contract
in Houston, Texas to provide for the services that led to the
crash. The Colombian company had also purchased about 80% of its
fleet of helicopters from a Texas company, had sent its pilots to
Texas for training, had sent members of its management to Texas for
technical consultations in connection with the purchase of its
fleet, and had accepted payment for the services that led to the
2
SSI has argued that Central conceded personal jurisdiction in
its opposition to attachment of the drilling rig under Rule B.
Central did admit, as part of that opposition, to the contacts with
Mississippi which are discussed above. Central argued that those
contacts meant that it could be found within the southern district
of Mississippi and so attachment under Rule B would be improper.
However, Central specifically stated that it was not thereby
conceding the issue of personal jurisdiction outside of the context
of Rule B attachment. Central stated, “Perforadora does not
dispute that the presence of the rig in the district itself is
sufficient to satisfy general personal jurisdiction in the district
for the purposes of Rule B as Rule B is not subject to common law
due process constraints. Maritime attachment warrants consideration
of a more flexible application of the doctrines of due process
consistent with its historical functions.” 4th Supplemental R. at
80 (emphasis added). Whether Central is correct or not concerning
what due process requires in the Rule B attachment context, Central
cannot be said to have conceded the issue of personal jurisdiction.
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crash in funds drawn on a Texas bank. In spite of all these
contacts with the state of Texas, the Supreme Court held that they
were insufficient to allow the Texas courts to take jurisdiction
over the Colombian company, considering that the litigation was
unrelated to the company’s contacts with Texas. Id. at 416. In
this case, Central, a Mexican company that has its headquarters in
Mexico and that does business almost exclusively in Mexico, made
contact with Mississippi only by virtue of its arrangement to
construct one marine drilling rig in a shipyard in Mississippi.
These contacts with Mississippi are even less substantial than
those of the Colombian company with Texas in Helicopteros.
The Mississippi long-arm statute does not allow a federal
district court sitting in Mississippi to take jurisdiction over
Central in this case. Even if it did, such an exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.
SSI argues, as an alternative ground for supporting the
judgment entered by the district court in its favor, that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) authorized the district court to
assume jurisdiction over Central.
Rule 4(k)(2) provides,
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, serving a
summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective,
with respect to claims arising under federal law, to
establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any
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defendant who is not subject to the courts of general
jurisdiction of any state.
Our court has previously held that claims falling within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts are claims arising
under federal law for the purposes of Rule 4(k)(2). World Tanker,
99 F.3d at 722-23.3
Rule 4(k)(2) applies to actions in which a federal court draws
its authority directly from federal law, and does not borrow it
from state law. The due process required in federal cases governed
by Rule 4(k)(2) is measured with reference to the Fifth Amendment,
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. That is, Rule 4(k)(2)
requires us to consider Central’s contacts with the United States
as a whole, and not just Central’s contacts with the state of
Mississippi. Id. at 720; Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, 11
F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank,
Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999). If Central has sufficient
contacts with the United States, then the district court could have
exercised jurisdiction over Central pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2).
In analyzing Central’s contacts with the United States, we
must keep in mind that this case does not arise out of Central’s
contacts with the United States. All the events constituting
Central’s conversion of SSI’s equipment - the seizure aboard the
DON FRANCISCO, the unloading of the equipment at the port of Dos
3
We find Central’s contention that the district court lacked
admiralty jurisdiction in this case to be without merit.
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Bocas, and the proceedings before the Mexican Ministerio Publico -
took place in Mexico. Therefore, Central’s contacts with the
United States must be, “continuous and systematic” to have allowed
the district court to take jurisdiction over Central pursuant to
Rule 4(k)(2). Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d
1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000); BP Chems., Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. &
Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 262-63 (3rd Cir. 2000).
The record reflects very few contacts between Central and the
United States other than those related to the construction of the
rig in Pascagoula. Central has an account at a Houston bank and
sends some employees to an offshore drilling conference in Houston
every year. Central has purchased spare parts and vessels in the
United States, though to what extent is not clear from the record.
Central’s vessels have also occasionally called on United States
ports. These contacts with the United States are, at best,
sporadic and of small consequence. Central conducts no operations
in the United States, maintains no office in the United States
(other than the one which is maintained solely to oversee
construction in Pascagoula), and owns no real or personal property
located in the United States.
Because Central’s contacts with the United States are not
continuous and systematic, the district court had no authority to
assume jurisdiction over Central pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2).
C.
SSI, as part of its cross-appeal, has argued that if we find
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that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over Central
then we should order attachment of Central’s rig under construction
in Pascagoula pursuant to Rule B and otherwise enforce the judgment
entered by the district court. As we have explained, the district
court did not have jurisdiction over Central. Nevertheless, we
decline to order attachment of Central’s rig pursuant to Rule B.
Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims provides, in relevant part,
In an in personam action:
(a) If a defendant is not found within the district, a
verified complaint may contain a prayer for process to
attach the defendant’s tangible or intangible personal
property - up to the amount sued for - in the hands of
garnishees named in the process.
(b) The plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney must sign
and file with the complaint an affidavit stating that, to
the affiant’s knowledge, or on information and belief,
the defendant cannot be found within the district.
Rule B allows a district court to take jurisdiction over a
defendant in an admiralty or maritime action by attaching property
of the defendant. Great Prize, S.A. v. Mariner Shipping Pty.,
Ltd., 967 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1992). We have interpreted the
requirement of Rule B that the defendant not, “be found within the
district” as meaning that the defendant is neither subject to the
jurisdiction of the district court nor amenable to service of
process within the district. Heidmar, Inc. v. Anonima Ravennate di
Armamento Sp.A. of Ravenna, 132 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998);
LaBanca v. Ostermunchner, 664 F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1981).
The district court gave two grounds for denying SSI’s motion
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to attach the rig pursuant to Rule B. The district court held that
Central could be found within the southern district of Mississippi
because its contacts with Mississippi made it subject to
jurisdiction there. The district court also held that SSI did not
submit the affidavit required by Rule B stating that Central could
not be found within the southern district of Mississippi. As
discussed above, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that Central’s contacts were sufficient to permit it to exercise
jurisdiction over this action. Thus, the district court erred in
concluding that Central would be found within the southern district
of Mississippi for the purposes of Rule B. However, that
conclusion does not mean that the district court erred in refusing
to attach Central’s rig pursuant to Rule B.
Rule B requires that a plaintiff seeking attachment pursuant
to Rule B file an affidavit, as well as a verified complaint,
concerning the presence of the defendant within the district in
which the action is filed. As the district court held, and as our
review of the record confirms, SSI did not file the required
affidavit with its verified complaint when it sought attachment of
Central’s drilling rig. SSI has argued, on the basis of the
holding in Amstar Corp. v. M/V ALEXANDROS T., 431 F. Supp. 328 (D.
Md. 1977), that its verified complaint alone should suffice to
allow attachment of the rig pursuant to Rule B. The district court
in Amstar did excuse the lack of an affidavit from the plaintiff in
that case given that the plaintiff also filed a verified complaint
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which stated that the defendant could not be found within the
district. However, Amstar does not stand for the proposition that
a district court must excuse a plaintiff’s failure to file the
affidavit required by Rule B when the plaintiff also files a
verified complaint. We cannot say that the district court erred in
this case because it chose to enforce Rule B as it is written.
The affidavit required by Rule B serves a useful purpose: it
assures the district court that the plaintiff has been diligent in
searching for the defendant within the district in which the action
is filed. Oregon v. Tug Go Getter, 398 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.
1968); West of England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n. v. McAllister
Bros., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993). As the district
court said, the contacts that Central had with Mississippi raised
questions about whether Central could be found within the southern
district of Mississippi. Thus, it was especially important that
SSI demonstrate that it had been diligent about searching for
Central and that SSI was not seeking attachment merely for purposes
of security or harassment. There was good reason for the district
court to enforce Rule B as written and refuse to attach Central’s
rig.4
4
Because we decide that the district court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Central, we do not reach the other
issues raised by Central in its appeal, including the choice of law
question, the forum non conveniens issue, or the district court’s
calculation of damages. We also do not reach the question of
whether ordering attachment of Central’s rig would be consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Shaffer in light of the fact
that the district court did not otherwise have personal
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IV.
For the reasons discussed above, Central was not subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the district court. Because SSI has
failed to comply with the requirements of Rule B, we need not
consider whether the district court could have taken jurisdiction
over Central by attaching its property. Therefore, the judgment of
the district court is VACATED and this case is REMANDED with
instructions to DISMISS this case for lack of jurisdiction.
jurisdiction over Central.
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