DocketNumber: 02-11096
Citation Numbers: 472 F.3d 287
Judges: Jones, King, Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Smith, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, Demoss, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Owen
Filed Date: 12/14/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/5/2024
dissenting:
I enthusiastically join the superb dissenting opinions penned respectively by Chief Judge Jones and Judges Clement and Owen. I dissent separately, not to discuss the merits of this case but to highlight the embarrassing procedural tangle caused by the various actions of the Supreme Court and this court in Penny-related cases.
In its Penny cases, this court has been inconsistent in deciding whether to (1) finalize a case and issue the mandate, (2) grant en banc rehearing, or (3) hold a case indefinitely. Presumably the instant case (Nelson) was taken en banc to reconcile this circuit’s Penny jurisprudence — that is, to harmonize our numerous Penny-related cases with each other and with the opaque pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
An examination of the time line in this court’s Penny cases only adds to the confusion. The panel decision in Nelson was issued on August 12, 2003.
On remand in Nelson, this court issued its panel opinion on March 1, 2006, stating that “[t]his death penalty case is reconsidered pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instruction following its summary grant of certiorari and the vacating of our prior opinion based on Tennard ... .”
In Tennard, which is the most prominent recent Fifth Circuit Penry case, however, no judge held the mandate to await an en banc decision in Nelson. Tennard is the most significant of our current Penry cases because the Supreme Court vacated the panel opinion and, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, rebuked this court for its approach to Penry questions.
Other Penry cases of note were active at this time. On November 15, 2004, the Supreme Court had vacated and remanded Cole v. Dretke, 99 Fed.Appx. 523 (5th Cir. May 19, 2004) (per curiam), for reconsideration in light of Tennard.
Also pending is Coble v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 345 (5th Cir.2006), in which the panel, vacating the opinion it had issued in Coble v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 508 (5th Cir.2005), took specific account of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tennard and Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (Nov. 15, 2004) (per curiam), in affirming the dismissal of the habeas petition.
Somewhat similarly situated to Coble is the Breiver case, in which the panel issued its initial opinion on May 31, 2005.
And then there is, finally, Garcia v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. July 13, 2006). There the panel grappled with Tennard and with this court’s relevant caselaw, including Brewer and Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. Mar.8, 2005), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 239, 163 L.Ed.2d 221 (2005). A judge held the mandate in Garcia on July 21, 2006, and a petition for rehearing en banc remains pending.
The Supreme Court’s responses to the foregoing have been somewhat perplexing after the issuance of its latest (2004) opinion in Tennard. The most surprising development is that on October 13, 2006, the Court granted a petition for writ of certio-rari in Brewer.
There is no jurisdictional bar to Supreme Court review of non-final cases from the courts of appeals, but it is unusual.
The Supreme Court has scheduled a trifecta of Penry cases for argument on January 17, 2007. The same day it granted certiorari in Brewer, it also did so in Cole, with Cole and Brewer consolidated for argument.
As Chief Judge Jones wisely states in her dissent in Nelson, “[t]his court cannot ‘underrule’ the Supreme Court. Our duty is to harmonize its decisions as well as possible. We are always bound by the force of stare decisis.” So maybe, on the other hand, the current Court will determine that the various panels of this court, in the cases discussed above, have correctly applied the Court’s precedents, as my dissenting colleagues show in their able opinions.
In this regard, it is unfortunate that the en banc majority in Nelson has insisted on issuing its majority opinion at this time, in the wake of the grants of ceHiorari that I have noted. Instead, this court should have denied en banc rehearing in all the recent Penry cases {Nelson, Brewer, Cole, Coble, and Garcia), so as to give the Supreme Court the option of picking various ones of them for review. By our piecemeal and inconsistent approach, we have the incongruous situation of some cases held and others not, and of some with ceHiorari petitions and some not, and lastly of a case {Nelson) in which this court granted en banc review without even the benefit of a petition for rehearing, and now has insisted on issuing an en banc majority opinion in Nelson without the predictable guidance that will come from the Supreme Court’s review in the cases to be argued on January 17. The en banc majority’s rush to judgment is, in that sense, truly regrettable, and I respectfully dissent.
.In its most recent explication of its habeas corpus jurisprudence, the Court has reminded us that in interpreting "clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we look only to the Court's holdings and not its dicta. Carey v. Musladin, No. 05-785, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9587, at *8-*9, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 649, 657, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2006) (reversing a finding by the Ninth Circuit that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law).
. See Nelson v. Cockrell, 77 Fed.Appx. 209 (5th Cir.2003).
. Nelson v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 934, 124 S.Ct. 2905, 159 L.Ed.2d 808 (June 28, 2004).
. Nelson v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 282, 283 (5th Cir.2006).
. Nelson v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 912, 912 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2006) (per curiam).
. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 282-89, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (O’Connor, J.).
. See Tennard v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. Mar.l, 2006).
. See Abdul-Kabir v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 985, 125 S.Ct. 496, 160 L.Ed.2d 368 (2004).
. Cole, 443 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
. Coble, 444 F.3d at 358 n. 11.
. See Brewer v. Dretke, 410 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. May 31, 2005).
. See Brewer v. Quarterman, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 433, 166 L.Ed.2d 307 (2006).
. Petition for Writ of Certiorari in No. 05-11287, Brewer v. Quarterman, at 2.
. Brewer, 442 F.3d at 275 (emphasis added).
. Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 75-78 (8th ed.2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)).
. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 13.
. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 432, 166 L.Ed.2d 307 (2006).
. See Ex parte Smith, 185 S.W.3d 455 (Tex.Crim.App. Mar.1, 2006), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 377, 166 L.Ed.2d 265 (2006).
. "Despite paying lipservice to the principles guiding issuance of a COA, ... the Fifth Circuit ... invoked its own restrictive gloss on Penry I ....” Tennard, 542 U.S. at 283, 124 S.Ct. 2562. "The Fifth Circuit's test has no foundation in the decisions of this Court.” Id. at 284, 124 S.Ct. 2562. "The Fifth Circuit was likewise wrong to have refused to consider the debatability of the Penry question Id. at 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562. "[T]he Fifth Circuit's screening test has no basis in our precedents .... ” Id. It is interesting to note Justice O'Connor’s repeated reference to this court not as "the Court of Appeals,” but as "the Fifth Circuit,” apparently to emphasize her obvious pique.