DocketNumber: 28865
Citation Numbers: 430 F.2d 873, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8514
Judges: Clark, Dyer, Thornberry
Filed Date: 6/24/1970
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
As a result of participation in a Viet Nam Moratorium demonstration in November 1969, ten students of Southwest Texas State University (SWT) were suspended. The students initiated an action in the district court seeking temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting their suspension and other disciplinary measures; a
The Viet Nam Moratorium, a nationwide movement to provoke and promote demonstrations against the war in Viet Nam, held its first public protest on October 15, 1969. The SWT segment of this October event was to consist of an hour long program of short speeches. Because of the nature of the program it was felt that an auditorium would best meet the needs of the group. The college officials authorized the program to take place in the Fine Arts Auditorium from 11:00 A.M. to 12:00 Noon. Without authorization and contrary to regulations, demonstrations were held from 10:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 Noon to 1:15 P.M. in the Huntington Statue area which is located between two classroom buildings. Both faculty and students subsequently complained that the demonstrations at these hours in the statue area disturbed and disrupted regularly scheduled classes. The Moratorium group’s over-all national plan called for successive monthly demonstrations of increasing length until the war in Viet Nam was settled. The November 13, 1969 event for which the SWT appellant-students before us today were suspended was the second of these projected moratoria.
The Students’ Rights chapter of the SWT handbook, known as “Hill Hints”, contained a regulation governing the holding of meetings on campus which had been adopted by The Student Rights Committee of the Student Senate. The text of the regulation follows:
“STUDENT EXPRESSION AREA
Students and University personnel may use the Student Expression Area located on the grass terraces in front of Old Main between the hours of 12:-00 noon to 1:00 p. m., and from 5:00 to 7:00 p. m. Reservations for the Student Expression Area are made through the Dean of Students Office and must be made at least 48 hours in advance.
Rules to be observed by users of the area include:
1. No interference with the free flow of traffic.
2. No interruption of the orderly conduct of University affairs.
3. No obscene materials.
4. Person making the reservation is responsible for seeing that the area is left clean and in a good state of repair.
When a registered student organization plans to invite a non-University person to address a meeting, his name must be submitted to the Dean of Students Office at least 48 hours before the event.”
The area specified in the regulation is centrally located on the University campus and is surrounded by classroom buildings. This handbook also contained a detailed chapter entitled, “Student Discipline and Conduct Code.”
The local group sponsoring the SWT moratoria had, on a number of occasions between November 4 and November 13, discussed plans for their November activities with the college administration. The Moratorium group insisted that they again wanted to hold a demonstration at the Huntington Statue area of the campus. The group further adhered to their requirement that the demonstration must take place from 10:00 A.M. until 2:00 P.M. Thus both the place and the time demanded by the Moratorium group were outside of the Hill Hints regulation quoted above.
University personnel endeavored to secure an auditorium so that the demonstration could be held inside but no auditorium was available. The college officials also offered to permit the demonstration to be held at the statue area if it was limited to the hour between 12:00 Noon and 1:00 P.M. Classes were scheduled to be and were in progress on this particular day in the classroom buildings which adjoined the statue area. No attempt was made to show that the student expression area defined in the regulations was not available to the group during the hours provided for therein. With explicit knowledge that they were acting contrary to the University’s general regulation and the particular directions of the University officials who worked with them, the second Moratorium demonstration began at the statue area at approximately 9:45 A.M. on November 13. An estimated fifty demonstrators congregated in the area at the outset, but after Appellee Martine, Dean of Students of SWT, arrived and told the demonstrators to leave only ten refused and remained. They are the appellants here. There is no conflict in the evidence nor is any issue raised concerning the demonstrators’ conduct. They sat upon the grass. They intended to be and were silent until the time of their suspensions. They had caused no injury to property themselves. They had attracted a crowd of on-lookers.
Despite the initial orderliness of the November demonstration, the officials of SWT testified that based upon their October experience they did not believe that they could preserve order if the demonstration were allowed to continue during the four hours planned in the middle of the academic day at this place on the campus. Some class disruptions had in fact already begun to occur at the time Dean Martine acted. The demonstrating group had been warned in advance that violation of regulations would result in disciplinary action. After the demonstration actually started Dean Martine specifically warned the students that if they continued to violate the University’s regulations they would be suspended until the Fall 1970 term. He then gave them a reasonable opportunity to desist. Only those who would not leave the prohibited demonstration site were suspended. The suspensions began on November 13, 1969
Plaintiffs have not attacked the procedures by which they were disciplined under the rules laid down in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). The sole object of their attack before the court below and on this appeal is the validity of Hill Hints regulation quoted above.
The broad standard applicable to appellate review of a district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief is measured by a strict test which disregards whether this court would have exercised its discretion to deny the injunction and looks only to determine whether the district judge clearly abused his discretion in acting as he did. Allen v. Mississippi Commission of Law Enforcement, 424 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1970); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Detroit Football Company v. Robinson, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice f[ 65.04 [1] & [2] (2d ed. 1966). In testing this discretion we must take into account the status of each of the parties, the respective effects which the denial or grant of the injunctive relief requested would have on these parties and upon any broader interests which might be affected — particularly public interests, the proof offered in support of and against the grant of such relief and the correct legal standards to be applied. All of these factors play a part in what is basically a balancing of the conveniences of the parties and the possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Some circuits have aptly expressed the equation as “a flexible interplay between the likelihood of irreparable harm to the movant and the court’s belief that there is a ‘reasonable certainty’ (or probability) that the movant will succeed on the merits at a final hearing.” Packard Instrument Company v. ANS, Inc., 416 F.2d 943, 945 (2nd Cir. 1969); Checker Motors Corporation v. Chrysler Corporation, 405 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1969); Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969).
The order denying the preliminary injunction in the case sub judice stated in part: “There is‘a gravely serious question that the plaintiffs could prevail on the merits as reflected by the record in this hearing.” Thus the district judge was, as we are, not convinced after the preliminary hearing that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case showing that the Hill Hints regulation was unconstitutional on its face or in its application to them, thus they had not demonstrated that their ultimate right to the relief sought was reasonably probable.
There is no showing that the University Administration in any way attempted to sidetrack the demonstration because of its subject matter. In argument before the court counsel for appellants admitted that the college had shown no animus toward the demonstrators or their cause. The October 15th demonstration had taken place without disciplinary action by the college — even though it was in violation of the above regulation and caused academic disturbance. The administration attempted to work out an agreeable time and place for the November demonstration which would permit it to be effective and at the same time have a minimal impact upon the essential educational functions of SWT. These facts when linked with the expectation that the demonstration was to be only one in a series of recurrent, increscent events impels the conclusion that the University officials acted reasonably to balance the interests of the majority of students in the maintenance of an academic atmosphere conducive to the pursuit of their chosen studies against the unquestioned rights of those who wished to demonstrate their views against the war in Viet Nam. Cf. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970).
The Student Expression Area regulation in Hill Hints is a valid exercise of the University’s right to adopt and enforce reasonable, non-diseriminatory regulations as to the time, place and manner of student expressions and demonstrations. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); see also C. A. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1027 (1969).
These students certainly have no standing to complain that the 48-hour notice period as applied adversely affected them. They were dealing with the University officials concerning a continuing series of demonstrations and had the subject November demonstration under actual consideration and discussion with University officials for nine days.
We think appellants underscore rather than undermine the reasonableness and constitutionality of the regulation by pointing out that it is permissive and that the University had no codified prohibition which would make the statue area (or any other campus areas) unavailable for student demonstrations. When this is coupled with the administration’s prior and present efforts to allow these very students maximum freedom of expression consistent with its duty to operate the college as an educational institution, we think it underscores the validity of having a regulatory minimum. A regulation governing conduct on a university campus is not a criminal law. It also bears noting that the minimum was set by the students themselves through their peers acting in the Student Senate.
The students now before us are mistaken in characterizing the admirable degree of flexibility displayed by the college administration in offering additional places and times to those specified in the Hill Hints regulation in a futile attempt to meet their demands, as some form of ad hoc action. The University’s compliance stands in stark contrast with their intemperate insistence that they would hold their activities when and where they pleased despite the regulation and particular directions to the contrary. Since the prescribed minimum was sufficient, the administration’s willingness to go the extra mile was clearly a virtue not a fault.
Appellants place great reliance upon the fact that the demonstration was silent and did not disrupt classes. There is evidence to the contrary. In any event we do not regard the nature of the demonstration as significant in the instant case for in this ease, unlike Tinker, Burnside and Blackwell these students violated a general standing campus regulation valid on its face. In Tinker, Burnside and Blackwell special ad hoc regulations were involved which were advised to specifically restrict the wearing of the arm bands or buttons there involved. In those cases the Supreme Court and this Court held it was significant that the proscribed conduct either was (Blackwell) or was not (Tinker and Burnside) causing and contributing to a disruption in the normal activities of the schools involved.
On this interlocutory appeal from the refusal of the district court to grant a preliminary injunction, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Our application of principles in the foregoing discussion is limited to the pleadings and the record facts now before us. When this case is ultimately fully developed on its merits, facts may appear which require a different application of law or raise different equities. Therefore, we intimate no view as to what the ultimate outcome of the case should be.
Since appellants failed to make out a prima facie case demonstrating a reasonable probability of success on the merits a fortiori they did not make that even stronger showing that is prerequisite to the grant of a stay and the issuance of an injunction pending a hearing on the merits of an interlocutory appeal. See Pitcher v. Laird, 415 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1969); and Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968). Therefore, this Court’s prior stay and injunction order of December 12, 1969 in this cause must now be vacated.
Interim stay and injunction pending appeal vacated. Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a) (1) (1966).
. Some pertinent provisions are:
“Sec. 101. Purpose
(A) A student at Southwest Texas State University neither loses the rights nor escapes the responsibilities of citizenship.
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“Sec. 204. Administrative Disposition of a Major Violation
*876 * * * Ai #
“(B) A student may refuse administrative disposition of his alleged major violation „..d on refusal is entitled to a hearing under Chapter 300. If a student accepts administrative disposition, he shall sign a statement that he understands the violation charges, his right to but waiver of a hearing, the penalty imposed, and his waiver of the right to appeal.
(C) In administratively disposing of a major violation, the Dean of Men and/or Dean of Women may impose any disciplinary action authorized under Section 601(A) 9, 10, or 11.
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“Sec. 601. Authorized Disciplinary Penalties
(A) The Dean of Men and/or Women, under Sections 203 and 204, or the Student Personnel Discipline Committee, under Section 304, or the Faculty-Student Board of Review, under Section 403, may impose one or more of the following penalties for violation of a Regents’ rule, University regulation, or administrative rule:
sjc * * Ai #
“(10) suspension from the University”
. Judge Thornberry’s concurrence indicates the need for a brief additional explication of the basis of the University’s action. The student-appellants could have been disciplined for failure to abide by the University administrators’ grant of permission to use the Huntington Statue area at a different hour, but the record shows that this and all other alternative means of demonstrating their protest of the war in Viet Nam were flatly rejected by these students. When Dean Martine confronted the demonstrating students his warning to disburse or face suspension and other penalties adverted only to their violation of student handbook regulations and not to breach of the more relaxed permissions offered by the Dean and other officials. The charge against them at the academic disciplinary hearing was based upon their failure to comply with tlie Hill Hints “Student Expression Area” provisions set out above. The complaint in the district court focused squarely upon the application of this handbook provision to the students and attacked its validity. This was the case made, it was the ease tried and must, in our opinion, be the subject of this review.
. Appellants made no showing that they liad applied to the district court for a stay or injunction pending appeal, pursuant to Rule 8, F.R.A.P. While such a failure is not a jurisdictional defect [See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Publice Service Comm., 260 U.S. 212, 43 S.Ct. 75, 67 L.Ed. 217 (1922)], we do not believe it should have been bypassed in the