Ward v. Wilkinson Cty Sch Dist

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/09/2023
REVISED 03/09/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 7, 2023
No. 22-60276
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Robert Ward,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Wilkinson County School District,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:20-CV-206
Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff Robert Ward (“Ward”) sued Wilkinson County School
District (the “School District”), asserting that he was not given adequate
time to review and sign his employment contract, in violation of due process
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of the School District. Ward appeals.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-60276
I. Facts and Procedural History
From 2019 to 2020, Ward worked part-time as a Lead Teacher for the
School District. His contract stated that his employment began on August 5,
2019, and ended on May 13, 2020. When the School District decided to make
the Lead Teacher position a full-time role, Ward expressed interest in the
position, and on June 10, 2020, the School Board approved offering Ward the
full-time Lead Teacher position.
With regard to employment contracts, Mississippi law provides in
relevant part:
If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal,
licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed
position who has been elected and approved shall not execute
and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been
tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school
board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract
tendered to him shall be void and of no effect.
Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). The statute has also been adopted by the
School District, almost in its entirety, as part of the District Policies.
On June 22, 2020, Ward was informed that his contract for the 2020–
21 school year was ready to be signed. On June 29, 2020, Ward was reminded
that his contract was ready to be reviewed and needed to be signed by July 1,
2020; Ward was out of town but stated that he would come in as soon as he
was able. On July 6, 2020, Ward went to the school office and reviewed the
contract; he was told that he needed to sign the contract that day, because
the relevant ten-day period had expired. Ward felt that he did not have
enough time to consider the contract, and did not sign it before leaving that
day. On July 8, 2020, the School Board voided Ward’s contract. Ward filed
suit against the School District, arguing that the School District violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On dueling motions for
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summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
School District.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de
novo. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016).
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact is
‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540
(5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam)).
III. Discussion
The threshold inquiry in a due process challenge is “whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty.”
Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999)). “To have a property interest in
a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 576 (1972).
On appeal, Ward argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on his due process claim, because he had a protected
property interest in the position of full-time Lead Teacher that was offered
to him. Ward argues that a public employee’s entitlement may be shown
through reference to a statute, written contract, or mutually explicit
understanding enforceable as an implied contract. See King v. Newton Cnty.
Bd. Of Sup’rs, 144 F. App’x 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2005). Specifically, however,
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we have held that “a public employee has a property interest in her continued
employment if she can prove a claim of entitlement to such a property
interest by reference to a (1) statute; (2) written contract; or (3) mutually
explicit understanding enforceable as an implied contract.” Id. (citing
Johnson v. Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 878 F.2d 856, 858
(5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)). Ward fails to cite any case, however, that
recognizes a property interest in prospective employment under Mississippi
law. And as the district court recognized, Ward’s previous part-time
contract with the School District ended on May 13, 2020, and he was not
employed by the School District when the School Board approved offering
him the full-time position (June 10, 2020), when he was notified that his
contract was ready to be reviewed and signed (June 22, 2020), or when he
reviewed the contract (July 6, 2020). He therefore had no protectable
property interest in continued employment with the School District after his
previous contract ended. 1 See Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1529-
30 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Texas teachers employed under fixed term
contracts did not have a property interest in continued employment beyond
the terms of their contracts).
Ward also argues that Mississippi Code Section 37-9-23 gives him “a
property right to consider and enter into an employment contract with the
school district.” But “[b]efore a property interest would exist, [the statute]
1
Ward also argues that because “Mississippi teachers have a due process right to
appeal hearings when they are terminated, they also have a due process right to have
reasonable time to consider their contracts for employment per state statute.” But this is
merely another attempt to construe his case as one of continuing employment rather than
of prospective employment. At the time when Ward was considering the full-time Lead
Teacher contract, he was not employed by the School District, and he therefore had no
protectable property right to continued employment. The existence of a protected property
right to continued employment does not impliedly create a protected property right to
consider prospective employment contracts.
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would have to constrain the [School Board] in a meaningful way.” Stem v.
Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). The statute Ward cites to establish
a property right provides the following:
If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal,
licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed
position who has been elected and approved shall not execute
and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been
tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school
board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract
tendered to him shall be void and of no effect.
Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). Although the statute permits the School Board
to rescind the contract after ten days, it does not forbid the Board from
rescinding it before ten days have passed. The statute therefore does not
constrain the School Board’s discretion so as to create a protected property
interest in a ten-day firm offer.
In sum, Ward has failed to demonstrate that he had a protected
property interest in prospective public employment with the School District.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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