United States v. Luna

Revised February 1, 1999
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 97-41265
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NORBERTO B. LUNA,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
___________________________________________________
January 15, 1999
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant, Norberto B. Luna appeals his sentence of eighty-
four months in prison for knowingly possessing stolen firearms, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Luna challenges the district
court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) and the constitutionality of §
922(j). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In August of 1996, Luna and two others burglarized a residence
in Corpus Christi, Texas, and stole five firearms. Luna was
subsequently arrested and charged in a single count indictment with
knowingly possessing five stolen firearms that had been shipped and
transported in interstate commerce, in violation if 18 U.S.C. §
922(j).1 Luna filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment,
arguing that § 922(j) was an unconstitutional exercise of the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The district court orally
denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. As Luna waived
trial by jury, he was tried by the court. Based on a written
stipulation of facts, the district court found Luna guilty of
possession of stolen firearms.
A presentence report (“PSR”) was prepared by a probation
officer who assigned Luna a base offense level of twenty pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Luna had a state conviction
for burglary of a habitation. Additionally, Luna received a total
of eight specific offense enhancements because (1) the offense
involved at least five firearms (§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)), (2) the
firearms were stolen (§ 2K2.1(b)(4)), and (3) the firearms were
possessed in connection with another felony offense —— the burglary
(§ 2K2.1(b)(5)). Luna’s offense level was reduced three levels for
acceptance of responsibility. His resulting net offense level was
1
Section 922(j) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or
dispose of any stolen firearm . . . which is moving as, which is
part of, which constitutes, or which has been shipped or
transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, either before or
after it was stolen, knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that the firearm . . . was stolen.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)
(1994).
2
twenty-five. This offense level and Luna’s criminal history
yielded a sentence range of 84 to 105 months imprisonment.
Prior to sentencing, Luna filed objections to the PSR, which
the district court ultimately denied. Luna argued that (1) the
enhancements under both §§ 2K2.1(b)(4) and (b)(5) constituted
impermissible double counting; (2) the application of § 2K2.1(b)(4)
was inappropriate because the firearms were not “stolen” prior to
the time that he removed them from the residence; and (3)
determination of his base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) was
incorrect because his earlier state conviction for burglary was not
a prior qualifying conviction. Finding Luna’s objections to be
meritless, the district court sentenced him to a term of eighty-
four months, followed by three years of supervised release.2
In this appeal, Luna reiterates his objections to the PSR, and
again challenges the constitutionality of § 922(j) —— the statute
under which he was convicted. As he argued in his motion to
dismiss the indictment, Luna asserts that § 922(j) is an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Luna contends that both facially and as applied
to him, the statute exceeds the authority of Congress under the
Commerce Clause because the conveyance of a firearm over state
lines at some unspecified point in the past does not substantially
2
The district court also imposed a $100 special assessment
and ordered Luna to provide restitution to the victim of the
crime.
3
affect commerce. We begin by addressing the constitutionality of
the statute and then consider Luna’s challenges to his sentence
under the Guidelines.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)
1. Standard of Review
In evaluating a constitutional challenge to a federal statute,
we apply a de novo standard of review.3
2. Facial Challenge
Luna contends that on its face 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Section 922(j) makes it unlawful for any person
to “receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of
any stolen firearm . . . which is moving as, which is a part of,
which constitutes, or which has been shipped or transported in,
interstate or foreign commerce.”4 Relying on the Supreme Court’s
3
United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 1998 WL 423916 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998); United States
v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 868 (1998).
4
18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
4
decision in United States v. Lopez,5 Luna argues that the mere
possession of a stolen firearm that has crossed state lines in the
past does not substantially affect interstate commerce, thereby
falling outside the realm of activities that Congress can regulate
under the commerce power. The district court rejected this
argument when it denied Luna’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
We have not previously been required to address the
constitutionality of § 922(j). In fact, the only federal appellate
court to rule on the constitutionality of § 922(j) so far is the
Eighth Circuit, which did so in an unpublished opinion. In United
States v. Kocourek,6 that court upheld the constitutionality of §
922(j) in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge, based on the
section’s plain language that established the interstate commerce
link —— “shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign
commerce.”7 The Kocourek court relied on its examination of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), a statute containing virtually identical language
to that of § 922(j), to ensure that the firearm in question
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.8 We agree with our
colleagues in the Eighth Circuit and likewise hold that § 922(j) is
5
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6
116 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997) (unpublished).
7
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
8
Kocourek, 116 F.3d at 481 (citing United States v. Shelton,
66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (concluding that §
922(g) contains the interstate commerce requirement), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1125 (1996)).
5
a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
To properly define the boundaries of Congress’s power to
regulate activities involving firearms —— specifically stolen
firearms —— we begin with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s
Lopez opinion. In Lopez, the Court examined 18 U.S.C. § 922(q),
which prohibits the possession of a firearm within a designated
school zone. The Court identified “three broad categories” of
activity over which Congress could constitutionally exercise its
commerce power: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate
commerce; and (3) activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.9 Analyzing § 922(q) within this framework, the Court
first dismissed the possibility that intrastate possession of
firearms could fit into the first two categories, and turned
instead to the third category —— whether the intrastate possession
of firearms could substantially affect interstate commerce.10 In
holding § 922(q) unconstitutional, the Court noted that, as a
criminal statute, § 922(q) had nothing to do with commercial
enterprise nor was it an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, and thus did not substantially affect commerce.
Central to this holding was the lack of a “jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the
9
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
10
Id. at 559.
6
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”11
Unlike § 922(q), § 922(j) does contain a jurisdictional
element. It specifically prohibits possession of a stolen firearm
“which is moving as, which is a part of, which constitutes, or
which has been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign
commerce.”12 Luna argues that the jurisdictional element in § 922(j)
is broadly worded, and such “clever legislative craftwork” cannot
shield the statute from constitutional attack.13 Section 922(j),
however, contains language virtually identical to that of §§
922(g)(1) and (g)(8), related provisions in the federal firearms
statute that we have held constitutional in the face of post-Lopez
Commerce Clause challenges.14
For example, we have upheld, on several occasions, the
11
Id. at 561.
12
18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
13
See United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 579 (6th Cir.
1996) (Batchelder, J., concurring) (“A statute that regulates
non-commercial activity cannot be converted into a statute that
regulates commercial activity by dint of clever legislative
craftwork.”), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2470 (1997).
14
See infra note 15 and accompanying text; Pierson, 139
F.3d at 503 (§ 922(g)(8) governs possession of firearms by
individuals subject to protective orders in family violence
cases); see also United States v. Hardy, 120 F.3d 76, 79 (7th
Cir. 1997) (finding § 922(u) constitutional); United States v.
Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v.
Miller, 74 F.3d 159, 159-60 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United States
v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1996) (finding §
922(k) constitutional); United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d
946, 953 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
7
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)15 —— the felon-in-possession
statute —— based in large part on the jurisdictional nexus
expressed in the plain language.16 Section 922(g)(1) makes it
unlawful for a convicted felon “to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm . . . or to receive any firearm . . . which has been
15
United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the holding in Lopez does not invalidate the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Gresham, 118
F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming Rawls), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 702 (1998); United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 973
(5th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 716 (1997);
United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 1996)
(same). We note that every other circuit that has addressed this
issue has upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). See
United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 1997)
(referencing decisions from each circuit court).
16
The cases interpreting § 922(g)(1) cite Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), as binding precedent, a case
which concluded that the predecessor statute to § 922(g) required
only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.
We find this holding instructive, but not binding on our
interpretation of § 922(j). Scarborough dealt with a felon-in-
possession statute and was not mentioned in the Lopez opinion.
Furthermore, prior panels have questioned the applicability of
Scarborough if the constitutionality of § 922(g) was res nova, as
the constitutionality of § 922(j) is today. See Rawls, 85 F.3d
at 243 (“If the matter were res nova, one might well wonder how
it could rationally be concluded that mere possession of a
firearm in any meaningful way concerns interstate commerce,” but
the language in Scarborough “carr[ies] a strong enough
implication of constitutionality to now bind us . . . .”)
(Garwood, Wiener, Emilio M. Garza, J.J., specially concurring);
Gresham, 118 F.3d at 265 n.11 (noting the restrictive
interpretation of the commerce power in Lopez, but finding that
only a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and interstate
commerce is required under Rawls); Kuban, 94 F.3d at 973 n.4
(same). In light of the uncertainty surrounding the application
of Scarborough, we base our holding on the factors set out in
Lopez.
8
shipped in interstate commerce.”17 Unlike the statute at issue in
Lopez, § 922(g)(1) expressly requires some nexus to interstate
commerce, reflecting the ability of Congress to exercise its
delegated power under the Commerce Clause to reach the possession
of firearms that have an explicit connection with or effect on
interstate commerce.18 We find that the same reasoning applies to
§ 922(j), and the language “shipped or transported in, interstate
or foreign commerce” likewise provides the requisite nexus to
commerce that was lacking in Lopez.
In addition to the jurisdictional nexus found in the language
of § 922(j), congressional findings support the conclusion that
possession of stolen firearms “substantially affects interstate
commerce.”19 Congress initially enacted legislation containing a
possession of stolen firearms provision out of a concern for
17
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).
18
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“[Section] 922(q) has no
express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a
discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”);
compare Rawls, 85 F.3d at 243 (“[Section 922(g)] does expressly
require some nexus to interstate commerce, thus importantly
reflecting that Congress was exercising that delegated power and
not merely functioning as if it were the legislative authority of
a unitary state.”) (Garwood, Wiener, Emilio M. Garza, J.J.,
specially concurring).
19
See United States v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th
Cir. 1996) (“[S]ection 922(d) addresses the disposal of firearms,
which is an inherently commercial activity.”); United States v.
Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[Section 922(x)],
possession of a handgun by a juvenile, as a general matter, could
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”).
9
“widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce.”20 Section 922 has been amended
twice since its inception, and both amendments have broadened the
scope and strengthened the role of the federal government in the
continuing fight against illicit trafficking in stolen firearms.
The provision was first expanded in 1990 to reach firearms “shipped
or transported in” interstate commerce. In its report on proposed
changes to § 922, the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives explained that the change in § 922(j) was designed
to “expand Federal jurisdiction to permit prosecutions for
transactions involving stolen firearms . . . where the firearms
have already moved in interstate or foreign commerce.”21 Again, in
1994, § 922(j) was amended to specify that the firearm could have
traveled in interstate commerce “either before or after it was
stolen.” Although Congress made no findings regarding this
amendment, we perceive the clear purpose to have been to extend
further its cognizance over any stolen firearm.
The expansion of federal jurisdiction over stolen firearms
demonstrates Congress’s commitment to eradicating the traffic in
20
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(1) (1968).
21
H.R.Rep. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 106
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6510; see also
United States v. Cruz, 50 F.3d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the legislative history of § 922(j)); United States
v. Honaker, 5 F.3d 160, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1993) (same), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1180 (1994).
10
stolen firearms. The propriety of that goal is exemplified in this
case by Luna’s admission that he intended to sell the stolen guns
in question —— the very activity that Congress seeks to end.
Given this historical background, we are satisfied that the
regulation of stolen firearms is “an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”22
As such, we give due deference to the collective institutional
expertise of Congress and conclude that § 922(j) embodies a
legitimate exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
3. Constitutionality As Applied
Luna also contends that § 922(j) is unconstitutional as
applied to him. Specifically, Luna argues that because he broke
into a house, stole firearms, and was later apprehended by the
police, all of which occurred in Texas, his crime is of a purely
local nature, historically prosecuted in the state system. Because
we hold that § 922(j) is constitutional on its face, it is likewise
constitutional when applied to Luna, given his stipulation that
22
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also United States v. Kirk,
105 F.3d 997, 1005 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (confirming the
constitutionality of § 922(o), governing the possession of
machine guns, because Congress has the power to “freeze the
escalating destructive power of the weapons of that [drug] war”),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see also United States v.
Franklyn, 1998 WL 603237, *4 (2d Cir. 1998) (trafficking of
machine guns has strong interstate effects), petition for cert.
filed, No. 98-6500 (Oct. 16, 1998); United States v. Rybar, 103
F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 46
(1997).
11
three of the five firearms named in the indictment were
manufactured in either New York or Connecticut. These firearms had
to travel in interstate commerce to reach the home Luna burglarized
in Texas, thereby satisfying the interstate requirement of the
statute.23 We therefore hold that § 922(j) is constitutional as
applied to Luna.
B. APPLICATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES UNDER § 2K2.1
1. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s interpretation of the
Guidelines de novo and findings of fact for clear error.24 We must
uphold a defendant’s sentence on appeal unless it was imposed in
violation of the law, involved an incorrect application of the
Guidelines, or constituted an unreasonable departure from the
applicable Guideline range.25
2. Double Counting Under § 2K2.1(b)(4) and (b)(5)
Luna argues that when enhancing his base offense level, the
district court impermissibly double counted by giving him a two-
level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(4) because the firearms were stolen
and a simultaneous four-level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(5) for
23
See Pierson, 139 F.3d at 504 (“[E]vidence that a gun was
manufactured in one state and possessed in another state is
sufficient to establish a past connection between the firearm and
interstate commerce.”).
24
United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196, 197 (5th
Cir. 1998).
25
United States v. Armstead, 114 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 315 (1997).
12
possessing these stolen firearms in connection with another felony
offense, the burglary. By applying both subsection (b)(4) and
(b)(5), Luna contends, his sentence was increased twice for the
same conduct —— stealing firearms.
Luna relies primarily on dicta in United States v. Guerrero26
and United States v. Armstead27 to support his argument. In
Guerrero and Armstead,28 we questioned whether a district court
should apply both § 2K2.1(b)(4) and (b)(5) when a defendant steals
a firearm during a burglary, because the burglary Guideline
expressly prohibits both adjustments in the same situation.29 The
burglary Guidelines, contained in § 2B2.1, include separate
sentence enhancements when “a firearm . . . was taken”30 and when
“a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.”31
According to the commentary, however, “possess[ing] a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) that was stolen during the course of
26
5 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1134
(1994).
27
114 F.3d 504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 315
(1997).
28
Guerrero, 5 F.3d at 873 n.10; Armstead, 114 F.3d at 513
n.4.
29
Luna did not commit a burglary under federal law (i.e.
burglary of a bank or post office); therefore, the burglary
Guideline was not applicable in calculating his offense level.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 (“Determine the offense guideline section .
. . most applicable to the offense of conviction.”).
30
U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(3).
31
U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(4).
13
the offense” will not lead to sentence enhancement under both
sections.32 In other words, the burglary Guidelines expressly
prohibit double enhancements for stealing and possessing the same
weapons at the same time.
Luna urges us to analogize the double counting prohibition in
the burglary Guidelines to the firearm Guidelines. In fact,
because the firearm Guidelines contain very similar provisions, we
have suggested —— in Guerrero and Armstead —— that separate
enhancements for possession of a stolen firearm and possession of
a firearm in connection with a burglary could constitute enhancing
a defendant’s sentence twice for the same conduct. Until now, we
have left this question unanswered, but we cannot avoid addressing
it head-on today. When we do, we conclude that the firearm
Guidelines permit separate enhancements for the firearm’s being
stolen and for the same firearm’s being possessed during the
commission of the underlying felony offense.
We base this holding on the clear, unambiguous language of the
firearm Guidelines.33 Section 2K2.1(b)(4) calls for enhancement
“[i]f any firearm was stolen.” And, although a related commentary
prohibits application of this subsection in limited circumstances,
none is present in this case. Note 12 to § 2K2.1 explains that the
32
U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1, commentary n.3.
33
United States v. Vickers, 891 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that in the absence of a discernable, contrary intent,
the court follows the clear language of the Guidelines).
14
enhancement in subsection (b)(4) is barred in cases involving a
violation of § 922(j) —— the section under which Luna was convicted
—— if “the base level offense is determined under subsection
(a)(7).”34 Luna’s base level offense was determined under
subsection (a)(4), however, so this exception does not apply.
Section 2K2.1(b)(5), on the other hand, calls for enhancement
“if the defendant possessed or used any firearm in connection with
another felony offense.” Luna does not dispute the applicability
of this subsection to his situation, but argues that it provides a
four-level enhancement for possessing the same “stolen” firearm
that produces a two-level enhancement under subsection (b)(4). As
we perceive significant differences between the two subsections, we
disagree. Subsection (b)(4) increases a base offense level ipso
facto if the thing possessed by the defendant is a stolen firearm.
For example, if Luna had received the stolen firearm in his home
and subsequently been convicted for attempting to sell it, his
sentence would have been enhanced under subsection (b)(4) because
the firearm he sought to sell was stolen. But assuming that he
committed no underlying felony, he would not have received an
enhancement under subsection (b)(5). Subsection (b)(5) requires an
increase in the base offense level when the firearm in question is
somehow involved in another felony offense.35 The language in
34
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, commentary n.12.
35
See United States v. Barlow, No. 96-40565 (5th Cir. Dec.
13, 1996) (unpublished) (holding that the district court properly
15
(b)(5) demonstrates the heightened public safety concerns when, for
example, a defendant enters a building illegally and, while there,
possesses a firearm, because it could be used to harm the occupants
or an unexpected visitor. Under such circumstances, the potential
for harm is greatly increased, thereby justifying the additional
enhancement.
Nonetheless, even if we assume arguendo that application of
both enhancements constitutes double counting, the result would
remain the same. We have recognized that the Guidelines do not
prohibit double counting except when the particular Guideline at
issue expressly does so.36 Furthermore, the Guidelines provide that
“[t]he offense level adjustments from more than one specific
offense characteristic within an offense are cumulative (added
together) unless the guideline specifies that only the greater (or
greatest) is to be used.”37 Section 2K2.1 contains no such
limitations regarding the application of subsections (b)(4) and
(b)(5). In fact, we find telling by contrast that the burglary
Guideline specifically prohibits double counting in the application
of similar enhancements. If the Sentencing Commission had wanted
enhanced defendant’s base offense level under § 2K2.1(b)(5)
because “another felony offense” refers to offenses other than
the firearms possession).
36
United States v. Morris, 131 F.3d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1546 (1998); United States v.
Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1163 (1996).
37
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, commentary n.4.
16
the principles expressed in the burglary Guidelines to apply
equally to the firearm Guidelines, it knew how to make that happen.
We hold that the district court’s application of subsections (b)(4)
and (b)(5) did not constitute prohibited double counting.
3. Application of § 2K2.1(b)(4)
As an alternative to the double counting argument above, Luna
contends that the district court improperly increased his offense
level under § 2K2.1(b)(4) —— “[i]f any firearm was stolen” ——
because the firearms were not “stolen” when he acquired possession
of them during the course of the burglary. To support his
argument, Luna relies on the reasoning and conclusion reached by
the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Rowlett.38 The Rowlett court
held that an enhancement under subsection (b)(4) applies only when
the firearm had already been stolen prior to the defendant’s taking
possession of it.39 Focusing on the fact that the Guideline is
written in the past tense, the Rowlett court reasoned that
subsection (b)(4) was concerned not with the way in which the
firearms were acquired by a particular defendant but with their
condition (stolen or not stolen) when acquired.40
38
23 F.3d 300 (10th Cir. 1994).
39
Id. at 304.
40
Id. To buttress its holding, the Rowlett court proceeded
in dicta to examine Application note 12, which provides that the
two level enhancement in subsection (b)(4) should not be applied
when the defendant is convicted under specified offenses
“involving stolen firearms or ammunition” because the “base
offense level itself takes such conduct into account.” See
17
We disagree with the holding in Rowlett and its emphasis on
the use of the past tense in subsection (b)(4).41 Rejecting this
grammatical technicality, we choose instead to read subsection
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, commentary n.12 (1993) (amended 1995, 1997, and
1998). See also U.S.S.G. Appendix C, amendment 522 for the text
of Application note 12 at the time of the Rowlett opinion.
Because the offenses listed in Application note 12 dealt with
the preexisting condition of the firearms as “stolen” and not the
manner in which they were acquired by the defendant, the court
explained, subsection (b)(4) must likewise address the
preexisting condition of the firearm. Rowlett, 23 F.3d at 304-
05.
41
The Government urges us to reject the holding in Rowlett
for reasons expressed in United States v. Askew, 966 F. Supp.
1103 (M.D. Ala. 1997). We agree with the outcome in Askew, but
find an inherent flaw in its reasoning and choose, instead, to
base our holding on an overall reading of the Guidelines. The
defendant in Askew was convicted of stealing firearms from a
licensed gun dealer pursuant to § 922(u) and, during sentencing,
received a two level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) because the
firearms were stolen. Id. at 1104. Relying on the holding in
Rowlett, Askew argued that he should not receive the (b)(4)
enhancement because the firearms were not stolen when he took
possession of them. Id. at 1106. The Askew court rejected this
argument and focused on an amendment to Application note 12 to
distinguish Rowlett and apply the (b)(4) enhancement to Askew.
Note 12 had been amended in 1995 to include § 922(u) — an offense
that addresses the manner in which the firearm was acquired —
leading the Askew court to conclude that subsection (b)(4) must
now reference both the preexisting condition of the firearm and
the manner in which it was acquired. Id. at 1106-07.
The fallacy we discern in Askew is the court’s reliance on
an incorrect proposition in Rowlett, i.e., that Application note
12, prior to being amended in 1995, referenced statutes that
dealt only with the preexisting condition of the firearm.
Actually, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(g) — which was included in the 1993,
pre-amended version of note 12 and has been included ever since —
provides that, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to
obliterate, remove, change, or alter the serial number or other
identification of a firearm required by this chapter.” As §
5861(g) does not address the preexisting condition of the
firearm, the reasoning in Askew fails, as does the Rowlett dicta
to that effect.
18
(b)(4) in the context of the entire firearms Guideline. Section
2K2.1 applies to the unlawful possession, receipt, or
transportation of firearms. Limiting the application of subsection
(b)(4) to firearms that were previously stolen would foreclose a
two-level enhancement for defendants who, for example, steal a
lawfully-possessed machine gun from a neighbor, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(o).42 The defendant in our hypothetical case example
could be convicted for illegal possession of a machine gun under §
922(o) but, under the holding in Rowlett, could not receive a two-
level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) simply because the machine
gun was not stolen when the defendant acquired it. We find this
result antithetical to the overall scheme of the Guidelines. Luna
(1) illegally entered a home, (2) stole the firearms during the
commission of the burglary, and (3) departed with the stolen guns
in his possession. This course of conduct clearly triggered the
application of § 2K2.1(b)(4).43 We conclude that the district court
42
Section 922(o) provides, “Except as provided in paragraph
(2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a
machine gun.”
43
Our reasoning is further supported by the 1995 amendment
(which still applies) to Application note 12 that significantly
expands the use of subsection (b)(4). Prior to 1995, note 12
instructed sentencing courts to disregard the enhancement in
subsection (b)(4) if the defendant was convicted under one of the
enumerated offenses involving stolen firearms or
altered/obliterated serial numbers. Under the 1995 amendment,
however, sentencing courts are instructed to disregard the
enhancement only if the defendant was convicted under one of the
enumerated offenses and his base offense level was calculated
under subsection (a)(7), the “catchall” provision that applies
when none among (a)(1)-(6) or (8) applies. See U.S.S.G. Appendix
19
properly applied a two-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) to
Luna’s base offense level.44
4. Base Offense Level Under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
Luna’s final challenge to his sentence relates to the
calculation of his base offense level. Luna contends that the
district court erred in assessing his base offense level under §
2K2.1(a)(4)(A), which mandates a level of 20 if the defendant “had
one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.” Luna argues that the use of the
past tense “had” indicates that § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) was intended to
apply only when the other violent felony conviction occurred prior
to the commission of the firearms offense.45 In this case, Luna
committed and was convicted of another burglary after he committed
the federal firearms offense, but before he was sentenced for the
firearms offense.
As correctly argued by the government, Luna’s contention is
C, amendment 522. As two qualifications are now required to
disregard the enhancement under (b)(4), the Sentencing Commission
has demonstrated an intention for more defendants to receive the
(b)(4) enhancement.
44
Luna additionally argues that, at the very least, §
2K2.1(b)(4) is ambiguous and under the rule of lenity, ambiguity
should be resolved in his favor. United States v. Granderson,
511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994). We do not find the term “stolen” to be
ambiguous and therefore reject this argument.
45
Luna relies on the Sixth Circuit case of United States v.
Barton, 100 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1996), which held that “only those
convictions that occur prior to the commission of the firearms
offense may be counted against the defendant in determining the
base offense level [under § 2K2.1].” Id. at 46.
20
precluded by our previous decision in United States v. Gooden.46
In Gooden, we held that a conviction for a robbery that occurred
after the commission of a federal firearms offense was a “prior
conviction” for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because the
defendant’s sentence for robbery was imposed prior to the
imposition of his sentence on the firearms offense.47 Even if we
were inclined to disagree, we would not be at liberty to disregard
the holding of a prior panel of this court absent an intervening
amendment to the statute or a Supreme Court opinion.48 We therefore
hold that the district court correctly calculated Luna’s offense
level under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is
constitutional, both facially and as applied to Luna.
Additionally, we find no reversible error in the application of the
Guidelines by the district court. Accordingly, Luna’s conviction
and sentence are, in all respects,
46
116 F.3d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 350
(1997).
47
Id. at 724-25; accord United States v. McCary, 14 F.3d
1502, 1506 (considering offenses resulting in conviction prior
to the defendant’s sentencing on the federal firearms offense in
setting the defendant’s base offense level under § 2K2.1).
48
United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1090 (5th Cir.
1997); Matter of Evangeline Refining Co., 890 F.2d 1312, 1326
n.12 (5th Cir. 1989).
21
AFFIRMED.
22
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join fully in the court’s opinion, except for Part
II.B.3.(“Application of § 2K2.1(b)(4)”), as to which I concur in
the result for the following reasons.
Section 2K2.1(b)(4) provides:
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
* * *
(4) If any firearm was stolen, or had an
altered or obliterated serial number, increase
by 2 levels.
I agree that § 2K2.1(b)(4) applies to the sentence of a
defendant convicted of knowingly possessing a stolen firearm if the
weapon was a “stolen firearm” at the time of the offense of
conviction, regardless of who committed the theft, i.e., that it
is irrelevant whether the illegal possessor was also the thief. In
the absence of Application Note 12, however, I do not think the
Guideline unambiguously expresses an intention that every defendant
convicted of knowingly possessing a stolen firearm in violation of
23
18 U.S.C. § 922(j) shall receive a 2 level increase in his offense
level.
On the contrary, if it were not for Application Note 12, I
would conclude that the Guideline itself should be read to mean
that a defendant convicted of an offense involving a stolen firearm
would receive a 2 level increase only if any firearm involved in
the offense of conviction had an altered or obliterated serial
number, and that a defendant convicted of an offense involving an
altered or obliterated serial number would receive a like increase
only if any firearm involved was stolen. (Of course, a defendant
convicted of a crime to which the Guideline applies that does not
by statutory definition involve a stolen or altered firearm, would
also receive an increase by 2 levels under § 2K2.1(b)(4), if any
firearm involved was stolen or had an altered or obliterated serial
number.) In the absence of Application Note 12, this meaning would
logically and reasonably follow because (1) the fact that a firearm
is a stolen firearm is a not a specific, but a generic, offense
characteristic when the offense of conviction is knowingly
possessing a stolen firearm; therefore, with respect to this
particular offense of conviction, that generic offense
characteristic would be implicitly excluded from the category of
“specific offense characteristics”--in other words the fact that
the firearm was stolen would not aggravate, distinguish or qualify
the offense of conviction in any respect; and (2) the base offense
level already takes into account that the firearm was stolen.
24
Application Note 12, however, explicitly, carefully and
thoroughly provides that in certain cases of convictions involving
stolen or altered firearms a defendant shall be spared from
enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4) when his base offense is determined
under § 2K2.1(a)(7). The extension of this mitigation only to
cases in which the base level is determined under subsection (a)(7)
clearly implies that it shall be withheld when the base level is
determined under any other subsection; thus, two levels must be
added if any firearm was stolen or had an altered serial number,
unless the base level is determined under subsection (a)(7). This
requirement is troublesome when the offense of conviction is
possession of a stolen or altered firearm because the stated reason
for the enhancement is an essential element of the basic offense,
not an aggravating factor involved in the commission of the crime,
and therefore provides no evident basis for increasing the
punishment. However, a “commentary in the Guidelines Manual that
interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson
v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). Because I cannot say
that any flaw in the rationale of the Guideline or its commentary
reaches these proportions, I respectfully concur in the result.
I cannot agree with the majority’s argument that “the overall
scheme of the Guidelines” and the machine gun hypothetical provide
additional support for that result. Without Application Note 12,
25
I believe the 2 level increase would not be required.
26