U.S. v. Santa Lucia

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-5569
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HENRY JOSEPH SANTA LUCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
May 7, 1993
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
Convicted on a guilty plea of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), Henry Joseph Santa
Lucia appeals, contesting the voluntariness of his plea and
challenging his sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
Santa Lucia pled guilty to the first of multiple counts of an
indictment charging participation in a cocaine distribution
operation. The count to which he pled, a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a), carries a statutory minimum penalty of 20 years
imprisonment. Santa Lucia's plea bargain agreement recognized this
but it committed the government to seek a downward departure to not
more than 18 years because of Santa Lucia's assistance. As
promised, at sentencing the government moved for a downward
departure to 18 years imprisonment. Santa Lucia objected,
insisting that he should be sentenced within the United States
Sentencing Guideline range of 151 to 188 months that would have
applied had his offense not been subject to a statutory minimum
sentence.1 The district court rejected this argument and imposed
an 18-year sentence. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Santa Lucia raises two issues on appeal: (1) the district court
impermissibly departed upward without explanation by sentencing
above the guideline range that would have applied absent a
statutory minimim; and (2) his plea was involuntary because he
believed he would be sentenced within the 151-188 month range
absent unforeseen grounds for departure. Neither contention has
merit.
The 18-year sentence was a downward departure from the guideline
sentence, not, as Santa Lucia maintains, an upward departure.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) provides:
1
After credit for acceptance of responsibility, Santa Lucia's
offense level was 34 and his criminal history category was I.
2
Where a statutorily minimum sentence is greater than the
maximum of the applicable guideline range, the
statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the
guideline sentence.2
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes the district court to sentence
"below a level established by statute as minimum sentence" upon
motion of the government indicating that the defendant has provided
"substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense." Consistent with this
provision and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 p.s. permits a
downward departure from the guidelines sentence if the government
files a substantial assistance motion.3 The plain language of
these provisions admits of only one interpretation: a sentence
below the statutory minimum is a downward departure from the
guideline sentence. Contrary to Santa Lucia's argument, the
statutory minimum is the guideline sentence whether or not the
government moves for a reduction.4 And, upon appropriate motion by
2
See also United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, _____ U.S. _____, 111 S. Ct. 2066, 114 L. Ed. 2d 470
(1991).
3
Application Note 1 to § 5K1.1 p.s. declares:
Under circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), as amended,
substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense may justify a sentence below a statutorily
required minimum sentence.
4
See United States v. Hayes, 939 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, _____ U.S. _____, 112 S. Ct. 896, 116 L. Ed. 2d 798
(1992). Santa Lucia also contends that the district court ignored
his assertion that he had cooperated with the government to the
best of his ability and instead relied solely on the government's
assessment of his assistance in selecting the 18-year sentence.
His argument rests on a misreading of the record. In affirming
3
the government, the court may depart downward from such a statutory
minimum sentence.5
Finally, Santa Lucia's challenge to his guilty plea is
foreclosed by circuit precedent. As we held in United States v.
Jones,6 reliance on the erroneous advice of counsel relative to the
sentence likely to be imposed does not render a guilty plea
unknowing or involuntary. "As long as the defendant understood the
length of time he might possibly receive he was fully aware of his
plea's consequences."7 The court informed Santa Lucia during his
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 allocution that a guilty plea would expose him to
a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum of life
imprisonment, a fine of $2 million, and supervised release. No
more was required to inform Santa Lucia of his sentencing exposure.
AFFIRMED.
that it was sentencing "based, not on the guideline level, but on
the government's recommendation," the court was referring to the
dispute about whether the guideline sentence was the statutory
minimum or the guideline level that would apply absent a statutory
minimum.
5
Three circuits addressing this matter have found
departures from statutory minimum sentences appropriate upon
motion by the government. United States v. Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.
1991); aff'd 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992); United States v. Keene, 933
F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1991).
6
905 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1990).
7
Jones, 905 F.2d at 868 (internal citations omitted); see
also United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, _____ U.S. _____, 111 S. Ct. 977, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1991).
4