Smith v. Warden Allen Corr

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-30140
_____________________
JAMES R. SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN ALLEN CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(97-CV-2393)
_________________________________________________________________
March 6, 2000
Before JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and DOWD,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
James Smith was initially charged with second degree murder
and later pled guilty to manslaughter. The court sentenced him to
seventeen years in prison. The petitioner filed for habeas corpus
relief, arguing that he was never informed of the elements of
manslaughter and did not understand what those elements are, making
his plea constitutionally involuntary. We deny habeas corpus
relief.
*
District Judge of the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by
designation.
è
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I
Smith was initially charged with second degree murder in the
fall of 1984. On the first day of trial, several witnesses
testified that Smith had admitted killing the victim. The first of
these testified that Smith had claimed self defense. The policemen
testified that they had found the victim’s body with the throat cut
and the genitals cut off. Photographs of the scene were shown to
the jury.
The following day, Smith agreed to plead guilty to the reduced
charge of manslaughter. The prosecutors accepted his plea, and he
was sentenced to 17 years of hard labor. On direct appeal, Smith
raised a single assignment of error, that his sentence was
constitutionally excessive. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
rejected this argument and affirmed his conviction and sentence.
On December 21, 1989, Smith filed an application for post-
conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly and voluntarily. The trial court denied relief on
January 2, 1990, without an evidentiary hearing. Smith then sought
review in the Court of Criminal Appeal, which denied his writ,
stating only that “[t]here is no error in the trial court’s
ruling.” Smith next filed a writ application with the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which was denied in 1996.
On October 2, 1997, Smith filed a § 2254 petition, arguing
that his guilty plea was involuntary. The magistrate judge
recommended denial and dismissal with prejudice. Smith filed
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objections, but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, denying the petition and dismissing with
prejudice. Smith filed a notice of appeal and the district court
granted a COA on the issue of whether Smith’s guilty plea was
entered knowingly and voluntarily.
II
A
We must first determine the proper standard of review to apply
in this case. A prerequisite of the standard of review specified
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) for habeas corpus appeals is that the claim
was adjudicated “on the merits” in state court. We determine
whether there was such an adjudication by considering:
(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases;
(2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state
court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the
case on the merits; and
(3) whether the state courts’ opinion suggests reliance upon
procedural grounds rather than a determination on the
merits.
Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999).
Weighing these three factors leads us to conclude that the
Court of Appeal did adjudicate this claim on the merits as opposed
to procedurally. A review of previous Louisiana cases does not
reveal any where claims such as Smith’s were dismissed based on
procedural grounds. By itself, this proves nothing, except that
this factor does not favor either alternative. With respect to the
second factor, there is no suggestion that the court was made aware
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of any procedural reasons for dismissing Smith’s motion because the
state did not file any motion whatsoever in the Court of Appeal.
See Singleton v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 381, 384 (1999)(Where the state
did not raise procedural grounds for denying relief, it suggested
that the state court was not aware of any procedural grounds for
dismissal.). Third, the state court opinion, while ambiguous, does
suggest that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits.
The Court of Appeal would probably have used language different
from “[t]here is no error in the trial court’s ruling” had the
claim been dismissed procedurally. Mentioning an absence of error
indicates that the court actually looked for error. Based on these
three factors, we conclude that there was an adjudication on the
merits.
For this reason, § 2254(d) establishes the standard of review
in this case:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
Whether Smith had adequate notice of the elements of the
offense of manslaughter is a question of fact. We therefore review
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to determine whether it would be unreasonable to conclude that
Smith had such notice.
B
The Supreme Court has stated that a guilty plea cannot be
voluntary unless the defendant has “real notice of the true nature
of the charge against him,” which includes notice of the elements
of the offense. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646-47, 96
S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976). But that does not mean that
there must be an express discussion of the elements on the record:
Normally the record contains either an explanation of the
charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation
by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has
been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without
such an express representation, it may be appropriate to
presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely
explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to
give the accused notice of what he is being asked to
admit.
Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
Cases within our own circuit provide some additional guidance.
In Burden v. State of Alabama, 584 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir.
1978), we held that there was insufficient notice of the elements
of the crime. We based this conclusion on the lack of a discussion
of the elements of the offense either in the defendant’s “Ireland
Form”1 or the judge’s statements to the defendant, and in the
absence of any statement by defense counsel on record that he had
discussed the elements of the crime with the defendant. In Hobbs
1
This is a form informing the defendant of the charges against
him and of his rights.
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v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), on the other
hand, we upheld a guilty plea without any discussion of the
elements on the record because review of the colloquy with the
judge revealed that the defendant understood the general meaning of
the charge and the consequences of his guilty plea. Moreover, in
Bonvillain v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1986), we
again upheld a guilty plea without any enumeration of the elements
of the offense. Instead, the defendant’s counsel had signed a form
stating that he had “informed the defendant of his or her rights,
particularly the nature of the crime to which he or she is pleading
guilty,” which we found sufficient. Id.
In the case before us, defense counsel did not sign anything
similar to the one in Bonvillain. The judge never expressly
discussed the elements of manslaughter. Instead, our sole
indication of what the defendant did know comes from the colloquy
with the judge:
By the Court: Mr. Smith, you are here with your
attorneys, Ms. Fournet and Mr. Bracato.
Is that correct, sir?
By Mr. Smith: Yes sir, it is.
By the Court: It is the Court’s understanding that you
have fully discussed this case with both
of your attorneys. Is that correct, sir?
By Mr. Smith: Yes sir, I have.
By the Court: Are you satisfied with the advice they
have given you?
By Mr. Smith: Yes sir, very satisfied.
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By the Court: All right. I want to be sure that you
understand the . . . . what you are now
charged with, sir. According to the
amended Bill of Information or Indictment
you are charged with the offense of
manslaughter that in or about the 25th
day of December, 1982, you committed
manslaughter of one Frank Knapp. Do you
understand what you are charged with,
sir?
By Mr. Smith: Yes sir.
By the Court: Do you understand, sir, that if the Court
accepts your guilty plea you could be
sentenced by the Court to serve a term of
imprisonment for a period not to exceed
twenty-one years at the Department of
Corrections?
By Mr. Smith: Yes sir, I understand that.
By the Court: I want to be sure that you understand the
rights you are giving up if I accept your
guilty plea.
...
By the Court: Mr. Smith, the Court is satisfied that
with the advice of your attorneys, who
are very, very competent, the most
competent firm in the City of Alexandria
representing you, that you fully
understand the nature of the plea that
you are making, you fully understand the
consequences of the guilty plea, and that
the plea is knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entered, and that there is a
factual basis for the plea. I am going
to now advise that I will accept the
plea.
From this colloquy, it appears that Smith had excellent legal
counsel. He had two lawyers from what the trial judge considered
to be an excellent firm. Smith also had the opportunity to discuss
his case with them. It would seem reasonable to assume that his
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lawyers discussed his offense in detail with him before he agreed
to plead guilty.
We do will not venture to guess what the result would be if
the standard of review and burden of proof in this case were
different. But Smith has not carried his burden of proof, nor has
he overcome the standard of review. He has not established that it
would be unreasonable to presume that his lawyers explained the
nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give him notice of
what he was being asked to admit. We therefore conclude that
habeas corpus relief would be inappropriate.
III
For the reasons stated herein, Smith’s motion for habeas
corpus relief is
D E N I E D.
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