Thomas v. United Beverage/Gulf

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-60429
Summary Calendar
Gerald M. Thomas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
United Beverage/Gulf Distributors,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:99-CV-903-LN)
November 29, 2001
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gerald Thomas, the pro se plaintiff-appellant in this case,
appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for a
new trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
denial of Thomas’s motion and therefore affirm the district court’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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ruling.
I.
Gerald Thomas sued United Beverage for employment
discrimination, claiming that United Beverage (1) denied him a
promotion because he is African-American, and (2) eventually fired
him because he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The district court
dismissed his case on summary judgment.
After the district court entered summary judgment against him
on March 9, 2001, Thomas filed two undesignated motions for
reconsideration. Thomas filed his first motion for reconsideration
on March 21. The district court denied that motion. Thomas filed
his second motion for reconsideration on April 12. The district
court denied that motion as well. On May 15, 2001, Thomas filed a
notice of appeal challenging the summary judgment entered against
him. United Beverage then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Thomas’s notice of appeal was
not timely. Another panel of this court denied United Beverage’s
motion, but held that our jurisdiction was limited to reviewing
“whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
[Thomas’s] second motion for reconsideration.” Thomas v. United
Beverage/Gulf Distribs., No. 01-60429 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 3,
2001). The court considered this second motion for reconsideration
to be a Rule 60(b) motion. Thomas now appeals the district court’s
denial of his second motion for reconsideration.
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II.
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion for relief of judgment for clear abuse of discretion. See
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 183 (5th Cir. 2000). “It
is not enough that the granting of relief might have been
permissible, or even warranted; denial must have been so
unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Seven Elves,
Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981).
B. Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Thomas’s second motion for reconsideration. As stated above, a
prior panel of this court deemed this undesignated motion to be a
Rule 60(b) motion solely because Thomas filed the motion too late
for it to qualify as a Rule 59 motion. Thomas does not, however,
allege specific grounds for reversal under Rule 60(b). His sole
arguments on appeal are that (1) the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because there are disputed material
issues of fact in this case; and (2) the district court erred in
finding that Thomas failed to establish a prima facie case for
employment discrimination.
Thus, Thomas seeks to challenge the merits of the district
court’s summary judgment ruling through a Rule 60(b) motion; he
does not present facts that ordinarily lend themselves to Rule
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60(b) relief. His assignments of error do not fit into any of the
first five subcategories of Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Even the broadly worded Rule 60(b)(6), allowing relief for “any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment,”
requires some “extraordinary circumstance” for this court to grant
relief. See Heirs of Guerra v. United States, 207 F.3d 763, 767
(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,
613-14 (1949)). In Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, this court set
forth several factors relevant to determining whether Rule 60(b)(6)
relief is warranted, including:
(1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed;
(2) that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a
substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should be
liberally construed in order to achieve substantial
justice; (4) whether the motion was made within a
reasonable time; (5) whether if the judgment was a
default or a dismissal in which there was no
consideration of the merits the interest in deciding
cases on the merits outweighs, in the particular case,
the interest in the finality of judgments, and there is
merit in the movant's claim or defense; (6) whether if
the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits the
movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim or
defense; (7) whether there are intervening equities that
would make it inequitable to grant relief; and (8) any
other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment
under attack. These factors are to be considered in the
light of the great desirability of preserving the
principle of the finality of judgments.
635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). These factors militate strongly
against Thomas’s motion for reconsideration. Thomas presents no
extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. He instead argues
that the court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) there
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are disputed issues of fact in this case and (2) the court
incorrectly found that he failed to establish a prima facie case.
These arguments are proper for ordinary appeal, but not a Rule
60(b) motion. See Pryor v. United States Postal Serv., 769 F.2d
281, 286 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Rule 60(b) may not be used to provide an
avenue for challenges of mistakes of law that should ordinarily be
raised by timely appeal”). It is also important to note that
Thomas had an adequate opportunity to present his version of the
facts before the court. Thus, in light of the policy of favoring
the preservation of judgments, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for reconsideration.
III.
Thomas has not demonstrated any “extraordinary circumstances”
or that any of the district court’s rulings were “fundamentally
incorrect.” We therefore find no grounds for Rule 60(b) relief.
The district court’s ruling denying Thomas’s motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
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