United States v. Shakur

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 29, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-50932
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KHALEEL NA’IM SHAKUR, also known as
Khaleel Shakur,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-02-CR-66-1
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Before KING, Chief Judge, and DEMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Khaleel Shakur challenges his guilty-plea conviction and
sentence for conspiring to make, utter, or possess a counterfeit
security of an organization. He asserts for the first time on
appeal that the factual basis was insufficient to establish that
he had agreed to join a conspiracy. He has not shown that the
district court committed plain error in accepting his guilty
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-50932
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plea, as Shakur’s admissions establish the elements of a
conspiracy. See United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529,
530 (5th Cir. 2000).
Shakur contends, also for the first time on appeal, that
during his rearraignment proceeding the district court violated
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 in three separate instances. He maintains
that the court did not explain the nature of the charge to him,
in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); did not adequately
explain the effect and operation of supervised release, pursuant
to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); and did not ask him whether his
willingness to plead guilty resulted from discussions between his
attorney and the Government, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
He has not established that these omissions constituted plain
error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043,
1046 (2002).
Shakur maintains that the district court abused its
discretion in departing upward at sentencing to impose a sentence
of 60 months. The district court concluded that the upward
departure was warranted based upon the underrepresentation of
Shakur’s criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit
more crimes in the future. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. The
court’s explanation of its reasons for departure includes an
implicit explanation for the rejection of intermediate
categories. See United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th
Cir. 1993)(en banc). The degree of the departure was reasonable.
No. 02-50932
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See United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174-75 (5th Cir.
1995). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
departing upward. See United States v. McKenzie, 991 F.2d 203,
204 (5th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.