Coakley v. Seariver Maritime, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 18, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30569
Summary Calendar
DERIC COAKLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SEARIVER MARITIME, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:02-CV-3509
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Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Deric Coakley sued his employer, SeaRiver Maritime, Inc.
(“SeaRiver”), for injuries sustained while employed by SeaRiver
as a seaman. Coakley slipped on ice on a barge owned by Kirby
Inland Marine, Inc. (“Kirby”), which was being towed by Seariver
pursuant to a reciprocal towing agreement between Kirby and
SeaRiver.
Coakley appeals the district court’s summary judgment
dismissing Coakley’s unseaworthiness claims. The district court
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-30569
-2-
correctly concluded that SeaRiver was not the owner pro hac vice
of the barge on which Coakley was injured. The contract between
SeaRiver and Kirby was for towage. SeaRiver did not assume the
incidents of ownership necessary for the creation of a bareboat
charter or ownership pro hac vice. See Torch, Inc. v. Alesich,
148 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1998); Ducote v. International
Operating Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 678 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir.
1985). As SeaRiver was not the owner or owner pro hac vice, it
is not liable for any unseaworthy condition of the barges in its
tow. See Forrester v. Ocean Marine Indem. Co., 11 F.3d 1213,
1215 (5th Cir. 1993); Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d
523, 530 (5th Cir. 1981).
Coakley next argues that the district court erred in
refusing to strike a juror for cause. Our review of the record
demonstrates that the district court adequately questioned the
juror to assure her impartiality and did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to strike the juror for cause. See Smith v. Shell
Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1087, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1984).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.