Stolley v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 28, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-11068
Summary Calendar
DANIEL STOLLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division
4:04-CV-303
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Daniel Stolley appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for the defendant, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co.
(“Lockheed”) in this Title VII religious discrimination case. We
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
On February 13, 2003, Stolley applied for employment as an
aircraft assembler at Lockheed’s manufacturing facility in Fort
Worth, Texas. The application included a question asking whether
Stolley was able to perform shift work, rotational work schedules,
overtime, and work schedules that included Saturdays and Sundays.
Stolley answered in the affirmative and expressed no concerns at
that time. Two days later, Stolley accepted Lockheed’s job offer
and agreed to start on February 24. On February 27, however, he
learned that he had been assigned to a shift that include working
from 3:45 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. on Fridays. This presented a problem
for Stolley because, as a member of the United Church of God, he
observes the Sabbath from sundown on Friday until sundown on
Saturday, and is prohibited from working during that time.
Stolley notified Lockheed of his predicament, and the
assignment supervisor inquired about re-assigning Stolley to a
different department with an earlier shift that would not conflict
with his religious observance. The other department saw no problem
with the reassignment, but the labor relations department advised
that the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between Lockheed and the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“the Union”)
prohibited any such reassignment. The CBA governs the terms of
employment for aircraft assemblers like Stolley, and includes
provisions that allocate preference for shift-swapping and
transfers based on seniority.
2
Stolley next contacted his Union representative, Norm
Huddleston, and a labor analyst, Daryl Rous, to evaluate whether
Lockheed could accommodate him, either through transfer to an
earlier shift or allowing him to work different hours than those
established for that shift. The CBA forbid the transfer, however,
and required Lockheed to pay Stolley overtime for any make-up hours
worked outside the established shift.1 The Union was unwilling to
waive the applicable provisions.
On March 14, Lockheed fired Stolley for leaving work before
sundown on each of the Fridays that he had been scheduled to work.
At that time, Stolley had been employed for less than 35 days and
was still a probationary employee.
In the district court, Stolley argued that Lockheed violated
the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by failing to reasonably accommodate his
religious beliefs through reassignment, and by asking prospective
employees whether they could work on Saturdays and Sundays, which
creates a disparate impact on individuals with religious beliefs
similar to Stolley’s. The district court granted Lockheed’s motion
for summary judgment, and Stolley appeals.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Atkins v.
1
Under the CBA, Lockheed would have had to pay Stolley
overtime pay 1.5 times his hourly rate for each hour worked for
reporting early on Fridays, and 2 times his hourly rate for any
hours worked on the weekend.
3
Hibernia Corp., 182 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the record establishes “that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
II. DISCUSSION
This case arises under Title VII, which prohibits religious
discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2003).
It is undisputed that Stolley informed Lockheed of his bona-fide
religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement,
and was fired because of his failure to comply with the
requirement, thus establishing a prima-facie case of religious
discrimination. See Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270,
273 (5th Cir. 2000). The burden shifts to Lockheed to show that it
was unable to reasonably accommodate Stolley’s beliefs without
undue hardship. Id. The district court, in granting summary
judgment, found that Lockheed could not reasonably accommodate
Stolley because of the seniority provisions of the CBA. Title VII
does not require an employer to “deny the shift and job preferences
of some employees,” or “deprive them of their contractual rights,
in order to accommodate . . . the religious needs of others.”
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
On appeal, Stolley argues that the trial court erred by (1)
drawing inferences in favor of summary judgment from disputed
facts, (2) evaluating only the accommodations that Stolley himself
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proposed, thereby overlooking Lockheed’s failure to seek reasonable
accommodations with the Union, and (3) holding that no
accommodations were possible under the CBA.
On summary judgment, inferences drawn from disputed facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir.
1991). The fact at issue is whether Lockheed’s labor analyst,
Rous, asked the Union whether it would waive the seniority
provision of the CBA. Rous first spoke with Union representative
Huddleston, who stated that the Union was unwilling to waive the
provisions. Rous says that he then spoke with Bennie Baker,
another Union representative, who reiterated Huddleston’s
statement. Baker, however, does not remember discussing the matter
with Rous prior to Stolley’s termination. Based on this, Stolley
argues that whether Rous asked the Union to waive the provision is
a disputed fact. However, it is only disputed whether Rous spoke
to Baker, not whether Rous spoke to Huddleston. Therefore, the
court did not draw an inference in favor of Lockheed by finding
that the Union — speaking to Rous through Huddleston — refused to
waive the provisions.2
Stolley next argues that the district court erred by only
2
Stolley also argues that the district court erred in
concluding that the single conversation foreclosed all the
discussion of accommodation required by an employer. However, the
record shows that Stolley and Lockheed made the Union fully aware
of the need for an accommodation, and Stolley does not provide any
authority suggesting a greater duty.
5
evaluating the accommodations that Stolley had earlier proposed,
thereby overlooking Lockheed’s failure to seek other reasonable
accommodations with the Union. He specifically points to two
potential accommodations he believes Lockheed should have pursued.3
Contrary to Stolley’s argument, however, the order granting summary
judgment suggests that the district court considered these
additional accommodations — referring to them as “belatedly”
suggested by Stolley — and found that they too ran afoul of the
CBA. We therefore find that the district court did not overlook
these alternative accommodations, and turn to the question of
whether the court was correct in finding that, as a matter of law,
Lockheed could not reasonably accommodate Stolley’s religious
beliefs.
As stated above, Title VII does not require employers to make
religious accommodations that infringe on the rights of fellow
employees. See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 81. Moreover,
where seniority-bidding provisions in collective-bargaining
agreements conflict with the religious beliefs of an employee so
that no accommodation is possible, an employer will not be liable
for its failure to accommodate. Id. at 79; Brener v. Diagnostic
Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982).
3
The additional suggested accommodations for Lockheed were (1)
placing Stolley in one of three vacant early-shift positions that
were instead filled with new hires, or (2) exercising its right of
management, found in the CBA, to make a transfer outside seniority
lines for “other legitimate reasons.”
6
Had Stolley expressed his need for religious accommodation
during the hiring process, before he was assigned to a shift,
Lockheed may have been able to place him in the earlier shift
without implicating the CBA. After Stolley was hired, assigned,
and began work, however, reassigning him to the earlier shift would
have violated the provision in the CBA that allocates the right to
such transfers based on seniority. Because the Union was unwilling
to waive the provision, Lockheed could not reasonably accommodate
Stolley without running afoul of the CBA.
The additional accommodations suggested by Stolley — placing
Stolley in one of three vacant early-shift positions that were
instead filled with new hires; or exercising Lockheed’s right of
management, found in the CBA, to make a transfer outside seniority
lines for “other legitimate reasons” — would have also violated the
CBA. While there were vacancies on the earlier shift at the time
Lockheed fired Stolley that were subsequently filled with new
hires, the CBA already applied to Stolley as an existing employee,
and forbid the transfer. Similarly, Lockheed’s right of management
to make transfers for “other legitimate reasons” cannot sidestep
clear precedent that religious accommodation does not trump other
workers’ rights under the CBA. See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S.
at 81.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
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