Benningfield v. The City of Houston

Revised October 22, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-20429
DEBBIE L. BENNINGFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellee
PEGGY FRANKHOUSER; PAMELA M. GRANT
Intervenor Plaintiffs - Appellees
VERSUS
THE CITY OF HOUSTON; ET AL
Defendants
SAM NUCHIA, Chief; RICHARD J. PFEIL; A. WADE RUNNELS; C.O.
BRADFORD; ROBERT T. FLEMING; J.R. JONES
Defendants - Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
October 5, 1998
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JONES and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Defendants appeal from the denial of summary judgment on the
following claims: violation of the First Amendment (42 U.S.C. §
1983), 42 U.S.C. § 1985, tortious interference with business
relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Defendants, all employees of the Houston Police Department (“HPD”),
appeal the denial of their motions for summary judgment based on
their qualified immunity. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs, Debbie Benningfield (“Benningfield”), Pamela
Grant, (“Grant”), and Peggy Frankhouser (“Frankhouser”), are all
current or former employees of the Houston Police Department. The
Defendants, Sam Nuchia (“Nuchia”), Richard J. Pfeil (“Pfeil”), A.
Wade Runnels (“Runnels”), C.O. Bradford (“Bradford”), Robert T.
Fleming (“Fleming”), J.R. Jones (“Jones”), are current or former
employees of the Houston Police Department. In the mid-1980's, the
Plaintiffs, who worked in the Identification Division (“ID”),
complained of discrimination and a hostile working environment.
Audra Runnels, then head of the ID, was allegedly forced to resign
because of the Plaintiffs’ complaints.
A. Wade Runnels, Audra Runnels’s son, became the new head of
ID. Allegedly, the discrimination and hostile working environment
in the ID continued. According to the Plaintiffs, Runnels sought
to avenge his father’s termination with a campaign of retaliation
against them. In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that Runnels and
the other Defendants harassed and retaliated against them because
they continued to report problems in the ID.2
Grant contends that the Defendants’ actions led to her
involuntary retirement. In 1989, Runnels assigned Grant to work
under Fleming. According to Grant, she was involved in a romantic
relationship with Fleming that ended in the early 1980's when she
learned that Fleming had sexually abused her daughter. Grant
alleges that when Runnels assigned her to work under Fleming, he
knew of this relationship and the reason it ended. Grant maintains
that, in addition to other harassment in the ID, being forced to
work under Fleming caused her emotional breakdown in 1991 and led
to her medical retirement.
Frankhouser and Benningfield contend that the Defendants
conducted a campaign of harassment and retaliation against them.
Frankhouser maintains that she was constructively discharged
because the Defendants’ actions created a hostile work environment.
Among other things, Frankhouser claims that Runnels and Fleming
stripped her of her cadet training position at the Police Academy.
In 1993, she retired from the HPD and accepted a similar position
with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department.
Benningfield alleges, among other things, that she was demoted
and formally reprimanded in retaliation for her grievances.
Benningfield still works for the HPD.
Benningfield sued the individual Defendants and the City of
Houston in state district court. Frankhouser and Grant
subsequently intervened as plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs’ claimed,
under Texas law, discrimination, retaliation, intentional
3
infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with
business relations, defamation, premises liability, and invasion of
privacy. The Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to include
a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a 42 U.S.C. §
1985 conspiracy claim.
The Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court
denied summary judgment with regard to the § 1983, § 1985, tortious
interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
causes of action. The other claims were either dismissed by the
court or withdrawn by the Plaintiffs. The individual Defendants
appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
Under Nerren v. Livingston Police Dept., we have
“interlocutory jurisdiction to ‘take, as given, the facts that the
district court assumed when it denied summary judgment’ and
determine whether these facts state a claim under clearly
established law.” 86 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995)). This interlocutory
jurisdiction applies to both the federal and state law claims. See
Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 804 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
“orders premised on the denial of qualified immunity under Texas
state law are appealable in federal court to the same extent as
4
district court orders based on the denial of federal law
immunity”). The standard of review is de novo. See Johnston v.
City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mozeke
v. International Paper Co., 856 F.2d 722, 724 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Considering the facts that the district court assumed, we now
consider each of the causes of action to determine which, if any,
of the Plaintiffs’ claims state a claim under clearly established
law. For those that do we then consider whether issues of fact are
present.
II. First Amendment
A First Amendment retaliation claim must include facts showing
(1) that the employee’s speech involved a matter of public concern,
(2) that the employee suffered an adverse employment action for
exercising her First Amendment rights, and (3) that the employee’s
exercise of free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse employment action. See Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d
359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997).
A. Matter of Public Concern
Connick v. Myers teaches that “whether an employee’s speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record.” 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). The Court noted that
“when employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
5
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” Id. The Court
stated that review by a federal court is improper where the speech
involves matters of solely personal interest. See id.; Ayoub v.
Texas A & M University, 927 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a professor’s complaint about a discriminatory pay scale was
not a matter of public concern where the professor’s complaint
focused on his individual compensation).
The fact that an employee’s speech contains an element of
personal interest is not fatal, however. See Thompson v. City of
Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d 456, 463-65 (5th Cir. 1990). An
employee’s speech may contain a mix of public and private concerns.
See id. at 464. In Starkville, a police officer protested improper
promotions by filing grievances and aiding others in filing
grievances. This court held that the officer’s speech constituted
a matter of public concern because his allegations of police
misconduct brought attention to matters beyond purely personal
interest.
Similarly, the present case involves a mix of public and
private speech. Personal concerns certainly played a major role in
the Plaintiffs’ grievances. The Plaintiffs thought that their
personal careers were being negatively affected by mismanagement,
gender discrimination, and a hostile work environment.
The Plaintiffs’ speech, however, contained matters of public
6
concern as well. The Plaintiffs complained about contamination of
criminal histories in the ID. According to the Plaintiffs,
contamination involves the wrong criminal histories being
attributed to individuals. The Plaintiffs maintain that the
problems with the criminal histories resulted from mismanagement
and, in some instances, deliberate tampering. The integrity of and
tampering with criminal histories are important to effective law
enforcement and certainly a matter of public concern. See Brawner
v. City of Richardson, Texas, 855 F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that “[t]he disclosure of misbehavior by public officials
is a matter of public interest and therefore deserves
constitutional protection, especially when it concerns the
operation of a police department”).
The fact that the Plaintiffs chose to file internal grievances
rather than publicize their complaints is not dispositive. In
Givhan v. Western Line Cosol. Dist., the Court stated:
The First Amendment forbids abridgment of “freedom of
speech.” Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions
indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer
rather than to spread his views before the public. We
decline to adopt such a view of the First Amendment.
99 S.Ct. 693, 696-97 (1979); See also Wilson, 973 F.2d at
1270(citing Givhan, 99 S.Ct. at 696-97); Thompson, 901 F.2d at 466-
67 (stating that the fact that the plaintiff complained to his
superiors rather than the public did not preclude a finding that
his speech dealt with matters of public concern).
7
B. Adverse Employment Actions
“Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions,
refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.” Pierce v.
Texas Department of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149
(5th Cir. 1994) (citing McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563
(11th Cir. 1994)). See also Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359,
365 (5th Cir. 1997). In Pierce, the court declined to expand the
list of actionable adverse actions, noting that some things are not
actionable even though they have the effect of chilling the
exercise of free speech. Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1150.
Officer Grant has failed to establish a causal connection
between speech on matters of public concern and the adverse
employment actions she alleges.1 For example, Grant was given a
medical discharge after she suffered an emotional breakdown. Grant
alleges that she was discharged in retaliation for her grievances.
The evidence, however, indicates that Grant’s medical retirement
came as a result of an independent psychiatric evaluation. Grant
has, therefore, failed to state a First Amendment violation.
Benningfield and Frankhouser allege many acts of alleged
retaliation, most of which are insufficient to constitute adverse
employment actions. Benningfield alleges that she was falsely
accused of stealing criminal history records. Similarly, Officer
1
Grant’s brief alleges that she was offered a day shift position
to withdraw her grievance. Her brief fails to reference specific
evidence in the record supporting this claim, however, and our
review of the record has found none.
8
Frankhouser alleges that she was falsely accused of attempting to
sabotage the fingerprint identification system. Assuming that
these allegations are true, mere accusations, without more, are not
adverse employment actions. Cf. Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366(holding that criticism did not constitute an adverse employment
action).
Benningfield maintains that she was subjected to an IAD
investigation in retaliation for her First Amendment activity.2
Although a reprimand can constitute an adverse employment action,
an investigation does not. See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1150 (stating
that an investigation, by itself, was not an adverse employment
action). Benningfield also alleges that she was referred to the
Administrative Personnel Committee (“APC”) to undergo psychological
testing to determine her fitness for duty. The APC referral was
not an adverse employment action. Rather, the referral was
designed to gather facts to form the basis for an employment
decision.
Frankhouser maintains that her job performance rating was
lowered in retaliation for her grievances. However, she admits
that it was returned to its previous level two days after it was
lowered. This does not constitute an adverse employment action.
Benningfield alleges that she was prevented from attending
2
There is substantial evidence in the record indicating that
Benningfield was investigated because she was away without leave
for three days. For the purposes of this appeal, however, we will
assume that her allegations are true.
9
certain conferences in retaliation for filing grievances. We
rejected a similar claim in Dorsett v. Bd of Trustees for St.
Colleges & Univ. 940 F.2d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1988). In
Dorsett, we found the plaintiff’s complaints about teaching
assignments, administrative matters, and departmental procedures
insufficient to constitute adverse employment actions. We stated
that “[w]e have neither the competency nor the resources to
micromanage the administration of thousands of state educational
institutions.” Id. at 124. Similarly, deciding whether an officer
may attend certain conferences would constitute needless
micromanagement of the HPD.
Frankhouser makes claims which fail for the same reason. She
contends that she was assigned an unusually heavy work load and has
not received overtime and travel reimbursement due her. She also
alleges that the Defendants inhibited the performance of her duties
by preventing Printrak representatives from speaking directly with
her. These allegations involve administrative matters and are not
adverse employment actions. See id.Benningfield maintains that transferring her to the night
shift constituted an adverse employment action. Merely changing
Benningfield’s hours, without more, does not constitute an adverse
employment action. A transfer may also constitute a demotion. See
Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996); Click
v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992). However, the
transfers in Forsyth and Click involved more than mere changes in
10
working hours and are, therefore, distinguishable.
Benningfield maintains that she was threatened with discharge
and promotional pass over unless she withdrew her EEOC complaint.
However, her brief fails to point to specific evidence in the
record supporting this assertion. Our review of the record
revealed none.
Benningfield alleges that she was formally reprimanded because
of her First Amendment activities. Formal reprimands constitute
adverse employment actions. See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1149. The
Defendants argue that Benningfield was reprimanded because she was
away without leave (“AWOL”) for three days. Benningfield maintains
that her grievances are the real reason for her reprimand and that
the AWOL incident is merely pretextual. However, the reprimand was
rescinded though internal HPD procedures and, thus, does not
constitute an adverse employment action.
Frankhouser alleges that she was verbally reprimanded. She
has failed, however, to present any evidence that these
“reprimands” were anything more than mere criticisms. See
Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366 (holding that criticism did not
constitute an adverse employment action). Thus, Frankhouser’s
allegations of verbal reprimands fail to state a claim.
In her affidavit, Benningfield states that Runnels demoted her
while the internal affairs investigation took place. Benningfield
affirms that, prior to the demotion, she was the AFIS Manager. She
avers that Runnels took away her managerial title and required her
11
to report to Pfeil. See Click, 970 F.2d at 110. The fact that
Benningfield’s complaints resulted in the removal of Runnel’s
father tends to support Benningfield’s claim that the demotion was
a response to Benningfield’s grievances.
The Defendants claim, however, that Benningfield was required
to report to Pfeil because of an audit recommendation and
Benningfield’s AWOL incident. The audit recommendation is included
in the Defendant’s summary judgment evidence.
In her affidavit, Frankhouser states that Runnels and Fleming
stripped her of her cadet training position at the Police Academy.
This action is arguably a demotion. See id. Frankhouser’s
affidavit indicates that she complained of mismanagement,
harassment, and retaliation in the ID. This evidence suggests that
she was stripped of her training position because of her First
Amendment activities.
Norbert LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”), a retired HPD officer,
corroborates Benningfield’s and Frankhouser’s claim that they were
demoted for exercising their First Amendment rights. LeBlanc
affirms that he personally witnessed discrimination and retaliation
by the Defendants, particularly Runnels and Fleming. LeBlanc
further affirms that Runnels and Fleming retaliated against him for
supporting Benningfield and Frankhouser by writing “scathing”
letters to Management Review about him and putting a negative mark
in his file.
There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
12
Benningfield and Frankhouser were demoted, and, if so, whether it
was in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.
Summary judgment should be used “most sparingly in . . . First
Amendment case[s] . . . involving delicate constitutional rights,
complex fact situations, disputed testimony, and questionable
credibilities.” Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir.
1979). Accordingly, the denial of summary judgment is affirmed
with regard to the alleged demotions of Benningfield and
Frankhouser.
Benningfield’s promotion was delayed for two years. The
Defendants maintain that the delay was not retaliation for
Benningfield’s First Amendment activities. Rather, they argue that
the promotion was held up because of a delay in administering a
required test. Further, the Defendants contend that Benningfield
received retroactive pay and seniority because the test was given
late. Although a refusal to promote is an adverse employment
action, these facts merely indicate a delay in promotion. See
Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1149 (stating that adverse employment actions
include refusals to promote). We need not address whether a mere
delay in promotion constitutes an adverse employment action because
Benningfield received the promotion with retroactive pay and
seniority.
Frankhouser maintains that she was constructively discharged.
To prove a constructive discharge, Frankhouser must show that a
“reasonable person in [her] shoes would have felt compelled to
13
resign.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, 429 (5th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Bourqe v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980)). Further, a constructive discharge claim
requires a “greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than
the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment.” Id. at
430 (citing Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School
District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981).
Frankhouser has not produced evidence showing that a
reasonable person in her shoes would have felt compelled to resign.
In fact, Benningfield, who alleges a much greater degree of
harassment and retaliation than Frankhouser, is still working for
the HPD. Frankhouser essentially contends that she resigned
because she believed that she would be the next target of
retaliation. Frankhouser’s fear of future retaliation is not
sufficient to support her claim of constructive discharge.
C. Qualified Immunity
In Click v. Copeland, rejecting a police officer’s qualified
immunity defense, we stated that “a reasonable officer should have
known that if he retaliated against an employee for exercising his
First Amendment rights, he could not escape liability by demoting
and transferring the employee rather than discharging him.” 970
F.2d 106, 111 (5th Cir. 1992). Similarly, in this case, we hold
that the Defendants should have known that they could not retaliate
against Benningfield and Frankhouser for exercising their First
Amendment rights.
14
III. §1985 Claims
The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants conspired to
interfere with the performance of their duties and to deprive them
of their rights and privileges under the law. §1985(1) applies in
cases of interference with federal officials in the performance of
their duties. §1985(1) is not applicable to state officials. See
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717-
18 (9th Cir. 1981); Baron v. Carson, 410 F.Supp. 299, 300-01
(N.D.Ill. 1976); see also Congress of Racial Equality v. Clemmons,
323 F.2d 54, 63 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating that city officials had no
federal right to be protected in the performance of their municipal
duties). The Plaintiffs are not federal officials and, therefore,
their allegations fail to state a claim under §1985(1).
The Plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to deprive
them of their First Amendment and equal protection rights. Under
§1985(3), a corporate entity and its employees constitute a “single
legal entity which is incapable of conspiring with itself.”
Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a school board and its employees constituted a single legal
entity which could not conspire with itself for § 1985(3)
purposes).3
3
The plaintiffs’ reliance on Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. is
misplaced. 660 F.2d 594, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1981). In Dussouy, the
court questioned the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in dicta.
However, the court had no occasion to rule on the vitality of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine because Dissouy was a diversity
case involving Louisiana law. See id. at 596, 602-04.
15
A possible exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
exists where corporate employees act for their own personal
purposes. See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732
F.2d 480, 486 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984); H & B Equipment Co., Inc. v.
International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Plaintiffs allege that Runnels’s father was forced to resign
because of their grievances and, therefore, Runnels had a personal
motive for retaliating. Further, the Plaintiffs maintain that the
other Defendants conspired with Runnels and aided in the
retaliation.
Assuming the allegations of a personal motive are true, the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under § 1985(3). In Hilliard, the
court stated that, under § 1985(3), plaintiffs must show that the
alleged conspiracy was “motivated by class-based animus.” 30 F.3d
at 653. Here, the Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show that the
purported conspiracy was motivated by class-based animus. Rather,
the Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) claim is based on the theory that
Runnels’ desire to get even with those who forced his father to
resign was the motivation for the conspiracy.
IV. Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship
The Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim for tortious
interference with business relations. Generally, as agents of the
city, the Defendants cannot be liable for interference with the
city’s contracts. See Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 796
(Tex. 1995). An agent may be liable, however, where he acts in
16
furtherance of his own personal interests. See id. In Holloway,
the court stated that, in order to prove personal interest the
“plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in a fashion so
contrary to the corporation’s interests that his actions could only
have been motivated by personal interests.” Id. Proof of mixed
motives is insufficient to create liability. See id.In this case, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing that
the Defendants’ actions could only have been motivated by personal
interests. At best, the Plaintiffs’ contentions indicate that the
Defendants acted with mixed motives and are, therefore, legally
insufficient.
V. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The district court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment with regard to Frankhouser on the issue of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. This appeal involves only Grant
and Benningfield’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress are: (1) the defendant acted either intentionally or
recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme or outrageous; (3) the
defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress was severe. See Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie
Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Dean v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Grant’s allegations are sufficient to withstand summary
judgment with regard to Runnels. Grant affirms that Runnels
17
assigned her to work under Fleming knowing that Grant and Fleming
had been romantically involved and that the relationship ended when
Grant discovered that Fleming had sexually abused her daughter.
When Grant attempted to shield her work station from Fleming’s
constant view by putting partitions around her work area, Runnels
allegedly removed the partitions in order to cause Grant emotional
distress. Grant concludes that Runnels’s actions led to her
emotional breakdown and subsequent medical discharge.
In their affidavits, Benningfield and Frankhouser corroborate
Grant’s claim. Benningfield affirms that during Grant’s emotional
breakdown, Grant exclaimed “I can’t take this anymore. What are
they going to do to me next?” Frankhouser avers that she
personally witnessed retaliation against Grant.
Memos written by Runnels and Fleming tend to support Grant’s
claim that her injury was caused by Runnels’s actions.4 Runnels’s
memo notes that the Staff Psychologist, Beverly Nichols, concluded
that Grant suffered from work related stress. In addition, the
memo states that, following an investigation, Grant’s Injury on
Duty (IOD) status was approved. In his memo, Fleming admits that
Grant sustained a psychological injury on the day Runnels allegedly
removed the partitions around her desk. Fleming also concedes that
Grant was ruled IOD and, thus, her injury claim was covered by
Workmen’s Compensation.
4
Runnels’s and Fleming’s memos are attached to Grant’s affidavit
as Exhibits B-2 and B-3, respectively.
18
Requiring an employee to work under a supervisor she dislikes
would not ordinarily constitute outrageous conduct. See Wilson v.
Monarch Paper, 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that, in
most cases, intentionally creating an unpleasant work environment
does not constitute outrageous conduct). In this case, however,
Grant alleges that Runnels assigned her to Fleming, knowing that
Fleming sexually molested her daughter. See id. (holding that
forcing a corporate executive to perform menial janitorial duties
constituted outrageous conduct). Further, Texas immunity law does
not protect Runnels because he allegedly acted in bad faith. See
Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 804 (noting that public officials must
act in good faith in order to enjoy immunity under Texas law).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary
judgment as to Runnels because a genuine issue of material fact
exists.
On the other hand, Grant’s allegations fail to state a claim
against the other Defendants because their purported actions are
not sufficiently extreme and outrageous. Similarly, Benningfield’s
contentions fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against any of the Defendants. Aside from
Runnels’s treatment of Grant, Benningfield and Grant allege conduct
which does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct under
Texas law. See id. at 1143 (creating an onerous and unpleasant
work environment does not usually constitute intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Ugalde, 990 F.2d at 243 (calling an
19
employee a “Mexican” and a “wetback” is not extreme and outrageous
conduct).
CONCLUSION
With regard to the Plaintiffs’ § 1985 and tortious
interference claims, we reverse the district court.
We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on
Benningfield’s § 1983 claim that Runnels demoted her while the
internal affairs investigation was proceeding and on Frankhouser’s
claim [against Runnels and Fleming] that she was demoted by being
removed from a cadet training position at the Police Academy. We
also affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to those claims.
The district court’s denial of summary judgment is reversed with
regard to the other § 1983 claims.
We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on
Grant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Runnels. The court’s denial of summary judgment is reversed with
regard to the remaining intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims.
REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED.
20
21