United States v. Husain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 99-21151
__________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAZA HUSAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
H-98-CR-105-1
______________________________________________
December 5, 2000
Before BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.*
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:**
Defendant-appellant Raza Husain was convicted of two counts
of possessing machineguns, two counts of transferring machineguns,
one count of tampering with a witness, and one misdemeanor count of
*
Judge Vela, District Judge of the Southern District of
Texas, was a member of the panel that heard oral arguments but did
not participate in the decision. This case is being decided by a
quorum, 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
failure to make appropriate entry of records. The district court
sentenced him to a total term of imprisonment of seventy-one
months. He now appeals raising numerous arguments, including:
insufficiency of the evidence; double jeopardy violations;
erroneous admission of prior bad acts; failure to provide a
limiting instruction with respect to the extrinsic evidence; and
various sentencing errors. Concluding that he has not shown that
he is entitled to relief, we AFFIRM.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Raza Husain (Husain) started his own security
company in 1984. Six years later he became a licensed firearms
dealer. The firearms license allowed Husain to sell firearms in
general, but not machineguns.
In February of 1996, ATF Agent Tinker received information
from another agent indicating that four foreign nationals were
engaged in the business of selling machineguns. One of these
individuals was identified as Abdulhady. The agents initiated
surveillance on Abdulhady.
On February 23, Abdulhady agreed to sell a machinegun to a
confidential informant. At 2 a.m. on February 24, the surveillance
officers at Abdulhady’s apartment observed the arrival of a vehicle
registered to Husain. The driver of the vehicle exited it, opened
the trunk and removed a package. Abdulhady spoke to the individual
and carried the package into his apartment. The driver then re-
entered his car and drove away. Officer Miller of the Houston
2
Police Department (HPD) followed the car until a marked car could
stop it and identify the driver, Husain.
Abdulhady delivered the package to the confidential informant,
who tested the weapon and determined that it was a machinegun. The
confidential informant paid Abdulhady $1200 for the weapon and
left. The weapon was a Norinco SKS rifle bearing serial number
1500449.
On March 6, the surveillance officers observed Abdulhady’s
departure from the apartment and his subsequent return. Husain
then arrived in his car. Once inside the security gate, a package
was removed from Husain’s vehicle and taken into Abdulhady’s
residence. It apparently took both Husain and Abdulhady to carry
the package.
Agent Torres, who was operating undercover, learned that
certain weapons were ready for delivery. The package was then
taken from Abdulhady’s residence and replaced in Husain’s car about
thirty minutes after it had been taken inside the apartment.
Agent Torres and Abdulhady had decided to conduct the
transaction at the Fiesta parking lot located on Bellaire
Boulevard, Houston, Texas. Once Agent Torres was able to confirm
that the package contained machineguns, the arrest signal was
given. Abdulhady was taken into custody and the agents seized five
more weapons, all Norinco SKS rifles bearing the following serial
numbers: 11480481, 204599, 20009321, 12037511, and 11538567.
After Abdulhady’s arrest, Husain became the focus of the
3
investigation. ATF records revealed that no machineguns were
registered to Husain. Based on the previously witnessed deliveries
of machineguns by Husain to Abdulhady, the agents obtained a search
warrant of Husain’s residence and security company. The warrant
was executed on April 11, 1996.
Husain’s firearms acquisition and disposition books were
seized during the search. The agents reviewed the books and
discovered that no information with respect to the weapons Husain
had delivered to Abdulhady on February 24, 1996, and March 6, 1996
had been recorded. Among other things, the agents seized a booklet
explaining how to convert a semi-automatic rifle into an automatic
rifle.
After Abdulhady was convicted, he became a cooperating witness
against Husain. Abdulhady had purchased numerous weapons from
Husain over a four-year period. To purchase weapons, Husain would
meet Abdulhady at a designated location and deliver firearms from
his vehicle. Abdulhady filled out some of the required forms for
Husain; however, he used incorrect names and addresses.
Husain told Abdulhady that he had a friend who knew how to
convert the semi-automatic rifles to automatic weapons. Husain
also instructed Abdulhady regarding how to switch the wood stocks
in the firearms to plastic.
After Abdulhady’s arrest, Husain counseled Abdulhady with
respect to what he should tell the investigators. Specifically,
Husain instructed Abdulhady to assert that the weapons were
4
defective.
Ray Morgan was a witness against Husain at trial. Morgan also
was a licensed firearms dealer. Morgan testified that Husain
bought twelve Norinco rifles from him. Morgan recalled that Husain
had literature illustrating the conversion of semi-automatic AK-47s
to machineguns. Morgan testified that he saw Husain in possession
of two machineguns on one occasion and six on another.
Morgan and Husain test-fired weapons on property owned by
Morgan. Morgan fired some of Husain’s machineguns. Some of them
were “slam firing” in that “they would take a round into the
chamber and then continue firing until the clip was empty even
after the operator took his finger off the trigger.”
ATF Agent Cooney testified that all of the weapons seized
during the course of the investigation had been converted to fully
automatic weapons. The firearms had been “modified by removing
metal from the bottom of the hammer and removing the disconnector
part internal to the weapon.” Husain testified in his own behalf.
On the first day of trial, Husain pleaded guilty to the
misdemeanor charge of failure to keep proper firearms records.
Ultimately, the jury convicted Husain of two counts of unlawful
possession of machineguns and two counts of unlawful transfer of
machineguns and one count of tampering with a witness. The
district court sentenced Husain to a total term of 71 months of
imprisonment, all sentences to be served concurrently.
II. Analysis
5
A. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, COUNTS 3 & 4
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the Government proved the essential elements of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95,
97 (5th Cir. 1996). All the evidence admitted at the trial must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all
credibility choices and reasonable inferences that tend to support
the verdict. Id.Title 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) defines a “machinegun” as “any
weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily
restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” (emphasis added).
Husain argues that his convictions on counts 3 and 4 of the
indictment (possession and transfer of five machineguns) were not
supported by the evidence because it was never established that
these guns would fire automatically by a single function of the
trigger.
Relying on the testimony of ATF Agent Cooney, Husain argues
that the guns in question do not fall within the above-quoted
statutory definition of machineguns. Specifically, Husain points
out that Agent Cooney testified that when he test-fired the five
guns in question, they would fire when the bolt was released and
6
went forward, without the trigger having been touched.1
In support of his argument, Husain quotes the following
language from a footnote in Staples v. United States, 114 S.Ct.
1793, 1795 n.1 (1994): “That is, once its trigger is depressed, the
weapon will automatically continue to fire until its trigger is
released or the ammunition is exhausted. Such weapons are
‘machineguns’ within the meaning of the Act.” The evidence is
insufficient to prove that the guns were machineguns, Husain
argues, because there is no evidence that the guns would fire “by
a single function of the trigger.” Therefore, the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his convictions for the possession and
transfer of five machineguns.
At trial, Agent Cooney testified that the guns “are machine
guns under the federal definition. They shoot automatically more
than one shot without manual loading by a single function of the
trigger.” Agent Cooney further testified that the weapons had been
“intentionally modified” to permit automatic fire.
In our opinion, Husain’s argument, although perhaps clever,
proves too much. Husain essentially argues that his machineguns
fired more automatically than the statute requires. In any event,
as previously set forth, the agent expressly testified that the
machineguns he test-fired would “shoot automatically more than one
1
The witness testified that the gun began firing “before I
could get my finger down to the trigger.”
7
shot without manual loading by a single function of the trigger.”
The jury was free to credit Agent Cooney’s testimony as it saw fit.
See United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 634 n.12 (5th Cir. 1996).
A rational trier of fact could have found that the government
proved the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Husain contends that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from
double jeopardy was violated by his convictions for both possessing
and transferring the same machineguns pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
922(o). In pertinent part, § 922(o) provides that “it shall be
unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.”
Husain argues that the transfer counts “necessarily included
conduct consisting of possession.”
Generally, counts of an indictment are multiplicitous if a
single offense is charged under more than one count of an
indictment. United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 577 (5th Cir.
1999). ”Multiplicity of an indictment must be raised as a defense
pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) to be preserved for appeal.”
United States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
In the body of his brief, Husain initially states that a
double jeopardy claim raised for the first time on appeal is
reviewed for plain error. In a footnote, however, he provides that
8
he objected to the possession and transfer counts in the indictment
as duplicitous and multiplicitous. As such, he states that such an
objection was arguably sufficient to apprise the district court of
his double jeopardy claim.
In his motion to dismiss the indictment, Husain asserted that
“[t]he allegations of possession in Count one and transferring in
Count two are duplicious and multiplicious with respect to the
allegations of possession in Count three and transferring in Count
four of the indictment.” That is the entire argument, i.e., the
possession and transfer counts of February 1996 are duplicitous and
multiplicitous with respect to the possession and transfer counts
of March 1996. This objection clearly is without merit because (1)
the February possession count related to a separate machinegun from
the five machineguns alleged to be possessed in March; and
likewise, the February transfer count related to a machinegun
separate from those alleged to have been transferred in March. We
do not read Husain’s objection before the district court to state
the same argument he now makes (that the possession counts are
duplicitous or multiplicitous with respect to the transfer counts).
We believe his objection failed to sufficiently apprise the
district court of the specific argument Husain makes before us.
Having failed to properly preserve this issue (or show cause for
failing to do so), he may not now challenge his convictions as
multiplicitous. See United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 266 &
9
n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that this Court has consistently
declined to review this argument for plain error).
Husain also argues that his sentences for both the transfer
and the possession counts constitute multiple punishments in
violation of the double jeopardy clause. To determine whether
Congress intended to allow multiple punishments for possessing and
transferring the same machineguns in violation of § 922(o), we
apply the test announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 52 S.Ct. 180 (1932). “[D]ouble jeopardy is not implicated if
each offense at issue involves proof of at least one element not
required of the other.” United States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977,
982 (5th Cir. 1988).
Although Husain did not make this particular objection in the
district court, a complaint with respect to the multiplicity of
sentences may be raised for the first time on appeal. See
Lankford, 196 F.3d at 577. Thus, unlike his multiplicity challenge
to the counts of conviction, we may review his claim of multiple
sentences for plain error. Id.2
To establish plain error, a defendant must show the following:
2
Although the district court ordered all Husain’s sentences
to be served concurrently, the record indicates (and the government
does not dispute) that the court imposed monetary assessments on
each of the separate counts of conviction. Under those
circumstances, we have held that a defendant is not precluded from
raising the claim of multiplicity of sentences for the first time
on appeal. See United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th
Cir. 1991).
10
“(1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affects the
defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Husain argues that his sentences for both transferring and
possessing the same machineguns under § 922(o) violate the double
jeopardy clause because the term “transfer” necessarily includes
“possession.” For purposes of the firearms chapter, Congress
defined “transfer” as including “selling, assigning, pledging,
leasing, loaning, giving away, or otherwise disposing of.” 26
U.S.C. § 5485(j). In the context of illegal possession of
firearms, we have recognized that possession may be either actual
or constructive. United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th
Cir. 1991). “‘Constructive possession’” has been defined as
ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself, or
dominion or control over the premises in which the contraband is
concealed.” Id. at 1085 (emphasis in opinion).3
Although it is clear that transfer of a machinegun involves
proof of an element not required for the offense of possession of
a machinegun, it is certainly arguable that the converse is not
3
In the context of a drug offense, we have looked to the
following dictionary definition of “possess”–-“‘to instate as an
owner . . . to have and hold as property.’” United States v.
Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857 n.7(5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 718 (1984)).
11
true. Cf. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S.Ct.
1668, 1673 (1985) (holding that although the government may obtain
an indictment based on a single act that charges a felon with both
receiving and possessing the same weapon, a defendant could not
suffer two convictions or sentences for those offenses). Indeed,
the government admits that “it is necessary for Husain to possess
the firearms in order to transfer them,” which arguably constitutes
a concession that the offenses do not pass the Blockburger test.
Nonetheless, we are mindful that Husain must show that the error
was “plain or obvious.” United States v. Rios-Quintero, 204 F.3d
214, 219 (5th Cir. 2000). After much research, we have been unable
to find any definitive authority addressing whether transferring
and possessing under § 922(o) constitute separate offenses under
Blockburger.4 We cannot conclude that the error was plain.
Assuming arguendo that the error was plain, as set forth
previously, such error must also affect the defendant’s substantial
4
We have recognized that the Blockburger test is a rule of
statutory construction and is not controlling if Congress has
indicated a contrary intent--the intent to impose cumulative
punishments. See United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1058 (5th
Cir. 1989). Of course, Husain’s convictions for possessing and
transferring are violations of the same subsection of a statute.
As set forth previously, § 922(o) provides that “it shall be
unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.” The
structure of § 922(o) does not indicate to us that Congress
intended to separately or cumulatively punish both transferring and
possessing the same machineguns. Additionally, the punishment for
transferring or possessing under § 922(o) is identical. See §
924(a)(2) (providing that anyone who knowingly violates § 922(o)
“shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both”).
12
rights. In Meshack, we stated that the third prong of the plain
error test generally requires a defendant to show prejudice. 225
F.3d at 577. Prejudice may be shown in the context of a sentencing
challenge if the error resulted in a longer sentence. Id. In that
case, we opined that Meshack arguably could not show a violation of
his substantial rights because he had a lengthier, concurrent
sentence that was not challenged. See id. We further opined that
even assuming his substantial rights were violated, we we would
not exercise our discretion to correct the error because it did not
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. See id. More specifically, we concluded
that the fourth prong of the plain error test was not met because
the defendant could “show no meaningful benefit he would receive
from vacating this sentence.” Id.Similarly, in the instant case, again assuming Husain has
shown plain error, it does not appear that he has shown that his
substantial rights were violated in light of the fact that the
district court sentenced him to a term of seventy-one months on
each of the five separate felony convictions–all to run
concurrently.5 Moreover, assuming Husain has shown that his
substantial rights were violated, as in Meshack, we decline to
exercise our discretion because he has failed to show that vacating
5
The district court also sentenced Husain to a concurrent
twelve-month sentence with respect to his misdemeanor conviction
for failure to keep proper firearms records.
13
two of his five, concurrent 71-month sentences would result in a
meaningful benefit to him. As such, we conclude that this claim
entitles Husain to no relief.
C. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE–WITNESS TAMPERING
Husain argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(3), which provides that:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or
physical force, threatens, or corruptly
persuades another person, or attempts to do
so, or engages in misleading conduct toward
another person, with intent to--
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the
communication to a law enforcement
officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense
or a violation of conditions of
probation, parole, or release pending
judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
(emphasis added).6
6
The district court instructed the jury as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime,
you must be convinced that the Government has
proved each of the following beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First: That the defendant corruptly persuaded or
attempted to corruptly persuade the person named in
the indictment as a witness;
Second: That the defendant acted with the intent to
prevent the communication to a law enforcement
14
Husain argues that there is no evidence that Morgan was a
witness in this case at the time of the offense of witness
tampering. This argument offers Husain no succor. As set forth
above, the statute prohibits, among other things, “corruptly
persuad[ing] another person”-–it does not use the term “witness.”
§ 1512(b) (emphasis added). Also, the statute provides that “an
official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted
at the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1). In light of
the fact that a proceeding need not be instituted at the time of
the offense, it would be illogical to infer a requirement that
there be evidence that the person was a witness at the time of the
offense.
Husain next contends that the “evidence merely revealed that
[he] contacted Ray Morgan and asked him not to say anything to the
ATF about his involvement with machineguns.” There was no proof of
threats, force, bribery, extortion or other means of corrupt
persuasion evidencing his intent to obstruct or interfere with the
administration of justice.
In its charge, the district court provided the following
definition: “To act ``corruptly,’ as that word has been used in
these instructions, means that the government must prove that the
officer or judge of the United States; and
Third: That such information related to the
commission or possible commission of a federal
offense.
15
defendant’s attempts to persuade were motivated by an improper
purpose. It also means to act deliberately for the purpose of
improperly influencing, or obstructing, or interfering with the
administration of justice.” Husain does not take issue with this
instruction on appeal.
At Husain’s trial, Ray Morgan testified that in September of
1998, ATF Agent Kirk Tinker interviewed him regarding firearms and
his relationship with Husain. Later that same day, Husain placed
a telephone call to Morgan. Prior to this phone call, it had been
approximately a year since he had contact with Husain. During this
phone conversation, it became apparent that Husain was under the
impression that the ATF had no evidence against him. Husain
instructed Morgan “not to say anything about his involvement” with
machineguns. Husain also informed Morgan that he had told the ATF
that the firearms in question were defective. After Morgan
informed Husain that he would not discuss the matter with him,
Morgan hung up the phone. Husain called again and reurged Morgan
“not to say anything.” Morgan terminated the call and paged Agent
Tinker. Husain called yet a third time but Morgan’s wife told
Husain that Morgan was not at home.
As the government asserts, the jury had before it evidence
that Morgan knew of Husain’s possession of machineguns and that
Husain knew of an investigation as early as April 11, 1996, when
his home was searched and firearms records were seized. The only
topic Husain broached during the phone call with Morgan in 1998 was
16
his possession and handling of machineguns. The evidence proves
that Husain instructed Morgan not to relate information with
respect to his offense conduct to ATF Agent Tinker. Moreover,
Husain informed Morgan that he had told the ATF that the firearms
were defective when he received them. When viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could believe
that Husain was attempting to corruptly persuade Morgan to
corroborate his story that the guns were defective. Although the
evidence is not overwhelming, we believe it is sufficient to show
that Husain attempted to corruptly persuade Morgan within the
definition given by the district court (i.e., to act deliberately
for the purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing, or
interfering with the administration of justice). Cf. United States
v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1481-82 (5th Cir. 1993) (in the context
of determining whether a wife’s letter to her husband urging him
not to continue to cooperate with authorities constituted
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, this Court opined
that the wife’s letter appeared to be prohibited by § 1512(b)).7
D. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS
Husain next argues that the district court erred in allowing
evidence that he had sold firearms to Abdulhady on prior occasions
7
The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides as an example
of conduct which warrants an enhancement for obstruction of justice
“conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.3(I)).
17
and that Ray Morgan previously had observed him in possession of
machineguns. We review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 196-99
(5th Cir. 2000).
The government responds that the evidence was relevant in that
it demonstrated Husain’s knowledge and his intent to transfer
machineguns as well as his reasons for failing to maintain proper
records. Even assuming for purposes of this appeal that the
admission of the evidence was error, we are convinced that any
error was harmless because (1) the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming with respect to the convictions for possessing and
transferring the machineguns, and (2) the district court did charge
the jury that Husain was not on trial for any act, conduct, or
offense not charged in the indictment. See Richards, 204 F.3d at
203 (explaining that the erroneous admission of evidence requires
reversal only if the evidence had a substantial impact on the
verdict). Husain is not entitled to relief on this claim.
E. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT
Husain contends that the district court erred in failing to
instruct the jury regarding their consideration of Husain’s prior
bad acts. He concedes that he made no objection; therefore, this
issue is raised for the first time on appeal and will be reviewed
for plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
Husain asserts that in United States v. Diaz, this Court held
18
that a district court committed plain error when it failed to give
a similar acts limiting instruction. 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1978).
Husain’s reliance on Diaz is misplaced. In that case, we
determined that the failure of the trial court to sua sponte
provide a limiting instruction regarding the defendant’s
convictions constituted plain error. Here, the complained of
evidence consists of prior unadjudicated acts. Diaz therefore is
not controlling.
This Court has explained that “failure to give limiting
instructions is generally held not to be plain error.” United
States v. Parziale, 947 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1991) (footnote and
internal quotation marks omitted). In Parziale, a case involving
the admission of prior bad acts, we concluded that there was no
plain error because the trial court had instructed the jury on the
burden of proof, explained the essential elements of each count,
and had emphasized that the “defendant is not on trial for any act
or conduct or offense not alleged in the indictment.” Id.Likewise, in the instant case, the district court provided
Husain’s jury with instructions very similar to those in Parziale.8
Husain therefore has not demonstrated that the district court
8
The district court charged Husain’s jury with respect to
the burden of proof and the elements of the counts. The court also
expressly instructed the jury as follows: “You are here to decide
whether the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. The defendant is
not on trial for any act, conduct, or offense not alleged in the
Indictment.”
19
committed plain error in failing to provide a limiting instruction
with respect to his prior bad acts.
F. NUMBER OF FIREARMS
Husain next contends that, at sentencing, the district court
erred in determining that his conduct involved a total of 27
firearms. The sentencing guidelines provide that if the offense
involves anywhere from 25 to 49 firearms, increase the offense
level by 5. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(E). We review a sentencing
judge’s application of the guidelines de novo and accept findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Rome,
207 F.3d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 2000).
The district court arrived at the figure of 27 based on the
following evidence at trial:
* in 1993, Ray Morgan allegedly observed Husain with 3
fully automatic firearms
* in 1994, Husain delivered 6 automatic firearms to Ray
Morgan
* 12 firearms were seized from Husain in connection with
his failure to maintain proper records
* 6 automatic firearms were seized from codefendant
Abdulhady as a result of the investigation
Husain objected to this determination in the presentence
report (PSR). Citing the record, he makes the following arguments
challenging the factual finding:
Even if Ray Morgan is believed, there is
no evidence that the six firearms, which are
the subject of this prosecution, are different
20
from those that were exhibited to Morgan some
five years earlier. In fact, it may well be
that they were the very same guns that he sold
to Husain. Nor is it evident that the three
firearms possessed in 1993 were different from
those allegedly brought to Morgan’s house in
1994. Moreover, Morgan testified that he
test-fired only one of the six guns that
Husain brought to him, so there is no evidence
that the other eight were fully automatic
(i.e., machineguns).
If a district court has relied on information in a PSR, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the information is
unreliable or untrue. Rome, 207 F.3d at 254. If a defendant
proffers no rebuttal evidence, the facts contained in the PSR may
be adopted without further inquiry so long as there is an adequate
evidentiary basis. Id.Here, the district court relied on evidence from the trial and
the PSR, e.g., testimony of codefendant Abdulhady and witness Ray
Morgan. Such testimony constitutes an adequate evidentiary basis
for the district court’s determination. Thus, Husain had the
burden of rebutting such evidence.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing provides that Husain
made the same challenges to the finding of 27 firearms that are
quoted above. When Husain objected that the government had not
carried its burden of showing that there were actually 27 different
firearms, the district court inquired as follows: “Tell me what you
have, that [shows] they are different.” In response, counsel
stated that it was the government’s burden to adduce evidence that
21
distinguishes the weapons.
The court overruled Husain’s objections, ruling as follows:
And with respect to speculation about
whether or not the firearms that were shown
later were duplicates of firearms that were
part of the offense conduct related to the
crime in this case, the Court finds that a
preponderance of the evidence supports the
idea that these were separate weapons, given
the amount of time between each of the events
listed in separately identified paragraphs,
and these separately identified events in
terms of the weapons that were delivered and
were shown to persons who testified in this
case, in that the total number of 27
accurately reflects the number of weapons that
were involved in this case and that were
supported by the preponderance of the evidence
in this case.
Husain argued before the district court (and now) that the
government had the burden of showing that there were 27 firearms.
He is correct to the extent that the government had the initial
burden of making such a showing. However, as set forth previously,
once the district court made a finding based on an adequate
evidentiary basis, it became Husain’s burden to come forth and
rebut it. The sentencing transcript indicates he failed to do so
because he relied on his mistaken belief that the government had
failed to shoulder its burden. Husain has not shown that the
district court clearly erred in crediting the testimony and
concluding that there were 27 firearms.
H. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Husain argues that the district court erred in denying him a
reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
22
We have reviewed a district court’s refusal to credit acceptance of
responsibility under three different (at least semantically)
standards: clear error, without foundation, and with great
deference. See United States v. Siebe, 58 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.
1995). There appears to be no practical difference among them,
however. Id. In any event, the sentencing guidelines provide that
the “sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” Id.; U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
(commentary).
Husain points to the fact that at the conclusion of the first
day of trial, he pleaded guilty to count five, which alleged
failure to keep proper records with respect to the firearms. Of
course, this ignores the fact that he put the government to its
burden of proof on the remaining counts of the indictment.
Although the “fact that a defendant may exercise his right to a
trial by jury is not a reason for denying the two points, . . . the
fact that a defendant has never admitted to violating the law is
sufficient reason.” Siebe, 58 F.3d at 163. In his brief before
this Court, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his convictions for possessing and transferring
machineguns. Such an argument indicates that he has not accepted
responsibility for the offense conduct. See United States v.
Becerra, 155 F.3d 740, 758 (5th Cir. 1998)(indicating that
defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of
23
responsibility, despite whatever assistance he may have provided to
government pre- and post-trial, inasmuch as defendant's counsel
contended in closing argument that defendant was innocent and
defendant challenged sufficiency of evidence on direct appeal).
The probation officer noted in the addendum to the PSR that
Husain had yet to accept responsibility for the charged offenses,
and the district court adopted the factual findings in the PSR.
Moreover, the district court expressly found that Husain committed
obstruction of justice. Husain has not shown that this is one of
those "extraordinary cases" in which adjustments for both
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 would be appropriate. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 942 F.2d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1991).
Under these circumstances, Husain, who had the burden of
establishing that he was entitled to the reduction, has not
demonstrated that the district court erred in denying him a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
G. Whether Additional Firearms Affected Offense Level
Finally, Husain asserts that the district court erroneously
sustained the following objection by the government at sentencing:
“The United States objects to the failure of the report to reflect
the additional machine guns that were testified about as having
been exchanged between the defendant and [codefendant Abdulhady].”
The Court then responded that it:
24
believe[d] that the United States is right on
that issue in that those additional firearms
should have been included in the count, but
even adding 18 to that 27, that still brings
it to a total of [45], which doesn’t change
the number of points that would be
attributable to that number of firearms under
[the guideline], since he was already above 25
and Subsection E is 25 to 49, which adds five
points to the offense level, he’s still within
that same range, so it doesn’t have any
ultimate impact on the offense level, but it
is information that I believe should have been
properly included within the report.
As set forth previously, the guideline in question provides
that if the offense involved between 25 and 49 firearms, increase
the offense level by 5. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(E). The PSR
provided that there were 27 firearms involved and the government
objected, arguing that the evidence demonstrated that an additional
18 firearms were involved. As quoted above, Judge Gilmore
sustained the objection, but noted that adding 18 firearms would
bring the amount to 45, which does not affect the offense level.
As previously determined, Husain has not shown the district
court clearly erred in finding that 27 firearms were involved.
Accordingly, because 18 additional firearms makes no difference in
his offense level, any error would be harmless. See United States
v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1158 n.27 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
any error with respect to increase in offense level for possession
of firearms would be harmless because the guideline range remained
25
the same).9
For the above reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
9
We also reject Husain’s argument that the district court
erred in denying his motion for new trial without a hearing. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse her considerable
discretion for the following reasons: (1) the “newly discovered
evidence” of a memo was not material; (2) an apparent lack of due
diligence with respect to obtaining C.E. Anderson’s report; and (3)
the impeachment evidence probably would not have produced an
acquittal. See United States v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 180, 183 (5th
Cir. 1997) (discussing standard for review of motion for new
trial).
26