Fleetwood Ent Inc v. Gaskamp

REVISED FEBRUARY 19, 2002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-20334
FLEETWOOD ENTERPRISES, INC.,
FLEETWOOD HOMES OF MISSISSIPPI, INC.,
AND GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIAM P. GASKAMP, JR., individually, and
as next friends for William P. Gaskamp, III,
Derek S. Gaskamp and Brooke A. Gaskamp, Minors;
SHANNON GASKAMP,individually, and as next
friends for William P. Gaskamp III, Derek S.
Gascamp and Brooke A. Gaskamp, Minors
Defendants-Appellants.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
--------------------
January 24, 2002
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from a district court order compelling
arbitration of all of the claims brought by plaintiffs in a
Mississippi state court lawsuit. The plaintiffs-appellants, the
1
Gaskamps,1 assert on appeal that the district court erred in
compelling arbitration of the claims of the Gaskamp children
because the children were not parties to the arbitration agreement
between the Gaskamp parents and the defendants-appellees Fleetwood
Enterprises, Inc. and Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc.
(collectively, “Fleetwood”), and Georgia-Pacific Corp. (“Georgia-
Pacific”). They also assert that the district court erred in
compelling arbitration of the parents’ claims because the
arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable. We reverse
in part and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 1997, the Gaskamp parents negotiated with a sales
representative for Manufactured Bargains the purchase of a mobile
home manufactured by Fleetwood. They made a down payment of $2,500
on the home, gave Manufactured Bargains some household items, and
traded in their old mobile home; in exchange, Manufactured Bargains
delivered and installed the new Fleetwood home on the Gaskamp
parents’ property. The Gaskamps moved into the new mobile home,
and remained there while Manufactured Homes arranged for financing
of the home. The following month, Manufactured Homes informed the
Gaskamp parents that it had arranged financing for the mobile home
through Bombardier Capital, Inc. (“Bombardier”). To obtain the
1
Hereinafter, William P. Gaskamp, Jr. and Shannon Gaskamp are referred
to, collectively, as “the Gaskamp parents;” William P. Gaskamp, III, Derek S.
Gaskamp, and Brooke A. Gaskamp are referred to as “the Gaskamp children.” All
members of the Gaskamp family are collectively referred to as “the Gaskamps.”
2
financing and keep the new home, the Gaskamp parents were asked to
make an additional down payment of $12,500.00, and to sign some
paperwork. The Gaskamp parents signed documentation on two
separate occasions, and made the payment. The documents signed
included an “Arbitration Provision.”2
After moving into the Fleetwood home, the Gaskamps began
experiencing health problems including throat and eye irritation,
runny nose, and respiratory problems. In September 1999, Brooke
Gaskamp was hospitalized as a result of breathing difficulties.
She received a diagnosis of reactive airway disease as a result of
exposure to formaldehyde. Two months later, the Texas Department
of Health, Toxic Substances Division, tested the new mobile home,
and found elevated levels of formaldehyde. Shortly thereafter, the
Gaskamps moved out of the mobile home.
2
The Arbitration Provision provides, in relevant part:
“The parties to the Retail Installment Contract or Cash Sale Contract
agree that any and all controversies or claims arising out of, or in any way
relating to, the Retail Installment Contract or Cash Sale Contract or the
negotiation, purchase, financing, installation, ownership, occupancy,
habitation, manufacture, warranties (express or implied), repair or
sale/disposition of the home which is the subject of the Retail Installment
Contract or Cash Sale Contract, whether those claims arise from or concern
contract, warranty, statutory, property or common law, will be settled solely
by means of final and binding arbitration before a three-judge panel of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) in accordance with the rules and
procedures of the AAA....
The parties agree that this Arbitration Provision inures to the benefit
of, and is intended to be for the benefit of, the manufacturer of the home
which is the subject of the Retail Installment Contract or Cash Sale Contract
as fully as if the manufacturer was a signatory to the Retail Installment
Contract or Cash Sale Contract.
The parties agree that this Arbitration Provision inures to the benefit
of, and is intended to be for the benefit of, any lender or mortgagee (or
assigns) who provides financing for the purchase of the home...
THE PARTIES KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A
JURY TRIAL.”
3
In June 2000, the Gaskamp parents brought suit in Mississippi
state court against the manufacturer of the home, Fleetwood; the
manufacturer of particle board contained in the home, Georgia
Pacific; the seller, Manufactured Bargains; and the financing
institution, Bombardier. The Gaskamp parents brought the suit
individually and as next friends of the Gaskamp children, alleging
a variety of claims for personal injuries resulting from the
exposure to formaldehyde.3
In December 2000, two of the defendants in the Mississippi
lawsuit, Fleetwood and Georgia-Pacific, filed a Complaint to Compel
3
In summary, the claims listed in the complaint were as follows:
First, strict liability claims against Fleetwood, Georgia-Pacific, and
Manufactured Bargains for defective design and manufacture of the home.
Second, claims for negligence in the design, manufacture, financing, and
marketing of the home.
Third, claims for fraud, on the grounds that defendants knowingly and
intentionally concealed the dangers of formaldehyde poisoning, in violation of
statutory requirements.
Fourth, claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the
grounds that the defendants intentionally engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct that caused distress and damages to all the plaintiffs.
Fifth, claims for negligent misrepresentation, on the grounds that
defendants supplied false information on which the plaintiffs relied in
deciding to purchase and occupy the home, and that the defendants’ withholding
of the information about the formaldehyde caused injuries to the plaintiffs.
Sixth, claims for constructive fraud, in that the defendants made
material misrepresentations that the home was habitable.
Seventh, claims for trespass to realty, on the grounds that defendants
designed and constructed the home in a manner that permitted the invasion of
unacceptably high levels of formaldehyde into the Gaskamps’ property.
Eighth, claims for negligence under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, on
the basis that the presence of formaldehyde in the home is not the sort of
event that occurs in the absence of negligence.
Ninth, a claim for misrepresentation, on the grounds that the defendants
materially misrepresented the character and quality of the home as fit for
human habitation via advertising and labeling, thereby causing injuries to the
plaintiffs.
Tenth, plaintiffs allege that various defendants are responsible for
additional torts such as negligent testing, liability to third persons for
negligent performance of an undertaking, misrepresentation and false
advertising, and “violations of the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 324A.”
4
Arbitration against the Gaskamps in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. The Gaskamps responded
with a motion to dismiss. The Gaskamp parents subsequently settled
their claims against Bombardier in the Mississippi state court
lawsuit, and filed a motion to dismiss all of their individual
claims in the Mississippi state court lawsuit in February 2001.
After the Gaskamps’ settlement with Bombardier, Fleetwood and
Georgia-Pacific filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and for
Expedited Hearing. On February 20, 2001, the district court
ordered all of the Gaskamps’ claims to arbitration, and stayed all
proceedings in both the district court and the Mississippi state
court (including the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the claims of
the Gaskamp parents). In its Order Compelling Arbitration and
Staying State and Federal Cases, the district court explained,
without citing authority, that the children must arbitrate with
their parents because “[u]nlike a guest who happened to be in a
mobile home when he was hurt, the children are permanent residents
whose presence and use is wholly derivative of the parents’ use of
the mobile home.”
On appeal, the Gaskamps make two main arguments. First, they
assert that the district court erred in compelling arbitration of
the Gaskamp children’s claims because they were not parties to the
arbitration agreement or third-party beneficiaries thereof.
5
Second, they argue that the arbitration provision is procedurally
unconscionable.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion to
compel arbitration. See Webb v. Investacorp, 89 F.3d 252, 257(5th
Cir. 1996). In adjudicating a motion to compel arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act, courts begin by determining whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. See Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105
S. Ct. 3346, 3353-54 (1985); Folse v. Richard Wolf Medical
Instruments Corp., 56 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1995). This
determination is generally made on the basis of “ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924
(1995). Next, the Court must determine "whether legal constraints
external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of
those claims." Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at
3355; see also Folse, 56 F.3d at 605. In the present case, the
6
parties agree that Texas state law governs matters that are not
addressed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.4
II. The Claims of the Gaskamp Children
As stated earlier, the first step in evaluating a motion to
compel arbitration is to determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate. This determination depends on two considerations: (1)
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the
parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the
scope of that arbitration agreement. Webb, 89 F.3d at 258. In
determining whether the dispute falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement, “ambiguities... [are] resolved in favor of
arbitration.” Volt Info. Serv., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989). However, this
federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the
determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate
between the parties; instead “[o]rdinary contract principles
determine who is bound.” Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc., v. NCR Corp., 29
F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 478
(“[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have
4
In addition, under Texas choice of law rules “the law of the state
with the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue
will be applied to resolve that issue.” Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, 665 S.W.2d
414, 421 (Tex. 1984). In the present case, the state with the most significant
relationship to the arbitration clause is Texas. The Gaskamp parents
purchased the home in Texas and signed the sale contract and arbitration
clause in Texas, and the arbitration clause itself provides that Harris
County, Texas, is the forum.
7
not agreed to do so.”); EEOC v. Waffle House, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 489,
at *24-*25 (U.S. Jan 15, 2002)(citations omitted)(“Because the FAA
is ‘at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private
contractual arrangements,’... we look first to whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals.... It
goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”);
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 1994)(“The federal
policy [favoring arbitration], however, does not extend to
situations in which the identity of the parties who have agreed to
arbitrate is unclear.”).5
In the present case, the parties agree that the dispute in
question, i.e. the set of claims for personal injury resulting from
use of the mobile home, falls within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, which is very broad. However, the parties disagree with
regard to the first consideration, namely, whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate between the parties. The Gaskamps argue
that, although there is an arbitration agreement between the
5
The federal policy favoring arbitration does not extend to a
determination of who is bound because, as stated by the Supreme Court, the
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is “to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 (1967); see
also Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625-26,
105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353(1985)(citation omitted)(“The preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which
parties had entered.”).
8
Gaskamp parents and the appellees,6 there is no such agreement
between the Gaskamp children and the appellees. The issue in
this case is, then, not what claims are arbitrable, but rather who
must arbitrate. We apply Texas law to determine whether the
Gaskamp children are required to arbitrate.
The Gaskamp children did not personally sign the arbitration
agreement, and there is no provision in the agreement expressly
stating that the Gaskamp parents, on behalf of their children,
agreed to submit the children’s claims to arbitration.
Nonetheless, the appellees argue that because the Gaskamp children
are minors, their parents were empowered to make decisions of
substantial legal significance concerning the minors.
Additionally, the appellees contend that under Texas law, non-
signatory family members who bring claims intertwined with a
signatory family member’s claims are bound to arbitrate. Because
the Gaskamp children are minors and because they joined their
parents in the Mississippi state court suit, appellees argue, the
arbitration agreement should be considered binding on the Gaskamp
children.
6
It is not entirely clear whether the arbitration agreement covers
Georgia-Pacific. The agreement states that it “inures to the benefit of the
manufacturer” but is not clear on whether it covers manufacturers of component
parts of the mobile home. However, because the Gaskamps have not raised the
issue of whether Georgia-Pacific is protected by the agreement, they have
waived it. See Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 114 F.3d 557,
561 (5th Cir. 1997).
9
To determine whether the Gaskamp children are bound by the
arbitration agreement under Texas contract law, we apply the law as
interpreted by the state’s highest court, in this case, the Texas
Supreme Court. See Ladue v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 920 F.2d 272,
274 (5th Cir. 1991). Texas courts have found non-signatories
bound to arbitration agreements in only two situations: first,
where the non-signatory sued on the contract; and second, where the
non-signatory was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. The
present case does not fit either model.
In In re First Merit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001), the
Texas Supreme Court held that the owners of a mobile home, who had
received the home as a gift from their parents and were non-
signatories to the arbitration agreement between the seller and the
parents, were bound by the agreement. The Court specifically
grounded its decision on the fact that the donees had sued on the
basis of the contract: “a litigant who sues based on a contract
subjects him or herself to the contract's terms. Here, the
Alvarezes fully joined the de los Santoses' contract claims...
Thus, by suing FirstMerit based on the de los Santoses' installment
contract, the Alvarezes subjected themselves to the contract's
terms, including the Arbitration Addendum.” Id. at 755-56.
Indeed, the claims made by the Alvarezes and de los Santoses in
First Merit Bank included traditional contract claims: breach of
contract, revocation of acceptance, and breach of warranty. In
10
Southwest Tex. Pathology Assocs., L.L.P. v. Roosth, an intermediate
appellate court refused to bind a nonsignatory wife to arbitration
of claims against her husband’s employer, even though the husband’s
claims were subject to arbitration. 27 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. App.
San Antonio 2000)(“[A] nonsignatory can only be bound by the terms
of an arbitration provision in an agreement if the nonsignatory is
asserting claims that require reliance on the terms of the written
agreement containing the arbitration provision.”).7 In the present
case, while the Gaskamp children fully joined the Gaskamp parents’
claims in the Mississippi state court lawsuit, these claims were
not contractual, but rather tort claims. At no point have the
Gaskamp children attempted to enforce the contract, or sue on the
basis of any warranties contained in the contract; the Gaskamps’
complaint in state court does not rely at all on the terms of any
agreement with the state court defendants. Thus, it cannot be said
that the children sued on the contract, thereby subjecting
themselves to the arbitration agreement.
Intermediate appellate courts in Texas have also held that non-
signatories are bound by arbitration agreements where the non-
7
There are additional cases in which wives were found not to be bound by
arbitration agreements signed by their husbands. In In re Conseco Fin.
Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App. Waco 2000), the court held that in the absence
of a theory that would bind a non-signatory wife to her husband’s contract,
she could not be bound to arbitrate. And in another case, a court held that a
wife was not required to arbitrate her claim for loss of consortium even
though it was derivative of the wrongful termination claim of her husband, who
was subject to arbitration under his employment contract. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Longoria, 783 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.
Corpus Christi 1990).
11
signatories are third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. See In
re Rangel, 45 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. App. Waco, 2001); Nationwide of
Bryan, Inc. v. Dyer, 969 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. App. Austin 1998).
Under Texas law, parties are presumed to be contracting for
themselves only; as stated by the Texas Supreme Court, “[a] court
will not create a third-party beneficiary contract by
implication.... The intention to contract or confer a direct
benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or
enforcement by the third party must be denied.” MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. Texas Utilities Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d
7647, 651 (Tex. 1999); see also MJR Corp. v. B&B Vending Co., 760
S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tex. App. Dallas 1988). Thus, “the fact that a
person is directly affected by the parties’ conduct, or that he
‘may have a substantial interest in a contract’s enforcement, does
not make him a third-party beneficiary.’” Loyd v. Eco Resources,
Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 134 (Tex. App. Houston (14th Dist.)
1997)(citing Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allred Fairbanks Bank,
678 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. App. Houston (14th Dist.)). In other
words, the intent to make someone a third-party beneficiary must be
clearly written or evidenced in the contract. Otherwise, Texas
will not recognize that person as a third-party beneficiary. In
the present case, the contract does not mention the Gaskamp
children at all and there is no indication in the contract that it
is designed to benefit anyone other than the Gaskamp parents, who
12
purchased the home. Any intention to confer a direct benefit on
the children is far from being “clearly and fully spelled out.”
And the fact that the children lived in the home for some period of
time renders them only incidental beneficiaries, not third-party
beneficiaries. Thus, the Gaskamp children are not third-party
beneficiaries of their parents’ contract under Texas law.
The parties have not explicitly asserted any additional basis
on which a non-signatory could be bound to arbitrate. The only
potential argument at which the appellees hinted is that the fact
that the Gaskamp children are minors somehow binds them to their
parents’ agreements to arbitrate. However, there is no basis in
existing Texas law for such an argument, and we should not create
such a rule in this case. When the state's highest court has not
yet spoken on an issue, as in this case, we must determine, to the
best of our ability, how that court would rule if the issue were
before it. See Ladue, 920 F.2d at 274. There is no reason to
think that the Texas Supreme Court would adopt a rule requiring
non-signatory children to arbitrate on the basis of their parents’
arbitration agreement in the absence of third-party beneficiary
status or an attempt by the child to enforce the contract. To the
contrary, several indicators suggest that the Texas Supreme Court
would refuse to adopt such a rule. First, the language of Texas
decisions that have addressed the question of when non-signatories
are bound to arbitrate is restrictive: the decisions do not even
13
mention the possibility of additional bases for binding non-
signatories to arbitration. Second, other jurisdictions that have
addressed the question of when non-signatories are bound have only
gone a little further than Texas, holding that there are five
theories under “common law principles of contract and agency law"
that provide a basis "for binding nonsignatories to arbitration
agreements: 1) incorporation by references; 2) assumption; 3)
agency; 4) veil piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel." Thomson-
CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1995). See also Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435,
440-43 (3d Cir. 1999); International Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen
Maschinen & Anlagen, 206 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2000); Amoco
Transport Co. v. Bugsier Reederei & Bergungs, A.G. (In re Oil Spill
by the "Amoco Cadiz" ), 659 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1981);
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 356 (1st Cir. 1994); In re Hydro-
Action, Inc., 266 B.R. 638, 645 (U.S. Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Tex.
2001). None of these theories would require children to arbitrate
simply because they are minors and their claims are related to
those of their parents. If the Texas Supreme Court were to add to
the circumstances Texas has recognized so far for binding non-
signatories, it is unlikely that it would go beyond the theories
listed above. Finally, even outside the context of arbitration
agreements, Texas law does not ordinarily bind children to the
contracts their parents sign. See, e.g., Stern v. Wonzer, 846
14
S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. App. Houston (1st Dist.)1993)(holding that
parents’ contract with a law firm for legal representation did not
bind their child with respect to her claims arising from the same
incident, and noting that “there is a distinction between having
authority to contract for legal representation of a child and
actually exercising that authority.”). In sum, because the Gaskamp
children are not signatories to the sales contract, are not third-
party beneficiaries of the agreement or contract, and are not suing
on the basis of the contract, they are not bound by the arbitration
agreement signed by their parents.
III. Procedural Unconscionability
The Gaskamps raise a defense to arbitration, arguing that the
arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable. The Gaskamps
argue that Paul and Shannon Gaskamp were improperly told that the
arbitration agreement was “standard documentation” that they were
required to sign to keep living in the home. Consequently, they
claim that they were given no meaningful choice as to acceptance of
the arbitration agreement. Moreover, they assert that no
explanation of the document was given to them, and that they did
not have an opportunity to read or negotiate the agreement’s terms.
They also point out that they were unsophisticated with respect to
business and legal matters, whereas the appellees are very
experienced in contract negotiations. Thus, the Gaskamps argue,
there is evidence of Manufactured Bargains’ “overreaching or sharp
15
practices combined with the buyer’s ignorance or inexperience,”
which make the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable.
American Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 934 F. Supp. 839,
844 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
The party contesting the contractual arbitration provision has
the burden to show procedural unconscionability. Smith v. H.E.
Butt Grocery Co., 18 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex.App. Beaumont 2000, pet.
denied) (citing In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, 987 S.W.2d 571, 573
(Tex. 1999)). The Gaskamps have not met their burden here. The
only evidence the Gaskamps have presented is in the form of their
allegations of misrepresentations and pressure to sign the
documents quickly. Such allegations are insufficient to establish
unconscionability. And while there may be imbalance in the
relative sophistication of the parties, this imbalance is
insufficient on its own to render the agreement unconscionable.
See Rangel, 45 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App. Waco 2001) (holding that an
agreement was not unconscionable even though one of the parties had
never attended school, was 75, hard of hearing, and had difficulty
reading). The only cases under Texas law in which an agreement was
found procedurally unconscionable involve situations in which one
of the parties appears to have been incapable of understanding the
agreement. See In re Turner Bros. Trucking Co., 8 S.W.3d 370 (Tex.
App. Texarkana 1999)(finding an agreement was procedurally
unconscionable where one of the parties was functionally
16
illiterate, nobody explained the agreement to him, and the person
who gave him the agreement to sign did not understand the
agreement); Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937
(S.D. Tex. 2001)(finding procedural unconscionability where the
plaintiffs did not speak English and the agreement was not
translated or explained to them).
CONCLUSION
The Arbitration Provision was not procedurally unconscionable
and the Gaskamp parents have not raised any valid defenses to
arbitration of their own claims, so as signatories they are bound
to arbitrate all of their claims for fraud and negligence.
However, because the Gaskamp children are not signatories to the
contract or third-party beneficiaries thereof, and because they
have not sought to enforce the contract, the children cannot be
required to arbitrate. The district court’s order compelling
arbitration and staying state and federal cases is therefore
REVERSED with regard to the Gaskamp children’s claims, and AFFIRMED
with regard to the claims of the Gaskamp parents.
17