Bennett v. Allstate Ins Company

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 95-30970
Summary Calendar
_______________________
EDWARD L. BENNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(94-CV-2755)
_________________________________________________________________
January 16, 1996
Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Edward L. Bennett (“Bennett”) appeals the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his insurer, Allstate
Insurance Company (“Allstate”), on Bennett’s claims that Allstate
breached its insurance agreement with him, failing to pay him the
full amount of his uninsured motorists (“UM”) coverage. After
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bennett, this
court affirms.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
BACKGROUND
In October of 1989, Bennett obtained an automobile
liability insurance policy through Allstate that provided liability
limits of $25,000/$50,000/$25,000 and UM limits of $10,000/$20,000.
At Bennett’s request, the couple's liability coverage was increased
as of April 11, 1990 to $100,000/$300,000/$100,000. However, less
than one month later, Bennett’s wife, Ms. Handy-Bennett, signed her
husband’s name to a form entitled “Uninsured Motorist Insurance
Selection of Coverages and Limits” (“UM Form”). This form provided
the Bennetts with three options: option 1 allowed the insured to
choose UM limits equal to the policy’s liability limits; option 2,
to choose UM limits below the corresponding liability limits; and
option 3, to choose no UM coverage at all. The UM Form signed by
Bennett’s wife selected option 2 and specified that the UM limits
were to be $10,000/$20,000.1
Bennett was later involved in a serious automobile
accident with a motorist who carried an insurance policy with a
$10,000 limit on liability coverage. After being paid $10,000 from
the motorist’s insurance, Bennett sought to supplement his recovery
by collecting $100,000 in UM coverage from Allstate. Because Mrs.
Handy-Bennett had signed the UM Form, however, Allstate paid
Bennett what it considered to be the applicable limits of his UM
coverage, $10,000.
1
Specifically, a typewritten “X” was placed in the box
next to option 2 and the UM limits were typewritten on the UM Form
as well.
2
Because Bennett contends that the applicable coverage was
$100,000, he filed suit to collect the $90,000 balance. After the
parties conducted discovery, the district court granted Allstate
summary judgment against all of Bennett’s claims.
DISCUSSION
This court reviews the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, employing the same criteria used in that court.
Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir.
1995). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Factual
questions and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272
(5th Cir. 1994).
Although Rule 56(c) requires the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, a
dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmovant. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). If the moving party
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then
the nonmovant is burdened with establishing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
3
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). This
burden requires the nonmovant to do more than merely raise some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1355.
As discussed earlier, Bennett alleges that his applicable
UM limit is $100,000, not $10,000 as Allstate contends. In
general, in Louisiana, Allstate and other automobile insurers must
provide UM coverage equal to or greater than the liability limits
provided for in the policy, unless the insured specifically rejects
such coverage or selects lower limits in writing. See La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22:1406D (West 1995). The policy rationale underlying
this legislation is to encourage sufficient UM coverage so that
victims of automobile accidents like Bennett will be fully insured.
See, e.g., Washington v. Savoie, 634 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (La. 1994).
Interpreting this legislation, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has delineated an acceptable method by which an insured can
either reject UM coverage or select a lower limit. Specifically,
when an insured selects lower UM limits, the Louisiana statute
imposes three requirements for this selection to be valid: (1) the
insured must be informed of his options in a way that allows him to
make a meaningful choice among these options;2 (2) the insured’s
selection must be clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable; and (3) any
waiver of UM coverage must be in writing and signed by either the
2
As discussed earlier, the three options are to have UM
coverage equal to the liability limits in the policy; to have UM
coverage that is less than the liability limits; or to have no UM
coverage whatsoever. See, e.g., Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
609 So. 2d 195, 198 (La. 1992).
4
insured or his authorized representative. See, e.g., Henson v.
Safeco Ins. Cos., 585 So. 2d 534, 538 (La. 1991); Giroir v.
Theriot, 513 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. 1987). When such a UM
selection is contested, the insurance company has the burden of
establishing the waiver’s validity. See Henson, 585 So. 2d at 538;
Tugwell, 609 So. 2d at 197;
As the district court concluded, the UM Form in the
present case is valid and comports with all requirements of
Louisiana law. After all, the UM Form described UM coverage and
gave the Bennetts an opportunity to make a meaningful choice from
the three statutory options. The UM Form also clearly marked
option 2, providing for UM coverage of $10,000/$20,000, less than
the policy’s general liability limits. Furthermore, it was dated
and signed by Bennett’s wife in his name.3 For all these reasons,
it validly modified Bennett’s UM coverage to select the lower limit
of $10,000/$20,000.4
Since Bennett was entitled to recover only $10,000 in UM
coverage from Allstate, the district court properly concluded that
Allstate has already satisfied its obligations to Bennett under
their insurance agreement by tendering that amount to him.
3
Ms. Handy-Bennett signed her husband’s name to the UM
Form. She admits that the signature on the UM Form is hers.
4
Bennett’s argument that the UM Form is somehow invalid
because his wife never intended to sign such an agreement is
specious. Bennett has no evidence whatsoever to challenge the fact
that his wife signed the UM Form and, as a result, also attested to
reading it. Bennett cannot survive summary judgment merely by
speculating or raising some metaphysical doubt about the legitimacy
of the UM Form. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1355.
5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the
district court's grant of summary judgment to Allstate against
Bennett’s claims.
6